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
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
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A SERIOUS DRAMA
OF MODERN HISTORY.

How Danish Slesvig was lost:

"Madness, Krieger, to let go the
Conference upon a Dividing Line."
Andra.

A peep behind the veiled Scenes of Diplomacy,
and a warning,




BY

FREDRIK BAJER. (13 2 13 ed)

With Map of the District, showing roughly two of the disputed
Boundary lines.

TRANSLATED BY P. H. PECKOVER.



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DRAMATIS PERSONÆ.

AUSTRIAN DELEGATES :—

- COUNT R. APPONYI, Ambassador in London. Age 52.
- M. L. BIEGELEBEN. Age 52.

DANISH DELEGATES :—

- G. F. QUADE, Minister of Foreign Affairs from January 8th to July 11th, 1864. (Whilst he was in London the Foreign Office was conducted by D. G. Monrad, President of Council and Minister of Finance.) Age 51.
- T. BILLE, Ambassador in London since 1860. Age 45.
- A. F. KRIEGER, Member of the Landsting (Ex-Minister.) Age 47.

FRENCH DELEGATE :—

- PRINCE H. G. B. A. LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE. Age 41.

GERMAN CONFEDERATION DELEGATE :—

- BARON F. F. BEUST. Age 55.

ENGLISH DELEGATES :—

- EARL JOHN RUSSELL, Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Conference. Age 72.
- EARL G. W. F. V. CLARENDON, staunch friend of Peace, delegate at the Conference of Paris, 1856, after the Crimean War; member of Palmerston's Ministry since March, 1864. Age 64.

PRUSSIAN DELEGATES :—

- COUNT A. BERNSTORFF, Ambassador in London since September, 1862; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1861-62. Age 55.
- H. L. BALAN, Ambassador in Copenhagen 1859-63, afterwards in Brussels. Age 52.

RUSSIAN DELEGATE :—

- BARON E. P. BRUNNOW, Ambassador in London. Age 67.

SWEDEN AND NORWAY DELEGATE :—

- COUNT C. WACHTMEISTER, formerly (1858-61) Envoy in Copenhagen, now in London. Age 41.

PROTOCOL SECRETARY :—WILLIAM STUART.



PROLOGUE.

THE SITUATION AT THE OPENING OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE, APRIL 20TH, 1864.

“There goes Norway’s Kingdom out of thy hand, King Olaf,” said Einar Tambeskaelver, at the battle of Svoldr, in the year 1000, as his bowstring snapped.

We cannot so exactly fix the moment when the pearl of Danish Slesvig fell from Denmark’s crown, but it can hardly be disputed that it was in connection with the London Conference of 1864.

That Conference opened on April 20th, two days after the fortification of Dybbol was taken by the Prussians, who were threatening Als, and the whole of Denmark; and our Fatherland had little ground for expecting help from any quarter. Its national debt, by reason of the war with two great Powers, had gone up 35,000,000 kro., between November 16th, 1863, and March, 1864. Such was the situation when the three Danish delegates met in London five from the hostile Powers, Prussia, Austria, and the German Confederation, and five from the Neutral Powers.

To avoid misrepresentation, each speech is copied as nearly as possible from the official Protocols—giving only what is in close connection with Danish Slesvig. The delegates are introduced as speaking.

The letters G. B. indicate British delegates; A., Austrian; D., Danish; F., French; G. C., German Confederation; P., Prussian; R., Russian; and S. N., Swedish-Norse.

M238349



EARL RUSSELL.

BORN 1792.

DIED 1878.

HOW DANISH SLESVIG WAS LOST.

At the five meetings (April 25, May 4, 9, 12 and 17), the negotiations dealt with the Armistice (a month from May 12, afterwards prolonged to June 25th), the Treaty of London, &c. The idea of Partition of Slesvig came forward first in

ACT I.

The Meeting of May 28th,

and was thus introduced by the President :

(G.B.) *Lord John Russell*. For a series of years the German population of the German Confederation have felt a lively sympathy for their brethren who are subjects of the King of Denmark. The Danes, on their part, are inspired with love of independence and a desire to uphold their ancient monarchy. These sentiments on the part of the two parties involved, call for the attention of Europe.

In order to prevent future strife and to satisfy Germany, it would in our opinion be necessary completely to separate Holstein, Lauenburg, and the southern portion of Slesvig, from the Danish monarchy.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. After having studied the causes of the present conflict, my Government becomes more and more convinced that they have their origin in the unfortunate way in which the various nationalities, comprising the Danish Monarchy, are distributed, and that it is therefore necessary to seek a basis for a new understanding more in harmony with the national feelings of the two races. The basis of arrangement suggested by the First Secretary of State (Russell), which consists in as far as possible dividing the two nationalities in Slesvig, so that the Danes should be incorporated with Denmark, and the Germans be more closely united with Holstein and Lauenburg, can therefore do no other than find acceptance with the Government of the Emperor (Napoleon III.)

