

The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK



Volume 36 (Part II): 2011



United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook

A rich source of historical knowledge of developments, trends and achievements of multilateral disarmament for more than 30 years. Part I contains an annual compilation of text and statistics of disarmament-related resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly. Part II presents the main topics of multilateral consideration during the year and a convenient issues-oriented timeline.

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USD 55
ISBN 978-92-1-142286-3

Printed at the United Nations, New York

e-ISBN 978-92-1-055633-0

12-31406—September 2012—2,210



Office for Disarmament Affairs
New York, 2012

The United Nations
**DISARMAMENT
YEARBOOK**



Volume 36 (Part II): 2011

Guide to the user

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, in print and electronic format, is designed to be a concise reference tool for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community.

Part I of the 2011 Yearbook was published in March this year. It contains all the resolutions and decisions of the previous General Assembly.

Part II is divided among the main multilateral issues under consideration throughout the year. It presents developments and trends on the issues; a convenient issue-oriented timeline; short summaries of First Committee and General Assembly actions taken on resolutions and decisions; the full texts of principal multilateral agreements reached during the year and declarations adopted by treaty review conferences.

As much of the background information is condensed, it is helpful to consult previous editions for expanded historical knowledge. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations appear as footnotes.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages of the United Nations at <http://ods.un.org>. Specific disarmament-related documents can also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection at <http://disarmament.un.org/library.nsf>.

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www.un.org/disarmament

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
Sales No. E.12.IX.2

ISBN 978-92-1-142286-3

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Printed at the United Nations, New York

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Foreword

To first-time readers of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*: welcome to this authoritative annual chronicle of multilateral events relating to disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The Yearbooks offer a descriptive account rather than an analysis of relevant events. Yet readers have found them useful both in analysing developments and in promoting new efforts to advance disarmament goals.

To our past readers: welcome back. As before, this Yearbook focuses largely on the United Nations disarmament machinery—including its deliberative institutions (the General Assembly’s First Committee and the Disarmament Commission) and the forum to negotiate multilateral treaties (the Conference on Disarmament)—all assisted by the Secretariat.

The Yearbook also covers developments relating to key multilateral treaties and norms:

- The entry into force of the New START (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms).
- Initiatives to implement commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
- Consultations for convening a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
- Initiatives to promote entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to commence negotiations on a fissile material treaty.
- Progress in implementing the protocols to treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.
- Improvements in nuclear safety and security after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which was the focus of a high-level meeting at the United Nations.
- Preparations for final negotiations in 2012 on an arms trade treaty, and the launching of the web platform of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) on the “Global Reported Arms Trade”.
- Significant progress with the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as States parties adopted an implementation architecture for the treaty.

- The launch of the United Nations International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, allowing countries and peacekeepers to improve stockpile management.
- The first Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts under the Programme of Action on small arms, which focused on marking, record keeping and tracing of small arms.

Yet within the disarmament machinery, determined efforts to build consensus have once again fallen short of success—in the Conference on Disarmament, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Through his words and deeds, the Secretary-General continued to promote progress in disarmament, which he has repeatedly identified as one of his highest priorities.

Some readers of this Yearbook will conclude that this lack of consensus is due to some flaw in the disarmament machinery. Others, I believe more justifiably, will recognize that the difficulties are due more to persisting disagreements among the Member States, especially with respect to nuclear weapons. These include the rate of progress on disarmament, the emphasis on preconditions for disarmament, the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation, and the merits of a nuclear weapons convention.

In 2011, there was also a mixed record in addressing proliferation issues. Concerns were raised over nuclear activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. Additional States have signed or brought into force the Model Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen international nuclear safeguards—though universal adherence remains a long-term objective, as is the case with the NPT, and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. In April last year, the Security Council extended the mandate of the committee established under resolution 1540 (2004) for another 10 years (until 2021). Yet another year passed with the CTBT not having entered into force and there were no negotiations on a fissile material treaty.

This mixed record of advances and setbacks makes it very difficult to reach an overall assessment of developments in 2011. This Yearbook describes numerous conferences and meetings of States parties to key multilateral treaties, many of which were held at the United Nations. It discusses relevant events and initiatives at the regional level, especially with respect to conventional weapons and small arms. It also provides an account of some parts of the disarmament machinery that operate without much public attention, such as the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. In many respects, 2011 was a year of transition—but to what end remains difficult to predict.

Space limitations prevent the inclusion of several additional developments in the Yearbook, such as the Secretariat's engagements with civil society and the contributions of the dozens of young people who serve as interns at UNODA each year. In many ways, hopes for the future of disarmament will depend upon the support it has earned from the public, and the younger generation in particular.

Yet for all it offers, I believe that readers will find this Yearbook to be another valuable contribution to the literature and the history of disarmament. I commend it not only to all proponents of disarmament, but also to its critics—for everyone has much to learn and this Yearbook has much to teach.

Angela **Kane**
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
August 2012

Acknowledgements

The production of volume 36 (Part II) of the *Disarmament Yearbook*, like all previous productions, continued to be a team effort involving the considerable time and energy of many members of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The publication was produced under the overall direction of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, as well as the Director of the Office, Hannelore Hoppe.

Many thanks go to the following writers and contributors from the respective units of the Office: Junko Hirakawa, Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Thomas Markram, Myrna Peña, Curtis Raynold, Nils Schmieder, Nikita Smidovich, Fiona Simpson and Michael Spies (Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch); Mikko Autti, António Évora, Gillian Goh, Tsutomu Kono, Pamela Maponga, Tak Mashiko, Hideki Matsuno, Sabrina Pfiffner and Daniël Prins (Conventional Arms Branch); Ngoc Phuong Huynh van der Blij, Richard Lennane, Hine-Wai Loose, Valère Mantels, Piers Millet, Bantan Nugroho, Peter Kolarov, Sarka Krcalova and Jarmo Sareva (Geneva Branch); Leonardo Lara, Louis Dronau and Xiaoyu Wang (Regional Disarmament Branch); Ewen Buchanan, John Ennis and Soo-Hyun Kim (Information and Outreach Branch); Amanda Cowl and Mélanie Régimbal (Lima Centre); Julia Knittel and Aleksander Micic (Kathmandu Centre); Ivor Fung and Colby Goodman (Lomé Centre); and Randy Rydell and Jungmin Julia Oh (Office of the High Representative). Deep appreciations go to the Yearbook consultant, Nazir Kamal, for his high quality contributions, as well as to our colleagues at the Copy Preparation and Proofreading Section for all the assistance provided particularly for this volume of the publication.

Special thanks go to the core team members: Cecile Salcedo for research assistance and copy-editing and Patricia Romualdez Lopez for desktop publishing.

Tam Chung
Editor/Coordinator
New York, August 2012

Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2011

Source: UN Photo/JC McIlwaine



Néstor Osorio (left), Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations, chairs a meeting of the Security Council at which members unanimously adopted resolution 1977 (2011).

Security Council extends mandate of 1540 Committee for 10 years, unanimously adopting resolution 1977 (2011) (20 Apr.)

Pelindaba Treaty opening for signature, 15th anniversary (11 Apr.)

Antarctic Treaty entry into force, 50th anniversary (23 Jun.)

Second Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (28 Feb.-4 Mar.)

Fifth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (4-14 Apr.)

January February March April May June

Conference on Disarmament, first session (24 Jan.-1 Apr.)

Conference on Disarmament, second session (16 May-1 Jul.)

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons opening for signature, 30th anniversary (10 Apr.)

United Nations Disarmament Commission session (4-21 Apr.)

Source: UN Photo/Mark Garten



Unexploded ordnance being prepared for destruction by a United Nations demining battalion in Lebanon.

Source: UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré



Greeting each other prior to the beginning of the 1224th session of the Conference on Disarmament are the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament (right) and the Permanent Representative of China (left).



Source: United States Air Force

A B-1B Lancer unleashes cluster munitions.



Source: Wikipedia/Herbert Orner

Vienna International Centre

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs establishes new office in Vienna (2 Nov.)

Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention (28 Nov.-2 Dec.)

Rarotonga Treaty entry into force, 25th anniversary (11 Dec.)

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (23 Sept.)

Second Ministerial Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (31 Oct.-1 Nov.)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opening for signature, 15th anniversary (24 Sept.)

Second Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (13-16 Sept.)

General Assembly meeting on the follow-up to the 2010 High-Level Meeting on the revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations (27-29 Jul.)

High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security (22 Sept.)

Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons entry into force, 5th anniversary (12 Nov.)

Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (14-25 Nov.)

Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (5-22 Dec.)

Sixty-sixth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly (3-31 Oct.)

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia opening for signature, 5th anniversary (8 Sept.)



Source: UN Photo / UN Photo/JC McIwaine

Secretariat building renovation work continues.

July

August

September

October

November

December

Third Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (11-15 Jul.)

Conference on Disarmament, third session (2 Aug.-16 Sept.)



Nuclear
disarmament
and
non-proliferation

CHAPTER I

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

Nuclear disarmament is especially important because if we fail to achieve it, our other goals will also be in grave jeopardy. International peace and security is not a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. Quite the contrary, verified nuclear disarmament itself would make an immense contribution to international peace and security, and should be pursued today, not deferred because of the false notion that it should be undertaken only in a world fully at peace.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL¹

Developments and trends, 2011

FOLLOWING THE ACHIEVEMENTS in 2010 of important agreements on new commitments aimed at attaining a world free of nuclear weapons and other objectives related to nuclear non-proliferation and security, international efforts in 2011 focused on implementation and consolidation of these gains. Progress on advancing the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda remained stagnant in many respects, although accomplishments in 2011 have laid the groundwork for future improvement.

During the year, States undertook additional actions to implement the commitments agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).² On 5 February, the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms entered into force. From 30 June to 1 July, the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) met in Paris to discuss the implementation of the action plan agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, with a view, in particular, to elaborating a standard form for reporting information on their nuclear arsenals.

At the same time, the NWS continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals, including their nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Some NWS also continued to develop and deploy new nuclear-weapon systems with

¹ Secretary-General's message to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, delivered by Sergio Duarte, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Hiroshima, 6 August 2011. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SG/docs/2011/2011-08-06_Peace_Memorial_hiroshima.pdf.

² The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

new military characteristics, while some advanced plans to modernize their nuclear-weapon research and development infrastructure.

Other States continued to step up efforts to fully implement the commitments agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to advance the broader nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. The 10-nation³ Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Initiative continued their engagement, including at the ministerial level, to maintain the momentum of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to expedite its implementation. From February to July, Kazakhstan convened the Nuclear Discussion Forum in New York to engage in an in-depth discourse on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security issues. Following from the United Nations Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament,⁴ which he articulated in 2008, a group of countries led by Uruguay continued to explore ways to elaborate a road map for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including by means of a universal, legal instrument.

The international community continued to consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. In March, the State Duma of the Russian Federation approved the ratification of the protocols to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)⁵ with reservations. In May, United States President Barack Obama submitted the protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty and to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty⁶ to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Also in May, the First Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, established pursuant to the Pelindaba Treaty, convened in Addis Ababa. In November, the States parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)⁷ and the NWS concluded negotiations that would enable the NWS to accede to the Protocol to the Treaty.

Preparations continued in support of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. In October, the Secretary-General, together with the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, in consultation with the States of the region, announced the appointment of Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, as facilitator and the designation of Finland as the host Government for the conference.

³ Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

⁴ Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/sg5point.shtml> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

The E3+3 countries⁸ and the Islamic Republic of Iran met in January in Istanbul, but were unable to reach agreement on a substantive outcome on issues associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. Although parties were unable to make any progress in their diplomatic efforts by the end of the year, both sides had reaffirmed their willingness to pursue negotiations. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General continued to provide regular reports to the IAEA Board of Governors and United Nations Security Council on the implementation of safeguards and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report submitted for the November meeting of the Board of Governors, which elaborated on previously disclosed information regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's past activities that pointed to a military dimension to its nuclear programme, gave new impetus for the unilateral imposition of sanctions by some countries.

On 3 October, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a report to the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1957 (2010), pertaining to Iraq's progress on its commitment to ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁹ Although Iraq has yet to ratify the Additional Protocol, since 17 February 2010, it has provisionally implemented the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force. Furthermore, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reported that Iraq was continuing its cooperation with the Organisation to implement the Convention.

With respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, on 24 May, the IAEA Director General issued a report to the IAEA Board of Governors in which he concluded that the building at the Dair Alzour site, destroyed by Israel in 2007, was very likely a nuclear reactor that should have been declared by the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement. On 9 June, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/41, in which it, *inter alia*, determined that the Syrian Arab Republic's "undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor" and failure to provide design information on the Dair Alzour site constituted non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. The Board further called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to take steps to remedy the non-compliance forthwith and decided to report the matter to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

With respect to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, throughout 2011, the key States concerned took steps to ease political tension and improve relations to facilitate the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Towards this end,

⁸ China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

⁹ The full title of the treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

in April, China proposed a three-phased process leading to the resumption of the talks. In December, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reportedly agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment programme in exchange for food aid as a precondition for the possible resumption of denuclearization talks, although the implementation of the agreement was interrupted following the death of that country's leader on 17 December.

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant drew attention to the need for the international community to strengthen nuclear safety and security, as well as to further enhance the global radiation emergency response framework. Following his engagement with the heads of international organizations and United Nations entities on the response to the accident, on 20 May, the Secretary-General launched a United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. In June, the IAEA convened the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, which resulted in the development by the IAEA Director General of an Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.¹⁰ In September, the Secretary-General convened a High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, which built upon the existing efforts of the international community to enhance nuclear safety and the international emergency preparedness and response framework.

States continued to make progress to advance their commitments at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., and to make preparations for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in Seoul. In July, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement) and its 2006 and 2010 protocols entered into force. The Agreement committed each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium removed from their nuclear-weapon programmes. A number of States continued to convert their research reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel and to repatriate their stockpiles of highly enriched uranium fuel to the country of origin.

Efforts to address multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle continued to focus on advancing mechanisms to ensure the supply of nuclear fuel for power reactors in the event of non-commercial supply disruptions. In March, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a proposal by the United Kingdom for nuclear supply guarantees, which provided a framework for the establishment of an agreement between a supplier country and a recipient

¹⁰ IAEA, document GOV/2011/59-GC(55)/14. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/Documents/gc55-14.pdf> (accessed 21 May 2012). See also IAEA, "IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan Approved by General Conference", 22 September 2011. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/actionplan.html> (accessed 21 May 2012).

State, to be co-signed by the IAEA. Such an agreement would guarantee an uninterrupted supply either through a contractual assurance or through an agreement with a stand-by supplier State.

Many States expressed growing dissatisfaction with the continuation of the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and some sought to consider alternative means of advancing disarmament negotiations. In July, the General Assembly held a follow-up meeting to the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations held in September 2010. The First Committee of the General Assembly considered several proposals for taking forward negotiations and resolved to review such proposals at its sixty-seventh session in 2012. This included consideration of options for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, should the Conference on Disarmament fail to agree on and implement a comprehensive programme of work by the end of its 2012 session. During the year, the United Nations Disarmament Commission ended another consecutive cycle without agreement on any substantive outcome, including on its agenda item addressing “recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”.

The ratification of the Indonesian parliament of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty¹¹ in December brought the entry into force of the Treaty one step closer. Indonesia, an Annex 2 State, had not yet deposited its instrument of ratification by the end of the year. Of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, eight,¹² excluding Indonesia, had yet to complete ratification. China and the United States continued to express their willingness to ratify, however neither State advanced their ratification efforts in 2011.

For more information on the resolutions and decisions related to this chapter, refer to appendix VIII.

Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty

The seventh Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) took place at the United Nations in New York on 23 September.¹³

¹¹ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

¹² China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Pakistan and United States.

¹³ Conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT were also convened in Vienna in 1999, 2003 and 2007 and in New York in 2001, 2005 and 2009, in accordance with article XIV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. Background information, statements and

Over 160 countries committed themselves to promoting the Treaty's entry into force at the highest political level and joined the United Nations Secretary-General in urging the nine countries whose ratifications were required for the Treaty's entry into force to act without further delay: China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia,¹⁴ Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States. A number of intergovernmental organizations, specialized agencies and related organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations and the media were also present at the Conference.

The Secretary-General convened the Conference in his capacity as the depositary of the CTBT. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Patricia Espinosa Cantellano, and the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, presided over the Conference.

The Conference unanimously adopted the Final Declaration (see appendix II) that called upon the remaining countries to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay. The Final Declaration outlined 10 practical measures for early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty, including various capacity-building and outreach activities; support for bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives by interested States to promote the Treaty's entry into force and its universalization; and encouragement of cooperation with intergovernmental organizations and civil society to raise awareness of the Treaty.

Events in Japan in March

The monitoring data from the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) demonstrated their usefulness for disaster mitigation purposes in March during the devastating earthquake in Japan and the subsequent tsunami.

Over 40 CTBTO radionuclide stations detected radioactive emissions related to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission provided 120 signatory States and 1,200 scientific and expert institutions with independent, reliable and real-time data on the impact of the release. It also responded to requests to share its monitoring data and analysis reports with international organizations involved in disaster prevention and nuclear safety. In this connection, data and analysis on the possible dispersion of radioactive substances in Japan and the wider region was sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Health

documents related to the conferences are available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/XIVConferencesCTBT.shtml>. The Treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

¹⁴ The Indonesian parliament subsequently approved ratification on 6 December 2011. Once Indonesia deposits its instrument of ratification, the number of States that must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force will be reduced to eight.

Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

A United Nations system-wide study¹⁵ on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant highlighted the relevance and usefulness of the CTBTO radionuclide monitoring network in a nuclear emergency and recommended that the CTBTO Preparatory Commission contribute to developing countries' preparedness capacities.

CTBT: Science and Technology 2011 conference

About 500 scientists as well as over 200 diplomats, representatives of civil society and the media participated in the conference entitled "CTBT: Science and Technology 2011", held from 8 to 10 June in Vienna. Representing 105 countries, participants discussed advances in science and technology relevant to test ban verification and explored scientific applications of the CTBT verification infrastructure. The conference also offered a unique opportunity to build partnerships and encourage knowledge exchange between the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the broader scientific community.

In his video address¹⁶ to participants, the United Nations Secretary-General commended the role played by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission during the Japan events in March and praised efforts to "advance the science and technology that underpin the global ban on nuclear testing". During the opening ceremony, Austrian Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Michael Spindelegger, reiterated his country's commitment to ensuring the Treaty's entry into force, which he described as long overdue and necessary.

Over 300 scientific submissions and posters were presented during the three-day conference. Two special sessions on the tragic events in Japan were convened, at which those events were discussed in public for the first time. The first one examined the CTBTO monitoring of the devastating earthquake and the subsequent radioactive emissions from the Fukushima power plant, while the second session considered some of the issues raised since then, such as greater sharing of data and expertise to enable a faster response if such a situation were to occur again.

The next conference in the series, "CTBT: Science and Technology 2013", will be held in Vienna in June 2013.

¹⁵ SG/HLM/2011/1. Available from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=SG/HLM/2011/1 (accessed 2 May 2012).

¹⁶ Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, video message to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Science and Technology 2011 conference, Vienna, 8 June 2011 (recorded on 31 May 2011). Available from <http://www.ctbto.org/specials/ctbt-science-and-technology-20118-10-june-2011-vienna-austria/?Fsize=o> (accessed 16 May 2012).

International Day against Nuclear Tests

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission organized a number of outreach activities at the United Nations in Vienna and New York to raise awareness about the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 29 August. The Day was established by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/35 of 2 December 2009 at the initiative of Kazakhstan.

International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

The Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission joined over 500 high-level officials, lawmakers, non-proliferation specialists and media representatives from around the world at the International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World in Astana on 12 October. Kazakhstan organized the meeting on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the closure of the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. The Forum adopted a Declaration on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,¹⁷ which included a call to all States to ratify the CTBT and to refrain from nuclear testing.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Political support

Momentum for the entry into force of the CTBT was sustained in 2011 with ratifications by Guinea and Ghana. The Treaty's 182 signatures and 155 ratifications as at the end of 2011 reflected the near universal recognition within the international community that the Treaty was an effective instrument of collective security and an important pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Furthermore, the verification regime being established by the CTBTO to monitor the globe for nuclear explosions was now approaching completion, with over 80 per cent of its monitoring facilities fully operational.

Capacity Development Initiative

In addition to training hundreds of technical experts in CTBT verification-related fields over the years, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission launched a new Capacity Development Initiative in 2011 aimed at training the next generation of CTBT experts. It was based on the recognition that building and maintaining the necessary capacity, particularly in the developing world, to effectively tackle the scientific, political and legal challenges that are facing the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regime is of critical importance.

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Declaration on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Astana, October 12, 2011". Available from <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/news/nws2011/2011-10-12> (accessed 10 May 2012).

As part of this initiative, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has developed a series of introductory and advanced courses dealing with various aspects of the Treaty and the verification regime. An introductory course was held from 5 to 9 September, entitled “Strengthening Verification, Enhancing Security”. Follow-up activities during the year included an advanced science course from 28 November to 9 December, which examined in depth the scientific and technical aspects of the Treaty’s verification regime.

Campaigns related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

A website series, which put a spotlight on the most “Infamous Anniversaries” of nuclear tests conducted since 1945, was launched in 2011. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission also initiated a campaign on 6 August to commemorate the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which included a dedicated feature on the public website, a video clip and a range of social media outreach activities.¹⁸

Michael Douglas, United Nations Messenger for Peace, appeared in a new series of television spots launched in November, in which he called on all countries to support the CTBT and to help end nuclear testing forever. In particular, he appealed to those States that had not yet ratified the Treaty to do so without delay so that it could enter into force and become global law.

Bilateral agreements, multilateral discussions and other issues

Implementation of disarmament commitments by the nuclear-weapon States

From 30 June to 1 July, the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) met in Paris to discuss the implementation of the action plan¹⁹ agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The meeting focused, in particular, on the commitment of NWS to accelerate concrete progress of steps leading to nuclear disarmament, the development of a standard form for reporting information on their nuclear arsenals and implementation of the action plan on the Middle East. The NWS agreed to continue their discussions on transparency in 2012 at the expert level and on the margins of the first session of Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

¹⁸ More information about the CTBTO social media campaigns is available from www.ctbto.org (accessed 9 May 2012).

¹⁹ NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 19-31.

Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

On 5 February, the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),²⁰ entered into force. The parties began the process of implementing their obligations under the Treaty, including, inter alia, making plans for the required reductions in deployments, bilateral consultations, and the exchange and public release of information on their treaty-accountable stockpiles.

The Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) on the New START held its first two sessions in 2011. As the implementation body established by the Treaty, the Commission is required to meet at least twice each year, unless the parties agree otherwise. At each of the BCC meetings, both countries discussed technical issues related to the implementation of the Treaty. At its first session, the BCC adopted two joint statements²¹ pertaining to the conduct of on-site inspections.

Follow-on measures to the Treaty

Although the Russian Federation and the United States continued dialogue on further reductions, including their stockpiles of non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons, no follow-on negotiations were initiated in 2011. Both sides publicly expressed their respective positions early in the year, revealing the persistence of divergent views on matters pertaining to non-strategic nuclear weapons, missile defence and other matters.

In connection with the ratification of the New START, President Barack Obama, in a message to the United States Senate on 2 February, pledged “to initiate, following consultation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies but not later than one year after the entry into force of the New START, negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner; and ... it is the policy of the United States that such negotiations shall not include defensive missile systems”.²²

²⁰ United States Department of State, “New START: Treaty Text”. Available from <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm> (accessed 8 May 2012).

²¹ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “New START BCC Joint Statements”, 8 April 2011. Available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/NST/BCC_statements.htm (accessed 21 May 2012).

²² The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Message from the President on the New START Treaty”, 2 February 2011. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/02/message-president-new-start-treaty-0> (accessed 21 May 2012).

On 1 March, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, discussed his country's position²³ on the next steps related to nuclear disarmament and "cuts [in] tactical nuclear weapons". Towards the goals of reaching "global zero" and reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, he stated that the key principle was the "indivisibility of security". In addition, he added that "there is a clear need to take into account the factors that negatively affect strategic stability, such as plans to place weapons in outer space, to develop non-nuclear armed strategic offensive weapons, as well as unilateral deployment of a global ballistic missile defence system". He further stated that "the considerable imbalances in conventional arms" must also be addressed, particularly as this matter relates to regions of conflict. Specifically regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons, he affirmed that "[w]ithdrawal of these weapons to the territory of the State to which they belong as well as removal of the infrastructure for their deployment abroad should be regarded as a first step towards the resolution of this problem".

Missile defence

The United States continued its efforts to develop ballistic missile defence (BMD) in Europe, under its European Phased Adaptive Approach plan and as a national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture. The stated purpose of the plan is to protect against ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East towards the United States or Europe.

As part of the first phase of its plan, in March, the United States announced the deployment to the Mediterranean of the Aegis BMD-capable USS Monterey, a guided-missile cruiser. In April, Poland ratified an agreement to host the second site of land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) BMD interceptors, to be deployed in 2018. In May, Romania and the United States announced an agreement on the location of the first site for land-based SM-3 interceptors, to be deployed in 2015. In September, Turkey agreed to host a transportable X-band, high-resolution, phased-array (AN/TPY-2) radar as part of plans to deploy a total of 18 such systems to support BMD in Europe.

The Russian Federation remained concerned about the plans to place anti-missile interceptors in Europe. Pursuant to the decision taken in November 2010, the NATO-Russia Council met three times during the year to discuss missile defence, as it continued unsuccessful efforts to explore opportunities for joint missile defence cooperation. The ongoing dispute threatened to undermine recent progress towards the reduction of strategic offensive nuclear forces and to complicate efforts to achieve further cuts in all

²³ See Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, "Statement by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament", 3 March 2011. Available from <http://www.rusembassy.ca/ru/node/538> (accessed 21 May 2012).

types of nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, as well as deployed and non-deployed.

