

# Reasons and Motivations for Violence by Internal and External Actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Dynamics of Conflict

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*„I was on the point of crying at her, ‘Don’t you hear them.’ The dusk was repeating them in a persistent whisper all around us, in a whisper that seemed to swell menacingly like the first whisper of a rising wind. ‘The horror! The Horror!’”*

*Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad*

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## **Introduction**

The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>1</sup> appears to be a conflict of a multilayered character. It is a conflict that shows some significant complexities that contains important driving forces on both the micro-level and the macro-level. It is the author's point of view that there seems to appear a wide gap between the international aspects of the conflict and the root causes of the conflict in the rural areas on the micro-level dynamics. Another important factor to take notice of is that the game condition of the conflict and the scenario of actors, strongmen etc. have changed significantly since 1996 where the conflict started. The arisen of the stateless societies in the eastern zones of the country is an outcome of the national power shift in government, but has during the years developed into some more local and individual based agendas motivated by the prospects of economically, military and political power. The national agendas and strategies that once gave birth to the conflict has transformed into individual warfare where politics are military based, based on violence, and driven by profit<sup>2</sup>. This has created a fragmentation in the political landscape, and by this the conflict is complex.

It is the author's intention with this paper to present an overview of the different factors that fuels the conflict and analysing them in its contexts. There will be a main focus on the Eastern regions of the country but with references to the national level of the political power-game since decisions made by the central government in the capitol Kinshasa have great impact on the local power-game in the East, and opposite.

It is the authors point of view that the Congolese conflict, which is one of the most severe in the world, is in general neglected by the western media, and when it does appear it is often superficial analysed out from factors which emphasizes the macro-level aspects on behalf of the local rooted causes which contain the important factors that prevent a cessation of the conflict. With this it is also the author's thesis that the same causes that fuels the conflict on the micro-level also bares with in it the causes for solutions leading to an end of conflict; in a way the options for lasting peace is parallel to the strengthening of the civil community and the local options for trade, access to land and rural and mineral resources, and political participation in decision making.

The international community represented in the United Nations has through a rapport from 2001 criminalized the exploitation of the mineral resources in DRC by the so called uninvited parties. It is in this rapport emphasized that all export and commercialization of Congolese mineral resources is referred to as being illegal activities when it is executed without the acceptance of the

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<sup>1</sup> After this 'the Democratic Republic of Congo' will be refereed to as 'DRC'.

<sup>2</sup> Vlassenroot, Koen: "The Formation of Centres of Profit, Power and Protection, Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo (2005), p. 5.

Congolese government<sup>3</sup>. This has been criticized not only of being a contribution of the reductionistic interpretation of the conflict which again emphasize the macro-dynamic element of the conflict (because of the focus on the external actors and their impact, e.g. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), but also leaves out the important elements in the conflict given by the more subtle political structures that is an outcome of the conflict. To criminalize the informal economy and trans-bordering commerce in DRC leave out some important factors for coming solutions and options for a post-conflict reconstruction. The local communities in Eastern DRC are deeply depended on simple necessities produced by the rural-based production, and their possibilities of commerce is a key factor that in some cases creates political stability and preservation of some kind of peace, as well as it is a guarantee for maintenance of survival. In some cases local strongmen and militias also have become patrons of daily live Congolese.

The author finds this specific topic important because it contains the core of conflict that can be traced in many other conflicts around the world, and that the Congolese conflict contains enough elements to create a frame of understanding of other violent conflicts as well. It is the author's ambitious hope that a sustainable solution and a deeper understanding of this conflict will create a path for peace and reconciliation with a long lasting peace as an outcome, and that it could lead the way for a complete ending of violent conflicts world wide serving as a role model.

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### **Executive summary (overview of conflict)**

Newly analysis<sup>4</sup> shows the complexity and scope of the conflict in the DRC<sup>5</sup>. On the surface, one might reach the conclusion that chaos and anarchy are the dominating factors in the stateless societies that have arisen after the outbreak of war in 1998 and 1996, and the coup d'état in 1997 which led Laurent Desiré Kabila to power and made the creator of the Zairian kleptocracy, Joseph Desiré Mobutu, flee the country to his Moroccan exile. But a deeper look at the conflict shows that the breakdown of the traditional and formal political structures has resulted in the emergence of new political and arms based power structures.