The application of this principle moreover does not seem to involve any difficulty, so far as concerns the two extreme portions of Slesvig where the nationality is distinctly marked. As to the mixed districts in the centre, in whatever way their fate is decided, there must always be Danes belonging to a German country, or Germans subjected to Denmark. Taking into consideration the absolute impossibility of making

nationality a rule on this point, we hold that it would be fair to solve this difference in favour of the weaker party, especially since he submits to sacrifices already imposed on all points in which this rule evidently works against him. My Government considers it also essential that the boundary should be drawn in conformity with what is necessary to Denmark's defence.

(S.N.) *Wachtmeister*. Equally with Great Britain, my Government recognises that if the Treaties of 1850 are abandoned, no solution can be found other than the principle of a mutual separation of the two nationalities, the Danish and the German. Proceeding on these lines my Government would have found it more natural that Denmark's new frontier should be placed on the Eider, because that river, from time immemorial, divided Denmark and Germany. I am nevertheless empowered to agree to the proposal made by Earl Russell, upon the condition that the frontier of Denmark be not laid further North than Sli and Danevirke; that the part of Slesvig, lying north of that line, be fully incorporated with Denmark; that Germany in future have no right to interfere in the internal concerns of that Monarchy; and that the newly made frontier shall be placed under European guarantee. With respect to the provinces, which in the above named eventuality, would be resigned by the King of Denmark, my Government proposes that their future destiny should not be decided without their sanction; and that the freedom of a plebiscite should be secured by efficient guarantees.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. The German Plenipotentiaries believe they may declare already that neither Austria, nor Prussia, nor the German Confederacy will refuse to take into serious consideration a proposal for negotiations which might lead towards the goal which their Plenipotentiaries have from the beginning pointed out, which is, the securing of a firm and lasting peace. In this respect however the proposed line of demarcation does not fulfil its object. The German Plenipotentiaries must in consequence thereof reserve to their governments the right of making a counter-proposition in that respect. As to that which relates to the Duchy of Lauenburg, the German Powers will probably be disposed to regard this as a compensation for a part of the Northern Territory of the Duchy of Slesvig.

(D.) *Quaade*. I do not find myself prepared at the present juncture to enter upon a discussion of Earl Russell's

proposition, which not only abandons the basis of the transactions of 1851, but also deviates from the principle of the London Treaty, whose validity cannot be called in question. I promise however to bring it under the notice of my Government.

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. Since the Danish Plenipotentiaries have had preliminary information of the English Proposition, they must be more or less provided with instructions with regard to the same.

(D.) *Quaade*. My Government is acquainted with its leading features.

(D.) *Krieger*. The Danish Plenipotentiaries have heard it completely formulated for the first time to-day. Besides it is important that the Danish Government, before it pronounces itself, should know the mind, not only of the Neutral Powers, but, as far as possible, of the German Powers.

(P.) *Balan*. It does not strike me as fair that the Danish Plenipotentiaries should reserve any declaration until the Plenipotentiaries of Germany have defined with further precision their adhesion to the principle of the English Proposition.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. The German Plenipotentiaries have, indeed, declared that the Proposition will be taken into serious consideration by their Governments. Will not the Danish Plenipotentiaries regard themselves as empowered to make a similar declaration?

(D.) *Quaade*. I am persuaded that my Government will bestow the most serious consideration upon this as upon any Proposition made by the Neutral Powers.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. The German Plenipotentiaries have accepted the principle of Earl Russell's Proposition, and the Danish ought therefore also to declare whether they accept the principle of this Proposition.

(D.) *Krieger*. I cannot admit that the principle has been accepted.

(A.) *Apponyi*. The German Plenipotentiaries have taken a long step in the direction of conciliation, since they have modified their Proposition* by accepting the principle of the English Proposition.

*N.B. The German Powers, before Russell advanced the English Proposition, had proposed the complete separation of Slesvig and Holstein from Denmark, and their being united into one State under the Augustenburger.

(D.) *Quaade*. The Frontier question is the chief point.

(G.B.) *Russell*. I hope that the Plenipotentiaries will be in a position to discuss the question of Frontiers at the next meeting.

ACT II.

Meeting on June 2nd.

(D.) *Quaade*. If the European Powers really abandon the Treaty of London, His Majesty (King Christian IX), in order to prevent a resumption of hostilities will not oppose a surrender of territory; but only upon condition most specially that not only shall peace thereby be attained, but also an entirely self sustained independence for his remaining States; and under the provision that the future fate of the surrendered districts shall not be settled without their own consent.

The Danish Government therefore accepts, in principle, Earl Russell's Proposition for the re-establishment of Peace between Denmark and the German Powers, laid before the previous meeting.