The NATO-Russia Council meeting in January addressed possible modalities for shared missile defence systems. However, the parties could reportedly not agree on whether to develop two separate systems, as preferred by NATO, or one integrated system, as preferred by the Russian Federation. At its meeting in July, the NATO-Russia Council was said to have been able to clarify some outstanding issues, though the parties were unable to reach agreement on the major points.

On 23 November, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a statement²⁴ on missile defence in which he expressed regret at the lack of cooperation. In response to the ongoing plans to deploy a BMD in Europe, President Medvedev announced the decision to, inter alia, “deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country”, including the deployment of Iskander missiles in the region of Kaliningrad. At the NATO-Russia Council meeting in December, members of NATO expressed regret over the decisions taken by the Russian Federation and affirmed their interest in continuing to seek cooperation.

Modernization of nuclear forces and related infrastructure

In his message²⁵ to the Senate on 2 February, President Obama stated that he intended “to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM); and maintain the United States rocket motor industrial base”. He further stated his intent to accelerate the design and engineering phase for the construction of two multi-billion-dollar nuclear facilities,²⁶ necessary for the resumed production of new nuclear weapons, and committed to request multi-year funding for these facilities. In early 2011, the United States Navy and Air Force reportedly indicated that preparations were under way for the development of a new generation of SSBNs and “a new long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber”. Further reports stated that the Air Force had begun studying design options for a potential successor to the Minuteman III ICBM, to “shape the plan and resource strategy to recapitalize [the] ICBM force beyond 2030”.

²⁴ President of the Russian Federation, “Statement in connection with the situation concerning the NATO countries’ missile defence system in Europe”, 23 November 2011. Available from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3115> (accessed 21 May 2012).

²⁵ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Message from the President on the New START Treaty”, 2 February 2011. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/02/message-president-new-start-treaty-0> (accessed 21 May 2012).

²⁶ Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 plant in Tennessee.

In February, the Russian Federation released its State Armament Programme for 2011-2020, which reportedly included \$70 billion to be spent during this period on modernizing the Russian nuclear arsenal. As it continues to deactivate and retire its 10 remaining active Delta-III and Delta-IV SSBNs, the Russian Federation continued to produce up to a total of eight Borey-class SSBNs.²⁷ The boats would eventually all be armed with the Buluva SLBMs and were expected to be certified for service later during the year. Reportedly, the State Armament Programme further provided for the development of a new “heavy” ICBM, to be deployed by 2018. Russian defence officials reportedly stated that the new ICBM would feature multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles to potentially “defeat” missile defences deployed by the United States. The Russian Federation continued to deploy a new variant of the road-mobile Topol-M ICBM, which carries either three or four warheads each.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Throughout the year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reportedly continued to operate its uranium enrichment facility and make progress on the construction of a 30 MW(e) experimental light-water reactor at Yongbyon. Though the IAEA has been unable to verify the status of the uranium enrichment facility, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had previously indicated that it was operational and configured to produce low-enriched uranium. Early during the year, political re-engagement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea continued to be considered a prerequisite for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, notwithstanding the proposal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 1 January for an unconditional return to disarmament negotiations. The two States ended initial, working-level, inter-military talks in February, reportedly without achieving any major breakthrough. In May, the President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-Bak, stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be invited to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit if the latter were to “firmly agree to denuclearization”. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not provide any public response to this offer.

On 22 July, at the margins of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in Bali, the Vice-Foreign Minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea met with his counterpart in the Republic of Korea for discussions aimed at eventually restarting the Six-Party Talks. Following this meeting, on 29 July, the United States Special Representative for North Korea Policy and the First Vice-Foreign Minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held a bilateral meeting towards resuming the Six-Party

²⁷ The first completed Borey-class SSBN, *Yuri Dolgoruki*, began sea trials in 2009. The second boat in this class, *Aleksandr Nevskiy*, is expected to be delivered in 2011.

Talks, in which the former sought to explore the willingness of the latter “to take concrete and irreversible steps toward denuclearization”. Both countries held a second bilateral meeting in October.

In September, IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, submitted to the Board of Governors and the General Conference a report entitled “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. The report provided an historical overview and update on the recent developments “of direct relevance to the Agency” pertaining to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and was prepared at the request of members of the Board of Governors. (For more information, see p. 28.)

On 17 December, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reportedly agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment programme in exchange for up to 240,000 tons of food aid, following two days of bilateral discussions in Beijing between the United States special envoy for North Korean human rights issues and the Director-General of North American affairs at the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. According to news reports, as a “possible” precondition for the resumption of denuclearization talks, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea agreed “to implement initial measures of denuclearisation that include a suspension of its uranium enrichment programme”. Due to the death on 17 December of the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-Il, the implementation of the agreement was suspended.

On 20 December, the IAEA Director General reaffirmed the readiness of the Agency to redeploy inspectors to the Yongbyon nuclear site, which he characterized as “absolutely necessary for progress on denuclearisation”.

Islamic Republic of Iran

With respect to international efforts to resolve the concerns pertaining to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, little progress was made towards the achievement of a diplomatic and political solution. From 21 to 22 January, the E3+3 countries²⁸ and the Islamic Republic of Iran held talks in Istanbul that reportedly concluded without agreement on substantive issues, including on various points pertaining to the purpose of the negotiations.

Despite this outcome, the parties continued to seek the establishment of a long-term negotiating process, though no further meetings between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran were held during the year. On 1 February, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry expressed the readiness of his country to pursue additional talks. Later that month, the European Union (EU) High Representative, Catherine Ashton, reportedly sent a letter to Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, requesting a further meeting of the E3+3.

²⁸ China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

Though the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council reportedly “accepted” the invitation from the EU High Representative in a letter dated 10 May, a spokesperson in the Office of the EU High Representative stated that the response “[did] not contain anything new and does not justify a further meeting”. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to announce new developments with respect to its nuclear programme. In April, the Chief of the Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly stated that his country would build four to five new research reactors, fuelled with uranium enriched to 20 per cent U-235, in different provinces within the next few years “to produce radio-medicine and perform research”. Furthermore, a spokesperson for the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that his country would have produced sufficient 20 per cent U-235 by March 2012 to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor.

On 9 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 1984 (2011), in which it decided to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) for one year. The Council requested that the Panel provide a midterm report to the 1737 Committee by 11 November and to the Council by 9 December, following discussions by the Committee. In resolution 1984 (2011), the Security Council determined that “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security”.

During the second half of the year, diplomatic efforts to address the nuclear issues proceeded along two separate tracks, as the EU High Representative and the Russian Federation sought the modalities to resume negotiations. At the same time, the IAEA sought increased cooperation from the Islamic Republic of Iran on resolving outstanding issues as it expressed “increasing concern” and released more detailed accounts of information it had received from Member States over a period of years.

On 13 July, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, described a proposed “step-by-step” approach²⁹ to resolve the nuclear issue, during a press conference with the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. According to the Russian Foreign Minister, the proposal would entail a “phased and mutual process”, which would include “some kind of a roadmap, starting from the easiest questions and in the end there will be the most difficult ones that would require time. ... [E]ach specific step of Iran would be followed by some reciprocal step, like freezing some sanctions and shortening the volume of sanctions”.³⁰ He further reported that the proposal had already

²⁹ See United States Department of State, “Remarks With Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov After their Meeting”, 13 July 2011. Available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168478.htm> (accessed 21 May 2012).

³⁰ Ibid.

been shared with China and the United States and that consideration of the proposal would be continued at the expert level.

Although the Russian proposal received a mixed reaction from Iranian officials, according to press reports, on 21 July, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad “cautiously welcomed” the proposal. Following two rounds of talks with Russian officials in Tehran, on 19 August, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council reportedly stated that the proposal “can be a basis to start negotiations for regional and international cooperation, specifically in the field of peaceful nuclear activities”.

In September, the IAEA Director General issued an updated report³¹ on the implementation of safeguards and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report notably expressed that the Agency was “increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency continues to receive new information”. The report indicated that the source of the information that underlined its concern had been acquired both from “many Member States” and through the Agency’s own efforts and that it was extensive and comprehensive.

Efforts to advance political negotiations continued through October, as the E3+3 appeared to consolidate its position around the establishment of a phased step-by-step process leading to the resolution of the nuclear issue. In a letter sent on 6 September, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council reportedly informed the EU High Representative that the Islamic Republic of Iran was ready to engage in new negotiations if its inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would be respected.

On 21 September, the E3+3 countries issued a joint statement³² in which they reaffirmed that “their overall goal remains a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution, on the basis of reciprocity and a step-by-step approach, which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program consistent with the NPT”.

The EU High Representative sent a letter of response to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council on 21 October. Her letter welcomed the suggestion to resume talks and expressed support for a “continuous and long-term process of building confidence and developing cooperation” to overcome the deficit in confidence. She reaffirmed the overall goal of the E3+3 joint statement of 21 September. According to the letter, the confidence-

³¹ IAEA, document GOV/2011/54. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-54.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

³² Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative (on behalf of the E3/EU+3), Brussels, 21 September 2011. Available from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124694.pdf (accessed 18 May 2012).

building measures would form the first elements of a phased approach that would eventually lead to a comprehensive settlement, including the full implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.

On 8 November, the IAEA Director General issued an updated report on the implementation of safeguards and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.³³ The report notably included a detailed annex on the possible military dimensions to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. The information contained in the annex generally reflected previously reported allegations regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's past efforts to develop a nuclear payload for a missile, based on information that had been available to the Agency for several years and described in less detail in earlier reports. The controversial report resulted in increased concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.

In reaction to the IAEA Director General's report, on 18 November, the Agency's Board of Governors adopted a resolution entitled "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran"³⁴ by 32 votes in favour to 2 against, with 1 abstention. In the resolution, the Board expressed "deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions".

The Board continued to express support for two parallel diplomatic tracks to address the nuclear issue, focusing on: the Islamic Republic of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA towards resolving outstanding issues of concern; and a diplomatic solution between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran. With respect to the former, the Board stressed that "it is essential for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue". With respect to the latter, the Board affirmed the goals expressed in the 21 September statement of the E3+3 and called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage in negotiations seriously and without preconditions.

In December, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to express readiness to advance political negotiations and to address the outstanding issues identified by the IAEA, amid the pursuit of unilateral sanctions by some and rising tensions among the parties. On 14 December, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly sent a letter to the IAEA Director General restating its invitation for high-level IAEA officials to visit the country. The purpose of such a visit would be to clarify the outstanding issues. On 31 December,

³³ IAEA, document GOV/2011/65. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

³⁴ IAEA, document GOV/2011/69. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-69.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi reportedly said that his country was ready to resume negotiations on the basis of the Russian proposal.

Syrian Arab Republic

With respect to the outstanding issues pertaining to the nuclear programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the IAEA was for the first time able to draw major conclusions pertaining to its investigation, although certain key issues remained unresolved. On 24 May, the IAEA Director General submitted to the Board of Governors a report entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”.

With respect to the Dair Alzour site, destroyed by Israel in September 2007, the Agency concluded that “the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor [that] should have been declared by Syria pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 of its Safeguards Agreement”. In particular, the IAEA assessed that the “features of the destroyed building are comparable to those of a gas cooled graphite moderated reactor”. The Agency also reported that it was unable to provide any assessment concerning the nature or operational status of three other locations that it had determined to be functionally related to the Dair Alzour site. The Agency continued to express regret that the Syrian Arab Republic had not cooperated since June 2008 in response to the Agency’s questions on this matter.

With respect to the detection of human-origin uranium particles found at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in 2008 and in 2009, the Agency concluded that, based on the information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic and the results of the Agency’s verification activities, the former’s explanations for the origin of the particles “are not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings”. Therefore, the Agency decided to henceforth follow up on the matter only through the routine operation of safeguards.

On 9 June, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/41,³⁵ in which it, *inter alia*, determined that the Syrian Arab Republic’s “undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor” and failure to provide design information on the Dair Alzour site “constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute”. The Board called upon the Syrian Arab Republic “to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement” and to respond “positively and without delay” to the Director General’s requests for information “so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria’s nuclear program pursuant to Syria’s Safeguards Agreement”. Furthermore, the Board decided to report the Syrian

³⁵ Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-41.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012). Adopted by a recorded vote, with 17 States in favour, 6 against, 11 abstentions and 1 not voting.

Arab Republic's "non-compliance" to all members of the Agency as well as to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly took any action on the Syrian nuclear issue in 2011.

Nuclear safety and security

On 11 March, a massive earthquake struck off the coast of Japan, triggering a devastating tsunami. The combined events crippled the cooling systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, owned and operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), and gave rise to a radiation emergency. It subsequently became known that within hours of the accident, the loss of cooling resulted in the full or partial meltdown of the nuclear fuel in three of the six units at the power plant and exposed spent fuel held in temporary storage ponds. The conditions in the cores of the damaged reactors led to the build-up of hydrogen gas, which resulted in large explosions that destroyed the secondary containment structures of three of the units.

The accident led to the widespread release of radiation into the environment and into the ocean, resulting in the mandatory evacuation of people living in the vicinity of the plant and restrictions on the distribution and consumption of certain food products in the affected areas. The Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency notified the IAEA that it classified the accident as level 7 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale. According to the IAEA, level 7, the highest point on the scale, denotes a major accident, including the major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring the implementation of planned and extended countermeasures. The Chernobyl accident was the only other event that had been classified as level 7.

At the end of 2011, TEPCO reported that it had achieved a cold shutdown of the damaged reactors at the plant, bringing the temperatures within the reactor cores below the boiling point of water, thereby achieving a key milestone in its efforts to stabilize the situation.

Immediately after the accident, the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre notified all relevant international organizations and activated the Joint Emergency Radiation Plan of the International Organizations, maintained by the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies.³⁶

³⁶ Established following the Chernobyl accident and comprising 15 member organizations: European Commission, European Police Office, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Criminal Police Organization, International Maritime Organization, Office for Outer Space Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency, Pan American Health Organization, Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, United Nations Environment Programme, World Health Organization and World Meteorological Organization.

Other international organizations also activated their emergency response arrangements and closely monitored the situation, including, inter alia, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization.

The United Nations Secretary-General engaged with the heads of the relevant international organizations soon after the accident. On 25 March, the Secretary-General held a videoconference with international organizations to take stock of the international response to the latest developments.

United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

On 19 April, in his speech at the Kyiv Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy, the Secretary-General proposed five concrete measures to strengthen nuclear safety and security, including a United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The study,³⁷ launched on 20 May, was comprised of contributions and inputs from sixteen United Nations entities, specialized agencies and related organizations³⁸ and was prepared for the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, convened by the Secretary-General on 22 September in New York. The IAEA acted as the lead coordinating entity for the aspects of the report that fell exclusively within its statutory areas of responsibility.

The study contained three parts, each with a particular focus: part one—specific issues pertaining to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear safety; part two—on nuclear safety and security; and part three—international emergency response framework in case of nuclear accidents. Based on the inputs provided by the contributing organizations, key observations by the Secretary-General included the following:

³⁷ SG/HLM/2011/1. Available from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=SG/HLM/2011/1 (accessed 2 May 2012).

³⁸ Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Pan American Health Organization, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, World Health Organization and World Meteorological Organization.

- The accident raised concerns about the adequacy of international safety standards and conventions, the global emergency preparedness and response system, and the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies.
- While some States have taken the decision not to pursue or to phase-out nuclear energy, other States remained committed to developing and acquiring nuclear power. Therefore, disaster risk analyses and enhanced hazard assessments must be further developed to ensure that nuclear plants are built and operated safely and are able to withstand any possible threat that could give rise to a radiation emergency.
- The accident underscored the critical importance of the public being properly informed about risk and options for its management, and also had implications for nuclear security and the prevention of attacks on nuclear energy installations and nuclear materials.
- The international response tested existing scientific and monitoring capabilities and highlighted the need for the integration of existing capabilities.
- The accident demonstrated that national and regional capacities to identify risks and hazards stemming from nuclear power stations and other industrial facilities should be augmented and linked to humanitarian contingency planning and preparedness processes.
- In light of the potential long-term health impacts from radiation exposure, in particular to agriculture, strengthened cooperation and coordination among relevant entities is important. Further reflection was also required on how the environmental, social and economic consequences of major accidents are included in decision-making processes pertaining to nuclear power.

High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security

On 22 September, the Secretary-General convened the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security. The meeting built upon the existing efforts of the international community to enhance nuclear safety and the international emergency preparedness and response framework in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, including the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in June. The discussions demonstrated the resolve of the international community and emphasized strong support for the IAEA in continuing to lead these efforts.

A total of 69 delegates spoke, including 8 Heads of State or Government, 30 ministers, and representatives of intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, specialized agencies and related organizations, including the IAEA. The Heads of State or Government of Brazil, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine addressed the opening session of the meeting.

At the end of the meeting, the Secretary-General circulated the Chair's summary (see appendix V), which reflected his understanding of the views expressed. Taking into consideration the points raised during the meeting, the Secretary-General suggested a number of follow-up actions.

To address the implications of the Fukushima accident, the Secretary-General appealed to the General Assembly to ensure that the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had all necessary resources to assess the radiation risks attributable to the accident. He also suggested that Member States consider the intersection between the issues of nuclear energy, climate change and sustainable development at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, also known as the Rio+20 Conference.

To strengthen the link between the international humanitarian coordination system and the international nuclear response system, the Secretary-General said that he would ask the Chair of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee³⁹ to examine how to improve the capacity of its members.

To raise awareness and improve nuclear safeguards, safety and security, the Secretary-General encouraged the G8 countries to further develop the International Initiative on 3S-Based Nuclear Energy Infrastructure.⁴⁰

To address the nexus between nuclear safety and security, he called for steps to ensure the universal application of the international conventions on nuclear safety and security. In particular, the Secretary-General called for States parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to consider ways to promote ratification and implementation of the Convention in 2012. He also called for these matters to be discussed at the relevant forums, including at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.⁴¹

International Atomic Energy Agency verification

Since its founding in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has served as the focal point for worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for promoting global nuclear security and safety and, through its verification activities, for providing assurances that international undertakings to use nuclear material and facilities for peaceful

³⁹ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is a unique forum involving the key United Nations and non-United Nations humanitarian partners.

⁴⁰ The "3S" principles are safeguards, safety and security.

⁴¹ The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference will take place in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2012.

purposes are being honoured.⁴² The following is a brief survey of the work of the IAEA in 2011, within the framework of nuclear verification, nuclear security, peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel assurances.

A major pillar of the IAEA programme involves activities that ultimately enable the IAEA to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The Agency's verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".⁴³

Strengthened safeguards system

Safeguards conclusions

At the end of each year, the IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State with a safeguards agreement in force, based upon the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a "broader conclusion" to be drawn that "*all* nuclear material remained in peaceful activities", a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)⁴⁴ and an additional protocol (AP)⁴⁵ in force, and the IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities in the State. For States that have CSAs but not APs in force, the IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as the Agency does not have sufficient tools to draw credible safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

For those States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn and for which a State-level integrated safeguards approach has been approved,⁴⁶ the

⁴² For more on the IAEA, see <http://www.iaea.org/About/>.

⁴³ For a description, see "The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency", http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012). See also article III (1) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

⁴⁴ CSAs are based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected), "The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infircs/Others/infirc153.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁴⁵ APs are based on INFCIRC/540 (corrected), "Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards". Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infircs/1997/infirc540c.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁴⁶ IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval in 1997 of the Model Protocol Additional (issued as INFCIRC/540 (corrected)), and the work begun in 1999 directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards: an optimized combination of all safeguards

Secretariat is able to implement integrated safeguards to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the IAEA safeguards obligations.

During the year, safeguards were applied for 178 States⁴⁷ with safeguards agreements with the IAEA in force, and of these, 109 States had both CSAs and APs in force. For 58 of these States,⁴⁸ the IAEA concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. For 51 of the States, the Agency had not yet completed all the necessary evaluations under their APs, and concluded that the declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. For 61 States with CSAs in force but without APs in force, the IAEA was able to draw the conclusion that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities.

In 2011, for three States that had safeguards agreements in force, based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which require the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items subject to such safeguards agreements, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items, to which safeguards were applied, remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States, all of which have voluntary offer safeguards agreements in force. For these five States, the IAEA concluded that nuclear material to which safeguards were applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements.

The Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions in 2011 for 14 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without safeguards agreements in force.

Integrated safeguards⁴⁹ were implemented during the entirety of 2011 in 51 States.⁵⁰

measures available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the IAEA safeguards obligations.

⁴⁷ The 178 States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where the IAEA did not implement safeguards and therefore could not draw any conclusion.

⁴⁸ And Taiwan Province of China.

⁴⁹ See section G on integrated safeguards, in "The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵⁰ Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols

Safeguards agreements⁵¹ and APs are the principal legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments therefore continued to be the key to an effective and efficient IAEA safeguards system.

In 2011, CSAs pursuant to the NPT entered into force for the Congo, Montenegro and Mozambique. A CSA was signed with Guinea. In addition, an agreement with Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of two nuclear power stations, which is based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, entered into force.

APs to safeguards agreements entered into force for Andorra, Bahrain, the Congo, Costa Rica, the Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco and Mozambique. APs were signed with Guinea and the Republic of Moldova. In addition, an AP with Iraq continued to be provisionally implemented in 2011 pending its entry into force. Overall, a total of 138 States had signed APs and 113 had brought APs into force by the end of the year.⁵²

Small quantities protocols (SQPs) to CSAs were amended with El Salvador, the Gambia, Guatemala, Panama, the Republic of Moldova, San Marino and Zimbabwe.⁵³ Such amendments were concluded in the context of the Board of Governors' September 2005 decisions on SQPs that reinstated the IAEA rights for the application of safeguards measures in States with limited nuclear material and activities.

The conclusion and amendment of such legal instruments was the focus of safeguards outreach activities by the IAEA Secretariat throughout the year.⁵⁴ In 2011, the Secretariat convened four outreach events: an interregional seminar, held in Singapore in March, on the Agency's safeguards system for States in South-East and South Asia with limited nuclear material and activities; a regional seminar, held in Singapore in March, on the Agency's safeguards system for States in South-East Asia with significant nuclear activities; and two briefings, held in Geneva in May and New York in October, for a number of Permanent Missions on the Agency's safeguards. In addition,

⁵¹ Specific types of safeguards agreements are defined in the *IAEA Safeguards Glossary*, 2001 edition, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 3, paras. 1.18-1.21.

⁵² For more information, see Safeguards Statement for 2011, Background to Safeguards Statement and Executive Summary of the Safeguards Implementation Report. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵³ For more information, see http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2005/strengthening_sg.html (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵⁴ For additional information, see the IAEA document, "Plan of Action to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols". Available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sg_actionplan.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

consultations on the amendment of SQPs and the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and APs were held throughout the year with representatives of member and non-member States in Berlin, Geneva, New York and Vienna, and also during training events organized in Vienna and elsewhere by the Secretariat.

Verification activities

The report of the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors and the fifty-fifth IAEA General Conference in September entitled “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”⁵⁵ provided a historical overview and update on developments of direct relevance to the Agency, along with information on the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Since December 2002, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had not permitted the IAEA to implement safeguards in the State and, therefore, the IAEA could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the country.⁵⁶ In addition, the report stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had not implemented those measures that were binding upon it pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

In September, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution⁵⁷ that, *inter alia*, expressed concern regarding the claimed uranium enrichment programme and light water reactor construction of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and which strongly urged the country not to conduct any further nuclear tests and to fully comply with all its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and other relevant resolutions. It also called upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to, *inter alia*, come into full compliance with the NPT and to cooperate promptly with the IAEA in the full and effective implementation of Agency comprehensive safeguards.

In 2011, the Director General submitted four reports⁵⁸ to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. In November, the IAEA Director General reported to the Board

⁵⁵ IAEA, document GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/GC55Documents/English/gc55-24_en.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵⁶ For more information, see Safeguards Statement for 2011, Background to Safeguards Statement and Executive Summary of the Safeguards Implementation Report. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵⁷ IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, document GC(55)/RES/13. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/GC55Resolutions/English/gc55res-13_en.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁵⁸ IAEA, “IAEA and Iran: IAEA Reports–2011”. Available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/iaea_reports.shtml (accessed 9 May 2012).

of Governors that while the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside the facilities declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its CSA, as the Islamic Republic of Iran did not provide the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its AP, the IAEA was not able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in that country was used in peaceful activities. The report also noted that contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its CSA; suspend its enrichment-related activities; suspend its heavy water-related activities; or address the Agency's serious concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. The November report also contained an annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency's concerns about possible military dimensions to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme.⁵⁹

In November, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution in which, *inter alia*, it stressed the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues and requested "the Director General to include in his progress report to the March 2012 meeting of the Board of Governors an assessment of the implementation of this resolution".⁶⁰

During the year, two reports⁶¹ of the Director General were submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic. In his report⁶² to the June meetings of the Board of Governors, the Director General stressed that the Syrian Arab Republic had not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the three other locations allegedly functionally related to it. Based on all the information available to the Agency and its technical evaluation of that information, the Agency assessed that it was very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency. As for the three other locations, the Agency was unable to provide

⁵⁹ IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran", document GOV/2011/69. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-69.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁶¹ Available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeasyria/iaea_reports.shtml (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁶² IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic", document GOV/2011/41, para. 1. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-41.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

any assessment concerning their nature or operational status.⁶³ Concerning the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), a plan of action was agreed upon in September 2010 for resolving the inconsistencies identified by the Agency, and the Syrian Arab Republic provided requested access to Homs. The report concluded that the matter would be addressed in the routine implementation of safeguards.⁶⁴

On 9 June, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution in which, *inter alia*, it found “that Syria’s undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and failure to provide design information for the facility ... are a breach of Articles 41 and 42 of the Syrian Arab Republic’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute”. The Board also decided “to report, as provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute, through the Director General, the Syrian Arab Republic’s non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement to all members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, to provide to the Security Council all reports prepared by the Director General related to the issue, and to make the text of this resolution as well as all previous reports on this issue available to the public”.⁶⁵

Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East

IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East

In 2000, the IAEA General Conference adopted decision GC(44)/DEC/12, in which the Conference requested the Director General, *inter alia*, to develop an agenda and modalities, which would help to ensure a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), including confidence-building and verification measures for establishing an NWFZ in the region of the Middle East. As mandated by decision GC(44)/DEC/12, the Director General sought the views of member States of the Middle East region with regard to developing an agenda and modalities for convening a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence-building. In this regard, the Agency

⁶³ IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”, document GOV/2011/30, para. 33. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-30.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 34.