The ongoing conflict in the Eastern part of DRC has often been explained as being a conflict created by greed and exploitation of mineral resources by internal and external actors motivated by pure profit, because of the extreme concentration of mineral resources on Congolese

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<sup>3</sup> Cuvelier, Jeroen: "Linking the local to the global: legal pluralism in the DRC conflict", in: *Conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo*, p. 197.

<sup>4</sup> Analyses going one year back are included in the definition 'newly'.

<sup>5</sup> DR Congo was during the rule of Mobutu named Zaire between 1971 and 1997. The name come from the local language and is the original name of the Congo River.

soil. One often overlooked factor is the micro level dynamics that creates informal politics and power structures parallel to the central transitional government in the capital Kinshasa.

The access to land, mineral resources and political decision making, are three major issues in the conflict in the eastern parts of DRC and especially the region of Ituri. In its basic structures the conflict is a local rooted conflict<sup>6</sup>.

Ethnic affiliation has become an even more dominating and noticeable factor in the conflict with armed groups using it in their recruitment strategies for new members. In the lack of stable and continuous governance, ethnicity indeed has become an excuse to use violence to gain control of assets in the politically fragile environment. Seen in the light of the colonial legacy and its favouring of some ethnic groups and the exclusion of others, these issues have become an ever self-birth giving Sisyphus-like obstacle on the road to peace, and with a constant overshadowing threat of a disastrous full scale war or extensive violent clashes with deadly outcomes. So is the case of the Hema and Lendu disputes, and the Tutsi and Hutu disputes that have created astronomic death tolls, and have generated the most severe humanitarian crisis since the Second World War.

The tensions between DRC and neighbouring Rwanda produces a constantly threat of partly interventions as was the case in June 2004 were a Rwandan backed faction of 2-3000 soldiers headed by two renegade commanders, took over the city of Bukavu in South Kivu from June 2 to June 9. Taking in consideration that Paul Kagame's strong (tutsi-) leadership and his holdings in at least 10 mines in DRC, and that the basic economy of the Rwandan capital Kigali is based on Congo resources, a full scale intervention from Rwandan side is not a fanciful notion. A possible violent outcome of the tensions is further more likely to become a reality, when taking in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in consideration. In August 2004 the key argument from a high ranked Rwandan officer was that if not DRC could track down the Interahamwe on Congolese territory, Rwanda must go in and take them out<sup>7</sup>.

With the government of President Joseph Kabila in office and the ongoing peace dialogue (the Inter-Congolese Dialogue), the international community has better chances than before to secure human rights and pressure the government to obligate itself to the peace process and the disarmament of small armies and violent factions in the country. In the terms of 'nation building' as an aspect that goes hand in hand with 'peace building', one might take in consideration by the present situation what the scenario would be in and after an election process. The political

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<sup>6</sup> Vlassenroot, Koen: "The Formation of New Political Complexes: Dynamics of Conflict in Ituri", Occasional Paper, Center of African Studies (2003), p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Official statement from Rwandan military officer (...).

games in DRC carry with them a violent element that might take over and blaze up in a full scale war in a hypothetical election situation where the game is open for political actors to gain profit and power.

The planned election in June 2005 is an optimistic and risky goal, if the result should lead to democracy and stability. The physical conditions of the country are in such bad shape that travelling by airplane many places is the only option. One might view that basic building of a countrywide infrastructure should be done before elections to create the right foundation for fair elections and proper access possibilities for international observers to motivate fairness among political actors in DRC.

The international community represented in governances and middle state organisations has played a significant role in the peace process. The installation of the transitional government in the capital Kinshasa in August 2003 which officially ended the occupation and division of the country and led the way to coming democratic elections is the product of a political tendency that has its roots in the past colonial period. 'Nation Building' has become a norm in peace interventions and is based on a strong presence of operating staff and opportunities for political interference in the decision making processes. This is a break with the principle of the sovereignty of nations and some has described it as 'post-colonialism' or 'neo-colonialism'. In the case of state building in DRC the average Congolese has only little influence on the decision-making on the governmental level. It represents a vertical power structure that easily tends to create opaque structures of bureaucracy like the ones during the past colonial rule instead of a local political involvement on a grass root level namely through NGO's and local political associations. Also the religious institutions which in many cases have close contact to the people on the ground is an opportunity because of the network, national and international, it possesses.