But with regard to the sacrifices to be required of Denmark there are limits which the Danish Government cannot exceed.

Also the new Frontier of Denmark is for her a vital question. She must of necessity have a Frontier which takes account of her military and commercial interests, and this Frontier must be secured by efficient guarantees.

(R.) *Brunnow*. If the Proposition is accepted by Denmark I am fully empowered to enter into an agreement in the direction indicated.

(G.B.) *Russell*. Bearing in mind the protest against the proposed boundary line brought forward by Count Bernstorff at the previous meeting, I ask the German Plenipotentiaries whether they are prepared to lay before the Conference the counter-proposition which they have reserved the right to do?

(P.) *Bernstorff*. The German Plenipotentiaries have only now been informed that Denmark accepts the principle of the Proposition. We have therefore not yet any detailed counter-proposition to produce.

(P.) *Bernstorff* (later). I believe, that in the meantime, I may say that our instructions empower us to propose a line of demarcation which may be drawn between Aabenraa and Toender.

(D.) *Quaade*. I cannot enter into discussion of such a line. It is impossible for me to pay regard to such a Proposition.

(A.) *Apponyi*. The separation of the whole Duchy of Slesvig was the original starting-point of the German Powers. Consequently the Proposition of an Aabenraa line is already a concession.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. The cession of Lauenburg may be regarded as a compensation for the mixed districts in Slesvig.

(D.) *Krieger*. The principle of nationality is a very important element in the question, but not the only one which must be taken into account.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. Full regard to that is paid in the German Proposition.

(R.) *Brunnow*. My instructions authorise me to support the view expressed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain respecting the line of demarcation, so long as it is not traced north of the Sli-Danevirke line.

(S.N.) *Wachtmeister*. I am empowered to maintain the Sli-Danevirke line as the only one consonant with Denmark's future independence and security.

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. It is necessary to find a good Frontier for Denmark, both in a military and commercial sense. In my opinion it will not be difficult to come to an agreement upon that point. One third of the Duchy of Slesvig will not be a sufficient compensation for Lauenburg.

(D.) *Quaade*. I propose a line drawn south of Ekernfoerde and south of the City of Slesvig, and which then follows the Danevirke line up to Fredriksstad.

(G.B.) *Russell*. Now that the Plenipotentiaries have made themselves acquainted with the position (the map was produced), I consider it very desirable to mark off the points respecting which the conference may find itself agreed.

1. The King of Denmark will not oppose a territorial concession, provided it not only secures peace, but also entirely self sustained independence to Denmark.

2. And on condition that the fate of conceded territories shall not be decided upon without their own consent.

3. Denmark to have a Frontier which respects both her military and commercial interests.

4. This Frontier to be secured by an efficient guarantee.

As the matter now stands, it appears to me that it will not properly consist with the honour of the European Powers if a solution of the difficulties which still remain cannot be reached without a fresh outbreak of war, which would be the most lamentable of all solutions. In that case it would be really difficult to foresee how or where it would stop.

(A.) *Apponyi*. I believe I must make a reservation with respect to point 2, on the ground, *inter alia*, of the difficulty of getting an eligible Frontier in the mixed districts.

(G.C.) *Beust*. Every hamlet and village cannot be interrogated; it is only to be made clear in this or that district which is to be separated from Slesvig, whether the majority of the inhabitants are really Danish.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. I am not empowered to propose any other line than the Aabenraa line, but my colleague (Balon) and I are disposed to recommend to our Government the acceptance of a line which should pass from Flensburg Fjord, north of that city and north of Toender, ending at Hoejer, including the Frisian Islands, in the part which shall be united with Germany.

(D.) *Quaade, Bille and Krieger*. That line also we find inadmissible.

(D.) *Bille*. It must not be supposed that the Danish Plenipotentiaries, because they recommend a prolongation of the armistice to the consideration of their Government, can regard the line proposed by the German Plenipotentiaries as admissible.

(P.) *Balan*. The last proposition of the Prussian Plenipotentiary does embrace an approximation between the two lines.

ACT III. SCENE I.

Meeting of June 6th.

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. The question at issue between Germany and Denmark has since the opening of the Conference been reduced to a much narrower compass, and the only question

of any real difficulty, which still remains to be arranged, is the question of Frontier. We may surely come to an agreement upon the principle in respect to this point in the three weeks still remaining.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. I am still prepared to prolong the armistice, but not for so limited a period as fourteen days.

(D.) *Krieger*. My Government makes a sacrifice in suggesting fourteen days. If there is a possibility of coming to an agreement upon the Frontier, it must take place between now and June 26th.

(A.) *Biegeleben*. Why is so short a limit proposed?

(D.) *Quaade*. My Government has its reasons as well as right to decide thereupon.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. My instructions are in any case more pacific than those of the Danish Plenipotentiaries.

