




UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

India. Governor-General.  
East India (non-co-operation).  
Telegraphic correspondence re-  
garding the situation in India.

DS  
480.45  
A4  
v.15

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES



EX LIBRIS

EAST INDIA (NON-CO-OPERATION).

---

---

Telegraphic Correspondence  
regarding the Situation in India.

---

---

*Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.*

---

---



LONDON :

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY  
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from  
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :

IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2, and  
28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1;

37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER;

1, ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF;

23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH;

OR FROM

EASON & SON, LTD., 40 & 41, LOWER SACKVILLE STREET, DUBLIN.

1922.

*Price 6d. Net.*

[Cmd. 1586.]

## CONTENTS.

| No. | Date.  | Subject.   | Page |
|-----|--|--|------|
| 1   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 9th February 1922.  | General appreciation of the situation regarding non-co-operation.                          | 3    |
| 2   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 9th February 1922.  | Riot at Chauri Chaura -  | 14   |
| 3   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 14th February 1922. | Resolution passed by Congress Working Committee for suspension of mass civil disobedience. | 15   |
| 4   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 28th February 1922. | Postponement of proceedings against leaders.   | 15   |
| 5   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 1st March 1922.     | All-India Congress Committee confirms, with modification, resolution referred to in No. 3. | 16   |
| 6   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 1st March 1922.     | Decision to arrest and prosecute Gandhi.   | 17   |
| 7   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 5th March 1922.     | " " "  | 18   |
| 8   | From Viceroy, Home Department, 11th March 1922.    | Arrest of Gandhi - -   | 18   |

480.45  
AA  
v. 15

## EAST INDIA (NON-CO-OPERATION).

### Telegraphic Correspondence regarding the Situation in India.

#### No. 1.

*From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for  
India, dated 9th February 1922.*

(Received, 10th February 1922.)

(Telegraphic.)

The following is a general appreciation of the situation as regards non-co-operation. In order to explain the situation as it exists, it is necessary to trace the origins of the non-co-operation movement and its developments. It is impossible to give within the scope of a telegram an adequate appreciation of whole situation, and Government of India would have preferred, had time permitted, to send a considered despatch. As, however, the matter is one of great urgency we have done our best to give a connected account in message that follows.

The first manifestation of non-co-operation with Government as a political force took place about the beginning of 1920. The spirit of nationalism in this country as elsewhere had been greatly stimulated and intensified by the war and the pronouncements made as to the principles for which the Allies stood. It was intended by the Reforms Act of 1919 to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Indian people, and moderate and reasonable opinion was to a certain extent satisfied thereby. An extreme section of Indian politicians rejected it as inadequate, but opposition to it might not have assumed formidable proportions had it not been for the operation of special causes—in particular, racial feeling, which had been engendered by the Punjab disturbances in 1919, the economic distress which resulted from the general rise in prices, the bitter resentment on the part of Muhammadans over the delay in announcing the terms of peace with Turkey and their apprehensions lest these terms should prove unfavourable to Turkey. It was as a result of these causes that the doctrine of non-co-operation, which was a revival of Gandhi's *Satyagraha* movement of 1919, began to make rapid progress in 1920.

In March 1920 Gandhi established close relations with Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali, and other leaders of the Khilafat movement, and he announced publicly that that movement had his sympathy and that he would lead the non-co-operation movement, directed against the Government, if the terms of peace with Turkey did not meet the sentiments of his Moslem fellow-subjects. He declared in this manifesto that the only remedy left open to him was non-co-operation based on non-violence. There was no very clear announcement at that time

of the precise form which the movement would take, but Gandhi defined his programme later in the year after the Turkish peace terms had been published. There was to be a beginning of non-co-operation by—

- (1) the resignation of titles and honorary posts ;
- (2) the resignation of posts in the Civil Service of Government, the Police being excluded ;
- (3) the resignation of service in the Police and the Army ; and
- (4) the refusal to pay taxes.

By resolutions passed at a special meeting of Congress held at Calcutta in September 1920 the following items were added to the programme :—

- (1) withdrawal of children from educational institutions aided or controlled by Government and establishment in their places of National Schools and Colleges ;
- (2) boycott by lawyers and litigants of British Courts and establishment of private Arbitration Courts ;
- (3) refusal by military, clerical and labouring classes to volunteer for service in Mesopotamia ;
- (4) withdrawal of candidates for election on new Councils and abstention on the part of voters ;
- (5) gradual boycott of foreign goods.