⁶⁵ IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”, document GOV/2011/41 (9 June 2011), para. 3. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-41.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

circulated a proposed agenda in 2004⁶⁶ and continued seeking the views of the concerned member States. On 4 March 2011, the Director General once again sought the views of member States of the Middle East region on an agenda and modalities for convening a forum along the lines of the Secretariat's proposal. Many States welcomed the Director General's continued efforts. On 31 August, the Director General wrote to all member States inviting them to take part in the IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East from 21 to 22 November at the Agency's headquarters. The Director General appointed Jan Petersen, Resident Representative of Norway to the IAEA, to chair the Forum.

Some 275 participants from 97 member States of the IAEA attended the Forum, where they heard presentations from representatives of the five existing NWFZs, as well as two regional verification entities—the European Atomic Energy Community and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.⁶⁷

The outcome document of the Forum was the Chair's summary based on the proceedings of the Forum.⁶⁸

Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel

The world's first low-enriched uranium (LEU) reserve under the Agency's auspices was inaugurated on 17 December 2010, located at the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk, Russian Federation.⁶⁹ The LEU Reserve is available to IAEA member States whose supplies of LEU are disrupted for reasons unrelated to technical or commercial considerations. The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the IAEA regarding the establishment on the territory of the Russian Federation of a Physical Reserve of LEU and the Supply of LEU therefrom to the IAEA

⁶⁶ IAEA, "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East", document GOV/2004/61-GC(48)/18, annex. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/GC48Documents/English/gc48-18_en.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁶⁷ IAEA, "Forum on Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Middle East Closes". Available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/nwfz-forum-closes.html> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁶⁸ Available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/misc/2011/petersen221111.pdf> (9 May 2012).

⁶⁹ IAEA, "Russia Inaugurates World's First Low Enriched Uranium Reserve", available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2010/leureserve.html> (accessed 9 May 2012). IAEA Director General, "Statement at Inauguration of LEU Reserve at IUEC, Angarsk", available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2010/amp2010n024.html> (accessed 9 May 2012). IAEA, "Assurance of Supply for nuclear Fuel: IEUC and the LEU Guaranteed Reserve", available from <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Assurance-of-Supply/iuec.html> (accessed 9 May 2012).

for its Member States,⁷⁰ signed in Vienna on 29 March 2010, entered into force on 3 February.

On 10 March, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a proposal for a Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NFA)⁷¹ by the United Kingdom, co-sponsored by the member States of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States, for the assurance of supply of enrichment services and LEU for use in nuclear power plants. The NFA is designed to provide IAEA member States with an additional level of assurance for the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The United Kingdom originally proposed the NFA in August 2009 based on the principle of governmental non-interference in existing supply contracts involving suppliers of nuclear fuel services. The Standard NFA underpinning a supply contract between a customer State and a supplier State, with the IAEA as a co-signatory, assures that a commercial contract shall not be interrupted for non-commercial reasons as long as the commitments made by the States parties continue to be met. A Stand-by NFA underpinning a supply contract between a customer State and a supplier State, with the IAEA as a co-signatory, assures that a supplier State would be able to provide fuel supplies in the event that a contracted third-party supplier in another State, with whom the customer has a contract, is prevented from fulfilling that contract for non-commercial reasons.⁷²

The Board of Governors approved the establishment of an LEU Bank owned and operated by the IAEA on 3 December 2010.⁷³ Should an IAEA member State experience a supply disruption of LEU for nuclear power generation, and the supply cannot be restored by the commercial market, it may call upon the IAEA LEU Bank to secure LEU supply at market price, as long as it fulfils the eligibility criteria as set out by the Agency's Board of Governors. During 2011, the IAEA Secretariat continued work on developing the administrative, financial, legal and technical arrangements. In May, the Agency circulated criteria for a host State and invited member States to submit proposals to host the IAEA LEU Bank. Kazakhstan was the only member State to formally submit an expression of interest, and proposed two candidate sites for an IAEA LEU Bank. The Agency sent a technical mission to Kazakhstan

⁷⁰ IAEA, "Agreement Signed to Set Up a Low Enriched Uranium Reserve", 29 March 2010. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2010/uraniumfuelbank.html> (accessed 21 May 2012).

⁷¹ IAEA, "Communication dated 19 May 2011 received from the Resident Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Agency regarding Assurance of Supply of Enrichment Services and Low Enriched Uranium for Use in Nuclear Power Plants", document INFCIRC/818. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2011/infirc818.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁷² IAEA, "Assurance of Supply for Nuclear Fuel. Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NFA)". Available from <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Assurance-of-Supply/nuclear-fuel-assurance.html> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁷³ IAEA, "Factsheet: IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Reserve". Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/iaea_leureserve.html (accessed 9 May 2012).

in August to assess the two sites. The Government of Kazakhstan and the Agency continued their discussions on the finalization of site selection. Member States, the European Union (EU) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) made pledges in excess of \$150 million for the establishment of the IAEA LEU Bank. By the end of 2011, Norway (\$5 million), the United States (approximately \$50 million) and the NTI (\$50 million) had fully paid their pledges, the EU had paid €10 million of its €25 million pledge, and arrangements were being finalized with Kuwait (\$10 million) and the United Arab Emirates (\$10 million).⁷⁴

None of the three mechanisms on the assurance of supply noted above diminishes in any way the rights of member States to establish or expand their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle. Having the right to receive LEU from such mechanisms does not require giving up the right to establish or further develop a national fuel cycle or have any impact on it.

Nuclear safety and security (IAEA)

Nuclear Security Plan, 2010-2013

The Agency's Board of Governors and the General Conference adopted in September 2009 the third IAEA Nuclear Security Plan, which covers the period 2010 to 2013. The Plan was built on lessons learned from the implementation of previous Plans and designed to respond to priorities identified by the Secretariat in conjunction with member States. It sought to move from ad hoc interventions to providing long-term sustained improvements in nuclear security and envisaged a budget of approximately €23 million per year, the majority of which would come from the extrabudgetary contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund.

International nuclear security framework

Together with the nuclear security guidance—developed and published in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series—the global nuclear security framework encompasses binding and non-binding international legal instruments. This legal framework, including measures to facilitate its implementation through, inter alia, training, information exchange, legislative assistance and capacity-building, represents an effective nuclear security regime within a State.

The binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security include: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols;

⁷⁴ IAEA, “Assurance of Supply for Nuclear Fuel: IAEA LEU Bank”. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Assurance-of-Supply/iaea-leu-bank.html> (accessed 9 May 2012).

and United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). The non-binding international instruments are the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In addition, the document entitled “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities”⁷⁵ provides a comprehensive basis for guiding States on the requirements that should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.

Table. Status of key international instruments relating to nuclear security

(As at 31 December 2011)

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Binding</i>	<i>Adherents</i>
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Yes	145
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Yes	51
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources	No	106
Code of Conduct’s supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources	No	69
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	Yes	77

Nuclear security guidance for Member States

Three of the second “top-tier” documents of the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) were published in the first quarter of 2011, presenting best practices that should be adopted by States in the application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals. These were the NSS No. 13—“Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)”⁷⁶; NSS No. 14—“Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities”⁷⁷; and NSS No. 15—“Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control”⁷⁸. The primary publication

⁷⁵ IAEA, document INFCIRC/225/Revision 5. Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁷⁶ Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

⁷⁷ Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1487_web.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

⁷⁸ Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1488_web.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

in the NSS, the Fundamentals document entitled “Nuclear Security Fundamentals: Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime” is expected to be published in early 2012.

Illicit trafficking database

The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database contains data on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events from 1993 onwards. The membership of the Agency’s database programme has continued to expand, now numbering 112 member States and 1 non-member State. By 31 December, States had reported, or otherwise confirmed, 2,074 incidents since the establishment of the database; 172 incidents were reported in 2011, of which 93 had occurred during the period 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 (others having occurred earlier). Of those that had occurred during this period, 11 incidents involved illegal possession and attempts to sell nuclear material or radioactive sources; 3 additional incidents were scams to this effect, which did not involve nuclear or other radioactive material. In 32 cases, thefts or losses of radioactive sources were reported. The remaining 126 incidents involved discoveries of uncontrolled material, unauthorized disposals and the inadvertent, unauthorized movement or storage of nuclear material, radioactive sources and/or radioactively contaminated material.

Nuclear security human resource development

Education and training continued to be key to sustainable improvement in nuclear security. In 2011, the IAEA conducted 52 training events on all aspects of nuclear security reaching more than 1,300 people from 120 States.

The Agency recognized the need for different levels of nuclear security expertise in a State. Depending on the national infrastructure, not only well-trained people in certain areas of nuclear security were needed, but also specialists and highly educated experts with in-depth knowledge in all areas of nuclear security. To support this, the Agency has developed a guideline for the development of a Master of Science and a Certificate Programme in Nuclear Security through the International Nuclear Security Education Network, established in 2010. Currently, five universities in Europe are developing a European Master of Science Programme in Nuclear Security that is based on the IAEA guideline. This academic programme is planned to be launched in the fall semester of 2012 and is supported by the European Commission and the IAEA.

In addition, the IAEA has initiated the process of establishing a collaborative network among the nuclear security training community. An IAEA topical meeting took place in 2011 to facilitate the collaboration among Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs) or associated training centres and to promote the concept of national NSSCs. An NSSC aims at educating highly qualified nuclear security personnel, as well as providing technical and

scientific support to competent authorities and other institutions responsible for nuclear security in a country. The concept has been successfully rolled out in several countries, such as Ghana and Pakistan.

Nuclear security peer reviews

The IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States evaluate their nuclear security systems and needs. During the year, 17 such missions were conducted with a focus on physical protection and the legal, regulatory and practical measures for controlling nuclear and other radioactive material. The Agency implemented three International Physical Protection Advisory Services in France, Sweden and the United States, countries with large nuclear programmes. The results of these missions will be disseminated to other States. It continued to promote other review services at the request of States to examine arrangements to detect illicit nuclear trafficking and respond to nuclear security emergencies and incidents. The IAEA also conducted a number of technical visits, which addressed security needs at locations including border crossings, medical facilities, scientific institutes and industrial sites.

Risk reduction

On request and in cooperation with States, the IAEA continued to provide assistance in upgrading the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive sources, such as radioactive waste and associated facilities and transports, against defined threats. These upgrades covered all major functions of the physical protection system, which are detection, delay and response. In 2011, the Agency completed upgrades to three nuclear facilities in two States and to 16 facilities housing other radioactive material in five States. In addition, also upon States' request, 36 vulnerable highly active radioactive sources with a total activity of 173 TBq (4700 Ci) were removed from four countries. It further continued its long-standing support to States' activities aimed at reducing the vulnerability of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to theft and unauthorized removal. A regional workshop on the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program was organized in the United States and three technical meetings on the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium took place throughout the year. In addition, the tripartite contract between the IAEA, the United States and the Russian Federation was signed for shipments of fresh HEU from Ukraine in 2012.

Export controls

Nuclear Suppliers Group

From 23 to 24 June the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its twenty-first plenary meeting in Noordwijk, Netherlands. During the plenary, the

participating Governments⁷⁹ took stock of developments since the last meeting in 2010, expressing their sorrow at the devastation caused by earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan. The Group noted the need to address proliferation concerns without hampering legitimate trade, reaffirmed the importance of licensing and enforcement based on NSG guidelines and control lists, and reiterated its support for diplomatic efforts and peaceful solutions to the nuclear issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The primary outcome of the meeting was agreement on new guidelines pertaining to the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Whereas the previous guidelines required the Group only to “exercise restraint” in exporting enrichment and reprocessing technology, the new guidelines reportedly also include a list of “objective criteria” for States to be eligible to receive such transfers. Under these criteria, a recipient must have brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol or, pending such a step, the implementation of appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the Agency, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

At issue during the negotiation was the effect of the new rules of the NSG waiver to India, granted in 2008. The new guidelines seemingly would have no implications for future nuclear cooperation between NSG members and India, as both the old and new guidelines would effectively preclude the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India.

In addition to reaching agreement on the revised guidelines, the NSG also exchanged views on various topical matters. NSG members emphasized the importance of keeping the Group's lists up to date with technological developments. The Group continued to discuss its relationship with India. It also discussed brokering and transit issues and agreed to consider options for how to best reflect these matters in its guidelines. The Group also reviewed the status of adherence to the Additional Protocol.

⁷⁹ As of 31 December 2011, the NSG had 46 participating Governments: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The European Commission is a permanent observer.

Missile-related issues

Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its twenty-fifth Plenary Meeting in Buenos Aires from 11 to 15 April to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify its efforts to prevent missile programmes and their proliferation. The Plenary was inaugurated by Alberto D'Alotto, Secretary of Foreign Relations of Argentina, and chaired by Roberto Garcia Moritán (Argentina).

MTCR Partners⁸⁰ discussed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery that constitute a threat to international peace and security. They reaffirmed the importance of addressing these challenges and the role of the MTCR in this regard. The MTCR guidelines and controls list constitute an international export control standard, which is increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR. The Partners, therefore, agreed to redouble their efforts to encourage and assist, upon request, non-partner countries that support the objectives and purposes of the Regime to contribute to the efforts of missile non-proliferation.

The Partners conducted extensive discussions on missile proliferation-related activities worldwide. Their discussions covered: developments in missile programmes and their proliferation; procurement activities and techniques in support of such programmes; rapid technological change; the role of intangible technology, brokering, and trans-shipment in facilitating proliferation; and key technology trends in proliferation missile programmes. These discussions demonstrated that additional export control efforts by MTCR countries could have an even greater impact. The Partners also underlined the importance of addressing transit and trans-shipment issues and, in this context, the proliferation risk posed by countries with weak export controls.

MTCR Partners exchanged information on their concerns about the ongoing missile programmes in the Middle East, North-East Asia and South Asia, including the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which could contribute to regional instability and supply missile proliferation activities elsewhere.

Partners noted the direct relevance of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1874 (2009) and 1929 (2010), *inter alia*, to MTCR export controls. In this connection, they expressed their determination to implement these

⁸⁰ The MTCR has 34 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

resolutions, exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction missile proliferation programmes. Such action, they said, would be in accordance with their national legislation and be consistent with international law.

The Partners agreed to continue exchanging views on missile programme developments. They also reaffirmed the critical importance of the ongoing technical work of MTCR. They noted the rapid evolution of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward-looking action to address these developments. They expressed their appreciation for the work of the Licensing and Enforcement Expert Meeting, the Information Exchange Meeting and the Technical Expert Meeting, in particular the decision adopted on amendments to the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

The MTCR undertook outreach with Belarus, China, India, Kazakhstan, and Thailand.⁸¹ The Partners indicated that they intended to conduct further outreach with additional countries, in order to increase transparency about the Regime's activities and to promote its objectives. Partners indicated that they would welcome the activities of non-partners in support of the objectives of the Regime.

MTCR Partners also agreed to continue their individual and collective efforts to assist interested countries in implementing the missile-related export controls mandated under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and to work with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to this resolution.

The Partners also reviewed a number of key aspects of the internal functioning of the Regime, including issues related to future membership.

The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation

The Subscribing States⁸² of The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) held their Tenth Regular Meeting in Vienna from 2 to 3 June. The Conference

⁸¹ See MTCR website at <http://www.mtcr.info/english/Press%20Release%20April%202011.html> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁸² Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino,

discussed, inter alia, the strengthening of confidence-building measures, such as pre-launch notifications and annual declarations of ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicles and the importance of outreach activities to foster the universalization of the HCOC, and thereby, increasing the number of Subscribing States. Since the Ninth Regular Meeting in 2010, Iraq and the Central African Republic have subscribed to the Code, bringing the number of Subscribing States to 132.

Florence Mangin (France) handed over the Chairmanship of the Tenth Regular Meeting of the HCOC to Nineta Barbulescu (Romania).

The Chairperson of the Conference emphasized the importance of the Code together with the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions. After reminding States that HCOC constituted one of the very few existing multilateral instruments concerning the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the Chair highlighted Romania's objectives for the coming year. As matters of priority, Romania would advance the full and comprehensive implementation of the Code in all its aspects, conduct regional outreach activities for advancing the process of HCOC universalization, deepen the relationships with the United Nations and with other regional and multilateral organizations and start preparations for the marking of the tenth anniversary since its creation in 2002.

In the general debate, those Subscribing States making statements reaffirmed the importance of HCOC as a unique confidence-building and transparency instrument in the framework of multilateral efforts against ballistic missile proliferation. They also noted the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

It was agreed that the Eleventh HCOC Regular Meeting would be held from 31 May to 1 June 2012 in Vienna under the chairmanship of the Republic of Korea.

1540 Committee: implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) on 28 April 2004, which obliged all States to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempted to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,

Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.

transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. In implementing the resolution, all States were to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. The Security Council also established a Committee as its subsidiary body to examine the implementation of the resolution (the 1540 Committee).

On 20 April, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1977 (2011) (see appendix VII for the text). The resolution noted that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure implementation of these laws, was a long-term task that would require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels. The resolution extended the 1540 Committee's mandate until 25 April 2021. Also, to monitor the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council decided that the 1540 Committee would conduct comprehensive reviews after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate. It also decided that the 1540 Committee should continue to intensify its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution through its Programme of Work.

On 17 June, the 1540 Committee approved its tenth Programme of Work for the period ending 31 May 2012. The Programme of Work includes detailed objectives and tasks for the four Working Groups of the 1540 Committee (i.e., monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001); and transparency and media outreach), as well as procedures on how the 1540 Committee and the Working Groups will operate.

On 12 September, the 1540 Committee submitted to the Security Council its third report⁸³ on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) covering the period from 25 April 2008 to 24 April 2011. The report concluded that the Committee had facilitated and documented an upward trend in the progress made by States in implementing measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. The work of the Committee had contributed to strengthened global non-proliferation and counter-terrorism regimes and to better preparing States to prevent proliferation of such weapons to non-State actors. The report also stated that “while the status of implementation of the resolution has continued to improve since 2004, the Committee recognizes that much work remains to be done and that the gravity of the threat remains considerable”.

⁸³ S/2011/579.

Status of implementation

As of 31 December, the record of reporting by States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) reached the high level of 168 States having submitted at least one report and 105 States having provided additional information, many of them more than once. In 2011, Ethiopia, Gabon and Rwanda provided their first reports to the 1540 Committee and seven States⁸⁴ submitted additional information.

States were also encouraged to prepare on a voluntary basis national implementation action plans mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and to submit those plans to the Committee. France submitted a national action plan, which shared experience on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and on capacity-building activities. The action plan also urged States wishing to receive assistance to submit detailed requests. This brought to four⁸⁵ the number of national action plans submitted to the Committee as at the end of 2011. The Committee experts contributed to country-specific activities with the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Kyrgyzstan, supported by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), to assist them in developing national action plans.

Assistance

Resolution 1540 (2004) recognized that some States may require assistance in implementing the resolution and invited States to offer assistance in response to specific requests. The 1540 Committee facilitates assistance efforts by matching assistance requests and offers through its assistance template.

In 2011, Afghanistan, Albania, Ethiopia and the Caribbean Community made new assistance requests and Canada, France and the United States provided updates on their previous offers of assistance. Developments during the year focused on implementation of revised guidelines to process assistance requests, facilitation of match-making between assistance requests and assistance offers, and continued development and refining of assistance guidelines.

Cooperation between the Committee and other international organizations

On 19 October, the European Union (EU) and the United States signed a joint declaration⁸⁶ reiterating their commitment to the full and comprehensive

⁸⁴ Croatia, Finland, France, Mexico, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine.

⁸⁵ Argentina, Canada and the United States had previously submitted a national action plan.

⁸⁶ Available from http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/pdf/eu_us_declaration.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012).

implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011). In particular, the declaration states that efforts should be focused on support of UNODA and other selected United Nations activities, such as identifying roles for regional or subregional organizations in implementing the resolution, supporting countries in developing legislation needed to control weapons of mass destruction-related materials and developing relevant training programmes. The declaration also expressed support for strengthening the 1540 Committee in its role as a clearing house for those countries seeking international assistance to improve their national non-proliferation capabilities, as well as for developing visits to States. To support efforts to facilitate the universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the United States made a US\$ 3 million grant to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities while a new EU Council Decision in support of resolution 1540 (2004) was under preparation.

From 27 to 29 September, UNODA co-organized with the Conflict Prevention Centre of the Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) a regional workshop for Central Asian States⁸⁷ hosted by the Government of Kazakhstan in Astana. Sixty-two participants attended the workshop, including representatives of a number of international and regional organizations. Its objective was to promote capacity-building on national and regional levels in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It also aimed to enhance national capacities for the management of border and export controls, and to promote cooperation in technical assistance.

The Committee intensified its collaboration with the IAEA in the area of nuclear security and with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to promote measures to strengthen chemical security. The Committee expanded cooperation with the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), including through participation in the development of a BWC-ISU implementation guide.

In promoting full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), regional and subregional organizations also help in gaining valuable insights about the needs and priorities common to their members. The Committee participated in a workshop on the role of the OSCE in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and continued strengthening cooperation with the OSCE by focusing on issues regarding assistance. Furthermore, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in October between the United Nations and the OSCE Secretariat on the joint implementation of projects related to resolution 1540 (2004).

During the year, the Organization of American States supported the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by its member States through country-specific activities, particularly in Mexico and Colombia. Moreover,

⁸⁷ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

the Organization informed the 1540 Committee of the designation of a regional coordinator for the Central American Integration System beginning in October.

At the G8 Summit held in Deauville, France, in May 2011, Heads of State and Government decided to renew the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction beyond 2012. The Global Partnership—Assessment and Options for Future Programming,⁸⁸ adopted in Deauville, identifies four priorities for the future, including the facilitation of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

The Committee continued cooperation with the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011),⁸⁹ as well as 1373 (2001)⁹⁰ and 1988 (2011),⁹¹ and their experts, including through joint or coordinated outreach activities.

Transparency and outreach

Considerable progress was made during 2011 to enhance transparency of the work and achievements of the 1540 Committee. The Committee and its experts continued to reach out to civil society to generate wider awareness of the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and to further facilitate its effective implementation.

In September, the 1540 Committee conducted its first visit to a State at its invitation. The one-week visit to the United States helped the Committee gain a deeper understanding of measures taken by the United States to implement resolution 1540 (2004). In 2011, the Committee also received invitations to visit Albania, Croatia and Madagascar.

Political declarations and other initiatives

In addition to his participation in key intergovernmental meetings on disarmament, the United Nations Secretary-General remained actively engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts, particularly in his continued outreach to civil society. In 2011, the Secretary-General addressed the Global Zero Summit in London, the Conference Promoting the Global Instruments of Non-proliferation and Disarmament organized by Japan and Poland, and an

⁸⁸ Available from <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/appendices/g8-global-partnership-assessment-and-options-for.1354.html> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁸⁹ Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.

⁹⁰ Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism.

⁹¹ Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) to oversee relevant sanctions measures and to undertake the tasks set out by the Security Council in paragraph 30 of the same resolution.

event organized by the EastWest Institute and the Global Security Institute on the occasion of United Nations Day, 24 October. He also sent messages to the fifty-ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, and meetings organized in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo by the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs to launch a signature campaign to start negotiations for a convention banning nuclear weapons.

Government and intergovernmental initiatives

During the year, non-nuclear-weapon States continued to seek new and innovative ways to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, to seek the implementation of the actions agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to promote the consideration of a nuclear weapons convention.

Nuclear Discussion Forum and the Astana International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

Following its recent efforts in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the International Day Against Nuclear Tests, Kazakhstan, together with the EastWest Institute, hosted a Nuclear Discussion Forum, with a series of five discussions held between February and July.⁹² Participants included members of the New York-based diplomatic and policymaking community, and involved representatives from nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and international organizations, and non-governmental experts. These meetings focused on, inter alia: concluding a legally binding document to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; nuclear weapons and international law, including international humanitarian law; and building transparency and promoting confidence-building measures in ongoing disarmament discussions.⁹³

From 12 to 13 October, Kazakhstan hosted the International Forum for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World in Astana and adopted a Declaration on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World.⁹⁴ The Declaration sought to reinforce the message that all States that possess nuclear weapons should pursue steps towards the total elimination of these weapons at the earliest possible time. It encouraged negotiations on further steps leading to nuclear disarmament

⁹² The five discussions were held on 30 March, 29 April, 2 June, 30 June and 28 July in New York.

⁹³ The work of the Forum was facilitated by a core group of countries, comprised of Austria, Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand and Uruguay.

⁹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Declaration on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Astana, October 12, 2011". Available from <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/news/nws2011/2011-10-12> (accessed 10 May 2012).

and emphasized the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and increasing transparency. The Declaration also called for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the further establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the consolidation of existing zones, the speedy adoption of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the implementation of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative

The 10-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) continued its activities in 2011.⁹⁵ On 30 April, Germany convened an NPDI second ministerial meeting. The group issued a statement⁹⁶ in which it specified that its objective was to maintain the momentum of the successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to expedite its implementation. The group agreed to four “concrete proposals” including: negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, including consideration by the General Assembly if the Conference on Disarmament remains deadlocked; achievement of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the universal application of the IAEA additional protocol; and consideration by the nuclear-weapon States at their meeting in Paris in June of a draft of a standard reporting form, to be developed by the group, for information on their nuclear arsenals.