SCENE II.

Meeting of June 9th.

(G.B.) *Russell*. With respect to the different lines proposed, there must be a possibility of coming to an agreement whereby the interests of Europe, and the political independence of Denmark, shall be secured.

ACT IV.

Meeting of June 18th.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. The aim of the Conference should be to agree upon a Frontier line, and in order to this the wishes of the population interested in the question must be ascertained.

(R.) *Brunnow*. I cannot give my consent to the appeal which the Prussian Plenipotentiaries propose to direct to the inhabitants of Slesvig. It is to the peasants they turn, allowing them to chalk out the Frontiers of a land, which are at this moment the subject of the negotiations of the London Conference!

(P.) *Bernstorff*. There are other inhabitants than *peasants* in Slesvig.

(R.) *Brunnow*. To question the subjects of the King of Denmark with respect to setting him aside would be inadmissible.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. It is not a question of setting aside the King of Denmark, but only of enlightening the Conference as to where the boundary line should be drawn.

(D.) *Quaade*. My Government has only conditionally given its consent to cession of territory, and has reserved the right to return to the Treaty of London.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. In accordance with its declaration of January 31st, His Majesty's Government (Prussia) considers itself wholly released from the obligations arising out of the London Treaty of 1852, and justified in negotiating any other combination entirely independent of that Treaty.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. Since in any case the principle of the partition of Slesvig is accepted on both sides, there now remains only the question of finding a new Frontier line. This gives a distinct aim. The mixed districts can be consulted without interrogating the whole Duchy of Slesvig.

(D.) *Krieger*. Denmark is not accepting the principle of partition in general, but giving its consent to a certain line of demarcation.

(G.C.) *Beust*. If the principle can be accepted that it is the people who should decide their own fate, the Powers will find themselves on neutral ground.

(G.B.) *Russell*. Now that the chief point of contention has narrowed itself into drawing a boundary line a few miles, more or less, northerly; since the two belligerent Powers have brilliantly upheld their military renown, and the resumption of hostilities would call forth a fresh series of calamities injurious to humanity, little worthy of our century's civilization, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain believe they are fulfilling a sacred duty in proposing to the belligerent Powers, Austria, Prussia, and Denmark, that they should appeal to a friendly Power who should settle a Frontier line, which should neither go south of the line indicated by the Danish, nor north of that indicated by the German Plenipotentiaries.

(R.) *Brunnow*. I entirely close in with the Proposition brought forward by Earl Russell.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. This Proposition is in full accordance with a principle of humanity, pronounced at the Paris Congress (1856), and later subscribed by the majority

of European Powers.* It is also in conformity with the spirit of conciliation and peace which has directed all the steps of my Government. I have therefore no hesitation in entirely uniting with it.

(S.N.) *Wachtmeister*. I engage that my Government will allow its adhesion to be dependent upon its acceptance by the Danish Government.

(A.) *Apponyi*. I hope to receive instructions by the next meeting.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. I desire to know with what instructions the Danish Plenipotentiaries are furnished, since I believe I understood that they knew of the English Proposition several days earlier than I, and have reported thereon to Copenhagen.

(D.) *Quaade*. We are without special instructions. I shall bring the Proposition to the knowledge of my Government.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. I accept the Proposition *ad referendum*.

(G.B.) *Russell*. The only task the mediating Power will have to undertake is to draw a Frontier line, and the decision come to by that Power in this respect, should be regarded as final by the belligerent Powers.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. That would be an Arbitration, and not such a mediation as was contemplated by the Paris declaration. But in my opinion an Arbiter would, even more than the Conference, need information as to the wishes of the population.

(G.C.) *Beust*. If it is proposed to make the question depend upon an Arbitration award, the Confederation will oppose the Proposition.

(D.) *Krieger*. My Government, already in January, demanded that the Principle of the Paris Declaration should

*Allusion is made to a provision attached to the Treaty of Paris, March 30th, 1856. After the Crimean War, the Plenipotentiaries of the European States, met in Paris on the occasion of the conclusion of Peace. The Great English Peace Society availed itself of the opportunity to send a deputation—Hindley, Jos. Sturge, and Henry Richard—to the English Delegate at the Conference, Clarendon, to beg him to use his influence in the direction of adding to the Treaty a general maxim relating to the use of peaceful means before resorting to war in future. After prolonged negotiations they succeeded, on April 14th, in getting the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments to express the desire that States, between whom any serious misunderstanding should arise, should seek the good offices of a friendly Power, so far as circumstances permitted, before having recourse to arms. This maxim in International Law gradually became recognised by forty Sovereign States.



EARL OF CLARENDON.

be applied. But the question of Frontier is not the only important point which must be solved.