All the foregoing steps were to be initiated before resignation of service in police and army and refusal to pay taxes, both of which were to be started only at the final stages of the campaign.

Little enthusiasm was roused at first by the movement ; all sections of moderate opinion were opposed to it, and even by Tilak and his followers it was regarded with some doubt and suspicion, while Hindu opinion naturally was averse from a close alliance with the more violent and fanatical aspects of the Khilafat movement. But the personality of the leader of the non-co-operation movement who was believed to be a selfless ascetic, a character which has a peculiar attraction for Indians, the propaganda which he and his lieutenants assiduously carried on, the intense irritation which had been caused among Mahommedans by announcement of the Turkish peace terms, and in particular the increasing economic pressure on large sections of the population, drew a growing number of adherents gradually to the movement.

2. Certain disquieting symptoms commenced to show themselves in the movement towards the end of the year 1920. A tendency to imitate military methods was developed in some of the Volunteer Associations, which had been originally started, at any rate nominally, for philanthropic and social service, and the leaders of the agitation against Government were not slow to utilise for political purposes these organisations as a potent instrument of social boycott.

This volunteer movement has presented peculiar difficulties, partly owing to the fact that some of the associations were in the past founded in good faith, in pursuance of some form of social service, and have, in fact, on occasions rendered valuable assistance in assisting strangers and facilitating the maintenance of order at great religious fairs and pilgrimages, and partly owing to our disinclination to interfere with Associations whose activities were ostensibly directed to political objects which did not come within the criminal law. Violence is opposed to the professed objects for which members are drawn into these bodies; yet gradually the establishment of these Associations has put into the hands of the leaders powerful organisations, which can be, and have been, used for sinister purposes. Attempts to usurp functions of police, intimidation and use of violence to enforce *hartals* and social and commercial boycott, or under guise of *swadeshi* or temperance movements in order to impair authority of Government and terrorise political opponents, have been prominent features of their recent activities. In some places only have military drill and evolutions been practised. The avoidance of violence has throughout been a part of their ostensible creed, and it was a matter of no small difficulty to decide at what point their suppression was essential in the interest of law and order, and would not be condemned by public opinion as undue interference with freedom of political association. The non-co-operation movement presented other sinister features in the growing violence of the speeches made by the principal Khilafat leaders and in endeavours to enlist the sympathy of students and immature schoolboys, while cause for anxiety was given by the possible effects on the Indian Army and Police of a campaign of seditious propaganda. As early as April 1920 instructions were issued by Lord Chelmsford's Government that there should be prompt prosecution of all persons tampering with the loyalty of the Troops or the Police, and a scheme for instituting counter propaganda was formulated in July of the same year. In September instructions were issued to Local Governments to take action vigorously to prosecute for all incitements to violence, and their attention was drawn in October to the dangerous potentialities which lay in the volunteer movement. Lastly, in November 1920 a Resolution was issued by Lord Chelmsford's Government defining their general attitude towards the non-co-operation campaign. It was explained that, although the entire movement was unconstitutional, they had refrained from instituting criminal proceedings against such of its promoters as had advocated simultaneously with non-co-operation abstention from violence, and they had given instructions to Local Governments that action should be taken against those persons only who, in order to further the movement, had advanced beyond the limits which its organisers had originally set up, and had openly incited the public to violence.

by speech or writing or endeavoured to tamper with the loyalty of the Army or the Police. The following considerations had influenced Government in adopting this policy :—

- (1) Reluctance to interfere with the freedom of the Press and liberty of speech at a time when India was on the threshold of a great advance towards self-government.
- (2) The knowledge that those against whom prosecution might be directed would be likely to find in it the opportunity of posing as martyrs, and that they might swell the number of adherents to their cause by evoking false sympathy.
- (3) The belief that non-co-operation would be rejected by the country as a whole as a visionary and chimerical scheme, the result of which could only be widespread disorder, political chaos and the ruin of all such as possessed a real stake in the country itself, the appeal being made to the ignorant and prejudiced, and its creed being devoid of any constructive genius.