On 21 September, NPDI convened its third ministerial meeting in New York, in which it reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In its statement, the group reported on the steps it had taken since its second ministerial meeting to implement its proposals. In particular, the group stated that it had, inter alia: shared its draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form with the nuclear-weapon States; expressed support for the draft resolution to be introduced by Canada at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly to consider ways to proceed with the aim of beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; decided to draft a letter to the IAEA offering to share its collective experience in concluding and implementing the additional protocol; decided to work on practical proposals aimed at strengthening and reinforcing States’ export control systems; and pledged to actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, including by ensuring that the first-hand experience of the hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) does not fade from memory.

⁹⁵ Convened by Australia and Japan in 2010, the membership of the initiative includes: Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

⁹⁶ CD/1908.

Informal working group on the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order

The Prime Minister of India established an informal working group composed of Indian experts and academics aimed at rejuvenating the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. The effort uses as its terms of reference the seven steps proposed by India in 2006 in a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1816), which includes negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention as its final step. The working group issued a report that contains recommendations and a road map for implementing the goals of the Action Plan. Specific steps recommended in the report included reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, de-alerting, a global agreement on a no-first-use policy, a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and the negotiation of legally binding instruments on negative security assurances.

Civil society and other international efforts

The Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) was launched on 18 May, comprising 30 former senior political, diplomatic and military leaders from 13 countries around the region.⁹⁷ Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, convened the first meeting. The objective of the network is to inform and energize public opinion, and especially high-level policymakers, to take seriously the real threats posed by nuclear weapons, and to do everything possible to achieve a world in which they are contained, diminished and ultimately eliminated. In its inaugural statement,⁹⁸ APLN announced that it would establish working groups to address, inter alia, specific issues such as nuclear deterrence, nuclear transparency and the potential for the multilateralization of “the most sensitive stages” of the nuclear fuel cycle.

At its seventy-ninth annual meeting, held in June, the United States Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution⁹⁹ that, inter alia, reaffirmed its call on President Obama to work with the leaders of the other nuclear-weapon States to implement the United Nations Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament forthwith, so that a nuclear weapons convention or a related framework of mutually reinforcing legal instruments could be agreed upon and implemented by the year 2020, as urged by the

⁹⁷ Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam.

⁹⁸ Members of the APLN met for the first time in Tokyo from 10 to 12 November 2011, where those present agreed on the text of the inaugural statement released on 12 December 2011 in Seoul.

⁹⁹ United States Conference of Mayors, “Adopted Resolutions: 79th Annual Conference of Mayors—Baltimore, MD June 17-21, 2011”, p. 112. Available from http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/79th_conference/AdoptedResolutionsFull.pdf (accessed 21 May 2012).

Mayors for Peace. The Conference of Mayors, which sought the termination of funding for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and nuclear weapons systems, also called upon the national associations of local authorities of the other nuclear-weapon States to press their Governments to enter into negotiations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world and to sharply curtail expenditures on nuclear arms.



**Biological
and
chemical
weapons**

CHAPTER II

Biological and chemical weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention is a critical instrument. It helps to ensure that science and technology can be developed safely and securely. This Review Conference is a chance to respond to emerging risks. Cooperation can be boosted and the nightmare of biological warfare avoided.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL¹

Developments and trends, 2011

IN ACCORDANCE with the decision taken by the 2010 Meeting of States Parties, the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention was held in Geneva from 5 to 22 December. The Preparatory Committee for the Conference met in Geneva in April. At the Review Conference, States parties conducted a comprehensive overview of the Convention and succeeded in adopting a Final Document by consensus. They agreed on an intersessional work programme for the period until the next Review Conference, i.e. from 2012 to 2015, which included “standing agenda items” on the key issues of cooperation and assistance, science and technology, and national implementation. The States parties also agreed on revisions to the forms for reporting confidence-building measures, to establish a sponsorship programme, and to create a database to facilitate assistance and cooperation to be administered by the Implementation Support Unit. An important decision was the renewal of the mandate of the Unit through 2016 to ensure continued assistance to States parties in implementing the Convention.

In 2011, progress continued to be made in all areas of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. At the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of States Parties, delegations agreed on a constructive and forward-looking decision regarding the matter of the deadline for destruction of chemical weapons. The decision enabled the Russian Federation and the United States to continue and complete their respective destruction activities in the shortest time possible with enhanced reporting requirements.

The Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), established by the Director-General and composed of distinguished experts in the field, produced a widely

¹ Secretary-General’s video message to the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 5 December 2011. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/news/bwc_2011/sg_video/ (accessed 12 April 2012).

welcomed report, which contained forward-looking recommendations on the future work of the Organisation.

The year also witnessed important developments in Libya that underlined the value that the international community attaches to the elimination of chemical weapons, under the aegis of OPCW. In response to the evolving situation in that country, the Organisation's inspectors returned to Libya to continue their work in the context of the destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles.

In September, the OPCW Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security marked the Organisation's contribution to the International Year of Chemistry, which was celebrated throughout the world in 2011. The Conference underscored the critical importance of the use of chemistry for exclusively peaceful purposes, as outlined by the Convention, and it served to further strengthen support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Australia Group continued its efforts to strengthen national export controls over dual-use biological and chemical agents and equipment. At its annual plenary meeting in June, the Group agreed upon a number of important measures to deepen the implementation and enforcement of the national export control system. The Group also agreed to continue its extensive engagements with non-members and other international bodies in both 2011 and 2012 with a view to the wider global adoption of the Group's control lists.

For more information on the resolutions and decisions related to this chapter, refer to appendix VIII.

Biological weapons

Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention

A two-day session of the Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),² was held in Geneva from 13 to 14 April under the chairmanship of Paul van den IJssel (Netherlands). The Preparatory Committee unanimously elected Desra Percaya (Indonesia) and Judit Körömi (Hungary) as Vice-Chairpersons. A total of 93 States parties³ participated in

² The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 12 April 2012).

³ Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican

the Preparatory Committee. Three States⁴ that had signed, but had not yet ratified, the BWC participated without taking part in the decision-making. One State,⁵ which was neither a party nor a signatory to the Convention, participated as an observer. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the European Union also attended the Committee session. Eleven non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended public meetings of the Preparatory Committee.⁶

The Preparatory Committee discussed a variety of procedural issues for the Seventh Review Conference. The discussions resulted in a number of recommendations, including those on all procedural issues related to the Conference. On 14 April, the Preparatory Committee adopted its report.⁷

Speaking at the conclusion of the Preparatory Committee on 14 April, the Chairperson said that the meeting had taken all the necessary decisions, and paved the way for a full and comprehensive review of the BWC in December 2011. He stated that States parties had “worked in a collegial, constructive and highly focused way, keeping our overall goal in sight, and resolving our differences through careful listening, respectful dialogue, and flexible approaches”. He called on States parties to turn their attention “to developing practical proposals, bridging differences and building consensus”.

Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention

The Seventh Review Conference took place in Geneva from 5 to 22 December. The Conference was attended by 104 States parties to the

Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁴ Egypt, Haiti and Myanmar.

⁵ Israel.

⁶ Biological Weapons Prevention Project, Ferdous International Foundation, International Security and Biopolicy Institute, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Landau Network-Centro Volta, London School of Economics and Political Science, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, University of Bradford, Harvard Sussex Program (University of Sussex), United States National Academy of Sciences, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

⁷ BWC/CONF.VII/PC/2 and Corr.1. This and all documents of the Preparatory Committee are available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> (accessed 12 April 2012).

BWC.⁸ Five States⁹ that had signed, but had not yet ratified, the Convention participated without taking part in the decision-making. Two States, neither parties nor signatories to the Convention,¹⁰ participated as observers in accordance with the rules of procedure. Eleven United Nations and other international bodies¹¹ attended the Review Conference. At its first meeting, the Conference elected by acclamation Paul van den IJssel (Netherlands) as President, 20 Vice-Presidents,¹² as well as the Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons of the Committee of the Whole,¹³ the Drafting Committee¹⁴ and the Credentials Committee.¹⁵

On 5 December, the Conference heard a video message from the United Nations Secretary-General and held a general debate, in which 54 States parties, 1 signatory and 8 international organizations made statements.¹⁶ From 7 to 16 December, the Committee of the Whole held a total of 10 meetings, during which it reviewed the provisions of the Convention, article by article, and submitted its report¹⁷ to the Conference at the eighth plenary meeting

⁸ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Yemen.

⁹ Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Haiti, Myanmar and United Republic of Tanzania.

¹⁰ Cameroon and Israel.

¹¹ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, African Union, European Union, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, World Health Organization and World Organization for Animal Health.

¹² Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Romania, Poland, Slovakia and South Africa.

¹³ Chairperson: Desra Percaya (Indonesia); Vice-Chairpersons: Gancho Ganev (Bulgaria) and Eric Danon (France).

¹⁴ Chairperson: Judit Kőrömi (Hungary); Vice-Chairpersons: John Walker (United Kingdom) and U. L. M. Jauhar (Sri Lanka).

¹⁵ Chairperson: Mário Duarte (Portugal); Vice-Chairperson: Mr. Vipul (India).

¹⁶ See BWC/CONF.VII/2. This and all documents of the Seventh Review Conference are available from <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> (accessed 12 April 2012).

¹⁷ BWC/CONF.VII/5.

on 16 December. In parallel, the President held informal plenary meetings to discuss cross-cutting themes to address forward-looking elements of the operation of the Convention.

Following the conclusion of the Committee of the Whole, the President conducted a series of informal consultations. Facilitators in the following areas assisted the President in his work: (a) Solemn Declaration;¹⁸ (b) articles I-XV;¹⁹ (c) science and technology;²⁰ (d) assistance and cooperation;²¹ (e) confidence-building measures (CBMs);²² and (f) intersessional programme.²³

The President, supported by his Facilitators, continued to work on specific elements for the Final Document, including developing a draft text. The Credentials Committee held three meetings and adopted its report²⁴ on 21 December.

In the course of its work, the Conference was able to draw on a number of resources, including background information documents prepared by the Implementation Support Unit,²⁵ working papers submitted by States parties²⁶ and statements circulated during the Conference. On 22 December, the Conference adopted its Final Document²⁷ comprising three parts: (a) organization and work of the Conference; (b) the Final Declaration; and (c) decisions and recommendations.

Final Declaration

The Final Declaration (see appendix III for the text) reaffirmed that the BWC was comprehensive in its scope and that all naturally or artificially created or altered microbial or other biological agents and toxins, as well as their components, regardless of their origin or method of production and whether they affected humans, animals or plants, of types and in quantities

¹⁸ Alexandre Fasel (Switzerland).

¹⁹ Judit Körömi (Hungary) and Daniel Simanjuntak (Indonesia).

²⁰ Zahid Rastam (Malaysia).

²¹ Jesus Domingo (Philippines).

²² Paul Wilson (Australia).

²³ Jo Adamson (United Kingdom) and Ben Steyn (South Africa).

²⁴ BWC/CONF.VII/6.

²⁵ These included: (1) "History and operation of the confidence-building measures", BWC/CONF.VII/INF.1, (2) "Compliance by States Parties with their obligations under the Convention", BWC/CONF.VII/INF.2, (3) "New scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention", BWC/CONF.VII/INF.3, (4) "Developments since the last Review Conference in other international organizations which may be relevant to the Convention", BWC/CONF.VII/INF.4, (5) "Additional understandings and agreements reached by previous Review Conferences relating to each article of the Convention", BWC/CONF.VII/5, (6) "Common understandings reached by the Meetings of States Parties during the intersessional programme held from 2007 to 2010", BWC/CONF.VII/6, (7) "Status of universalization of the Convention", BWC/CONF.VII/7, and (8) "Implementation of Article X of the Convention", BWC/CONF.VII/8.

²⁶ See <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> (accessed 12 April 2012).

²⁷ BWC/CONF.VII/7.

that had no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes were unequivocally covered by the Convention. The Conference noted the importance of staying abreast of all scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention and therefore decided to include in the 2012-2015 intersessional programme a standing agenda item on review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention.

States parties reaffirmed their commitment to take the necessary national measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in the Convention. States parties also reaffirmed that the enactment and implementation of necessary national measures, in accordance with their constitutional processes, would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. In this regard, the Conference encouraged States parties to undertake collective action during the next intersessional process and for those States parties in a position to do so to provide assistance, upon request, to other States parties.

The Conference emphasized the importance of the exchange of information among States parties through the CBMs and welcomed the exchange of information carried out under these measures. The Conference recognized the urgent need to increase the number of States parties participating in CBMs and called upon all States parties to participate annually.

The Conference stressed the importance of the implementation of article X of the Convention and recalled that States parties had a legal obligation to facilitate, and had the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and not to hamper the economic and technological development of States parties.

The Conference noted with satisfaction that 10 States²⁸ had acceded to or ratified the Convention since the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. The Conference further reiterated the high importance of universalization, in particular by affirming the particular importance of the ratification of the Convention by signatory States and accession to the BWC by those that had not signed the Convention, without delay. States parties also agreed to continue promoting the universalization of the Convention.

²⁸ Burundi, Cook Islands, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Montenegro, Mozambique, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates and Zambia.

Decisions and recommendations

The decisions and recommendations of the Review Conference included:

- The establishment of an intersessional work programme for 2012-2015 in which annual Meetings of States Parties are preceded by annual Meetings of Experts;
- The creation of three Standing Agenda Items to be addressed at both the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties each year from 2012-2015, namely:
 - Cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X;
 - Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention; and
 - Strengthening national implementation;
- Focused annual work on:
 - How to enable fuller participation in the CBMs (in 2012 and 2013);
 - How to strengthen implementation of article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States parties (in 2014 and 2015);
- Appointment of two Vice-Chairpersons to support the work of the Chair to prepare and coordinate the annual work programme;
- Establishment of a database system to facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistance and cooperation among States parties;
- Creation of a sponsorship programme, funded by voluntary contributions from States parties, to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme;
- Revision of the CBMs, including a streamlined set of forms to make it easier to participate in annual exchanges of information;
- Renewal of the mandate of the Implementation Support Unit, *mutatis mutandis*, for the period 2012-2016. The Conference decided that, in addition to the tasks mandated by the Sixth Review Conference, the Unit will:
 - Implement the decision to establish and administer the database for assistance requests and offers, and facilitate the associated exchange of information among States parties;
 - Support, as appropriate, the implementation by the States parties of the decisions and recommendations of this Review Conference.

States parties in a position to do so may consider making voluntary contributions to the Unit to enhance its ability to carry out its mandated tasks.

Implementation Support Unit

The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) presented to the States parties at the Seventh Review Conference the fifth and final annual report²⁹ of its initial 2007-2010 mandate. The report included a summary of the efforts of the ISU to provide support for the administration of the BWC, national implementation, CBMs and universalization of the Convention.

The support of the ISU for the administration of the Convention included: (a) acting as the substantive Secretariat for the Seventh Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee; (b) preparing background information documents as requested by the Preparatory Committee; (c) brokering assistance to attend meetings of the BWC; (d) developing and expanding its website, including its range of online tools and restricted access section; (e) following and reporting on scientific and technological developments; (f) keeping in regular contact with relevant international organizations, as well as professional, commercial and academic institutions and associations; and (g) organizing and participating in relevant workshops, seminars and meetings.

As part of its efforts under national implementation, the ISU: (a) continued to act as a clearing house for the provision of assistance; (b) maintained and updated databases and compendiums of national approaches; (c) revised the restricted access section of its website to facilitate communication among States parties; (d) continued to interact with assistance providers; and (e) continued to collect and distribute details of national points of contact.

On the CBMs, the ISU: (a) maintained capabilities for electronic reporting; (b) compiled and distributed submissions; (c) provided routine administrative assistance and advice; (d) contributed in promoting a guide for completing CBM forms; (e) took part in or organized workshops promoting the CBMs; and (f) wrote to States parties reminding them of the deadline for submission.


The ISU provided support to the President of the Seventh Review Conference in his activities to promote universalization of the Convention. It promoted universalization during many of the seminars and events in which it participated and also provided information and advice on the Convention to several signatories and States not parties. As it became available, the ISU consolidated and published information on progress towards universality in the restricted area of its website.

²⁹ BWC/CONF.VII/3.

Prior to the Seventh Review Conference, the Unit took part in and organized several events and workshops involving discussions on the Review Conference and the future of the Convention.

The ISU report also provided details of the submission of information under the CBMs. Recent years had seen an increase in levels of participation in this international transparency exercise, peaking in 2010 at 72 States parties. Participation dropped slightly in 2011 to 69 States parties, representing about 42 per cent of the membership of the BWC (see figure I).

Figure I. Confidence-building measures participation since 1987 inception



In the discussions during the Seventh Review Conference, including those following the presentation of the report of the ISU, States parties acknowledged the important role the Unit played in supporting their efforts in all of the areas identified in the mandate of the ISU. The Conference decided to extend the mandate of the ISU, mutatis mutandis, for the period 2012-2016.

Update of the roster of experts and laboratories

The United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons was developed in the late 1980s, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolutions. The General Assembly, in resolution 42/37 C of 27 November 1987, authorized the Secretary-General to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning possible use of these weapons. In order to carry out investigations of alleged use, the Secretary-General maintains lists of experts and laboratories with a wide scope of expertise, skills and technical capabilities. Member States have nominated experts and laboratories to be placed on the Secretary-General’s roster. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is facilitating the

support and coordination for the functioning of the Mechanism, including updates of the roster and support for experts' training.

In 2011, collaboration between UNODA and international organizations continued to identify specialized international expertise relevant to investigations of alleged use of biological weapons. In January, UNODA and the World Health Organization signed a memorandum of understanding³⁰ concerning the latter's support to the Secretary-General's Mechanism. The memorandum provided for specific joint activities to strengthen the mechanism and cooperation in specific investigations.

In August, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force published a report of its Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks. The report, entitled "Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials",³¹ *inter alia*, described the Secretary-General's Mechanism and noted that the Mechanism could come into play in case of a chemical and biological terrorist attack. It acknowledged "a continuing need to work on the interoperability of procedures, to train investigation experts, and to conduct exercises to test and improve these procedures in realistic environments".

The Secretary-General's Mechanism was discussed during the Seventh BWC Review Conference held in December. The Final Document of the Conference recognized that the Secretary-General's Mechanism represented "an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons". The Conference noted national initiatives to provide relevant training to experts that could support the Secretary-General's investigative mechanism. In particular, the Government of France offered to organize in 2012 a training course for experts from the Mechanism's roster.

³⁰ Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/UN_WHO_MOU_2011.pdf (accessed 12 April 2012).

³¹ Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), "Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials", CTITF Publication Series (August 2011). Available from http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_wmd_working_group_report_interagency_2011.pdf (accessed 12 April 2012).

Chemical weapons

We are facing a time of rapid advances in science and technology. New chemical compounds and production methods are constantly being researched and discovered, affording the global community many benefits but also bringing with them certain risks. The need to understand these changes and to bring them to the attention of our States Parties has never been more pressing.

AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS³²

Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

The Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),³³ was held in The Hague from 28 November to 2 December. A total of 131 States parties³⁴ attended the Conference. Two signatory States³⁵ of the CWC attended as observers. Representatives of five international organizations, specialized agencies and

³² Opening statement by the OPCW Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Sixteenth Session (C-16/DG.18), The Hague, 28 November 2011. Available from http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=15203 (accessed 12 April 2012).

³³ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 12 April 2012).

³⁴ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

³⁵ Israel and Myanmar.

other international bodies,³⁶ as well as 29 non-governmental organizations³⁷ were also in attendance. The Conference elected Paul Arkwright (United Kingdom) as its Chairperson. The Conference also elected representatives of 10 States parties³⁸ as Vice-Chairpersons of the Conference, as well as Allan Wagner (Peru) as Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole.

The Secretary-General, in his message to the Conference³⁹ delivered by the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, underscored the importance of the CWC as a fundamental pillar of international peace, security and disarmament and non-proliferation. He welcomed the fact that over 70 per cent of declared chemical weapons had been verifiably destroyed and expressed his confidence that States parties would identify a constructive and forward-looking solution to address the deadlines for the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles, which will not be met by two possessor States as foreseen in 2012. The Secretary-General also urged the remaining eight non-States parties⁴⁰ to accede to the Convention at the earliest possible time.

In his opening statement,⁴¹ the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) provided an overview of

³⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, League of Arab States and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

³⁷ Accademia delle Scienze, American University in Cairo, Amman Center for Peace and Development, Asabe Shehu Yarádua Foundation, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, Brazilian Chemical Industry Association, Chemical Weapons Working Group, Environmental Protection and Population Care Association, Global Green USA, Green Cross Netherlands, Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland, Halabja Chemical Victims Society, Indian Chemical Council, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Institute for Security Studies, International Centre for Health Interventions and Research in Africa, International Council of Chemical Associations, Kenyatta University, Kurdocide Watch, Organization for Defending Victims of Chemical Weapons, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support, Fars Province Society for Defending the Right of Veterans and Chemical Weapons Victims, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, University of Science and Technology of Oran (Department of Chemistry) and Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

³⁸ Algeria, Belgium, Cuba, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Russian Federation, Sudan, Ukraine, United States of America and Uruguay.

³⁹ Statement of Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, to the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, delivered by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, The Hague, 28 November 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13974.doc.htm> (accessed 12 April 2012).

⁴⁰ Angola, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Somalia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Israel (signatory State) and Myanmar (signatory State).

⁴¹ Opening statement by the OPCW Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Sixteenth Session (C-16/DG.18), The Hague, 28 November 2011. Available from http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=15203 (accessed 12 April 2012).

progress in the Convention's implementation. He discussed the Organisation's activities in 2011, including those in the field of verification and destruction, industry inspection, international cooperation, assistance and protection, universality and external relations, and the impending institutional changes in the context of the transition process of OPCW. The Director-General highlighted, *inter alia*, the fact that the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons would remain a priority core objective for OPCW and commended States parties for the constructive and forward-looking decision approved by the Executive Council and recommended to the Conference. The Director-General, furthermore, underscored the continued importance of achieving universal adherence to the Convention and stressed the vital role that States parties could play to persuade non-States parties to join the CWC. He also expressed the hope that the prospective 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would facilitate universal adherence to the Convention.

Pursuant to a recommendation by the Executive Council at its thirty-first meeting, the Conference of States Parties adopted the decision regarding the final extended deadline for destruction of chemical weapons of 29 April 2012. Although the decision was adopted by a vote, States parties underscored their desire to continue to uphold the OPCW practice of reaching decisions by consensus. The Conference adopted 16 decisions on, *inter alia*: matters related to destruction deadlines; a framework agreement on international cooperation, in particular the full implementation of article XI of the Convention; the establishment of an International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons and the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for this purpose; universal adherence to the Convention; tenure policy; the OPCW programme and budget for 2012; and a comprehensive annual report on the Convention's implementation in 2010.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

With a total of 188 States parties, the OPCW covers 98 per cent of the world's population. The CWC rests on four main pillars—the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, the assistance and protection of States parties against chemical weapons, and international cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. In 2011, OPCW continued to implement the Convention in the areas of chemical demilitarization, verification and inspections; international cooperation and assistance; national implementation and assistance; protection against chemical weapons; and universality and external relations.

OPCW continued to make progress in the area of chemical demilitarization and verification. As of 31 December, 72.85 per cent of Category 1 and 52 per cent of Category 2 chemicals have been destroyed.

This represented an increase of more than 9 per cent compared with the level reached in 2010 for Category 1 chemicals. During the year, 209 inspections were conducted in accordance with article VI of the Convention.

Libya had destroyed more than half of its declared stockpiles of chemical weapons by 8 February, when operations were halted due to technical problems in the destruction facility. In response to the evolving situation in Libya, OPCW took a number of steps, including communicating with the United Nations Secretary-General and States parties to offer OPCW assistance and protection against chemical weapons, as needed. The Organisation's inspectors returned to the country to continue destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles. On 28 November, the Libyan authorities submitted a new declaration regarding additional suspected chemical weapons present in the country, to be verified by OPCW. The Secretariat continued to work closely with Libya for the earliest possible destruction of the remaining stockpiles.

In November, OPCW conducted a comprehensive challenge inspection exercise covering the main aspects of a challenge inspection, including both its headquarters procedures and field activities. The Government of Thailand hosted the field portion of this exercise.

The annual meeting of National Authorities, held from 25 to 27 November in The Hague, considered a range of issues relating to the effective national implementation of the Convention. The event was attended by 160 representatives from 110 States parties. In addition, the Technical Secretariat conducted four Regional Meetings of National Authorities throughout 2011, in Asia (Singapore), Africa (Ghana), Eastern Europe (Estonia) and Latin America and the Caribbean (Argentina). Thirteen technical assistance visits were undertaken in 10 States parties⁴² to assist them in implementing the Convention; these covered a range of support activities including legal assistance, customs and industry engagement.

On 23 September, the twelfth edition of the Associate Programme was successfully concluded. Participants represented 28 States parties,⁴³ including 11 African States.⁴⁴ The intensive nine-week programme entailed conducting modules at OPCW headquarters and the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom, as well as hands-on training at state-of-the-art plants in the chemical industry. To date, the Associate Programme has trained 265 scientists and engineers from 96 developing countries and countries with

⁴² Algeria, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cape Verde, Congo, Gambia, Malaysia, Mexico and Sierra Leone.

⁴³ Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Samoa, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

⁴⁴ Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Tunisia and Uganda.

economies in transition, combining both theoretical and practical training in modern production and in management and safety practices in the chemical industry.

In the area of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, the OPCW Secretariat, in collaboration with member States, conducted various regional capacity-building and training courses for specialists dealing with response to incidents with chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals.