### **The import of violence (motivations for violence in a historic perspective)**

The history of Congo as well as most of the other African states tells a bloody tale about colonization and terror. The former Belgian colony leaves out no exception in this matter. From when the first European, Diego Cow, showed up at the mouth of the Congo River in 1482 up to the extravagant Mobutu running his bizarre dictatorship, Congo has never seen or been able to tell a story that presents some kind of proud ness. Before the European colonial powers started their activities on the African continent there existed a sophisticated established political system with the king as the political head, and subdivisions into smaller political areas. The Congolese kingdom

was established in the fourteenth hundred, and tragically enough it was in many cases missionaries with an supposed message of humanity who in many cases cleared the track for merchants who saw endlessly possibilities for making a good profit with the outcome of a complete meltdown of the excising social and economic structures. The author will not go deeper into the historical dimensions of this part of the African continent, but mention it because of the element of historical national identity. When taking a look at the capitol Kinshasa (former Leopoldville) it is striking that the city is build by Europeans (Belgians) in the western style architecture. No Congolese can point out a physical monument that tells a story of Congolese sovereignty. Though one should be careful to emphasize the importance of national history as a part of modern identity, it does in this case play a role when the only history that can be told to mobilize some kind of productive feelings, is the story of suppression and exploitation. In fact Mobutu used this in his renaming of the country to Zaire and his banning of the use of western clothing in the early seventies as a part of his Africanization (Zairization). Ironically he became a true copy with the role model of the former European rulers, and tragically the population was dragged through thirty two more years of military overrule by one of their own. It is an psychological phenomenon of both Mobutu but also other present local elites that they adopt the same behaviour as their exploiters.

### **Stateless societies and fragile borders**

The eastern provinces of DRC (Ituri, North and South Kivu) have another political and economic agenda than the government controlled regions of the country. Because of its distance from the central government in Kinshasa and the lack of infrastructure they provide a natural (physically) separation of East and West. The forest that separates the country parts makes it even more difficult to maintain roads in transportable conditions, and the safest transportation is by airplane.

The provinces of Ituri and the North and South Kivus are highly explosive areas with ongoing disputes among ethnicities about land ownership, access to mineral resources and political participation in decision making. According to some observers the peace process never had the expected impact on the eastern parts of the country. Ethnic clashes continuously break out. So was the case of the strike on the Gatumba transit centre in the bordering Burundi August 13 on 163 ethnic Banyamulenge Tutsis presumable by Hutu militants living in exile in DRC. One of the reasons for this strike and mass-killing is the old hatred and tensions between Tutsies and Hutus, but the physical conditions for the possibilities of such local actions is also provided by the international community represented by UN in the area. Some of the refugee camps in Eastern DRC

are simply placed to close to the national borders, and have not been placed at least in a distance at 100 kilometres away as the international guidelines prescript. Secondly the refugee camps have served as recruitment bases for the Rwandan Interahamwe militia and other military factions. And thirdly the Monuc has simply failed to control the national borders properly mostly because of undermanned power (most important for arms-trafficking and troops-transportation). The establishing of refugee camps and the concentration of displaced persons creates some problems in general. It changes the social and economic landscape dramatically, and dissolves the once consisting social and economic structures into a complete dependence of external actors as the aid organizations and UN.

### **La Guerra dans la Guerra (dynamics and layers of conflict)**

The conflict in DRC carries elements of civil war, ethnic disputes, and regular war because of both the involvement of neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, but also Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola who are interfering in the conflict as a part of the Kinshasa government's faction, as well as it presents local rooted factors.

The unstable environment which is fuelled by the lack of a strong central government allows for the continuance of organized crime by local actors, but also from business partners and companies outside the country. A list of companies that has profited on the conflict and avoided paying high taxes, has outlined the commercial benefits and possibilities for making a good deal out of the conflict and creates a picture of a multilayered and multi dynamic conflict, which is hosting actors who prefer a "Cash-in a Suitcase- economy"<sup>8</sup>.