3. At the Congress Meeting which was held in December 1920 at Nagpur a new stage was reached. Little up to that time in the way of solid achievement could be pointed to by the leaders of the movement. Although the movement had undoubtedly engendered in certain parts of the country a general spirit of disloyalty and lawlessness, little success had been attained in giving effect to the specific items of the non-co-operation programme; there had been very few surrenders of titles, a handful only of lawyers had suspended their practice, and, though in the elections to the Reformed Councils the voting had been somewhat interfered with, the constitution of these Councils had not been seriously affected by it. Strong opposition had been provoked by the attack on educational institutions, and the attack had no lasting effect. But Gandhi at Nagpur was successful in capturing the entire Congress organisation for his party. Indication of the growing strength in that body of the Extremist element was given by the change in the first article of the constitution of the Congress which was effected by an overwhelming majority, the object of Congress being defined now as the attainment of Swaraj by all legitimate and peaceful means. There was omission of the reference to British connection. It became, moreover, clear by this time that the intention of the leaders of the movement was to spare no efforts by which the more ignorant masses might be permeated with their doctrine. An increasing activity with this object in view marked the early spring of 1921. There was great astuteness shown in promoting labour unrest and exploiting economic grievances, and promises of the wildest character were freely made (as now) to ignorant peasants,—for example, rent-free lands, cheap clothes, cheap food and free railway passes. The first evidence of this policy was the widespread agitation among the tenantry of Oudh, from which, in January 1921, serious



disturbances resulted, and there was exploitation with some success about the same time by the non-co-operation leaders of the Akali movement among the Sikhs—a movement which in its inception seems to have been inspired by a genuine desire for religious reform—and success was attained to some extent by such leaders in giving to the movement a character which was definitely anti-Government. At the end of January the Local Governments received from Lord Chelmsford's Government fresh instructions in view of these developments. That Government, while they adhered to the general policy which had been enunciated in November 1920, impressed on the Local Governments the necessity for instituting prosecutions with greater freedom in all cases of incitements to violence and endeavours to seduce police or Indian troops. Remedial legislation was urged where redress was demanded by genuine grievances. There were, too, to be steps taken for starting counter-propaganda whereby Government's policy would be justified, and in general for enforcing respect for the law. Government at the same time took every opportunity during the first session of the reformed Legislature of convincing Indian opinion that the reforms were real and great, and that they had conferred on the representatives of the people wide powers, and that there was a readiness to inquire into the cause of discontent, or any specific grievances. It was, for example, agreed to refer to non-official Committees of the Legislature certain Acts which conferred extraordinary powers on the Executive, as well as the Acts regulating the conduct of the Press; the greatest consideration was shown in framing the Budget to the opinion of the Legislature.

4. As the result of the agitation which was carried on by the non-co-operation leaders, there took place in the early summer of 1921 a stampede from the Tea Gardens of Assam of coolies to the number of many thousands, and there was simultaneously a strike on the Assam-Bengal Railway. Another development was a strong campaign against the use of foreign cloth and the drink traffic; this was mostly by means of a system of picketing, an operation in which a prominent part was played by intimidation. In spite of numerous prosecutions and restrictive orders, a general weakening of the respect for law and order resulted from all these activities; frequent outbreaks of mob violence followed from this in various parts of the country, and racial feeling directed against Europeans increased, whether they were engaged in commerce or in the service of Government. The leaders of the Khilafat party simultaneously employed language which steadily increased in violence, and many sections of the Mohammedan community which had hitherto been untouched by it were permeated by the agitation which aimed at the restoration of the Sultan of Turkey to his temporal power and pre-war religious ascendancy. A series of speeches was made by the Ali brothers in the

winter and the spring at various towns, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and in these speeches Great Britain was openly described as the arch enemy of Islam, and they did all in their power to incite against the British the animosity of their co-religionists. They declared that a time would arrive when it would be incumbent on all Mussalmans as a religious duty to draw the sword in defence of their religion, nor did they hesitate to put forward the view that if a Mohammedan Power were to invade India with the object of avenging the cause of Islam they would support it. While their prosecution for these speeches was under consideration, their friends induced them to sign a public apology and to undertake that in future they would refrain from speeches and writings which incited to violence or tended to the creation of an atmosphere of preparedness for violence. In a letter addressed in June 1921 to all Local Governments the situation was reviewed. The Government of India were still convinced, in spite of the disquieting symptoms to which reference has been made above, of the soundness of the general policy which had been pursued hitherto. They indicated at the same time that the attitude of Government should in no way be relaxed towards any advocacy of violence, including not only direct incitements but speeches calculated to give rise to feelings of disaffection, enmity or hatred such as were likely to lead to violence not as a remote or ultimate consequence but as a probable result in the near future.