A highlight of the Organisation's work in 2011 was the OPCW Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security, held from 12 to 13 September. The Conference was organized to mark 2011 as the International Year of Chemistry and as a contribution of OPCW to that celebration. The purpose of the Conference was to underscore the critical importance of the use of chemistry for exclusively peaceful purposes and to further strengthen support for the Convention. Over 400 participants from 29 countries participated in the Conference. The conference was further evidence of the strong commitment of the OPCW States parties to the goals of the Convention.⁴⁵

During the year, the Secretariat continued to carry out various activities aimed at promoting universal adherence. On 14 July, the Republic of South Sudan became the 193rd Member State of the United Nations. On 13 September, the Director-General addressed a letter to the South Sudanese authorities, encouraging the newly established State to join the Convention and offering OPCW assistance in facilitating the country's accession. The Secretariat also continued its outreach efforts with the Governments of Myanmar and Angola. At the invitation of the Government of Myanmar, a delegation from the Secretariat visited the country in June. The Secretariat also promoted and sponsored the participation of representatives of non-States parties in events organized by OPCW, such as awareness-raising and training activities, including the 2011 Challenge Inspection Exercise, and continued to maintain bilateral contacts with representatives of non-States parties, where possible, on the sidelines of official visits. The Director-General and Deputy Director-General raised the issue of universality during their official visits throughout the year.

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)⁴⁶ had requested OPCW and other relevant international organizations to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of

⁴⁵ The Outcome Document of the Conference is available from <http://www.opcw.org/chemicals-conference>.

⁴⁶ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 12 April 2012).

nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, expected to be convened in Finland, regarding modalities for such a zone, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained.⁴⁷ In response to this decision, OPCW continued to provide support to this initiative. In this regard, the OPCW Director-General met with Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State of Finland, in Helsinki in December.

Throughout the year, the Director-General and Deputy Director-General of OPCW addressed various international, academic and scientific forums, including, *inter alia*, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session, the Royal Society of Chemistry, the Conference on Disarmament, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and the Seventh BWC Review Conference. They also welcomed a number of high-level visitors at OPCW headquarters.

On 28 April, a ceremony to commemorate the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare was held at OPCW headquarters. Representatives of OPCW member States and other international organizations attended the event. In his message, the United Nations Secretary-General stressed that “this annual remembrance day, marking the anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, [was] an opportunity to pay tribute to the victims of chemical warfare and to reaffirm the international community’s condemnation of an inhumane weapon of mass destruction.”⁴⁸

Export controls

Australia Group

From 6 to 10 June, the Australia Group⁴⁹ held its annual plenary meeting in Paris. The Governments of Australia and France co-hosted the meeting.

⁴⁷ NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 30.

⁴⁸ Message of Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary General, on the 2011 Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, New York, 29 April 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5233> (accessed 12 April 2012).

⁴⁹ The Australia Group is a cooperative and voluntary group working to counter the spread of technologies and materials that may facilitate the development or acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by States of concern and terrorists. Australia Group participants are committed to ensuring that their export controls do not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors. Participants include the European Commission and 40 member States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. More information is available from <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html>.

During the meeting, participants worked to enhance best practices and measures to detect and prevent attempts to proliferate sensitive and dual-use chemicals, biological materials and related equipment. The Group shared experience on measures to enhance and refine licensing and export controls in order to meet current and emerging proliferation challenges.

The Group adopted a number of changes to its chemical and biological control lists, which were to be reflected in subsequent versions of the published lists. It also continued its review process of the proliferation risk associated with new and emerging technologies, with a view to identifying materials and equipment that might warrant inclusion at some future date in national export control lists.

Recognizing that preventing unauthorized transfers of intangible technology remains a priority for preventing the further proliferation of all forms of weapons of mass destruction, the Group reviewed steps being taken by several States to enhance such measures. As an additional practical contribution, the Australia Group approved a new manual,⁵⁰ for use by the Group's participants in dealing with intangible transfers of technology.

The Group emphasized the ongoing importance of engaging industry and academic sectors in support of the Group's work, including in controlling security-sensitive transfers of intangible technology. It noted the benefits to industry of such outreach in facilitating legitimate trade. The Group also shared experiences and best practices for such outreach activities.

The Australia Group plenary noted that its control lists continued to be an international benchmark for best practice controls on dual use, chemical and biological materials, equipment and related intangible technology. The plenary agreed to continue its extensive engagements with non-members and other international organizations in 2011-2012, with a view to the wider global adoption of the lists as they evolve over time.

No new members were admitted to the Group in 2011. Nonetheless, several countries received appropriate attention with regard to their interest in membership. The plenary approved further engagement with these States.

⁵⁰ The publication was made possible through the support of the Republic of Korea.



CHAPTER III

Conventional weapons issues

The United Nations is confronted with lax controls on the small arms trade in many parts of the world. Whether it is promoting sustainable development, protecting human rights, carrying out peacekeeping efforts, delivering food aid, improving public health, advancing gender equality, building safer cities, protecting forcibly displaced persons or fighting crime and terrorism, the Organization faces armed violence, conflict and civil unrest involving violations of international law, abuses of the rights of children, civilian casualties, humanitarian crises and missed social and economic opportunities.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL¹

Developments and trends, 2011

WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE in 2011 exceeded \$1.7 trillion, although it rose by just 0.3 per cent from the previous year and was also significantly less than the consistently high increases since 1998.² The global economic crisis and budget deficit pressures led some major defence spending nations to reduce their military outlays during the year.

Meanwhile, the easy availability of conventional arms and ammunition, in particular small arms and light weapons, continued to fuel repression, crime and terror, causing considerable suffering to civilian populations. The uncontrolled transfers of conventional arms also continued to fuel civil conflicts, enabling violations of Security Council arms embargoes and endangering development prospects in many countries.

The problems arising from the uncontrolled spread of conventional arms, however, led to intensive efforts in the United Nations for significant progress towards an arms trade treaty and increased global support for such a treaty. In 2011, the General Assembly engaged in hectic preparatory work for the long-awaited conference on an arms trade treaty, scheduled for 2012, which is supposed to establish the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.

¹ Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on small arms, S/2011/255, para. 7.

² Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "17 April 2012: world military spending levels out after 13 years of increases, says SIPRI". Available from <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/17-april-2012-world-military-spending-levels-out-after-13-years-of-increases-says-sipri> (accessed 4 June 2012).

With regard to the implementation of the Programme of Action on curbing the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, which was adopted in 2001, efforts were made in 2011 through the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts, which focused its attention on the issue of marking, recording-keeping and tracing of small arms, as well as on how best to tackle the implementation challenges. Preparations also started in 2011 for the Second Review Conference of the Programme of Action, scheduled for 2012, with the selection of Joy Ogwu (Nigeria) as the Chair-designate.

The online database of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms received a new map-based platform, entitled “The Global Reported Arms Trade”, which presents its data in an interactive, searchable and easily accessible manner, thus providing greater transparency in the global arms trade.

During 2010 and 2011, the Group of Governmental Experts on the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures reviewed the operation and further development of the instrument. The Group agreed on a number of recommendations in order to make reporting easier and simpler, one of which was to simplify the name of the instrument by calling it the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures.

The Group of Governmental Experts on cluster munitions held a series of meetings in 2011, as mandated, with a view to putting forward its recommendation to the Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The Review Conference took place in Geneva from 14 to 25 November.

Pursuant to the decisions of the Cartagena Summit for a Mine-Free World (Second Review Conference), held in 2009, and the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention, held in 2010, the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties took place in Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December.

In accordance with the decision of the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in Vientiane, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, in November 2010, the Second Meeting of States Parties was held in Beirut from 13 to 16 September and important decisions were taken for the future of the Convention and its effective implementation.

For more information on the resolutions and decisions related to this chapter, refer to appendix VIII.

Small arms and light weapons

Small arms and light weapons continued to wreak havoc in many parts of the world, in particular in post-conflict settings and areas of endemic crime. Concerned about the continued unregulated circulation of small arms and their ammunition, particularly their highly destabilizing impact on security and development in all regions of the world, the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly have continued to place the issue on their agendas.

Security Council

During the year, the challenge posed by the proliferation of small arms and related material remained an important theme throughout a wide array of topics addressed by the Security Council.

In particular, the Council held closed consultations on 25 April on the report of the Secretary-General on small arms³ submitted to the Council. The report contained recommendations on the promotion of weapons tracing and ammunition tracing in conflict and post-conflict areas; improving record-keeping procedures of arms and ammunition; securing of ammunition stockpiles to mitigate threats of diversion, including the production of improvised explosive devices; the development of measurable goals on armed violence prevention and the integration of security-related themes into the possible follow-up of the Millennium Development Goals; engaging armed groups with the aim of increasing their compliance with agreed norms regarding the use of small arms; and improving the information sharing between Security Council arms embargo monitoring groups, sanctions committees, peacekeepers, Member States and regional and international organizations.

The issue of small arms was also seen as highly relevant in other debates within the Security Council, including the challenge of children and armed conflict; the relationship between women, peace and security; the protection of civilians in armed conflict; violation of arms embargoes; and threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.

Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons

Since its adoption in 2001, the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects⁴ has been central to global efforts to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their uncontrolled proliferation. The Programme of Action spelled out a range of measures to be

³ S/2011/255.

⁴ A/CONF.192/15. Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx> (accessed 2 June 2012).

taken at the international, regional and national levels to address all aspects of the problem.

The year 2011 marked the tenth anniversary of the Programme of Action. During these 10 years, significant progress was made in its implementation. The International Tracing Instrument⁵ was agreed upon, and a United Nations expert group report on small arms brokering⁶ was welcomed by States as a basis for their efforts regarding the regulation of such brokering. A number of States established and revised national legislative frameworks, integrated small arms action plans into national development strategies, worked on weapons collection and destruction programmes, improved on their stockpile management, and entered into international cooperation and assistance. States further improved the security of stockpiles and destroyed surplus weapons, often with assistance provided by the United Nations, including its three regional centres for peace and disarmament, in partnership with donors, regional organizations and civil society. A growing number of States increased transparency by reporting their small arms transfers to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

National reporting under the Programme of Action, however, remained low in some regions. For instance in the three years from 2009 to 2011, only 35 per cent of States from the Asian Group and 45 per cent from the Latin American and Caribbean Group submitted their national reports.

Furthermore, national reports were often unclear on what the challenges were in national implementation, and on how they could be overcome. Moreover, effective operational information exchange between States' investigative and law enforcement authorities—and with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)—could still improve.

Periodic reviews of the implementation of the Programme of Action were held, including the Review Conference in 2006 and a series of four biennial meetings of States in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2010. From 2008 onwards, these meetings produced substantive outcome documents.⁷

In 2011, the first Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts was convened in New York from 9 to 13 May, in response to the request by States in resolution 63/72 of 2 December 2008, to connect the normative work at the global level with how experts deal with the topic in practice.

⁵ A/60/88 and Corr.2, annex, para. 38, as adopted by General Assembly decision 60/519 of 8 December 2005.

⁶ A/62/163.

⁷ A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3 and A/CONF.192/BMS/2010/3.

International Tracing Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

It was agreed⁸ that the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts would seek to facilitate the exchange of views, experiences and lessons learned among experts of all 193 Member States on the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, also known as the International Tracing Instrument.⁹ International and regional organizations, specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups also participated.

The meeting was chaired by Jim McLay (New Zealand). Topics for discussion were marking; record-keeping; cooperation in tracing; national frameworks; regional cooperation; and international assistance and capacity-building.

During discussions, participants identified a number of challenges that impeded the effective marking and tracing of weapons. These included the development of weapons families with similar design features, which could lead to an increased risk of misidentification; the trend towards modular weapons design that allows routine exchange of major components, which is a challenge for their effective marking; the falsification, alteration or erasure of serial numbers and other markings; illicit trade in weapon components; the need to regulate craft and artisan production of weapons; and a lack of equipment, expertise and other capacity shortfalls related to marking and record-keeping.

The participants identified a number of priority areas requiring assistance and capacity-building. These included the continuous training of law enforcement personnel in weapons identification; the acquisition of necessary equipment, including marking machines; the strengthening of existing legislation and the adoption of new legislation; and the transfer of relevant and up-to-date technology for marking.

Furthermore, participants recognized that weapons marking, record-keeping and tracing were mutually reinforcing activities that should be an integral part of national efforts to control SALW. They also noted the enabling role that effective national frameworks, active regional and international cooperation, and the provision of assistance and national capacity-building play in supporting full implementation of the International Tracing Instrument and relevant provisions of the Programme of Action.

⁸ General Assembly resolution 63/72, operative paragraph 13, or resolution 64/50, operative paragraph 15.

⁹ A/60/88 and Corr.2, annex. Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx> (accessed 2 June 2012).

Some participants suggested institutionalizing the Open-ended Meetings of Governmental Experts as part of the follow-up mechanisms under the Programme of Action. The General Assembly, in its resolution 65/64 of 8 December 2010, *inter alia*, stated that the Second Review Conference on the Programme of Action, to be held in 2012, may consider recommending convening an additional open-ended meeting of governmental experts to strengthen the implementation of the Programme of Action.

The Chair provided a detailed account of discussions in his summary, prepared under his own responsibility, which was issued after the Meeting as an annex to his letter to the Secretary-General.¹⁰ The outcome document of the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts¹¹ included an enumeration of the issues that were discussed during the week, and a reference to a Chair's summary containing a detailed account of each thematic session. By its resolution 66/47 of 2 December 2011, the General Assembly endorsed the report, and took note of the Chair's summary of discussions.

In addition, the Meeting also served as an appropriate forum for donor and recipient countries as well as regional organizations to explore opportunities for cooperation in technical, financial and other forms of assistance.

United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms

Concerning the issue of small arms, 23 United Nations partners with diverse and specialized expertise coordinate their work on the subject through the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA).¹² Established in 1998, CASA, which originally focused only on small arms, now fosters coherence within the Organization on a range of arms-related topics such as small arms, armed violence, the arms trade and ammunition stockpile management.

CASA continued to undertake, coordinate and oversee activities such as the development of the International Small Arms Control Standards; the improvement of the Programme of Action Implementation Support System;¹³ assessing the adverse impact of unregulated arms transfers on the work of the United Nations; the formulation of an implementation framework for the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines; and the establishment of implementation modalities for the assistance proposals submitted by affected States in combating the proliferation of small arms through the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures.

¹⁰ A/66/157.

¹¹ A/CONF.192/MGE/2011/1.

¹² For CASA partners, see www.poa-iss.org/CASA/CASA.aspx (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹³ More information is available from www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx (accessed 2 June 2012).

Through regular policy dialogue and information exchange, CASA also advanced collaboration externally with other intergovernmental and regional organizations. Recent efforts through CASA achieved mutually aligned and consistent reporting templates for the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with regard to their respective small arms instruments.

Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures

Since its inception in the document entitled “An agenda for peace”¹⁴ and its supplement,¹⁵ the concept of practical disarmament measures was developed to fill the gap between the traditional multilateral negotiations on disarmament and the actual needs of States affected by conflict and the often poorly controlled spread of small arms. The informal Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) was established as an open forum to assist affected States in their efforts to maintain and consolidate peace and security. GIS particularly advocates action-oriented practical approaches, including the control of SALW, demining, and demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.¹⁶

In 2011, GIS continued to function as a clearing house for the matching of assistance needs and available resources in the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms. In cooperation with GIS, the Secretariat updated and presented a compilation document of assistance proposals¹⁷ on the occasion of the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts in May and following GIS meetings. These proposals were formulated based on national needs and requests for assistance as identified by affected States in their 2010 national reports on the Programme of Action. Two cardinal principles underlying the compilation were that all the proposals must originate from and be endorsed by national authorities, in order to ensure the right ownership of envisaged activities, and that GIS and the Secretariat only functioned as brokers: when a donor and an implementing agency were connected, the project moved to the field. These assistance efforts resulted in a number of projects being funded or negotiated.

Participating States also agreed that the GIS should serve as a forum for information sharing to promote policy dialogue on relevant issues. In this connection, it facilitated the exchange of views related to the United Nations small arms process; the link between small arms issues, conflict prevention and an arms trade treaty; and the partnership between disarmament communities based in New York and Geneva.

¹⁴ A/47/277-S/24111.

¹⁵ A/50/60-S/1995/1.

¹⁶ See General Assembly resolution 51/45 N of 10 December 1996.

¹⁷ “Matching Needs and Resources: Updated May 2011”. Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalAssistance/AssistanceProposals-MGE2011.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

The General Assembly welcomed the activities undertaken by GIS and encouraged it to facilitate the effective matching of needs and resources in accordance with the outcome of the fourth Biennial Meeting of States.¹⁸

Armed violence and development

In 2006, the Government of Switzerland together with the United Nations Development Programme launched a high-level initiative that resulted in the adoption of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.¹⁹ The Geneva Declaration, which is now endorsed by over 100 States, recognized armed violence as both a cause and consequence of underdevelopment. It was designed to support States to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence in conflict and non-conflict settings by 2015.

The General Assembly, by its resolution 63/23 of 17 November 2008, introduced the link between armed violence and development in the United Nations agenda in 2008. Subsequently, the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly²⁰ acknowledged that armed violence undermined development and constituted an impediment to the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

The Second Ministerial Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration, hosted by the Government of Switzerland and the United Nations Development Programme, was held in Geneva from 31 October to 1 November. The 96 States that attended the Conference adopted an outcome document (for the text, see appendix VI), which established a concrete vision and set clear priorities for the implementation of the Geneva Declaration by 2015. The Conference also focused on sharing the wealth of experience that participants have gathered in tackling the scourge of armed violence and assessed progress in the implementation of the Geneva Declaration commitments.

At regional seminars held in Nairobi in February; in Kathmandu in March; in Abuja, Nigeria, in June; and in Zagreb in September, participants

¹⁸ A/CONF.192/BMS/2010/3, operative paragraph 29 (h), (i) and (j): "In order to identify, prioritize and communicate needs and match them with resources, States are encouraged to build on existing mechanisms ... and to consider other ways in which needs and resources can be matched effectively and assistance and cooperation can be more effectively coordinated, including by exploring opportunities for increasing dialogue between States; In this regard, States encouraged further efforts by the Office for Disarmament Affairs ... to assist States, upon request, in preparing project outlines identifying country-specific needs; In order to better identify donors for these proposals and to increase the visibility of available assistance, States encouraged intensified efforts among all States, international and regional organizations and civil society ...". Also see resolution 65/67 of 8 December 2010, operative paragraph 5.

¹⁹ Available from <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-Declaration-091020-EN.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

²⁰ A/64/228.

addressed the issue of armed violence and its impact on development in their respective regional settings.

Conventional arms ammunition

The United Nations Secretary-General pointed out that while arms can have a lifespan of decades and are often recycled from conflict to conflict, their value and the ability to sustain armed conflict or violence depend on the availability of an uninterrupted supply of ammunition.²¹

Demonstrating the urgent need to better secure ammunition stockpiles, much of the ammunition circulating among non-State actors seems to have been diverted from Government security forces. Stockpiles also present a secondary danger to civilian populations when they are placed in densely populated areas.

Improving the whole-life management of conventional ammunition stockpiles at the global, regional and national levels requires a concerted response. In accordance with the recommendation in the report of the 2008 Group of Governmental Experts on the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus,²² International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) have been developed within the United Nations under the United Nations SaferGuard programme, drafted by an expert consultant and reviewed by a technical review panel.

From 5 to 8 September, the technical review panel held its third meeting in Rio de Janeiro after which it gave its final affirmation that the technical content of the IATG was complete, comprehensive and of the highest available standards.

The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 66/42 of 2 December 2011, also welcomed the completion of the IATG and the establishment of the United Nations SaferGuard programme for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition. By adopting this resolution, Member States acknowledged the completion of the mandate given to the United Nations. The number of Member States sponsoring this resolution saw a marked increase from 2 to 52 Member States. Another eight Member States also joined as additional sponsors. The SaferGuard programme enabled quick experts-only responses to requests from Member States for assistance in securing ammunition stockpiles using the IATG. The implementation of the programme—for which countries in a position to provide funding were invited to do so—was currently under way.

²¹ See S/2008/258.

²² See A/63/182.

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1991 as a confidence-building measure to discourage excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms and to reduce the risk of misperceptions and miscalculations through enhanced levels of transparency.²³ The Register is a voluntary reporting instrument that covers transfers of major conventional weapons and SALW, as well as domestic arms procurement and military holdings, on a calendar year basis. Its primary emphasis has been on major conventional weapons but SALW are now an important part of its scope. The Register is an evolving mechanism, whose operation and further development are subject to periodic review by Governmental experts.

New database of the Register

Pursuant to the recommendations of the 2006 Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to improve the user-friendliness of the Register's database, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) developed a website called "The Global Reported Arms Trade", a technologically up-to-date, map-based platform allowing for direct access to and comparison of all data on arms exports and imports submitted since the beginning of the United Nations Register.²⁴ This database thus provided for significantly greater transparency in the global arms trade.

Annual report on the Register

The nineteenth consolidated report by the Secretary-General,²⁵ which were issued in 2011, contained information provided by 86 Governments on their transfers of conventional arms that took place in 2010. This figure was higher than those reported for 2008 and 2009. Of the 86 national reports received, 35 were "nil" reports, 33 contained information on exports, 40 contained information on imports, while 52 submissions also contained data on national military holdings and procurement through national production.

Annex I to this chapter lists all replies received by the Secretary-General and indicates which reply contained data on imports and exports of conventional arms, as well as what kind of background information was included.

²³ More details are available from <http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx> (accessed 2 June 2012).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ A/66/127 and Corr.1-2. A/66/127/Add.1 will be issued in 2012. Available from www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml.

Of the countries that reported their transfers, 49 included transfers of SALW. The percentage of reports containing additional background information on SALW transfers was 57 per cent (see figure I). Meanwhile, figure II shows a breakdown by region of reports containing information on transfers of SALW. The continued high reporting level on small arms confirms the relevance of including transfers of SALW in the Register, however the portion of national reports with data on SALW declined slightly in 2011. The information provided by States on international transfers of SALW is presented in annex II to this chapter.

Despite the turnaround in the overall participation in the Register in 2011, regional disparities remained a serious obstacle to achieving universal participation (see table 1). Of the 86 reports received in 2011, 2 came from Africa (out of 53 States), 19 from Asia and the Pacific (out of 53 States), 16 from Latin America and the Caribbean (out of 33 States), 21 from Eastern Europe (out of 23 States) and 28 from Western Europe and other States (out of 30 States). The percentage of reporting States in each region throws the regional disparities in sharp contrast. Submissions came from 4 per cent of the African States, 36 per cent of the Asian and Pacific States and 48 per cent of the Latin American and Caribbean States. In comparison, 91 per cent of the Eastern European States and 93 per cent of the Western European and other States reported to the Register in 2011. Such regional disparities also applied to reporting on transfers of SALW. In 2011, out of the 49 reports containing information on SALW transfers, none came from Africa (0 per cent of States in the region), 4 from Asia and the Pacific (8 per cent of States in the region), 9 from Latin America and the Caribbean (27 per cent of States in the region), 15 from Eastern Europe (65 per cent of States in the region), and 21 from Western Europe and other States (70 per cent of States in the region).

Figure I. Reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons as a percentage of total submitted reports, 2004-2011




Figure II. Reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons by regional group, 2004-2011




Table 1. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2001-2011

(Number of reports submitted)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Africa (total: 53)	11	17	17	10	16	16	15	8	4	4	2
Asia and the Pacific (total: 53)	31	30	29	32	31	27	26	21	18	16	19
Eastern Europe (total: 23)	21	21	22	20	21	21	22	22	19	19	21
Latin America and Caribbean (total: 33)	23	26	24	21	18	21	20	11	13	8	16
Western Europe and other States (total: 30)	30	30	29	30	29	30	30	29	26	25	28
Total	116	124	121	113	115	115	113	91	80	72	86

Note: The table shows participation in the Register based on the years in which the national report was submitted.

Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

The Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, now called the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, was established in 1981 to help build confidence among States through greater openness in military matters and also to encourage restraint in military spending.²⁶ It is a voluntary reporting instrument that seeks data, based on fiscal year spending, under four broad categories, namely: personnel; operations and maintenance; procurement and construction; and research and development. The instrument also provides for “nil” reporting by States that do not possess regular armed forces.

Group of Governmental Experts

During 2010 and 2011, a group of governmental experts (GGE) reviewed the operation and further development of this reporting instrument for the first time in three decades.²⁷ With a view to facilitating discussions within the GGE, a UNODA Occasional Paper was published, in cooperation with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, entitled *Promoting Further Openness and Transparency in Military Matters:*

²⁶ More details available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/>.

²⁷ See General Assembly resolution 62/13 of 5 December 2007.

*An Assessment of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.*²⁸

The GGE also reviewed data and information submitted by Governments since the inception of the instrument, as well as views and suggestions by Member States as reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General on ways and means of improving the operation of the standardized reporting system. The GGE examined the rate of submissions for the entire period of operation of the instrument, and analysed the reasons that may prevent countries from reporting military expenditures. The experts also examined the use of the standardized reporting forms and recognized that it was crucial to retain the main elements of the instrument in order to increase the relevance of the instrument and promote its universality. However, they concluded that the current structure of the reporting matrix did not fully reflect national systems and regional formats for reporting military expenditures, which limited the provision of the full range of information requested by the matrix in the reporting forms.

The GGE reached a common understanding that “military expenditures refer to all financial resources that a State spends on the uses and functions of its military forces. Information on military expenditures represents an actual outlay in current prices and domestic currency”. It agreed to a number of recommendations that included modifications to the standardized and simplified reporting forms, and developed a “nil” report form for Member States that possess neither armed nor military forces. The GGE further recommended including in the national reports information on national points of contact in order to facilitate communication between Member States and the Secretariat.

The GGE encouraged States to fund an overhaul of the existing UNODA database on military expenditures with a view to making it more user-friendly and to increasing its functionality. Furthermore, the GGE recommended that the General Assembly establish a process of periodic review of this instrument in order to ensure its continued relevance, and suggested that the next review be scheduled in five years.

Finally, it was suggested that the name of the instrument be simplified to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. By resolution 66/20 of 2 December 2011, the General Assembly endorsed the report of the GGE,²⁹ and the recommendations contained therein.