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. I cannot accept Krieger's interpretation according to which the Declaration of the Paris Congress should not be applied without also appealing to a mediating Power respecting all the questions at issue. We have only the one question of the disputed Territory and the Frontier. The object of the Proposition is, that the question of Territory between the two given lines should be submitted to the Arbitral award of a friendly Power, whose solution of the matter the belligerent Powers should bind themselves to accept as final. The moments are precious, for the renewal of hostilities is rapidly approaching if the Proposition should not be accepted.

ACT V SCENE I.

Meeting of June 22nd.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. The Plenipotentiaries of the two German Powers have informed their Governments of Great Britain's Proposition to the belligerent Powers respecting an appeal, in accordance with the Paris Declaration of April 14th, 1856, to a friendly Power, who shall cause a Frontier line to be drawn between the two proposed by Denmark and Germany.* Austria and Prussia are prepared to accept the mediation of a neutral Power which is not represented upon the Conference. At the same time they cannot engage beforehand to regard themselves as finally bound by the opinion which the mediating power may express, since the circumstances do not permit them to receive an Arbitral award. An arbitration moreover would neither be in accordance with the Paris Declaration, which expresses only the "Good Offices" of a friendly Power, or reflect the wording of the English Proposition.

(D.) *Quaade*. At a time when the subject of strife was yet undisturbed, and the German Powers alleged that the King of Denmark had violated engagements entered into, the Danish Government, conscious that it never meant anything but what was within its rights, and mindful

*The most Southerly, Ekenfoerde—Slesvig—Danevirke—Fredriksstad; the most Northerly, Aabenraa—Toender—Hojer.

that it had given its adhesion to the maxim laid down by the Paris Declaration of 1856, expressed its desire for an examination and solution of the disputed question, in accordance with the spirit of that maxim. But after all that has taken place since then, it does not see that the Paris Protocol can be adduced in support of the Proposition now brought forward by the English Government, and under these circumstances, to its great regret, finds itself unable to give its consent to this Proposition.

(G.B.) *Russell*. I express my exceeding regret at the answer which I have heard from the Plenipotentiaries of the belligerent Powers.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. I do not take it that the German Powers have rejected the English Proposition, but assert that they accept it in the spirit of the Paris Declaration.

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. As the author of that declaration I may assert that the expression "Good Offices" excludes neither mediation nor arbitration.

(G.C.) *Beust*. That in a question of right, in no way dubious, the Confederation should subject itself to the decision of a third party, who, notwithstanding complete impartiality, can have no sufficient claim to decide—that Germany should agree to make the fate of the populations, now under the protection of her arms, dependent upon such decision, it can hardly be denied is an impossibility.

(G.B.) *Russell*. I confess, and I do it with regret, that my Proposition is rejected by Denmark, and has not been accepted by the Allied Powers.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. While the Emperor's Government admits the impossibility of making nationality an absolute dividing line in the partition of the mixed districts in Slesvig, it is nevertheless of opinion that the elements for a decision that all might agree to be regulated by, should be sought in a vote of the Communes;* such a vote of the Communes would render it possible, in the final settlements of the Frontier, to pay the utmost possible regard to each nationality.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. I have nothing against accepting the proposal *ad referendum*.

*In order to insure freedom of vote, the speaker proposed that temporarily all military forces should be removed, and that the Powers should send delegates to see that the vote was absolutely unbiassed.

(G.B.) *Russell*. The English Plenipotentiaries are willing to unite with it if the Danish Government considers that it can agree to it.

(D.) *Quaade*. I cannot at all agree to accept it *ad referendum*. My instructions forbid my agreeing to any other line than that which the English Plenipotentiaries proposed at the meeting of May 28th, and which Denmark accepted (the Danevirke line).

(D.) *Krieger*. I unite with Quaade's reply.

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. The Proposition is not exclusively English, but that of all the Plenipotentiaries of the Neutral Powers—this Proposition of marking out a Frontier line between the two lines of the hostile powers. I am therefore surprised at the reproach directed by the Danish Plenipotentiaries against the *English* Government, because they have not adhered to that (Danevirke) line.

(R.) *Brunnow*. I add my confirmation that Lord Russell never intended to propose that line as an ultimatum, nor to press it upon the belligerent Powers as such.

(P.) *Bernstorff*. Neither have the German Plenipotentiaries ever understood it as an ultimatum.

(F.) *La Tour d'Auvergne*. In uniting with the Proposition, neither did I, in the least degree, think of denouncing the right of the Neutral Powers to propose any combination provided that were rejected.

(A.) *Biegeleben*. Cannot the Danish Plenipotentiaries, notwithstanding their rejection of the Proposition of Arbitration, refer back to their Government respecting the question of mediation, such as has been accepted by the German Powers?