5. A little time after this a more open form was assumed by the attempts to create disaffection in the ranks of the Police and the Army. There was widely published about midsummer on the alleged authority of 500 Ulema (learned men) a Fatwa, that is religious pronouncement, which purported to interpret the precepts of the Koran. All service under Government was declared in this to be forbidden by the Mussulman religion, and service in the Police and the Army was stigmatised as a specially heinous sin. A resolution was passed at Karachi in July at the meeting of the All-India Khilafat Committee, Mohamed Ali presiding, to the effect that it was incumbent on all Mahommedans as a religious duty not to join the Indian Army or to continue to serve in it or to give assistance in recruiting for the Army, and that the duty of all Mahommedans was to bring to the notice of the Moslem soldiers this religious injunction. Mohamed Ali, with Shaukat Ali, his brother, and four other Khilafat leaders, were afterwards prosecuted for this resolution and convicted, the conviction being under the ordinary law. In the month of July riots or minor disturbances took place, with serious loss of life in some instances, at the following places:—Dharwar, Madras, Aligarh, Calcutta, Chittagong, Matiari, Karachi. A fuller account of these events will be found in the Repressive Laws Committee Report of the Indian Legislature together

with its Appendices. In the month of August took place the outbreak of the Moplahs. This was an organised rebellion of a whole countryside which was populated by Moslem tribes of a peculiarly backward and ignorant character, whose fanaticism the Khilafat leaders had by their speeches and writings deliberately excited. Without doubt a considerable body of Hindu opinion was alienated from the Khilafat movement by this rebellion, in which many thousands of Hindus were plundered and many hundreds murdered, as it has become widely known that many Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam and Hindu temples desecrated. Attempts have been made to exploit to the discredit of the Government the lamentable railway train episode in which Moplah prisoners lost their life, but these have had little effect on Hindu opinion. Events in Malabar, however, brought about no modification in attitude of Gandhi. At Delhi on November 4th every Province was authorised by the Congress Committee to start civil disobedience. This authorisation stipulated however that conditions, such as proficiency in the spinning-wheel, should be fulfilled the nature of which was so impracticable as to indicate that the immediate inception of this policy was not desired by the Congress. On the day of the landing in India of the Prince of Wales, viz., 17th November, a general Hartal (cessation of business) took place in Northern India in most of the principal towns. An enthusiastic welcome was received by the Prince in Bombay itself, but an attack by non-co-operators on people returning from viewing His Royal Highness's arrival developed into serious riots which lasted three days; in these several Europeans were murdered, and in all there was a casualty list of 53 killed and approximately 400 wounded. Widespread intimidation on the part of the volunteers marked the Hartal in Calcutta; on a smaller scale the same thing occurred in other large towns.

6. A new and dangerous situation confronted Government after the events of the 17th November. An increasing disregard for lawful authority and the growth of a dangerous spirit of lawlessness had been engendered by the outbreaks of the last few months, and it had become evident that a systematic campaign of violence, intimidation and obstruction had been embarked on by many of the Volunteer Associations, to combat which it had proved ineffective to proceed under the ordinary criminal law. In many places these associations were at first recruited from educated classes, but as the campaign became more violent, they began to draw adherents from unemployed labourers, mill hands and city rabble, many of whom were paid for their service. Government decided in these circumstances that measures of a more comprehensive and drastic character should be resorted to, and information was sent to the Local Governments that sanction would be given to the application of the Seditious Meetings Act in any district where it was considered necessary.