Annual report on military expenditures

In 2011, UNODA received 67 national reports on military expenditures for the latest fiscal year (2010), including 10 “nil” reports.³⁰ These figures represented a slight increase in the number of reports received as compared with 2009 and 2010, when the number of submissions fell to their lowest since 2000. In particular, the level of participation from Latin America and the Caribbean rose significantly from 5 States in 2010 to 10 States in 2011. The number of reports from Eastern Europe also increased from 17 in 2010 to 21 in

²⁸ UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 20, November 2010 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.IX.5).

²⁹ A/66/89.

³⁰ Data provided by States are reproduced in the report of the Secretary-General (A/66/117 and Add.1) and available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/html/Milex_SGReports.shtml.

2010. In contrast, the level of participation from Asia and the Pacific dropped from 13 in 2010 to 10 in 2011. Information on States that provided data on military expenditures of 2010 is presented in annex III to this chapter. Regional participation in the instrument is reflected in table 2 below.

While overall participation in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditure showed a sign of improvement in 2011, there remained significant disparities in reporting by States among different regions. Of the 67 reports received in 2011, 3 came from Africa, 10 from Asia and the Pacific, 21 from Eastern Europe, 10 from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 23 from Western Europe and other States. The percentage of reporting States in each region were 5.7 per cent for Africa, 18.9 per cent for Asia and the Pacific, 30.3 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean, 95.5 per cent for Eastern Europe, and 76.7 per cent for Western Europe and other States.

Table 2. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, 2001-2011

(Number of reports submitted)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Africa (total: 53)	1	6	4	4	1	4	2	5	2	3	3
Asia and the Pacific (total: 53)	11	15	16	16	16	17	15	13	9	13	10
Eastern Europe (total: 22)	17	18	16	20	19	19	19	21	19	17	21
Latin America and the Caribbean (total: 33)	8	15	13	9	11	14	14	11	7	5	10
Western Europe and other States (total: 30)	24	26	26	29	28	26	28	27	21	20	23
Total	61	80	75	78	75	80	78	77	58	60	67

Note: The table shows participation in the instrument based on reports on military expenditures submitted by Members States, which generally contain information on the latest available fiscal year. This information is requested by UNODA through an annual note verbale, as mandated by the relevant General Assembly resolution.

Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms

The Secretary-General submitted his report on this issue³¹ to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session, pursuant to resolution 65/63 of 8 December 2010. It was the first time such a report was requested. It reviewed information provided by Member States on their implementation of this resolution since 2005, and provided an analysis of statistical information submitted by Member States during those years.

In his report, the Secretary-General identified three major categories of confidence-building measures (CBMs), namely:

- *Information exchange measures*, such as the appointment of military points of contact, the establishment of a hotline between chiefs of the armed forces, the exchange of military information on national forces and armaments, and the advance notification of important military manoeuvres and activities;
- *Observation and verification measures*, such as agreeing on observers to monitor major military exercises, or on missions for on-site evaluation of information provided by a Government on its military units and equipment;
- *Military constraint measures*, such as restrictions on the number and scope of major military exercises, limitations of troop movements, de-alerting and the establishment of demilitarized and weapon-free zones.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General noted that most CBMs referred to in national reports have been agreed to at the regional, subregional and bilateral levels and that the great variety of such measures underlined the importance of tailoring them to the particular security concerns of States within a region and subregion. With a view to further developing CBMs, the Secretary-General put forward several recommendations, which included: (a) building on existing measures with a global reach such as the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; (b) drawing upon an overview of CBMs to identify potential suitable measures; and (c) consolidating reporting by Member States through regional and subregional reporting.

As requested by resolution 65/63, UNODA established an electronic database containing information provided by Member States on CBMs. UNODA expressed its readiness, at the request of Member States, to organize seminars, courses and workshops aimed at enhancing their knowledge of new

³¹ A/66/176.

developments in this field. Information on CBMs provided by Member States to UNODA is available in its online database.³²

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

In its thirty-first year, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons continues to serve as a pillar of International Humanitarian Law and humanitarian action. It remains a flexible and dynamic framework, making a tangible difference in the lives of people caught in the cross-hairs of conflict.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL³³

Negotiations on cluster munitions in the lead-up to the Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, also known as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),³⁴ dominated the focus of the States parties. The negotiations had been under way for four years in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which was mandated to continue the negotiations in 2011 with a view to putting forward a recommendation to the Fourth Review Conference.³⁵

The GGE met three times in 2011 (21 to 25 February, 28 March to 1 April and 22 to 26 August) with Jesus S. Domingo (Philippines) being reappointed for a second term as Chairperson. Throughout the three sessions, he was assisted by four Friends of the Chair: Jim Burke (Ireland) and Leonidas Hidalgo (Philippines) led discussions on the preamble, general provisions and scope of application, definitions, general prohibitions and restrictions, and the technical annexes; and Philip Kimpton (Australia) and Anesa Kundurovic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) focused on discussions on the reporting requirements, transfers, possible review of the technical annexes and overall structure of the text.

The negotiations on cluster munitions remained contentious on a number of issues. As an example, the Chairperson's text³⁶ prohibited cluster munitions produced before 1 January 1980 and allowed for compliance with

³² Available from www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/infoCBM/.

³³ Message of the Secretary-General to the Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, delivered by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 14 November 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sgsm13941.doc.htm> (accessed 2 June 2012).

³⁴ The Convention is also known as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

³⁵ CCW/MSP/2010/5, para. 35.

³⁶ CCW/CONF.IV/9 and Rev.1.

this prohibition to be deferred for up to 12 years. Those opposing responded that 1980 was an arbitrary deadline and that States needed to take action on all cluster munitions, which posed a risk regardless of when they were produced. While some States maintained that these provisions were going to have major cost and security implications that may necessitate a deferral period, others responded that this was another example of States not being serious about addressing the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and that a deferral on “use” could not be justified.

Consequently, such divergent views were reflected in the report to the Review Conference³⁷ that the GGE adopted at its third session. It stated that the GGE could not reach consensus and that the Chairperson intended to submit his text for further consideration by the Fourth Review Conference.³⁸

Fourth Review Conference

The Fourth CCW Review Conference was held in Geneva from 14 to 25 November. Representatives from 95 States parties, 5 signatory States, 23 non-States parties, United Nations entities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations participated in the Conference.³⁹ In accordance with the rules of procedure, the Conference appointed 10 Vice-Presidents;⁴⁰ Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons of the two Main Committees, Credentials Committee, Drafting Committee;⁴¹ and 3 members of the Credentials Committee.⁴²

The Fourth CCW Review Conference was opened on 14 November by the Director of the Geneva Branch of UNODA. At the outset, Gancho Ganev (Bulgaria) was confirmed as the President of the Conference. The message⁴³ from the United Nations Secretary-General was delivered by the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. The Review Conference subsequently held a general exchange of views, with 51 States and 6

³⁷ CCW/GGE/2011-III/3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

³⁹ The list of participants is contained in CCW/CONF.IV/INF.1.

⁴⁰ Australia, Belarus, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and United States.

⁴¹ Credentials Committee Chairperson: Tamar Rahamimoff-Honig (Israel) and Vice-Chairperson: Amandeep Singh Gill (India); Main Committee I Chairperson: Jesus S. Domingo (Philippines) and Vice-Chairperson: Robert Jackson (Ireland); Main Committee II Chairperson: Eric Danon (France) and Vice-Chairperson: Arturas Gailiunas (Lithuania); Drafting Committee Chairperson: Fedor Rosocha (Slovakia) and Vice-Chairperson: Shen Jian (China).

⁴² Cuba, Germany and Romania.

⁴³ Message of the Secretary-General to the Fourth CCW Review Conference, delivered by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 14 November 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sgsm13941.doc.htm> (accessed 2 June 2012).

international organizations and non-governmental organizations delivering their statements.⁴⁴

The Fourth CCW Review Conference distributed its work between two main committees. Main Committee I⁴⁵ was responsible for reviewing the scope and operation of the Convention and its annexed protocols, consideration of any proposals, and preparation and consideration of the final documents. It made the following key decisions:

- To convene a Meeting of Experts on the issues under its review in 2012;⁴⁶
- To adopt an accelerated Plan of Action to promote universalization;⁴⁷
- To continue the CCW Sponsorship Programme;⁴⁸
- To enhance the implementation of the CCW Compliance Mechanism;⁴⁹
- To set the dates and duration of the CCW activities in 2012;⁵⁰
- To appoint Jesus S. Domingo as the Chairperson-designate of the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties in 2012.⁵¹

During the examination and review of the Convention and its annexed protocols, concern was expressed about the use of white phosphorous and the implications for Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons. After discussions, States

⁴⁴ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and United States. The representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (on behalf of a number of United Nations agencies and organizations involved in humanitarian action), the United Nations Mine Action Service, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Ban Advocates and Cluster Munition Coalition also participated in the general exchange of views.

⁴⁵ Main Committee I held meetings from 16 to 23 November 2011 and was led by Jesus S. Domingo (Philippines), Chairperson, and Robert Jackson (Ireland), Vice-Chairperson.

⁴⁶ CCW/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, Decision 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Decision 2. Since the Third Review Conference, 14 States had joined the CCW bringing the total to 114 States parties.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Decision 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Decision 4.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Decision 5, para. 1: Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II (23-24 April 2012); Meeting of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V (25-27 April 2012); Sixth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V (12-13 November 2012); Fourteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II (14 November 2012); an open-ended meeting of experts of three days in 2012 to discuss further the implementation of international humanitarian law with regard to mines other than anti-personnel mines (2-4 April 2012); and the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention (15-16 November 2012).

⁵¹ CCW/CONF.IV/4, para. 32.

agreed to “note the concerns raised during the discussions on Protocol III by some High Contracting Parties about the offensive use of white phosphorous against civilians, including suggestions for further discussion on this matter”.⁵² Another issue under Protocol III was the scope of reservations and their compatibility with the object and purpose of Protocol III. This issue was addressed by recalling “the basic principle that reservations to the Convention or its protocols must be in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention or its protocols, respectively”.⁵³

Main Committee II was tasked with the consideration of proposals for additional protocols to the Convention and the only subject before it was the negotiations on cluster munitions.⁵⁴ The President submitted to Main Committee II the report to the Review Conference, adopted by the GGE at its third session,⁵⁵ for consideration. The Committee had before it the text of draft protocol VI on cluster munitions, which further evolved.⁵⁶

Those delegations opposing the new draft protocol VI were concerned that it would constitute a backward step for international humanitarian law, undermine the Convention on Cluster Munitions and legitimize the use of cluster munitions, which posed a serious humanitarian risk. On the other hand, States supporting draft protocol VI stressed that it was important for all States to be included in regimes that were either regulating or prohibiting cluster munitions. It was indirectly acknowledged that some major States had military doctrines in which cluster munitions played a significant role. Those States preferred to put in place measures that would serve as intermediary steps towards a longer-term and more comprehensive prohibition.

The final plenary session of the Fourth CCW Review Conference determined the fate of a protocol on cluster munitions as Costa Rica, on behalf of 50 States, made a statement underscoring that there was no consensus on the draft protocol. As a result, draft protocol VI was withdrawn and the decisions and review of the Convention and its protocols under Main Committee I were adopted as the final outcomes of the Review Conference (see the text of the Final Declaration in appendix IV).

⁵² CCW/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, para. 2 of the review on Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 2, to the Review of the Convention.

⁵⁴ At its first meeting on 15 November, Main Committee II adopted its agenda (CCW/CONF.IV/MC.II/1) and its programme of work (CCW/CONF.IV/MC.II/2).

⁵⁵ CCW/GGE/2011-III/3, annex I.

⁵⁶ The text of the draft protocol evolved from CCW/GGE/2011-III/3, annex I, to CCW/CONF.IV/9 and subsequently CCW/CONF.IV/9/Rev.1.

Amended Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices

Amended Protocol II Group of Experts

Discussions in the Group of Experts⁵⁷ focused on the implementation and universality of the Amended Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II), including the legal feasibility of terminating the original Protocol II. To recall briefly, new developments, including the amendment to Protocol II,⁵⁸ article 1 and a fifth additional protocol, made the structure of the Convention even more complex and inflicts further confusion to potential new adherents. Moreover, some new States have even opted to join the original Protocol II instead of the amended version because it is still in force. These developments prompted the idea of terminating Protocol II. The Coordinator on the operation and status of Amended Protocol II⁵⁹ presented two options for the termination of legal instruments: (a) acceptance of termination by all the States parties; or (b) application of the provisions of the framework law for the Convention, i.e., article 59, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,⁶⁰ which provides for the termination of a treaty upon conclusion of a later treaty. Both options were still under consideration. In the meantime, the Coordinator reported that he had contacted the remaining 12 States parties to the original Protocol II that had not yet declared their intention to accede to Amended Protocol II to encourage them to facilitate the collective denunciation of the original Protocol II. Ten States reported that their respective authorities were in the process of considering accession to Amended Protocol II. Two other States were not in a position to join Amended Protocol II at this time for different reasons. One State argued that it had joined the higher standards set out in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The other State argued on national security grounds. On the second topic of national reporting, the experts acknowledged that the rate of reporting under the Protocol needed to be improved.

Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland), Coordinator on the problem of improvised explosive devices (IED), concluded from the presentations and subsequent discussions that incidents involving victim-activated IED were increasing. The Group underscored the importance of clearance of explosive remnants of war, improved storage control, reinforced international cooperation and assistance to reduce incidents of IED use. It

⁵⁷ The discussions were held at Geneva from 4 to 5 April 2011.

⁵⁸ As Protocol II was unable to prevent the catastrophic humanitarian crises resulting from the massive use of anti-personnel mines in the early 1990s, it was strengthened and amended on 3 May 1996.

⁵⁹ Abderrazzak Laassel (Morocco).

⁶⁰ Available from <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html> (accessed 2 June 2012).

also acknowledged the importance of the implementation of the provisions of Amended Protocol II and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to address humanitarian concerns posed by IED. The Group also heard a number of substantive presentations by experts.⁶¹

On technical approaches to deal with explosives, two national presentations⁶² highlighted various efforts to mark explosives for the purposes of identification and detection, including in the framework of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.⁶³ During the discussions, a representative of UNODA delivered a presentation on the ongoing work related to the development of technical guidelines for the stockpile management of ammunition within the United Nations.⁶⁴ She underlined that the development of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and their implementation by States could constitute an important contribution towards the prevention of IED incidents. Reference was made to the possible benefit of an interaction between representatives of the IATG process and the Group of Experts.

Thirteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II

The Thirteenth Annual Conference was held in Geneva on 11 November. The Conference was presided by Hellmut Hoffmann (Germany) and considered the work of the Group of Experts. The Conference adopted an appeal by the States parties to promote universal adherence to Amended Protocol II and recommended that the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the Conference exercise their authority towards this end. As of the Conference, Amended Protocol II had 97 High Contracting Parties.⁶⁵ A total of 53 States parties⁶⁶ submitted their national annual reports on the

⁶¹ “Improvised explosive devices” by Adrian King (Hazard Management Solutions Ltd., United Kingdom); “Improvised explosive devices (IEDs): problems and prospects” by Joseph Almog (Casali Institute of Applied Chemistry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); “Rehabilitation and care of the disabled in Iraq” by Chasib Ali (Ministry of Health, Iraq).

⁶² “Marking of explosives in Switzerland for the purpose of identification” and “Marking of plastic explosives” (Convention on the Marking of Explosive Material for the Purpose of Detection) by Urs F. Hilfiker (Federal Police, Switzerland).

⁶³ Available from <http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv10-english.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

⁶⁴ “International Ammunition Technical Guidelines: securing ammunition stockpiles to prevent IED manufacture” by Gillian Goh (Conventional Arms Branch, UNODA).

⁶⁵ Recent accessions were Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (6 December 2010) and Serbia (14 February 2011).

⁶⁶ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of

implementation of Amended Protocol II.⁶⁷ The Coordinator on the operation and status of Amended Protocol II, Abderrazzak Laassel (Morocco), informed the Conference that most of the High Contracting Parties had complied at least once with their reporting obligations, although a decrease in reporting was observable in recent years.

The Conference took note of the report by the Coordinator on the operation and status of Amended Protocol II⁶⁸ and decided to adopt the following steps:

- The Group of Experts would continue to review the operation and status of the Amended Protocol II and consider matters arising from the national annual reports. It should also consider the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines;
- The Plan of Action to Promote the Universality of the Convention and its Protocols was the mechanism to enhance the interest of non-States parties;
- The High Contracting Parties to the Convention would continue their contacts with the High Contracting Parties to the original Protocol II that had not yet become parties to Amended Protocol II. They would encourage their accession and thus facilitate termination of the original Protocol II; and
- The Group of Experts would analyse participation in national annual reporting and study the content of the reports, focusing on the information submitted in Form B, “Mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes”.

The Conference also took note of the report⁶⁹ by the Coordinator on IED, Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland) and decided to:

- Continue to exchange information on IED, and on IED incidents and their humanitarian effects and prevention, as well as on the significance of the CCW framework, its norms and their implementation relating to the IED threat;
- Continue to survey existing guidelines, best practices and other recommendations and to compile, for consideration of the High Contracting Parties, guidelines adding to existing work and aiming at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IED;

Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

⁶⁷ Available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/66F87A925AAEBCF4C12574830030A9CF?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/66F87A925AAEBCF4C12574830030A9CF?OpenDocument) (accessed 2 June 2012).

⁶⁸ CCW/AP.II/CONF.13/2.

⁶⁹ CCW/AP.II/CONF.13/3/Rev.1.

- Continue to follow the IATG process and exchange views with the IATG technical review panel with a view to, where appropriate, contributing to the review and implementation of the guidelines in order to enhance the prevention of IED incidents; and
- Continue discussions on victim assistance so that those providing assistance would bear in mind the 2008 Plan of Action on Victim Assistance of Protocol V⁷⁰ and the principles of age-sensitive and gender-sensitive medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support and adequate assistance for social and economic inclusion in a non-discriminatory manner.

In addition, the Group of Experts was mandated to review the operation and status of the Protocol, as well as to consider matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties and the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines.⁷¹ The Group of Experts decided to further continue the IED deliberations.⁷² In addition, the outcome of the work of the Group of Experts would be considered by the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II in 2012.

Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

Protocol V Meeting of Experts

The Meeting of Experts took place in Geneva from 6 to 8 April. It was opened and chaired by Mikhail Khvostov (Belarus), President-designate of the Fifth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. The Meeting of Experts comprised sessions on six substantive issues: (a) clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war (ERW);⁷³ (b) Article 4 Generic Electronic Template;⁷⁴ (c) cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance;⁷⁵ (d) generic preventive measures;⁷⁶ (e) national reporting;⁷⁷ and (f) Web-based Information System for Protocol V.⁷⁸

Clearance, removal or destruction of ERW and the Article 4 Generic Electronic Template. The session focused on priority-setting and quality

⁷⁰ Available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/C06B9919E7C95FA5C12576F80066DF17/\\$file/Plan+of+Action+on+Victim+Assistance+under+Protocol+V.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C06B9919E7C95FA5C12576F80066DF17/$file/Plan+of+Action+on+Victim+Assistance+under+Protocol+V.pdf) (accessed 2 June 2012).

⁷¹ Under the overall responsibility of the Coordinator, Jesus S. Domingo (Philippines).

⁷² Under the overall responsibility of the Coordinator, Philip Kimpton (Australia), assisted by Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland) as Co-Coordinator.

⁷³ Coordinated by Petra Drexler (Germany).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Coordinated by James O'Shea (Ireland).

⁷⁶ Coordinated by Eric Steinmyller (France).

⁷⁷ Coordinated by Amandeep Singh Gill (India).

⁷⁸ Coordinated by Gyula Somogyi (Hungary).

management. In this context, experts from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining delivered a presentation on the quality management for priority-setting in ERW clearance programmes, stressing that the objective was to clear the most important areas first and to use the resources in the most economic manner.⁷⁹ Belarus, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Ukraine provided updates on their respective clearance programmes.

The Coordinator on article 4 presented an assessment of the information on implementation that the High Contracting Parties submitted in their annual national reports. Two thirds of the reporting States parties provided information on steps to implement article 4. Only a few of these States referred to the Generic Electronic Template. Ireland delivered a presentation on its recording procedures pursuant to article 4 and illustrated that, as a State with both small armed forces and inventories of munitions and delivery systems, it had only limited resources to overcome the challenges of implementing article 4.

Cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance. The Coordinator on cooperation and assistance encouraged both donor and recipient countries to include detailed information on cooperation and assistance in their national reports. States that submitted requests for assistance were encouraged to provide regular updates on the status of those requests. Estonia, France, India and the Philippines delivered their national presentations. The Coordinator also co-chaired, together with the Coordinator on the subject of clearance, a session on the needs of ERW-affected States in the area of clearance.⁸⁰

Generic preventive measures. The discussions in this session focused on munitions management, life cycle of weapons and tests carried out throughout that life cycle. Belgium, France, Germany and the United States, as well as independent professionals,⁸¹ delivered presentations covering a range of issues such as the surveillance of munitions still in service and their maintenance throughout their life cycle, national regulations and practices with regard

⁷⁹ “Quality management for priority-setting in ERW clearance programmes” by Vera Bohle and Asa Gilbert (GICHD); “Measures undertaken by Ukraine to remove WWII munitions” by Tetyana Shalkivska (Ukraine); “Ireland’s implementation of article 4 of Protocol V” by Jim Burke (Ireland).

⁸⁰ “International cooperation and assistance: French mine action” by Lionel Pechera (French Army School of Engineers in Angers, France); “Georgia PFP Trust Fund III” by Kadi Silde (Ministry of Defense, Estonia); “Philippines international ERW cooperation” by Jesus S. Domingo (Philippines); “Cooperation and assistance” by Abhay Kumar Singh (India).

⁸¹ “Belgian best practices related to generic preventive measures of article 9” by Peter Constandt (Belgium); “German standards for ammunition storage installations and handling of ammunition” by Volkmar Posseltdt (Germany); “Generic preventive measures—life cycle” by Franck Decobeq (France); “Generic preventive measures—follow up to the guide on the implementation of Part 3 of the Technical Annex” by Franck Decobeq (France); and “Generic preventive measures—detailed visit of munitions” by Frank Decobeq (France).

to the storage and transport of munitions, and munitions management and testing.⁸²

National reporting. The Coordinator emphasized that national reports provided assurance that the provisions of the Protocol V were being implemented. Compliance with the reporting requirements was regarded as an indication of the level of commitment to the principles and rules incorporated in the Protocol. The Coordinator's main objective was to encourage the High Contracting Parties to meet their reporting obligations in both quantity and quality. The High Contracting Parties had submitted national reports.

Victim assistance. The session focused on the following three topics: (a) analysis of the 31 responses to the questionnaire on victim assistance; (b) consideration of the mechanism of reporting and possible elements to amend the template for reporting victim assistance; and (c) relevance of the Victim Assistance Plan of Action for the wider CCW community. The panel of experts on victim assistance shared their experience on key challenges faced by the survivors of ERW incidents.⁸³

Web-based Information System for Protocol V. The Coordinator made a brief presentation to update the experts on progress in testing the system.⁸⁴ The Implementation Support Unit and the United Nations will continue their work to set up and test the system.

Fifth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

The Fifth Conference took place in Geneva from 9 to 10 November. Two Vice-Presidents⁸⁵ assisted the President of the Conference.⁸⁶ Coordinators of the deliberations on substantive issues in the Meeting of Experts presented their reports. A total of 45 States parties subsequently presented their reports.⁸⁷

An additional six States⁸⁸ joined Protocol V since the Fourth Conference, held in 2010, bringing the number of High Contracting Parties to 76. The

⁸² "Fail safe design" by Lee Springer (United States).

⁸³ "Victim Assistance" by Zeljko Volas (Landmine Survivor Initiative, Bosnia and Herzegovina); "Victim assistance" by Jesus Martinez (Red de Sobrevivientes, El Salvador); and "Victim assistance" by Firoz Ali Alizada (ICBL).

⁸⁴ "Testing" by Gyula Somogyi (Hungary).

⁸⁵ Gerard Corr (Ireland) and Zamir Akram (Pakistan).

⁸⁶ Mikhail Khvostov (Belarus).

⁸⁷ Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and United States.

⁸⁸ Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Panama, Poland and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

importance of universalization, along with the implementation of Protocol V, was reflected in the agreed text for the Fourth CCW Review Conference.⁸⁹

The Conference agreed on the following recommendations:

Clearance, removal or destruction of ERW, and the Article 4 Generic Electronic Template

- To continue the consideration of clearance, removal or destruction of ERW;
- To further explore practical methods to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in ERW clearance programmes;
- To encourage the High Contracting Parties to include in their national reports detailed information on the implementation of article 4; and
- To encourage States to share their experiences on methods of recording and retaining information on the use or abandonment of explosive ordnance.

Cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance

- To continue the consideration of cooperation and assistance as a priority issue;
- To focus on the potential for cooperation among developing countries and among ERW-affected States, as well as for cooperation among providers of assistance;
- To encourage High Contracting Parties and international organizations and institutions to consider providing assistance in response to requests submitted under article 7 of the Protocol, or in response to needs identified in other ways; and
- To encourage States that have submitted requests for assistance to continue to provide regular updates on the status of those requests.

Generic preventive measures

- To continue the practice of addressing one specific technical issue related to generic preventive measures;
- To invite all High Contracting Parties to share information during the 2012 Meeting of Experts on their national technical approaches and experience in implementing article 9 and part 3 of the technical annex of Protocol V; and
- To develop a web page on generic preventive measures on the UNODA website for user-friendly access to declarations, presentations and guidelines, including other relevant sources of information, such as the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

⁸⁹ CCW/P.V/CONF/2011/12, annex II.

National reporting

- To encourage the High Contracting Parties and observer States to submit their national reports;
- To encourage the High Contracting Parties to use the Guide to National Reporting adopted by the Fourth Review Conference;
- To continue examination of the reporting forms and the Guide to National Reporting with a view to making recommendations to the Sixth Conference in the 2012 Meeting of Experts; and
- To provide an assessment from the national reports submitted on the utility of the Guide to National Reporting and the progress in implementing the provisions of Protocol V for the Meeting of Experts in 2012.