(D.) *Quaade*. I regard it as useless to refer it to Copenhagen. In that case the armistice must be prolonged, which under the present circumstances cannot take place except upon conditions which my Government cannot accept.

(P.) *Balan*. I wish again to accentuate that my Government agrees to a prolongation of the armistice, or to a truce; and I will simply remind of the fact that otherwise hostilities will commence on June 26th.

(D.) *Quaade*. The Danish Government must in any case require terms for the prolongation of the armistice, which will not be accepted by the allied Powers.

(P.) *Balan*. Could not the duration of the truce form the subject of further discussion?

(G.B.) *Clarendon*. I address the same question to the Danish Plenipotentiaries, whilst I am mindful of how serious a thing would be the renewal of war.

(D.) *Quaade*. The Danish Government has already declared that it will not agree to a truce, or even a prolongation of the armistice, with less than a real prospect of a peaceful solution. My Government would not express itself otherwise *to-day*.

SCENE II.

Meeting of June 25th.

(G.B.) *Russell*. The belligerent Powers are on the point of again taking up arms. This decision puts an end to the negotiations, whose object is the re-establishment of peace.

[He gives, in the name of the neutral delegates, a review of the work of the Conference. The document is appended to the Protocol. The belligerent Powers reserved the right of reply. In the same meeting were read explanations by the German delegates, but none by the Danish, although Krieger claimed the same publicity for his Government's eventual answer, as that given to the above named appendix. Finally, the Conference terminated with thanks from Apponyi to Russell, and his reply; together with those of Balan to Stuart for the pains he had taken with the drawing up of the Protocol.]

SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS.

THE Appendix of the Neutral Powers closes with Quaade's declaration in the meeting of June 22nd, that his instructions forbade his agreeing to any other line than that of Danevirke—and the following impressive concluding sentence :

“With this declaration the negotiations close. Hereby also is pointed out the obstacle, which the best efforts of the Neutral Powers have been unable to remove.

“It was in presence of this insurmountable difficulty that the labours of the Conference broke up.”

Beust eagerly took up this sentence when, on leaving London, he sent (June 29th) a note to Russell, designed to rectify a number of points in the summary of the Neutral Powers, and concludes thus :

“After having with my reclamations put your patience to the test, Lord Russell, it is very gratifying to me to be able to conclude with an avowal. The last sentence of the Summary notifies, in citing the declaration made by one of the Danish Plenipotentiaries, ‘the insurmountable difficulty in presence of which the labours of the Conference broke up,’ and indicates whence this obstacle came. I have learnt to know, and am glad to see the Summary itself tells us so, that the Neutral Powers laboured perseveringly to overcome it.”

The Danish delegates—were silent.

They were still standing upon the paper-drawn Danevirke line on June 29th, the day on which the German troops passed over to Als.

DANISH SLESVIG WAS LOST.

Danish Slesvig was lost because the Danish delegates did not draw back from Danevirke in time, yielding to the preponderating weight, not only of the Great German Powers, but of all the Neutral Powers at the Conference. Retreat could have been no disgrace. But now followed disgrace and loss too.

All the art of political negotiation lies in *holding on* and in *giving in at the right time*. In perceiving the *right time* for the one or the other lies the skill. Was it so difficult to perceive in the present instance?

Had the Danish delegates not preferred the appeal to sanguinary war, but been willing to meet both opponents and friends at the Conference, Danish Slesvig as far as Aabenraa—yes, indeed, as far as Flensburg—would have still belonged to Denmark to-day. The Slesvig question would, doubtless, have been settled thereby.

LONDON AND COPENHAGEN.

The judgment which it is the duty of the historian to give can hardly be lenient. It will, therefore, not be amiss here to bring forward some mitigating circumstances.

The Danish delegates in London had distinct instructions from Copenhagen. Certainly Plenipotentiaries have—their very name implies it—great power, and therefore great responsibility, when they take part in a Diplomatic Conference. Their power and responsibility are, or ought to be, similar to that of a General in command and his Chief-of-Staff; and, indeed, even they cannot exempt themselves from express commands of the Minister of War; but, as the Minister must look at the scene of battle with the Commander's eyes, he must, as a rule regulate his orders by the reports of the General-in-Chief. The War of 1864 was unquestionably too much led by the Ministry at Copenhagen, and too little by Headquarters upon the scene of war itself. Many things show that the same took place in the Diplomatic Campaign our three delegates carried on in London in such a way that Danish Slesvig was completely lost, although, as we have clearly seen, by far the larger part might have been saved.* Consequently, it is quite as much in Copenhagen as in London that we must seek the answer to the question—How was Danish-Slesvig lost?

THE FATEFUL CABINET MEETING.

This fateful decision was arrived at in the Cabinet Meeting of June 21st. "This *fateful* decision!" That is Historian Thrieger's expression twenty-five years afterwards.