to adopt that course. Instructions were also given to them that vigorous use should be made of the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Part II., for combating the Volunteer Associations' illegal activities, and that troops should be employed more freely, both in order to reinforce the police and to hearten and encourage all law-abiding citizens, and the measures to be taken in the event of civil disobedience being inaugurated were laid down. Provincial Governments were assured of the full support of the Government of India in checking disorder, while the formation of armed police battalions and the extensive enrolment of special constables was suggested. In particular, they were informed that they should not hesitate to prosecute any offenders against the ordinary law, however prominent their position, whose arrest and prosecution was in their opinion required for the maintenance of authority. Emphasis was laid on the importance of countering decisively the first active measures taken to give effect to civil disobedience. It was made clear that full strength of Government's resources was to be employed if necessary for this purpose, and that most prominent participators in the movement, not excluding Gandhi, should be arrested immediately and prosecuted. Action was promptly taken by practically all Local Governments in Northern India, in accordance with these instructions. The Seditious Meetings Act was introduced in most of the seriously affected districts in the Punjab, Bihar, Bengal, Assam and Burma. In some Provinces the various Associations had been proclaimed as unlawful, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, a few days before the receipt of our instructions, and certain other Provinces have now issued similar proclamations. A large number of persons have also been arrested and convicted under that Act and other enactments for preservation of law and order. At the same time prosecutions were more freely instituted against newspapers, leaders and speakers who had incited to violence. Throughout the year proceedings had been taken against a number of persons who had directly or indirectly advocated violence. Although serious alarm had been caused among a substantial section of Moderate opinion by the turn events had taken in the middle of November and it had demanded that sterner measures should be adopted by the Government, a disappointing revulsion of Moderate opinion in political and journalistic circles followed on the enforcement of the two Acts to which reference has been made above and the prosecution and conviction under them of a large number of persons.

An inclination was shown to represent the new policy as an interference with the freedom of association for political purposes and with the rights of free speech, and there was a disposition on this ground to make common cause with the Extremists. It was urged by many of the leaders of Moderate

opinion that a Round Table Conference should be held at which Government should be represented and all shades of political opinion, in order that some solution might be found of the situation through the means of some act of constructive statesmanship; there was advanced however no definite constructive suggestion. A deputation to His Excellency the Viceroy on the 21st December in Calcutta advanced the demand for a Conference. The speech of His Excellency explained to the deputation fully the reasons by which Government were induced to enforce special Acts. It emphasised the determination of Government to protect its law-abiding subjects, and a grave warning was in it conveyed as to the effect which affronts offered to the Throne were likely to produce on the public and on Parliament in the United Kingdom. Insistence was also made by His Excellency on the imperative necessity of the discontinuance of the unlawful activities of the non-co-operation party as a fundamental condition which should precede the discussion of any question of a Conference. A steadying effect was brought about in Moderate opinion by this speech. During Christmas week the Congress held its annual meeting at Ahmedabad. Gandhi had been deeply impressed by the rioting at Bombay, as statements made by him at the time had indicated, and the rioting had brought home to him the dangers of mass civil disobedience; and the resolutions of the Congress gave evidence of this, since they not only rejected the proposals which the extreme wing of the Khilafat party had advanced for abandoning the policy of non-violence, but, whilst the organisation of civil disobedience when fulfilment of the Delhi conditions had taken place was urged in them, omitted any reference to the non-payment of taxes, and were worded in such a way as to suggest that for the present civil disobedience would be restricted to defiance of the Seditious Meetings Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act directed against unlawful associations. Gandhi was appointed to be the sole executive authority of the Congress Committee. An overwhelming majority in the Subjects Committee of the Congress rejected the resolution as to a Round Table Conference, and it was made clear by Gandhi that any such Conference must be a Conference which would meet to register his decrees. In January there was held at Bombay a conference of politicians outside the Congress fold in order to formulate terms upon which it would be possible to have a Conference. The resolutions which purported to have been passed by this body were passed in reality by 20 only out of 200 persons, according to our information, and the attitude of Gandhi, who attended it and announced that he reserved the right to continue during a conference preparations for civil disobedience and the enrolment of volunteers, in return for the impossible conditions which Government were asked to

accept, had the result that Sir Sankaran Nair, the President, withdrew and that Moderate opinion was alienated and disgusted. Communication of the resolutions was subsequently made to His Excellency the Viceroy, who in reply stated that the basis for any profitable discussion as to a Conference was not contained in them. The presentation of what was practically an ultimatum to the Viceroy by Mr. Gandhi followed on the 4th February. He declared in this document that the non-co-operation party had had a campaign of civil disobedience forced upon them, in order that they might secure the elementary rights of free speech, free association and free press, which he maintained that Government had sought by its recent measures to repress, and he charged the Viceroy with having rejected summarily the proposal for a Conference, although the terms which had been accepted by the Working Committee of Congress accorded with the requirements of His Excellency as his Calcutta speech had indicated them. An announcement was at the same time made by him that, if Government agreed to release all prisoners convicted and under trial for non-violent activities and gave an undertaking absolutely to refrain from interfering with all non-violent activities on the part of the non-co-operation party, he would be prepared to postpone civil disobedience of an aggressive character, till the offenders now in prison had an opportunity of reviewing the whole situation, while continuing the illegal and seditious propaganda of the non-co-operation party. It was in reply to this manifesto that the Government of India issued the communiqué already published.