Victim assistance

- To provide adequate time for the continued consideration of victim assistance at the Meetings of Experts and Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V;
- To request the Meeting of Experts to continue consultations and work on the template for national reporting on victim assistance under article 8 of the Protocol and to request the Coordinator to make suggestions to the Sixth Conference of the High Contracting Parties based on these consultations;
- To call on the High Contracting Parties to continue their efforts to implement fully the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance;
- To hold a session on national assessments of needs of ERW victims in the 2012 Meeting of Experts; and
- To provide an assessment of the responses to the questionnaire and the sections of the national reports that address victim assistance in the Meeting of Experts in 2012.

Web-based Information System for Protocol V

- The Conference welcomed the establishment of the Web-based Information System for Protocol V and requested the CCW Implementation Support Unit to administer and supervise it. It further requested the Information and Communication Technology Service of the United Nations Office at Geneva to provide for maintenance.

CCW Implementation Support Unit

The Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which became fully functional on 9 May, presented its first annual report to the Fourth CCW Review

Conference.⁹⁰ The report described the activities of the ISU in implementing the tasks given to it by the 2009 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.⁹¹ The tasks of the ISU were primarily to: (a) provide secretariat services for all CCW meetings; (b) facilitate communications among States parties and international organizations; (c) serve as a focal point for submission of information by and to the States parties; (d) support States in their national implementation of the Convention and its protocols; (e) assist the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibilities pursuant to the Convention and its protocols; and (f) fulfil all other tasks as mandated by the States parties to the Convention and its protocols.

During the year, the ISU focused on supporting the negotiations on cluster munitions; preparing for the Fourth Review Conference; assisting the Coordinators and Chairs for Amended Protocol II and Protocol V; promoting universalization of the Convention and its protocols; administering the CCW Sponsorship Programme; and providing briefings to visiting delegations.

Anti-personnel mines

Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention

The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, also known as the Mine Ban Convention,⁹² provided in its article 11, paragraph 1, for regular meetings of the States parties to consider any matter relating to the application or implementation of the Convention, including: (a) operation and status of the Convention; (b) matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of the Convention; (c) international cooperation and assistance in accordance with article 6; (d) development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines; (e) submissions by States parties under article 8; and (f) decisions relating to submissions of States parties under article 5.

Against this background and pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Cartagena Summit for a Mine-Free World (Second Review Conference),⁹³ held in 2009, and the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties,⁹⁴ held in 2010, the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties took place in Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December.

In accordance with the established practice, the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties was preceded by a series of intensive meetings and informal

⁹⁰ CCW/CONF.IV/8.

⁹¹ CCW/MSP/2009/5, paras. 34-38.

⁹² The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

⁹³ APLC/CONF/2009/9, para. 29.

⁹⁴ APLC/MSP.10/2010/7, para. 27.

consultations, including those of, inter alia: (a) the Standing Committees (held in Geneva from 20 to 24 June), which dealt with intersessional work for 2011; (b) the Coordinating Committee; (3) the informal open-ended working group, mandated to examine new models for the financing of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and to present recommendations on the most feasible comprehensive financing model;⁹⁵ (d) the mechanism established to analyse requests under article 5 for extensions of the mine clearance deadlines; and (e) the States parties, observer States and interested international organizations, which convened the traditional one-day preparatory informal meeting.⁹⁶

The following aspects were particularly noteworthy in relation to the 2011 Intersessional Work Programme:

- The establishment of the new Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance (presided in 2011 by the President of the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties), which aimed at building upon the progress made during the special session in June 2010 on international cooperation and assistance, and during the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties;
- The experiment with the new ways of using the Intersessional Work Programme to more intensively focus on national contexts or otherwise to creatively support progress in the application of the Cartagena Action Plan,⁹⁷ and to ensure ongoing effectiveness of the Intersessional Work Programme (in particular, three of the Standing Committees convened concurrent small group discussions on mine clearance in Cambodia and Mozambique, on victim assistance in Afghanistan and Uganda, and on national implementation legislation); and
- The use of landmines in South Sudan and Libya, which was repeatedly mentioned as an issue of particular concern during the week of Standing Committee meetings on the intersessional work.

The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania and President of the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties, Gazmend Turdiu, opened the Eleventh Meeting. His Majesty Norodom Sihamoni, King of Cambodia,⁹⁸ the United Nations Secretary-General⁹⁹ and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross delivered messages at the opening meeting.

⁹⁵ Established pursuant to the decision contained in APLC/MSP.10/2010/7, para. 24.

⁹⁶ The informal meeting was held on 5 September 2011.

⁹⁷ Available from <http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

⁹⁸ Norodom Sihamoni, King of Cambodia, message to the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention, Phnom Penh, 28 November. Available from http://www.cambodia1msp.gov.kh/pdf/Royal%20Message_EN.pdf (accessed 2 June 2012).

⁹⁹ Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, message to the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention, Phnom Penh, 28 November. Available from

The Minister attached to the Prime Minister of Cambodia and Vice-President of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority, Prak Sokhonn, served as the President of the Meeting. Representatives of over 80 States parties and 16 observer States, as well as representatives of the United Nations and a number of international, regional and non-governmental organizations, participated in the work of the Meeting.

Held at one of the locations where the landmine movement was born, the Eleventh Meeting emphasized the evolution and vitality of the mine ban process by reflecting on the 20 years of efforts to end the suffering and casualties caused by landmines and by focusing on several key aspects of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan. Against this background and pursuant to the established practice, the Phnom Penh Progress Report¹⁰⁰ was welcomed as an important tool to support the application of the Cartagena Action Plan by measuring progress and highlighting priority areas of work. Deep concerns, however, were expressed about new uses of anti-personnel mines both by non-States parties and armed non-State actors.

The question of universalization was identified as a continuous challenge despite the recent accession of two new States to the Mine Ban Convention—South Sudan and Tuvalu—which was the first increase in the membership in four years. In this context, the States parties welcomed the announcement of the imminent accession of Finland in 2012. The work of Prince Mired Bin Raad Al-Hussein (Jordan), the President's Special Envoy on the universalization of the Mine Ban Convention,¹⁰¹ received expressions of high appreciation. Also, a decision on the continuation of his efforts as Special Envoy received unanimous support.

The Meeting granted four States¹⁰² an extension to their article 5 deadlines following the thorough process of examination and assessment of requests established by the time of the Cartagena Summit. For the first time, however, one country, the Congo, had failed to follow the established practice and was granted extension without its request being carefully examined and analysed by the special Task Force chaired by the President of the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties. The Eleventh Meeting noted, in particular, that the Congo had been non-compliant with respect to article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention since 1 November 2011 and expressed concern over the Congo's failure to act in accordance with the agreed timeline and procedures.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13973.doc.htm> (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹⁰⁰ APLC/MSP.11/2011/WP.6, WP.8, WP.10, WP.12, WP.13 and Add.1 and WP.14. Also available from <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/11MSP/11MSP-PhnomPenh-ProgressReport-8Dec2011.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹⁰¹ Prince Mired Bin Raad Al-Hussein was nominated President's Special Envoy by the Norwegian Presidency of the Cartagena Summit (Second Review Conference). At the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties his status changed as he was appointed Special Envoy of the Convention by all States parties.

¹⁰² Algeria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Eritrea.

Another matter of concern was the relatively high number of States parties that had failed to meet the 10-year deadline under article 5 and were forced to request extension.

The question on the financial situation of the ISU was a sensitive issue throughout 2011, particularly in the context of the discussions in the open-ended working group on the new models for the financing of the ISU. Due to the continued divergent views and the economic and financial situation in several States parties, the open-ended group could not agree on a new funding model. Therefore, the President of the Tenth Meeting reported that the ISU would continue to be financed through the present financing scheme and recommended that: (a) the results achieved be preserved so that the process aimed at improving the current model could be resumed at a later stage when external economic and financial circumstances would be more favourable; (b) the States parties meanwhile engage in an exchange of views on how to enhance the current system based on voluntary contributions with the objective to improve the financial situation of the ISU; and (c) all States parties, in particular those that had not been able to provide contributions so far, be encouraged to contribute to the Voluntary Trust Fund of the ISU.

In the same context, and pursuant to the “Directive from the States parties to the ISU” adopted at the Tenth Meeting, the States parties approved the work plan and budget for the activities of the ISU in 2012, as endorsed by the Coordinating Committee, as well as the report on the activities and finances of the ISU and the 2010 audited financial statement of the ISU.

The Meeting also pointed to the persisting unsatisfactory level of submission of national transparency reports by the States parties under article 7 of the Convention in terms of overall compliance rate, which was slightly over 50 per cent in 2011.

Pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Second Review Conference and the Tenth Meeting, the States parties continued to review the Intersessional Work Programme and focused, in particular, on the possibilities to rationalize the number of States in leadership positions (Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs) in the Standing Committees. In this regard, the States parties approved the proposal presented by the President of the Tenth Meeting, by which the number of States parties in leadership positions in each Standing Committee was reduced from four to two. This decision would be implemented in two phases from 2012 to 2013.

The Eleventh Meeting also decided to consider ways to enhance the interactive character of the annual Meetings of the States Parties, shortening their duration and increasing their overall effectiveness.

It was agreed that the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties would be held in Geneva from 3 to 7 December 2012 and would be chaired by Matjaž Kovačič (Slovenia). Furthermore, the meetings of the Standing Committees

would take place in Geneva from 21 to 25 May 2012. The Meeting also elected the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees, who will serve until the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties.¹⁰³

As of the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, the Convention was signed by a total of 133 States¹⁰⁴ and ratified by 158 States.

Cluster munitions

Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)¹⁰⁵ entered into force on 1 August 2010. Article 11 made the following stipulations:

- The States parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - Operation and status of this Convention;
 - Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - International cooperation and assistance in accordance with article 6 of this Convention;
 - Development of technologies to clear cluster munitions remnants;
 - Submissions of States parties under articles 8 and 10 of this Convention;
 - Submissions of States parties as provided for in articles 3 and 4 of this Convention;
- The First Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General annually until the first Review Conference.

In this connection, the General Assembly, by resolution 63/71 of 2 December 2008, requested the Secretary-General “to render the necessary

¹⁰³ Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Indonesia and Zambia (Co-Chairs), Netherlands (Co-Rapporteur); Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Algeria and Croatia (Co-Chairs), Colombia (Rapporteur); Stockpile Destruction: Germany and Romania (Co-Chairs), Nigeria (Rapporteur); General Status and Operation of the Convention: Norway and Peru (Co-Chairs), Bulgaria (Rapporteur); and Resources, Cooperation and Assistance: Albania and Thailand (Co-Chairs).

¹⁰⁴ Pursuant to its article 15, the Convention is no longer open for signature.

¹⁰⁵ The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him by the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, while “bearing in mind, in particular, the tasks entrusted to the Secretary-General pursuant to the terms of the Convention”.

Against this background and pursuant to the relevant decision¹⁰⁶ of the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, which took place in Vientiane, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, from 9 to 12 November 2010, the Second Meeting of States Parties was held in Beirut from 13 to 16 September. The Meeting was chaired by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Adnan Mansour, and assisted by Najla Riachi Assaker (Lebanon). Both officials were assisted by a group of Friends of the President in charge of key thematic issues relevant to the implementation of the CCM.¹⁰⁷

Preparations of the Second Meeting of States Parties were facilitated by: (a) an interim, informal intersessional meeting held in Geneva from 27 to 30 June, with a focus on substantive issues, including the general status and operation of the CCM, victim assistance, clearance and destruction of cluster munitions remnants and risk reduction education, stockpile destruction including retention, universalization, transparency, national implementation measures, and cooperation and assistance; and (b) a series of intensive consultations by a group of the Friends of the President, the United Nations Development Programme, UNODA, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Cluster Munition Coalition.

The Laotian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thongloun Sisoulith, opened the Second Meeting of States Parties. Representatives of 130 States, including 41 non-signatory States, and the United Nations, the ICRC and other relevant organizations and institutions attended the Meeting. It was preceded on 12 September by an opening ceremony and field visits to the Regional Mine Action Center in Nabatiyeh, Lebanon, and the Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped.

Based on the interaction of like-minded States and organizations and the active preparatory work, the Second Meeting of States Parties took important decisions for the future of the CCM and its effective implementation. In particular, it adopted an implementation architecture for the CCM, similar to the one for the Mine Ban Convention, consisting of:

- Annual informal intersessional meetings of up to five days in the first half of the year in Geneva;
- Six working groups on: (a) status and operation of the CCM; (b) victim assistance; (c) universalization; (d) clearance; (e) stockpiles destruction; and (f) cooperation and assistance—each chaired by two coordinators;

¹⁰⁶ CCM/MSP/2010/5, para. 28.

¹⁰⁷ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa and Zambia.

- Two additional coordinators on transparency reporting and on national implementation measures;
- Coordination Committee comprising the President, the coordinators and representatives of the United Nations, ICRC and the Cluster Munition Coalition.

The Meeting also agreed to establish “as soon as possible and preferably no later than the Third Meeting of States Parties” an independent Implementation Support Unit (ISU), hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and led by a Director. The President was mandated to negotiate, in consultation with the States parties, an agreement with GICHD on the hosting of the ISU, as well as a funding model to cover the costs of the ISU activities, and present these proposals to the States parties for their approval.

The Meeting submitted for consideration and recommended for use by the States parties some practical tools for the implementation of the CCM, for instance, on the application of all available methods for efficient identification of contaminated areas and release of land deemed uncontaminated, on model legislation, and on national implementation. The Meeting also warmly welcomed the Beirut Progress Report¹⁰⁸ on the implementation of the 66 concrete steps and goals (actions) contained in the 2010 Vientiane Action Plan¹⁰⁹ and adopted the Beirut Declaration.¹¹⁰

The Third Meeting of States Parties of the Convention will be held in Oslo for up to four days from 10 to 14 September 2012, and it will be chaired by Steffen Kongstad (Norway). The informal intersessional meeting of the working groups will take place in Geneva from 16 to 19 April 2012. The Meeting also appointed Coordinators¹¹¹ to guide the intersessional work programme. As of the Second Meeting, the Convention was signed by 108 States¹¹² and ratified by 63 States.

¹⁰⁸ CCM/MSP/2011/5, annex II.

¹⁰⁹ CCM/MSP/2010/5, annex II.

¹¹⁰ CCM/MSP/2011/5, annex I.

¹¹¹ Working Group on the General Status and Operation of the Convention: Holy See (in 2012) and Zambia (in 2012 and 2013), Working Group on Universalization: Japan (in 2012) and Portugal (in 2012 and 2013), Working Group on Victim Assistance: Austria (in 2012) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 2012 and 2013), Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction: Lao People’s Democratic Republic (in 2012) and Ireland (in 2012 and 2013), Working Group on Stockpile Destruction and Retention: Germany (in 2012) and Croatia (in 2012 and 2013), Working Group on Cooperation and Assistance: Spain (in 2012) and Mexico (in 2012 and 2013); Reporting: Belgium (in 2012 and 2013); National Implementation Measures: New Zealand (in 2012 and 2013).

¹¹² Pursuant to its article 15, the Convention is no longer open for signature.

Towards an arms trade treaty

At present, there is no global set of rules governing the arms trade. An eclectic set of national and regional control measures on arms transfers exists, but the absence of a global framework has obscured transparency, comparability and accountability. Too many weapons end up in the wrong hands, and too often an arms export request denied by one country is approved by another. Those suffering most from the poorly regulated arms trade are the women and men, adolescents and children, who experience blatant misuse of arms by armed and security forces, and those living amid conflict and pervasive crime, often in conditions of poverty, deprivation and extreme inequality. Following a strong push from civil society organizations, States started in 2006 a process to consider the possibility of an arms trade treaty (ATT). It has evolved subsequently over the years.

Second and third Preparatory Committee meetings on an arms trade treaty

After the adoption of General Assembly resolution 61/89 of 6 December 2006 on an ATT, an unprecedented number of Member States submitted their views to the Secretary-General on the issue, which he reported to the General Assembly in 2007.¹¹³ Then, in 2008, a group of governmental experts examined the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, and produced its consensus report.¹¹⁴ In 2009, an open-ended working group held two meetings, which allowed all States to contribute to the debate. And finally, the General Assembly decided to convene the Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms and decided to consider the remaining sessions of the Open-ended Working Group as sessions of the Preparatory Committee for this Conference. Significantly, Member States have committed themselves to concluding a “strong and robust” treaty, which would provide assurances of a meaningful process.

Building on the work carried out during its first session, the Preparatory Committee held its second session from 27 February to 3 March and its third session from 11 to 15 July in New York, chaired by Roberto García Moritán (Argentina). States continued their substantive discussions aided by revised drafts of an informal paper that the Chairperson had submitted to the Committee at its first session. During the sessions of the Committee and the intersessional period, the Chair of the Preparatory Committee conducted extensive consultations, which

¹¹³ A/62/278 (Parts I and II) and Add. I-4.

¹¹⁴ A/63/334.

allowed the Preparatory Committee to maintain the positive atmosphere that characterized its first session. Nevertheless, States expressed varied views on many of the substantive issues under consideration by the Committee.

Discussions in the second session revolved around the following issues: scope; criteria and parameters; and international cooperation and assistance. On the scope of the eventual treaty, States continued to hold divergent views on the types of arms and activities that should be covered, particularly on whether the ATT should cover ammunition, sporting and hunting rifles, parts and components and technology transfers. With regard to criteria and parameters that relate to eventual standards to guide States in their decisions on arms transfers, Member States emphasized the need for the ATT to contain objective and non-discriminatory criteria that could be applied in a transparent and predictable manner. The issue of international cooperation and assistance was less contentious, as there was broad agreement that cooperation among States, as well as capacity-building assistance to less-developed countries, would be necessary for the effective implementation of the eventual treaty.

During its third session, the Preparatory Committee focused its discussions on the issues related to treaty implementation and final provisions. Discussions focused on questions such as national enforcement measures, reporting requirements and possible Implementation Support Unit models that would be needed to support the implementation of the treaty. Some States also expressed views on the reporting requirements that should be contemplated under the ATT. States diverged on how prescriptive the ATT should be in outlining the measures that Governments would need to adopt in order to exercise effective control over arms transfers. Some favoured that the ATT should include simple and broad guidelines, while others preferred the treaty to contain more detailed guidelines.

In order to ensure that the Preparatory Committee would have enough time to complete all its work, including any remaining substantive work, the General Assembly, at its sixty-sixth session, decided to extend the duration and mandate of the last remaining session of the Committee from three to five days (13 to 17 February 2012).

In each session of the Preparatory Committee, civil society groups were given the opportunity to participate and make presentations.

Regional meetings organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research continued to support the ATT process through the organization of the second phase of a series of regional meetings, entitled “Supporting the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations through Regional Discussions and Expertise Sharing”, which had been launched in July 2010. The aim of the second phase was to help States develop their views on the elements that should embody the ATT and

to support States in developing expertise to implement effective arms transfer controls. In this regard, during the course of the year, the Institute organized the following seminars: in Casablanca (2 to 4 February) for countries of Central, Northern and Western Africa; in Montevideo (27 to 29 April) for countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and in Bali (6 to 8 June) for countries of East Asia and the Pacific.

Export controls

Wassenaar Arrangement

The seventeenth plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was held in Vienna from 13 to 14 December.¹¹⁵ This meeting concluded the fourth assessment undertaken by the Arrangement to carry out a review and evaluation of its overall functioning and contribution to regional and international security and stability. Since the last assessment in 2007, the Arrangement attempted to keep pace with advances in technology and market trends, and continued its effort to contribute to international and regional security and stability. Its plenary adopted “Best Practices Guidelines on Internal Compliance Programmes for Dual-use Goods and Technologies”;¹¹⁶ “Best Practices Guidelines on Subsequent Transfer (Re-export) Controls for Conventional Weapons Systems”;¹¹⁷ “Revised Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice concerning Potentially Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons”;¹¹⁸ and “Elements for Controlling Transport of Conventional Arms between Third Countries”;¹¹⁹ and introduced a number of amendments to the control lists.¹²⁰

In 2011, Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement continued efforts to make the existing control lists more user-friendly and readily understood by licensing authorities and exporters, and to ensure the detection and denial of undesirable exports. Efforts were undertaken to promote the Arrangement and to encourage voluntary adherence to its standards by non-participating States. The Arrangement continued to

¹¹⁵ The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established on the basis of the Initial Elements adopted in July 1996 (see www.wassenaar.org/). Meetings are normally held in Vienna, where the Arrangement is based. Currently the Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

¹¹⁶ Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/2%20-%20Internal%20Compliance%20Programmes.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹¹⁷ Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/3%20-%20Re-export.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹¹⁸ Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/1%20-%20Elements%20for%20Objective%20Analysis.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹¹⁹ Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/4%20-%20Elements%20for%20Controlling%20Transportation%20of%20Conventional%20Arms.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012).

¹²⁰ Wassenaar Arrangement, “Control Lists—Current: Lists of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List”. Available from <http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html> (accessed 2 June 2012).

undertake outreach in support of its aims and objectives, in particular through post-plenary briefings, interaction with industry and bilateral dialogue with non-participating States. The plenary reiterated that Wassenaar Arrangement membership was open to all States that comply with the agreed criteria and decided to offer another technical briefing in 2012 on recent changes to its control list for a number of non-participating States.

Annex I

Composite table of Member States that reported in 2011 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

State	Background information				
	Data on exports	Data on imports	Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of small arms and light weapons
1. Albania	nil	nil			yes
2. Andorra	nil	nil			yes
3. Antigua and Barbuda	nil	nil			nil
4. Argentina	nil	nil	yes	nil	nil
5. Armenia	nil	yes			yes
6. Australia	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
7. Austria	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
8. Bangladesh	nil	yes			nil
9. Belarus	yes	nil			
10. Belgium	yes	yes			
11. Belize	nil	nil			
12. Bhutan	nil	nil			
13. Bosnia and Herzegovina	yes	yes			yes
14. Brazil	nil	yes			
15. Bulgaria	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
16. Cambodia	nil	nil			
17. Canada	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
18. Chile	nil	yes			yes

<i>State</i>	<i>Background information</i>				
	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Military holdings</i>	<i>Procurement through national production</i>	<i>International transfers of small arms and light weapons</i>
19. China	yes	yes			
20. Colombia	nil	yes			yes
21. Croatia	nil	nil			yes
22. Cyprus	nil	yes			
23. Czech Republic	yes	yes			yes
24. Denmark	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
25. Dominican Republic	nil	yes			
26. Ecuador		yes			
27. El Salvador	nil	nil			
28. Estonia	nil	nil	yes		
29. Finland	nil	yes	yes	nil	
30. France	yes	nil	yes	yes	yes
31. Germany	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
32. Greece	yes	yes			yes
33. Grenada	nil	nil			yes
34. Guyana	nil	nil			nil
35. Hungary	yes	nil	yes		yes
36. Iceland	nil	nil			yes
37. India	nil	yes			
38. Ireland	nil	nil			yes
39. Israel	yes	nil			
40. Italy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
41. Japan	nil	nil	yes	yes	
42. Latvia	nil	nil			yes
43. Lebanon	nil	nil		nil	nil
44. Liechtenstein	nil	nil			yes
45. Lithuania	nil	yes	yes		yes

State	Background information				
	Data on exports	Data on imports	Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of small arms and light weapons
46. Madagascar	nil				
47. Malaysia	nil	nil			
48. Malta	nil	nil			nil
49. Mexico	nil	nil			yes
50. Monaco	nil	nil			
51. Montenegro	yes	nil	yes		yes
52. Mongolia	nil	nil			nil
53. Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
54. Norway	yes	yes			yes
55. Pakistan	nil	yes			
56. Palau	nil	nil			
57. Peru	nil	yes			yes
58. Poland	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
59. Portugal	nil	yes			yes
60. Republic of Korea	nil	yes			yes
61. Republic of Moldova	nil	nil			
62. Romania	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
63. Russian Federation	yes	nil			
64. Samoa	nil	nil			
65. San Marino	nil	nil			
66. Serbia	yes	yes			yes
67. Singapore	yes	yes			
68. Slovakia	yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
69. Slovenia	yes	nil			
70. Solomon Islands	nil	nil			
71. South Africa	yes	yes			
72. Spain	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

State	Background information				
	Data on exports	Data on imports	Military holdings	Procurement through national production	International transfers of small arms and light weapons
73. Suriname	nil	nil			
74. Sweden	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
75. Switzerland	yes	nil	yes	nil	yes
76. Tajikistan	nil	nil			
77. Thailand	nil	yes			
78. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	nil	nil			
79. Trinidad and Tobago	nil	nil	yes		nil
80. Turkey	yes	yes			yes
81. Turkmenistan	nil	nil			
82. Ukraine	yes	yes			yes
83. United Kingdom	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
84. United States	yes	nil	yes	yes	
85. Uruguay	nil	nil			
86. Viet Nam	nil	yes			

Annex II

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation of Member States in reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2011

Year of submission	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total no. of reports to the Register	115	117	117	113	91	80	72	86
No. of States reporting SALW transfers	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	48
1. Albania				yes	yes		yes	yes
2. Andorra								yes
3. Antigua and Barbuda				yes	nil	nil	nil	nil

<i>Year of submission</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>
<i>Total no. of reports to the Register</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>86</i>
<i>No. of States reporting SALW transfers</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>48</i>
4. Argentina					nil	nil	nil	nil
5. Armenia					yes	yes	yes	yes
6. Australia					yes	yes	yes	yes
7. Austria								yes
8. Bangladesh				yes	yes	yes		nil
9. Belgium						yes		
10. Bolivia (Plurinational State of)						yes		
11. Bosnia and Herzegovina				yes	yes		yes	yes
12. Brunei Darussalam					yes			
13. Bulgaria						yes	yes	yes
14. Canada				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
15. Chile					yes	yes	yes	yes
16. Colombia					yes		yes	yes
17. Comoros							nil	
18. Croatia					yes	yes		yes
19. Cyprus				yes	nil	nil		
20. Czech Republic				yes	yes	yes		yes
21. Denmark				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
22. El Salvador					nil			
23. Fiji					nil			
24. Finland		yes						
25. France		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes		yes
26. Georgia				yes	yes			
27. Germany				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
28. Ghana					nil			
29. Greece				yes	yes		yes	yes
30. Grenada								yes
31. Guyana								nil

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<i>Year of submission</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>
<i>Total no. of reports to the Register</i>	115	117	117	113	91	80	72	86
<i>No. of States reporting SALW transfers</i>	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	48
32. Haiti				yes				
33. Hungary				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
34. Iceland								yes
35. Indonesia					yes	yes		
36. Ireland						yes	yes	yes
37. Italy					yes	yes	yes	yes
38. Jamaica				yes				
39. Japan		PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP		
40. Kazakhstan						yes	yes	
41. Latvia	yes			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
42. Lebanon						nil	nil	nil
43. Liechtenstein				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
44. Lithuania				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
45. Luxembourg					yes			
46. Mali				nil				
47. Malta					nil	nil	nil	nil
48. Mexico				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
49. Mongolia								nil
50. Montenegro					yes			yes
51. Netherlands	yes							
52. New Zealand				yes	yes	yes		
53. Norway					yes	yes	yes	yes
54. Panama				yes		yes		
55. Peru						yes	yes	yes
56. Philippines				nil		yes		
57. Poland	yes							
58. Portugal				yes	yes	yes	nil	yes
59. Republic of Korea				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

<i>Year of submission</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>
<i>Total no. of reports to the Register</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>86</i>
<i>No. of States reporting SALW transfers</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>48</i>
60. Republic of Moldova				nil	nil	yes	yes	
61. Romania					yes	yes	yes	yes
62. Saint Lucia				nil				
63. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines						yes		
64. San Marino							yes	
65. Senegal				yes				
66. Serbia							yes	yes
67. Slovakia				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
68. Slovenia					yes	yes	yes	
69. Spain							yes	yes
70. Swaziland				nil	nil	nil		yes
71. Sweden	yes			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
72. Switzerland						yes	yes	
73. Thailand							yes	
74. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							yes	
75. Togo				nil	nil			
76. Trinidad and Tobago				yes				nil
77. Turkey				yes	yes	yes		yes
78. Ukraine					yes	yes	yes	yes
79. United Kingdom	yes							

Note: Nil means that a State provided a “nil” report on its export and import of small arms and light weapons. The abbreviation PNP stands for procurement of small arms and light weapons through national production.