Quaade actually did send the new English Proposition to Copenhagen—the proposition for Arbitration which Russell had placed before the Conference in London, June 18th. Quaade had recommended his Government to accept it in such a way that the district, respecting which Arbitration should decide, should be limited to the country between the Flensburg-Toender and the Slesvig Fredriksstad lines.

Krieger held that the Proposition could be accepted if the Northern boundary given by the Arbiter should be a line South of Flensburg to Husum, and, assuming this possibility, he telegraphed home that he did

*Bismarck even told J. Hansen, at Biarritz, October 13th, 1864: "I should personally have been content with the Flensburg-Toender line. At the London Conference we would perhaps have given Denmark the Gelting-Bredsted line. In military respects we were satisfied with the Sli line, but then 70,000 Germans would have been lost. Denmark on the other hand took up such a position in London that it was impossible. (F. J. Hansen. A Correspondent's Diary, Copenhagen, 1872.)"

not desire it, but he saw himself in a position to receive a facultative authorisation to accept it. Next day, June 20th, in the forenoon, he nevertheless began to hesitate, and apparently in accord with Quaade and specially with Bille, who was the least accommodating of the three Danish Delegates, he telegraphed again: he thought it not inevitably necessary to make any counter Proposition. The very same day, Krieger, who set great store by the opinion of Andræ, late Minister and President of Council, received an earnestly longed-for letter of June 13th from him, with his explanation of the enigmatical expression "Let it go" of a previous letter of May 24th. If Krieger received it before he telegraphed the second time (which it is hardly possible to ascertain), this phrase may have had its influence, although it was doubtless misunderstood by Krieger since Andræ in no way wished "to let" the Conference "go" upon a dividing line, but only the *London Treaty* as a basis of negotiation, since it was no longer respected on the part of the overpowering enemy. Long after, Krieger had to listen to the outburst in Andræ's house: "Madness, Krieger, to let go the Conference upon a dividing line!"

But to return to the fateful decision of the Cabinet in Copenhagen, June 21st. There also opinions were much divided. A ministerial crisis had arisen on account of the arrival in Copenhagen of the Danish Minister to St. Petersburg, Baron Otto Plessen, on June 14th, and almost simultaneously of his brother Karl, President of the Assembly of the Estates of Holstein; and this crisis continued almost without break until the final resignation of the ministry. Otto Plessen had advised the king to cede no territory, but to prefer a personal union, which he thought might be attained if the Government firmly adhered to that solution. The divisions in the Cabinet were increased when on June 16th, at a Cabinet Meeting, a letter from Brunnow was handed to the King in connection with a despatch from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gortschakoff, in which was held out the prospect of Russian support for an arrangement which should preserve the integrity of the Monarchy and the royal succession, upon condition of the union of the Duchies* with Denmark. As the King, so it is said, thereupon declared that he did not look upon the partition of Slesvig as an admissible solution, but preferred the plan indicated by Russia, and the Crown Prince adhered to this, Monrad (the Prime Minister) tendered his resignation; but withdrew it as the King would not insist upon his view.

On June 19th, the King held a consultation at Bernstorff Castle, with various statesmen, who seem all to have declared that the negotiations had gone too far for it to be possible to enter upon any fresh line. In vain the King appealed to Bluhme, Andræ and others, to form an

*The German Duchies: Holstein and Lauenburg.

entirely new Ministry. That all this had gone on before the fateful Cabinet Council of June 21st, enables us to understand how the decision to *refuse the Proposition for Arbitration* came to be made. Instructions in that sense were given to the Danish Plenipotentiaries in London; and while these posed as they did at the meeting of the Conference on the 22nd, it may be said, that it was not there but the day before, at Copenhagen, that Danish Slesvig was lost. Only a single one of the eight responsible ministers voted for the Arbitration Proposition in the Cabinet Council of June 21st. That man was Reich, Minister of War. Be this remembered to his imperishable honour! He, for his part, made the acceptance of the Arbitration Proposition a Cabinet question, and only on the representation of the Cabinet that it was impossible at that time to find him a substitute as Minister of War, did he allow himself to be prevailed upon to remain in the Ministry.

THE FEELING OF THE DANISH PEOPLE AS TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR.

“Every people has the government which it deserves.” This well known political axiom is confirmed on this occasion.

What was then the feeling of the Danish people when Danish Slesvig was lost?

The deluge of addresses and other pronouncements of opinion which poured around the foot of the Throne show it very clearly.

With a single exception the keynote in nearly all is a really superstitious faith in the wonders which war could, and would effect,—a war in which Denmark stood alone against two great Powers! But in other respects, the war cry was divided since it proceeded from two different camps; from two equally untenable standpoints: “Denmark intact,” and “Denmark up to the Eider.”