7. The following may be said to be the situation at the moment:—The lower classes in the towns have been seriously affected by the non-co-operation movement, although in the various items of its programme which have hitherto been attempted it has failed or secured but a partial success; and although the influence of the movement has been much smaller in the rural tracts generally, in certain areas the peasantry have been affected, particularly in parts of the Assam Valley, United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa and Bengal. As regards the Punjab, the Akali agitation which the Extremists had fostered for their own ends has penetrated to the rural Sikhs. A large proportion of the Mahommedan population throughout the country are embittered and sullen as a result of the Khilafat agitation, the need for countering which through a modification of the Sèvres Treaty has been incessantly and emphatically urged by the Government of India. We desire to take this opportunity of reiterating our convictions as to the imperative necessity of conciliating Mohammedan opinion by the modification of Turkish peace terms. We believe that the appeasement of 70 million Mohammedans of India, and consequent relief to a situation of real danger to

tranquillity of India, is of the utmost importance. Moderate opinion on the other hand has been alarmed and alienated by the recent declarations and attitude of Gandhi, and his failure so far to achieve any definite results has compelled him to resort to civil disobedience, which he proposes to start in Bardoli Taluka, where he has a strong local following, and to join issue on ground that will secure to the Government the maximum support for the measures it will take. While this entails grave possibilities, the Government of India are satisfied that the Army and the great majority of the Police are staunch, there is no disaffection on the part of the majority of the population, and there are now more promising economic conditions with a bumper harvest in prospect. Religious and racial feeling at the same time is so bitter that the Government of India are prepared for disorder of a more formidable nature than has in the past occurred, and do not seek to minimise in any way the fact that great anxiety is caused by the situation.

8. The Government of India desire in conclusion to make clear the principle which throughout has underlain their policy in regard to the non-co-operation movement. Of the risks inherent in this, they have been fully conscious, and if the more drastic measures which have been demanded by some of their critics have not previously been adopted in dealing with it, this has not been owing to any distrust in their power to suppress any possible outbreaks nor because instructions from higher authority have tied their hands, but because their belief is that a statesman-like policy must have in view the ultimate more far-reaching and more enduring consequences of any action taken rather than the immediate effects. It is with the co-operation of the people of India that British rule in India hitherto has been carried on, and it is essential for its continued success that there should be such co-operation. It has therefore been regarded by the Government of India as of the utmost consequence that they should carry with them so far as practicable in any measures that they took against the non-co-operation movement, the approval and acquiescence of Indian opinion. Evidence is given by the recent debates in the Indian Legislature that in this they have been largely successful. Nevertheless, though the impracticable nature of the demands of non-co-operation is realised by sober and sensible Indians, it has not been possible to ignore the fact that the non-co-operation movement has to a large extent been engendered and sustained by nationalist aspirations, and, so far as Mahommedans are concerned, by religious feelings which have a strong appeal to those also who have not adopted its programme; and the Government of India have thought, bearing this in mind, that the path of wisdom lay in exercising in regard to men swayed by such motives as much forbearance as in their judgment was consistent with their responsibilities. It is their belief that this policy will be justified by its fruits in the long run.

**No 2.**

*From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India, dated 9th February 1922.*

Received 12th February 1922.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegrams received from Government of the United Provinces :—