The rich resources of the country, has made it possible to finance the war continuously, with profitable possibilities and motivations, and the war has become self-supporting in a most deadly sense. There has been an exchange going on between providing military services or assistance for minerals such as diamonds and gold, and also timber. Coltan is another valuable mineral in DRC and is used in cell phones and computers. The market for the many resources that the Congolese soil contains is feeding the conflict endlessly.

The "flash points" where conflicts blaze up, are centred around mineral rich areas, and military action, whether it is small private militias or Rwanda's and Uganda's interference in DRC, is closely connected to commercial activities.

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<sup>8</sup> Hochschild, Adam: *Chaos in Congo Suits Many Parties Fine* (April 20, 2003), New York Times/www.globalpolicy.org.



It is not to be forgotten the link between the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in DRC. A very important aspect of the conflict is the historical dimension of ethnicities. The Hema/Lendu conflict in Ituri shares some of the same elements as the Tutsi/Hutu conflict that led to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, where around 800,000 Tutsies and moderate Hutus were brutally slaughtered.

The Hema community, much like the Tutsi community, was given preferential treatment by the colonial power in access to education, land and jobs, and that has created a cultural gap between the ethnic communities. In a time where the political structures of the colonial powers have collapsed and loyalty to the clan dominates, “ethnic citizenship” can easily become an excuse for warfare as well as it can serve as the one little factor that transforms rage into violence.

The involvement by internal actors of different identities and affiliations in the conflict plays a conspicuous part, and is especially noticeable in a political environment with undefined political and administrative structures as is the situation in the eastern regions of DRC. Local driving forces have a tendency to come to the front when the power distribution and control from the national governmental side fails and the political landscape becomes a subject to a redefinition. The scene becomes, so to speak, open for new power-actors with different motives. As Koen Vlassenroot so very well has described it:

*„At a time when the existing economic, administrative, and social patterns that have defined the local space become increasingly unstable, subject to external penetration, and unable to offer clear contexts within which people on the ground can make daily and life-choices, ethnicity indeed easily becomes an excuse for political action and violence”<sup>9</sup>*

### **Youth and conflict (anger and alienation)**

The youth element has played a crucial part in the DRC conflict as well as in the other African conflicts. Here it will be briefly illustrated since it is a dominating element in the instrumentalization of the violence carried out in the conflict. In DRC the main parts of the combatants are young men. The political interactions are deeply related to violence, and politics has become close related to military power. The consequence of the conflict in the Eastern zones of

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<sup>9</sup> Vlassenroot, Koen: “The Formation of New Political Complexes: Dynamics of Conflict in Ituri”, Occasional Paper, Center of African Studies (2003), p. 1.

DRC is that the monopoly of violence that was once possessed by the state is now in the hands of individuals, and as a rare alternative to marginalization violence has a political value<sup>10</sup>.

Other motivations for young people to join the conflict are the simple fact of anger and alienation from the surrounding society. A war thorn country region like the DRC's East neither does nor present a range of possibilities for education or jobs. There is a large group of unemployed young people who struggles not only for basic needs, but is faced with the reality of an uncertain future without the prospect of acknowledgement or recognition from their surroundings. Furthermore, when faced with the more or less failed national politics and an economically vacuum, joining a local militia seems like a rational choice. As mentioned before in this paper the economically profit made out of exploitation of the mineral resources doesn't provide tax money for making schools but are disappearing in the pockets of local elites as warlords and local business men. The Marginalisation and urbanization as a consequence of the globalization has created a radical change in the social landscape. Things that in the past seemed important as traditional values of families and identity have suffered a severe breakdown with a sense of nihilism as a consequence<sup>11</sup>. It is also not to be neglected that the simple fact of being in possession of a Kalashnikov and the power that follows has a certain quality among the young people (in fact all people). People respect you and are scared enough to give you all you want. The frustrations of having no prospects of establishing a family and getting married because of the lack of social and economically status are replaced by a "just take what you want".