Scarcely had King Christian IX shown himself on the balcony of the Castle of Kristiansborg, on November 16th, 1863, to receive the greetings of the people, before he heard the cry of “Denmark to the Eider.”

On December 21st, many deputations waited on the King, amongst them one from ninety-six Danish landed proprietors, to whom fourteen more afterwards united themselves, who urged “Denmark intact.” During the debate on the Address in the Landsting (Upper House) January 27th, Monrad, President of the Council, had declared that he never could conceive the possibility of entertaining the partition of Slesvig,—and as little of an independent Slesvig, or a Slesvig-Holstein; nor indeed any possibility whatever that the Danish Government would go in for any of these three things; *unless*, he added, *they were downright forced into it*. The Address had no such back door. It was voted in both Houses, but unanimously only in the Landsting. It may be said to be a true expression of the popular feeling at that time, which was still more

strongly evidenced in a new one, voted in place of this, February 25th. Two days later it was presented to the King in the presence of the whole assembled Rigsdag. The King replied that he would do his utmost to obtain a peace advantageous to Denmark.

At the end of May, when the London Conference seemed likely to bear fruit, the address movement grew stronger and stronger. From Slagelse came a cry to have the Rigsraad (Parliament, including the Duchies), called together as quickly as possible, that it might be publicly known that the people would have no prolongation of the armistice. From Tisted they said: "We fear nothing more than that the ignoble armistice should be the precursor of a dishonourable peace." From Holstebro: "We are still prepared to our utmost ability to make any sacrifice of life and property; and from Hjoerring: "The time is still far off when the Danish people will be content to accept a dishonourable peace"; and so on from nearly every corner of the land.

These are grand phrases when uttered by a people in a position to put deeds behind the words, but lose their brilliancy when this is not the case; and still more, when it must be acknowledged that the *proffered* peace—Slesvig divided according to the language boundary—could never be called "dishonourable."

Is it too much to allow these voices from the people to bear their full share of the responsibility for the loss of Slesvig?

This war craze, as it has been termed—this address movement—reached its climax, when on June 11th, thirty-five distinguished men at Copenhagen solicited signatures to a memorial to the King, in which a further prolongation of the armistice was designated an impossibility.

People *would have war*, and they got it. They did not want a dishonourable peace, but they got it; instead of the honourable one they might have had.

When the war-furies were again let loose on June 25th, it was stated on the responsibility of the President of the Council in the speech from the Throne at the opening of the Rigsraad: "Since England, supported by all the Neutral Powers who had seats on the London Conference, proposed that We should cede all the country belonging to the Danish Monarchy which lies south of Sli-Danevirke, We decided to make this, to Us, painful sacrifice. This offering was not however accepted by the German Powers. We could sacrifice no more. We replied to the requisition with "No!" firmly persuaded that this No is that of the Danish people."

Yes! Alas!

TOO FEW FRIENDS OF PEACE IN DENMARK.

Unhappily there were too few friends of Peace in Denmark in 1864. Their voice was all too weak to drown that of the great majority in the Cabinet, in the Rigsraad, the Rigsdag—the whole nation.

How people at that time depised the "Jute People's Association," founded at Tscherning, and its friends! Its leading men—Gert Winther, Reinhold Jensen, and others—had on January 19th, issued for signature an address to the King which says: "Denmark cannot suffer any aspersion upon her honour, if, deserted by all Foreign Powers, she, while reserving her rights, temporarily yields to requirements which do not appear to us to be fully substantiated. * * *

We are therefore rejoiced to learn that your majesty has repeatedly announced that you will only when the utmost necessity commands it seek a solution by force of arms."

With the comparatively small number of 3,306 signatures from eight parishes of North Jutland, this, so-called "Skanderborg Address" was presented to the King, all too late; only a few days before the renewal of war. About the same time, June 20th, the King received one of the usual sort, with the grand but far too high-flown phrases, about "self-sacrificing readiness to bear the burdens which the continuation of war will lay upon us." And at the presentation of this last "war address" as it might be called, the spokesman, Dr. C. W. O. Erbech added: "Surrounded as we are by the enemy's cannon, his swords and bayonets, we have not for a moment doubted the happy issue of our fatherland's life-struggle." Utopians! (How often, in later times, have the friends of peace been pursued by this mocking cry!)

Utopians! There would have been more reason to cry as a warning to those, who in 1864, preferred an insane war to an honourable peace—to those who had more faith in war than in arbitration.

Had the Peace movement been as large and strong in 1864 as now, it would have saved Denmark from a "dishonourable Peace." Then too, Danish-Slesvig had still belonged to our Fatherland.

It was the friends of War who, in 1864, forced on the loss of Danish-Slesvig. It was they whose Utopian policy weakened the independence of Denmark.

The Independence of a small State is always better secured by the methods of the friends of Peace, than by those of the friends of War.

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