I.—Following press communiqué being issued :—

“Commissioner of Gorakhpur wires as follows regarding Chauri Chaura affair, already reported :—‘ Trouble arose as follows. On previous Wednesday an attempt to picket Muderwa Bazaar, and prevent sales of fish, drugs and liquor, had been frustrated by police ; also an Ahir Government pensioner, who was a previous convict and had become a volunteer, was called up and threatened with loss of his pension. The volunteers determined on Saturday, that is next bazaar day, to forcibly picket bazaar and overawe all opposition by numbers. Owner of bazaar is loyal zamindar. They proceeded to bazaar through police station grounds. They attacked police station with kunkar and bricks. Eventually police fired in the air. The attack was renewed in greater force ; the mob rushed the police and they fled, some into fields and some into buildings. A few police must have fired on the mob in earnest, but whether it was before the rush or not I cannot say. The buildings were set on fire, and all the force there, except one constable and one chaukidar who escaped, were brutally beaten to death and then burnt. Also a little boy servant of the sub-inspector was murdered. Resistance to mob was, I fear, badly organised. Then the mob tore up two rails on the line, cut the telegraph wire and scattered. In all 21 police and chaukidars killed and two rioters at least. The attack was deliberately organised by volunteers, but there was a big crowd with them. Number of crowd 1,500 to 2,000. I have just returned from Chauri Chaura. Impossible to give more details at present. Military have arrived and police force of district has been strengthened. There is nervousness in other thanas, and requests for reinforcements have been received. No renewal of disorder yet. Investigation proceeding.’ ”

II.—Commissioner wires from Bareilly :— “Casualties yesterday’s riots, one man killed on spot ; two since died in hospital ; five wounded now in hospital, including one woman ; possibly five more wounded ; number difficult to ascertain.—Commissioner.”

We have drawn attention of all local Governments by telegram to standing orders regarding firing in air, and directed them to impress these on district and subordinate officers.



**No. 3.**

*From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India, dated 14th February 1922.*

(Received 10 a.m., 14th February 1922.)

(Telegraphic.)

Working Committee Congress passed following resolutions, amongst others, at Bardoli, on 11th and 12th :—In view of fact that imminence of civil disobedience has always resulted in violent outbreaks of disorder, Working Committee resolves that mass civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes and rent at Bardoli and elsewhere, be suspended till non-repetition of outbreaks is assured by atmosphere of non-violence. Working Committee advises cessation of activities designed to court arrest, and stoppage of all picketing, save for peaceful purposes, in connection with liquor shops; further advises stoppage of all volunteer processions and public meetings in defiance of law. In view of complaints of laxity of selection of members of volunteer corps, Congress organisations are warned to revise lists, and remove persons not conforming to standards already prescribed. Resolutions to have effect pending meeting All-India Congress Committee. In meantime, Working Committee advises enlistment of crore of members of Congress to whom creed is to be carefully explained; efforts to be directed to promote use khaddar - spinning wheels; organisation of national schools; amelioration of depressed classes; organisation of temperance campaign and Panchayats' Social Service Department to be emphasised; and collections Tilak Swaraj Fund to be encouraged. Special committee to be appointed to find employment for those giving up Government service.

**No. 4.**

*From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India, dated 28th February 1922.*

(Received 28th February 1922.)

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of our telegram of 9th February. The massacre on the 4th February of 21 police by a mob of volunteers at Chauri Chaura, in Gorakhpur, and in a lesser degree the serious rioting that took place on the following day at Bareilly shocked every shade of Moderate opinion throughout the country and led to a revulsion of feeling against the leaders of the non-co-operation movement and the movement itself. The Working Committee of the Congress met at Bardoli on the 11th and 12th February, Gandhi presiding, and passed the resolutions which have already been communicated in my telegram to you of the 14th instant. As a consequence of this changed attitude on the part of the leaders, of which we

**No. 7.**

*From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India,  
dated 5th March 1922.*

(Received 6th March 1922.)

(Telegraphic.)

Reference is requested to my telegram dated the 1st March. The Government of Bombay have telegraphed as follows:—

“It has been decided unanimously by the Governor of Bombay in Council that the prosecution of Gandhi should be proceeded with under the Indian Penal Code, section 124A, in respect of four articles published in *Young India*, as follows:—

- (1) 15th June 1921—“Disaffection a Virtue”;
  - (2) 29th September 1921—“Tampering with Loyalty”;
  - (3) 15th December 1921—“A Puzzle and Its Solution”;
- and
- (4) 23rd February 1922—“Shaking Manes.”

A decision was also arrived at to proceed at the same time on the same charge against S. G. Banker, the printer of *Young India*.

Arrests will take place probably on the evening of the 9th March, Thursday, at Bardoli.”

**No. 8.**

*From Viceroy, Home Department, to Secretary of State for India,  
dated 11th March 1922.*

(Received 11th March 1922.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bombay Government intimate that Gandhi was arrested evening of 10th.

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 001 017 107 2