The high rate of rapes is a noticeable factor in the DRC conflict as well as in all other African conflicts. Sex can and has been used as a political instrument since it is directed towards the female gender that is in position of the reproduction and the symbolizing of the nation<sup>12</sup>. The mix of violence and sex is not only an instrument capably of paralyzing a hole civilian population and villages, but can also be seen as young men's frustration and anger canalized out in sadistic tendencies in a symbiosis with pure regular horniness.

### **State building and peace building<sup>13</sup> (from illegitimate violence to legitimate politics)**

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<sup>10</sup> Luca, Jourdan: "Being at War, Being Young: Violence and Youth in North Kivu", in: *Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo* (2004), p. 157.

<sup>11</sup> Møller, Bjørn: "Vrede unge mænd og Afrikas voldelige konflikter", in: *Vrede Unge Mænd? Globalisering, marginalisering og mobilisering* (2004), p. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Møller, Bjørn: "Vrede unge mænd og Afrikas voldelige konflikter", in: *Vrede Unge Mænd? Globalisering, marginalisering og mobilisering* (2004), p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> 'State building' and 'peace building' is in this context seen as the same thing since it is introducing a new paradigm in international politics, when national sovereignty seems less important when it comes to ending conflicts an strengthen international security.

A brief comparison of the scope of the conflict in the DRC to the conflict in Kosovo at its height draws a serious perspective according to peace monitoring and peace keeping and efforts needed in a large-scale-conflict. The *All party parliamentary group's rapport on Genocide prevention*<sup>14</sup> outlined it very well by calling attention to the scope and challenge by saying that if the UN was to install the same amount of troops with the same density, the number would reach 10 million<sup>15</sup>.

Though the general secretary of the United Nations plead to his colleges and allies to extend the UN- mission with 23.900 troops, he only succeeded in getting the mission expand with the total number of 16.700.

In July 2003 the Security Council agreed to strengthen the mandate of MONUC and increase the number of peace keepers to 10,800 UN soldiers instead of the 5,200 it already had in place in DRC. The mission was to protect civilians and aid workers. The Ituri region, which contains some of the world's largest gold reserves, had transformed into a bloodbath of extremely large proportions.

The two dominate ethnic groups in the region, Hema and Lendu, were at each other's throats to gain control over the fertile soil. Years before in 1999, the eastern border cities such as Goma and Bukavu had descended into bloodshed and the whole belt along the Great Lakes in eastern DRC had showed itself as being the most troubled area in the world. The worst slaughtering was carried out in 1999, and in January 2000 the first wave of violence had killed 7.000 people and produced 150.000 civilian refugees who became internal displaced persons. The central market in the region's capital, Bunia, was a strategic spot for the various factions and Monuc set up a camp. A French battalion with 1200 troops was sent there in May 2003 under an EU-mandate. This was actually the first EU-led military intervention in Africa. According to ICG (International Crisis Group) the pacification of the Ituri district should provide a winning formula for the pacification of the Congo's entire east<sup>16</sup>.

With all military interventions, whether they are peace monitoring missions or direct military interference, there is a need for exemplary behaviour. Interventions and peace keeping missions are hardly successful if it does not carry with it the capability to establish ethical standards that can be a leading example for future operations in conflict areas. An intervention should always present a just picture by good leadership and for the subsequent political frame and system of government that is to be installed or motivated.

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<sup>14</sup> Burge, Richard: *All party parliamentary group on the Great Lakes Region an genocide prevention* (2002), s. (...).

<sup>15</sup> Directly quoted: „If the UN deployed the same density of troops-to-land as it has in Kosovo, it would need 10 million UN peacekeepers”.

<sup>16</sup> ICG, International Crisis Group, (June 2003), (...).

Examples from eastern DRC where UN troops have been taking advantage of their power position to have sex with distressed women for simple vital necessity as bananas as has been the example in the UN camp in Bunia, or simply just committed rape, is not just an act of immorality, but helps to create an aggravated feeling of hate between the local population and the peace keepers<sup>17</sup>. This again can lead to a strengthening of the opposition or rebel groups, opposed to the peace efforts, that will slow or stall the peace keeping efforts, or even clear the road for a possession of political power as the example was in Bukavu, May 2004.

It is important to have the sympathy of the local population on every level of peace keeping operations to prevent unnecessary resistance and violence against all parts in conflicts.

There is also a need for more sophisticated analysis that can combine intellectual knowledge with pragmatic solutions in the continuous process of the international community's interventions.

Troops, observers and staff operating on conflict sites must be "culturally well equipped" and educated in the cultural and historical background of the regions of their operations, and should not only present an authoritative role, but also be a guide of justice. In modern times where troop based warfare is being gradually replaced by highly skilled and specialized soldiers and sophisticated technology, this surely seems a surmountable mission.

The conflict in DRC parallels the war in the Balkans on specific levels because of its ethnic element. Though comparisons only show vague fragments of resemblance, it might be useful in predictions for the outcome of conflicts and potential aftermaths for the civilian populations in post conflict areas. The outcome of the Balkan-Conflict has been a political and administrative division of the region, motivated by ethnic, religious, and cultural/historic affiliations.

In areas like DRC one must take in consideration both ethnic and tribal affiliations, and national and geographical borders according to reconstruction and redefining the socio-political space. In this web of ethnic groups spread out across national borders, the importance of even stronger political structures and an effective supervision of its observances according to every aspect of the elements of a society are at highest necessity.

The local warlords who are profiting on mineral exploitation and demanding high taxes from the locals in the tense regions, Ituri and the Kivus, are a direct threat to the sense of affiliation that is needed for building a system of government that should transform the regions into peaceful and stable zones of commerce, whose surplus benefits the local people. The local informal

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<sup>17</sup> By spring 2005, 1500 cases of sexual violence as rape and prostitution with minors by UN peacekeepers in Eastern DRC are trailed by the international community.

economy that arises from the statelessness provides benefits for a few successful warlords and a business elite, but does not benefit the daily live people in the rural areas and villages. The outcome of the rage of profits is a complete lack of simple necessities as food health and education because the lack of taxation and that the tax that is paid is going directly in the pockets of local strongmen<sup>18</sup>.

In contrast to the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan, the various factions of the Congolese conflict, both armed and unarmed, have been invited to the 'Inter Congolese Dialogue' started in 1999 as a part of the 'Lusaka Peace Process'. On a grass-roots level it is supposed to present the voice of the civil society and is divided into four commissions, each with responsibility for issues like military and security, the constitution, humanitarian and development and an electoral commission<sup>19</sup>.

The peace initiatives never succeeded to have the expected impact in the eastern zone of DRC. Various rebel groups related to or supported by the neighbouring countries have found a good business in operating in an environment that on the surface seems anarchistic. The central government in Kinshasa on the other side of the country has only modest control of the situation in the east. That makes the rebel groups' basis for negotiating better than the central government's, with arguments and unrealistic demands motivated from not wanting peace. The situation has thus improved during the spring 2005, mostly because of the new mandate by UN with the right to take every necessary means. When that has been said it is important to take notice of DRC as a so called shell state<sup>20</sup>. It is a collapsed state that never really have had the single chance to show it self as a fully well functioning political cell, not just since the Mobutu regime, but since the Belgians left. René Lemarchand has described it very well:

*„In its most recent avatar – the Democratic Republic of Congo – the former Belgian colony is not just a failed state; it is the epitome of the collapsed state, whose descent into hell has set loose a congeries of rival factions fighting proxy wars on behalf of half a dozen African states”*<sup>21</sup>

### **Aftermath of conflict and options of lasting peace (question of guilt)**

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<sup>18</sup> Hochschild, Adam: *Chaos in Congo Suits Many Parties Fine* (April 20, 2003), New York Times/www.globalpolicy.org.

<sup>19</sup> APPG, *The Great Lakes and Genocide prevention*, (2002), s. (...).

<sup>20</sup> "Shell state" is here referred to as a description of the specific state pathology of DRC. A country with national boundaries and borders but plundered and bankrupt; a lack of internal legitimacy.

<sup>21</sup> Lemarchand, René: *The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction*, Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen (September 2001), p. 2.

Whether a conflict shall end or arise again is very much a condition created in the aftermath of a conflict. Statistically 40 percent of violent conflicts worldwide blazes up again after brought to an end<sup>22</sup>. In that matter it is important to take notice of the subtle definition of responsibility and guilt as an important factor in the post conflict and reconstruction phases of violently clashes between groups of people. One who has described the guilt perspectives subtleness in a strikingly precise way is René Lemarchand:

*„The hope that the full truth and nothing but the truth will eventually emerge from the record is a chimera; what is anything but fanciful, however, is the notion that enough will be known about the facts of genocide to bring out the underlying moral truth – that there are no good guys and bad guys lined up on each side of an ethnic fault line, only more criminals on one side than the other, and more innocents than criminals on both sides”<sup>23</sup>*

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Studies and statistics of conflicts show that conflicts ended by negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to the recurrence of armed conflicts than those ended by military victories<sup>24</sup>. Ended conflicts world wide has apparently a tendency to occur again. That is the case of DRC. The multilayered conflict presents a hazardous subtlety in which the civilian population is held as victim. While the international community represented by governments and middle state organizations supports the initiatives towards a sustainable economic and political construction, the micro-level dynamics has to be taken in heavy consideration. The parallel economy and the informal political structures in the stateless societies in DRC contain as well elements of violence as it contains the dynamics towards peace. It would be hazardous to criminalize all nongovernmental policy in the fragile regions in the process of ‘nation building’ and ‘peace building’. The existing structures are a product of the collapse after the war and neglect by a corrupt regime, and the lack of formal employment. As mentioned before the social marginalization of youth is an underlying factor behind the proliferation of armed militias. In conflict ravaged areas, joining a local militia and receiving a Kalashnikov is the only single opportunity for a marginalized youth for social identity, profit and survival. The rural economically space (opportunities for commerce) is an important factor which under the right circumstances can prevent violence. The element of conflict may be inevitable, but fair trade options on daily live basis is a key fact in transforming the conflict

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<sup>22</sup> Number given by International Crisis Group.

<sup>23</sup> Lemarchand, René: “Comparing the Killing Fields: Rwanda, Cambodia and Bosnia”, in: *Genocide: Cases, Comparisons and Contemporary Debates* (2003), p. 171.

<sup>24</sup> Licklider, ....: ”Ending violent conflict”, in *Conflicts in Africa* (2005), p. 154.

into political structures that protects the local peoples opportunities for making a daily living in an secure environment.

## **Conclusions**

The question of why the conflict continues opens up another question. Namely, who will benefit from an ending of the conflict? It is easy to see that it is the civilians, who are held as victims in this conflict that pays the greatest price. Never the mind it is the active actors who benefits from the statelessness and the profitable possibilities that have strong interests in keeping the conflict going. The fact that violence and militarized politics is a fare more lucrative business than joining peaceful agreements and lay down arms is especially obvious in the case of DRC. As mentioned before some rebel groups have succeeded in dragging on the peace process by coming up with unacceptable and unrealistic demands in the context that they knew they had the power because of the lack of the governmental representation on their operating areas. In that way they have kept the ongoing peace process as hostage. This problem has been a dominating factor in the Eastern DRC, and this sub-political<sup>25</sup> frame has served as the scene for the other aspect of the conflict, such as ethnic affiliation and economically gains<sup>26</sup>. The main task in the project of making DRC a united nation is the case of power sharing. As explained earlier the transitional government consists of former rebel leaders who before the installing of the present government each where occupying parts of DRC. It is therefore seen by many Congolese as an illegitimate government that represents foreign nations as Uganda and Rwanda. The coming democratic elections will hopefully lead the path to an end of the conflicting elements through a fair political representation with the possibilities of sanctions of those who violate human rights, and a fair redistribution of the profit made out of Congolese resources to the advantage of the average Congolese instead of a small elite.

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<sup>25</sup> 'Sub-political' is here referred to as being political deviations within the political official political frame represented by its leaders.

<sup>26</sup> Vlassenroot, Koen: "The Formation of New Political Complexes: Dynamics of Conflict in Ituri", Occasional Paper, Center of African Studies (2003), p. 14.

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