Annex III

Composite table of reports from Member States to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures in 2011

Reporting States	Submission received on (2011)	Form of submission			Additional information and clarifications
		Standardized	Simplified/own	"Nil" report	
1. Albania	29 Apr.	yes	yes/-		
2. Andorra	24 Mar.			yes	
3. Antigua and Barbuda	5 Dec.			yes	
4. Argentina	31 May	yes			
5. Armenia	29 Apr.		yes/-		
6. Australia	28 Apr.	yes			
7. Austria	29 Apr.	yes			
8. Belarus	6 May	yes			yes
9. Bosnia and Herzegovina	15 Apr.	yes	yes/-		
10. Brazil	29 Apr.	yes			
11. Bulgaria	30 Mar.	yes			
12. Burkina Faso	11 May	yes			yes
13. Canada	25 Apr.	yes			
14. Chile ^a	9 Sep.	yes			
15. China	1 Oct.		yes		
16. Colombia	8 Aug.	yes	yes		
17. Cyprus	27 Sep.	yes	yes		
18. Czech Republic	5 Apr.	yes	yes-		yes
19. El Salvador	13 May		yes/yes		yes
20. Estonia	11 May	yes			yes
21. Finland	6 May	yes			
22. France	6 Dec.	yes	yes		
23. Germany	24 Mar.	yes			
24. Greece	2 Jul.	yes			
25. Hungary	16 Dec.				

Reporting States	Submission received on (2011)	Form of submission			Additional information and clarifications
		Standardized	Simplified/own	"Nil" report	
26. Iceland	12 Apr.			yes	
27. India	23 Dec.	yes			
28. Ireland	10 Jun.	yes			
29. Jamaica	31 May		yes		
30. Japan	27 Apr.	yes			yes
31. Kazakhstan	29 Mar.	yes			
32. Latvia	29 Apr.	yes			
33. Lebanon	7 Jun.		-/yes		
34. Liechtenstein	3 Apr. 2012			yes	
35. Lithuania	5 Apr.	yes			
36. Luxembourg	30 Mar. 2012			yes	
37. Malaysia	4 May		-/yes		
38. Malta	9 Jan. 2012	yes	yes		
39. Mexico	4 May	yes			
40. Monaco	11 Mar.			yes	
41. Montenegro	2 Jun.	yes	yes/-		
42. Namibia	27 Dec.		yes		
43. Nauru	26 Apr.			yes	
44. Netherlands	2 May	yes			
45. Norway	24 Feb.	yes			yes
46. Peru	14 Jun.	yes			
47. Poland	19 May	yes			
48. Portugal	29 Apr.	yes			
49. Republic of Korea	5 May		yes/-		
50. Republic of Moldova	27 Sep.	yes			
51. Romania	19 Apr.	yes	yes/-		
52. Russian Federation	13 May	yes			
53. Samoa	15 Mar.			yes	

Reporting States	Submission received on (2011)	Form of submission			Additional information and clarifications
		Standardized	Simplified/own	"Nil" report	
54. Serbia	25 Apr.	yes	yes/-		yes
55. Slovakia	4 May	yes			
56. Slovenia	2 Jun.	yes			
57. Solomon Islands	25 Apr.			yes	
58. Spain	9 Sep.	yes	yes		
59. Switzerland	12 Apr.	yes			yes
60. Thailand	2 Nov.	yes			
61. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	29 Apr.	yes			yes
62. Trinidad and Tobago	8 Jul.	yes	yes		
63. Tunisia	5 May			yes	
64. Turkey	12 Apr.	yes			
65. Ukraine	21 Dec.	yes			
66. United Kingdom	28 Apr.	yes			
67. United States	29 Apr.	yes			yes

Note: In addition, Panama provided its views on the operation of the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.

^a Chile also submitted its 2008 and 2009 reports on 28 November 2011.



Photo credit: UN Photo/Marine Perret (top)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (bottom)

CHAPTER IV

Regional disarmament

The challenges and threats we face are simply too complex and connected for any country or any one organization to go it alone. A more effective United Nations depends on stronger and deeper cooperation with regional organizations.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL¹

Developments and trends, 2011

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS took place during the course of 2011 as intensive efforts were made to consolidate the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and to facilitate the creation of new ones. In particular, substantial steps were taken towards the ratification of the protocols to the African and South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zones by the nuclear-weapon States. Procedural progress was also made towards the holding of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as envisaged in the Final Document² of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A major meeting organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency also helped to prepare for the forthcoming conference on such a zone in the Middle East.

The three regional centres of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to strengthen and consolidate their cooperation with Member States and regional organizations in the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.³ In particular, their activities were focused on helping Member States in building their legal and administrative capacities for the tracing and marking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), strengthening control mechanisms to curb illicit trafficking in SALW and assisting in the destruction of surplus or obsolete SALW and related ammunition stocks. In addition, the UNODA regional

¹ Remarks to Collective Security Treaty Organization, Moscow, 22 April 2011. Available from http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1156 (accessed 13 June 2012).

² NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vols. I-III). Available from <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/index.shtml> (accessed 13 June 2012).

³ A/CONF.192/15. Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx> (accessed 11 June 2012).

centres engaged in activities related to public security and the reduction of armed violence, and also stepped up their role in assisting Member States in the preparatory work for the upcoming United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2012.

Several regional organizations also directed significant efforts towards curbing the illicit trafficking in SALW and, in this context, towards assisting Member States to enhance their capacities in the tracing and marking of SALW and in regulating brokering activities. The safeguarding of SALW stockpiles and the destruction of surplus or obsolete ammunition also received considerable attention and support. Similarly, Member States received support in their preparations for the ATT Conference in 2012, particularly in facilitating the development of common regional and subregional positions and perspectives on key issues related to a future ATT.

UNODA continued to maintain a close relationship with regional organizations and civil society groups, especially through its regional centres in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean. During the course of the year, those ties were further strengthened. UNODA also enlarged its institutional and outreach capacity by establishing the UNODA Office in Vienna in November. The Office seeks to facilitate closer cooperation and effective interaction in all areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control with the United Nations Office at Vienna and other Vienna-based organizations and related specialized agencies.

For more information on the resolutions and decisions related to this chapter, refer to appendix VIII.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

A brief glance at the preambles of the five regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties will confirm that none of these zones was ever intended as an end in itself ... Each was recognized ... as making some contribution to the strengthening of regional and international peace and security.

SERGIO DUARTE, UNITED NATIONS HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS⁴

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) is a regional approach for strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidating international efforts towards peace and security. The establishment of such zones has made significant progress and NWFZs

⁴ Remarks to the Task Force on the Technical Dimensions of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East, Como, Italy, 12 November 2011. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2011/2011-11-12_COMO_MEWMDFZ_Session_7.pdf (accessed 13 June 2012).

now cover the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific, South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia. In addition, Mongolia has gained international recognition of its nuclear-weapon-free status.⁵ In terms of land area, NWFZs comprise 84 million square kilometres of territory. In 2011, the concept of NWFZs continued to enjoy wide support in the United Nations; the General Assembly adopted without a vote three resolutions on NWFZs relating to Africa,⁶ the Middle East⁷ and South-East Asia.⁸ Other significant developments also took place during the year towards the strengthening of existing zones and the creation of additional NWFZs.

On 11 March, following the initiative by the Government of the Russian Federation in August 2010, the Russian State Duma approved the ratification of the Protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty.⁹ After ratification, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, clarified that several reservations were attached to the endorsement of the Treaty, including its non-application to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.¹⁰

On 3 May, United States President Barack Obama submitted the protocols of the Pelindaba and Rarotonga treaties to the Senate for ratification. This action came a year after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)¹¹ that the Administration would move forward on the ratification of these protocols, and it came 15 years after the initial signing of those protocols. The White House also declared its intention to work with the States parties to the Central Asian and South-East Asian NWFZs with a view to signing the protocols to those treaties as soon as possible.¹²

On 4 May, the First Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy convened in Addis Ababa. The purpose of the meeting was

⁵ The “Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status” was adopted by the parliament of Mongolia on 3 February 2000 and entered into force on the same day (available from <http://www.embassyofmongolia.be/node/39> (accessed 13 June 2012)). On 12 January 2009, the General Assembly, at its sixty-third session, adopted resolution 63/56, entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”.

⁶ General Assembly resolution 66/23 of 2 December 2011.

⁷ General Assembly resolution 66/25 of 2 December 2011.

⁸ General Assembly resolution 66/43 of 2 December 2011.

⁹ The full title is African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

¹⁰ Noël Stott, “The Treaty of Pelindaba: towards the full implementation of the African NWFZ Treaty”. Available from <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art3083.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2012).

¹¹ Treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

¹² See the White House Office of the Press Secretary, press release, 2 May 2011 (available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2011african_msg_rel.pdf (accessed 13 June 2012)). See also the White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement on Nuclear Free Zones in Asia and Africa”, 2 May 2011 (available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/statement-nuclear-free-zones-asia-and-africa> (accessed 13 June 2012)).

to make the Commission operational by establishing a bureau comprising the Chairperson, the Vice-Chairperson and the Executive Secretary; adopting rules of procedure; defining the statute and structure of the Commission; developing a programme of work; and deciding on a scale of assessments for the Commission's budget. The meeting also provided the opportunity to discuss the modalities for assisting member States towards compliance with their treaty obligations.

Important developments took place in 2011 with regard to the status of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). During the annual conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers, held in Bali from 16 to 23 July, a working group on the SEANWFZ called for a meeting between ASEAN arms control specialists and representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States (NWS) with a view to finding a solution to the long-standing stalemate between the two sides over the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty.¹³

For the first time in nearly 10 years, from 8 to 12 August, the representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States met with ASEAN officials to discuss the ratification of the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty by the five NWS. They were able to report substantive progress during the 19th ASEAN Summit on 17 November, enabling ASEAN and the five NWS to focus their subsequent attention on negotiating the remaining procedural issues.

On 18 November, the 3rd ASEAN–United States Leaders' Meeting, also held in Bali, welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations and agreed to take the necessary steps to facilitate the signing of the Protocol and its entry into force at the earliest opportunity. The agreement will ultimately provide for assurances of non-interference by the NWS, as well as negative security assurances.

Three documents emerged at the end of the negotiations between the NWS and ASEAN: (a) a protocol to the Treaty that the NWS agreed to sign; (b) a memorandum of understanding between ASEAN and China; and (c) a statement from ASEAN on the relationship between the Treaty and its Protocol. ASEAN will release that statement when the Treaty's Protocol and the memorandum of understanding with China are ratified. The agreement is considered non-binding until the NWS have signed the Treaty's Protocol.

Progress was also made towards the holding of a regional conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The decision to convene a conference in 2012 had been taken by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In

¹³ The Treaty is also known as the Bangkok Treaty. The text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

a joint press statement¹⁴ issued on 14 October, the United Nations Secretary-General and the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution proposing a Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,¹⁵ announced the appointment of Jaakko Laajava (Finland) as facilitator of the Conference and the designation of Finland as the host Government for the Conference.

In November, the additional protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force for all the States parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ)¹⁶ when Kyrgyzstan concluded the procedures for its adherence (following Uzbekistan in 1998, Tajikistan in 2004, Turkmenistan in 2006 and Kazakhstan in 2007).¹⁷ The CANWFZ Treaty is the only NWFZ treaty that requires each State party to conclude an additional protocol with the IAEA (in addition to its comprehensive safeguards system).

From 21 to 22 November, the Director General of the IAEA convened the Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, which was attended by representatives from more than 100 countries. The Forum provided a unique opportunity for interactive discussions on the lessons learned in establishing NWFZs. The IAEA mandate for holding this event stems from a decision adopted in 2000 by the IAEA General Conference,¹⁸ which had requested the Director General, *inter alia*, to develop an agenda and modalities to help ensure a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing NWFZs, including confidence-building and verification measures, for establishing a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

The principal focus of the Forum was to: (a) study the lessons of other regions regarding the regional setting and context that had prevailed there before they began considering an NWFZ; (b) review the existing multilaterally agreed principles for establishing NWFZs in populated areas of the world; (c) review the theory and practice of establishing the five existing NWFZs; (d) discuss with

¹⁴ Joint statement, New York, 14 October 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sg2180.doc.htm> (accessed 13 June 2012).

¹⁵ NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex.

¹⁶ Treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

¹⁷ See address by the delegation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Vienna, 21-22 November 2011 (available from <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeanwzf/canwftz211111.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2012)). See also IAEA, "Status List: Conclusion of safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols", 1 June 2012 (available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf (accessed 13 June 2012)).

¹⁸ IAEA, "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East", document GC(44)/DEC/12. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC44/Resolutions/gc44dec12.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2012).

representatives from the five existing NWFZs their experience in promoting, negotiating and practically implementing negotiated arrangements for NWFZs; and (e) discuss the region of the Middle East in this context.

The representatives of the five existing NWFZs and two regional verification arrangements (European Atomic Energy Community and Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) made presentations at the Forum. A presentation providing an overview of the experience of Mongolia as a single-country NWFZ was also made.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

In 2011, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) focused many of its activities on assisting Member States to build a stronger legal framework and to increase their capacity for the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Africa. Recognizing that many member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were using laws created in the 1960s and 1970s to regulate SALW, UNREC took the lead in developing a detailed guide to assist ECOWAS member States in strengthening and harmonizing their laws for the control of SALW. The guide, which was adopted by ECOWAS member States in June, provides guidance on how to incorporate into their national laws the provisions on SALW in the ECOWAS Convention. (For more information on the ECOWAS Convention, see p. 133.)

In order to assist States in East Africa to strengthen capacity to regulate small arms brokering activities, UNREC embarked on developing new software in 2010 specifically to help improve the registration of brokers and manage brokering licenses, a requirement under the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.¹⁹ Five Eastern African Governments²⁰ received this software along with training on its use and on regulating brokering activities. UNREC also assisted in the drafting and elaboration of new agreements on conventional arms control, such as the regional and subregional common positions on an arms trade treaty (ATT) (see below and pp. 131 and 132), and the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (see pp. 130 and 132).

¹⁹ Available from <http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Nairobi%20Protocol.pdf> (accessed 13 June 2012).

²⁰ Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania.

United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

In 2011, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) underwent changes in the management and proceedings of its meetings. In May, in order to enhance synergies and contribute to the activities of the newly established United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), the United Nations Secretary-General approved the transfer of the secretariat functions of UNSAC from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to the Department of Political Affairs, to be assumed by UNOCA.

During the first annual meeting of UNSAC in 2011 from 12 to 16 March in Sao Tome, UNSAC member States adopted the Sao Tome Declaration on a Central African Common Position on the Arms Trade Treaty,²¹ prepared, at their request, by UNREC in its capacity as Secretariat at the time. This common position reflected a coordinated and harmonized approach of the Central African States on the ATT negotiations to be finalized in 2012.

From 5 to 9 December, the second annual meeting of UNSAC took place in Bangui, Central African Republic, under the auspices of UNOCA as it assumed the secretariat functions for that body. During this meeting, member States reviewed and discussed issues ranging from the security impact of the illegal exploitation of natural resources to the fight against terrorism in Central Africa. Initiated by the delegation of the Central African Republic, the Committee adopted the Declaration on a Roadmap for the Fight Against Terrorism and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons in Central Africa.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) to promote public security were focused on assisting States in implementing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and norms, notably by bolstering their efforts to destroy surplus, obsolete and confiscated weapons; enhancing the capacity of security sector personnel to combat illicit firearms trafficking; and providing legal firearms assistance to State authorities responsible for firearms control.

Within the framework of stockpile management and weapons destruction activities of UNLIREC, Trinidad and Tobago and Ecuador made use of the Centre's new ammunition burning tank to destroy seven tons of ammunition. The Caribbean States also used the UNLIREC standard operating procedures to destroy 1,200 firearms. In addition, the Centre extended its stockpile management and destruction training to representatives from Ecuador,

²¹ Available from <http://unrec.org/docs/saotome.doc> (accessed 14 June 2012).

Guatemala, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. By taking ownership of such practical disarmament initiatives, the States were better equipped to prevent the diversion of weapons.

Nearly 500 security sector personnel from the countries in the region benefited from the UNLIREC Inter-institutional Training Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. As a direct result, there was an increase in the number of successful seizures of ammunition and firearms, most notably in the Andean region. Central American and Caribbean States, for their part, incorporated the UNLIREC standardized training methodology into existing police academy training curricula.

Recognizing the importance of a robust regional approach to addressing the threat posed by illicit firearms, UNLIREC completed comparative legal firearms studies for Central, South American and Caribbean countries and expanded its legal assistance to include specialized training for judicial officers in combating impunity in cases of illicit firearms trafficking. UNLIREC also increased its support to States in the region in drafting new legislation and assisting national commissions in defining and implementing priorities that were subsequently reflected in their national action plans.

UNLIREC actively supported States in their preparations for the global negotiations in 2012 on an ATT and also in their deliberations in the lead-up to the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention.²²

UNLIREC responded to more than 25 official requests for assistance from Member States. The increase in the number of requests further strengthened and expanded its roster of public security and firearms experts. The Centre's activities in the area of public security in the Andean, Caribbean and Central American subregions benefited from its continuing partnership with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and the United States Department of State. For the second consecutive year, UNLIREC was subcontracted by its regional partner, the Organization of American States, to deliver technical legal assistance to member States. Financial and in-kind contributions made to UNLIREC by States in the region also increased for the first time in the past five years, highlighting the growing value of the partnership between States and the Centre in support of disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

²² The full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), recognizing the challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction and illicit SALW, continued to advance the disarmament dialogue in the region and to promote effective implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on the illicit trade in SALW.

With regard to weapons of mass destruction, UNRCPD organized its two annual conferences: the 23rd United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues and the 10th United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues. The former, which was held in Matsumoto, Japan, in July, focused on concrete steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. The latter, which took place in Jeju, Republic of Korea, in November, focused on developments over the past decade in disarmament and non-proliferation and assessed challenges for the next decade.

The conferences generated in-depth, interactive and thought-provoking discussions among the participating representatives from Governments, intergovernmental organizations, policy institutes, academia and other civil society organizations. The events provided an opportunity to address and exchange views on pressing regional non-proliferation and disarmament challenges.

In order to highlight armed violence reduction and prevention, the Centre organized a regional seminar on armed violence reduction and prevention for South and South-East Asia, held in Nepal in March. There were 17 representatives from the two subregions, as well as from international and regional organizations, who benefited from the exchange of best and promising practices, as well as lessons learned, in addressing armed violence issues. The seminar also facilitated intersectoral and interregional cooperation and highlighted subregional mechanisms for the reduction and prevention of armed violence.

In an effort to mitigate the negative impact caused by the illicit possession or use of small arms and other portable lethal weapons in Nepal, UNRCPD continued to organize the Working Group on Armed Violence Reduction. By meeting every two months and engaging experts from the Government of Nepal and other national stakeholders, the Working Group increased the awareness of this challenge and fostered strategies to address it.

With a view to strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies in Nepal to combat illicit SALW trafficking, the Centre organized a training course in September in which 25 Nepali law enforcement officials were trained in SALW legal frameworks, marking and tracing, and stockpile management.

With a view to increasing regional capacities related to disarmament, UNRCPD put renewed emphasis on training and education in peace and disarmament issues.

In January, the Centre strengthened the capacity of media in East and South-East Asia by organizing a workshop in Beijing, in which senior journalists from nearly a dozen subregional countries and disarmament experts participated. The workshop enhanced the knowledge of journalists on disarmament and the media awareness of disarmament experts, thereby creating the potential for increased and more accurate media coverage on disarmament issues.

The Centre also conducted various peace and disarmament education initiatives for the youth. In Saitama, Japan, an event was organized for high school students to make presentations on disarmament issues. In Matsumoto, Japan, a special session for high school students took place during the annual United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues. In Nepal, a pilot project for informal peace education through volunteerism was successfully tested at a number of public schools in the Kathmandu Valley.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Vienna

The UNODA Office in Vienna, established as part of UNODA in November, was created in response to the growing need for closer cooperation and more effective interaction in all areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control with the United Nations Office at Vienna and other Vienna-based organizations and related specialized agencies. It coordinates with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and other relevant regional intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The establishment of the Vienna Office was made possible with the financial support of Member States, particularly the Government of Austria.

Disarmament and arms regulation at regional levels

Africa

In 2011, African States continued supporting different measures to strengthen disarmament in the continent. Recognizing the strong links between the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and armed violence, the African Union (AU), with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, continued to develop a common strategy to better control SALW. In September, experts from AU member States met in Lomé, Togo, and adopted the AU Strategy on

the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Strategy, *inter alia*, calls for addressing the SALW problem comprehensively by mainstreaming SALW control activities into projects to achieve peace, security, development and stability in the continent. (For more details on the Strategy, see p. 132.)

During the year, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda signed the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, also known as the Kinshasa Convention.²³ As a result, all 11 member States of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) became signatories. The Convention is a common reference point to coordinate efforts in order to stop the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW in Central Africa.

In 2011, States in Southern and Western Africa initiated the process of marking SALW with the aim of improving the traceability of weapons and their accountability. In December, governmental experts of the Economic Community of West African States adopted new standards and unique codes for the marking of SALW for the organization's member States. The agreement contains high standards, as the organization's member States need to ensure that SALW are marked, identifying the institution using the weapon or the user if it is for civilian use. Furthermore, member States must also ensure that classical and security markings are placed on new SALW imports and new "industrially produced" SALW. Uniquely, the text also includes marking requirements for craft-produced firearms. (For more details on these standards, see p. 133.)

Following the adoption in late September in Lomé of a common strategy to control SALW, governmental experts at the same meeting adopted a draft African Common Position on an Arms Trade Treaty. Expected to be discussed at the AU Summit in the summer of 2012, the draft African Common Position states that AU member States believed that the goal of the arms trade treaty (ATT) should be the establishment of the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms. As such, most AU member States agreed to the inclusion of SALW, ammunition, parts and components, and related technology and equipment in the scope of the treaty. The draft African Common Position also supported the inclusion of a broad range of activities to be covered by the ATT, including exporting and importing, brokering, leases and loans, transit controls, and restrictions in cases when arms transfers should not be authorized. Central African States that are members of UNSAC also adopted a common position on an ATT (see p. 134).

²³ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

African Union

The African Union (AU) continued to address strategic issues that were considered key to the maintenance of peace and security among its member States.

In the fight against illicit SALW, the AU held a meeting of experts from member States from 26 to 29 September in Lomé to consider the draft AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons,²⁴ and to elaborate an African Common Position on an Arms Trade Treaty. The meeting adopted a draft Strategy. Delegates also examined the draft African Common Position on the proposed ATT and provided inputs to the document. The documents were reviewed accordingly, and will be presented to the Executive Council for consideration in June 2012.

The AU Commission and the United Nations conducted a joint security sector reform training workshop for the Southern African Development Community region in Harare, Zimbabwe, in March and held a meeting of governmental experts of member States to consider the draft AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform in Addis Ababa in May. The meeting endorsed the amended AU Policy Framework, which was presented to the Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security, in October, and to the Pan-African Parliament in November and will be presented to the AU Summit in 2012.

During the year, the AU Commission started a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme in collaboration with the World Bank Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) and the DDR Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York). The programme was a result of ongoing consultations, which started in May, among the AU Peace and Security Department, the TDRP, the DDR Section and the United Nations Office to the African Union. Their common interest in fostering peacebuilding activities in Africa prompted the three organizations to seek to harness their various experiences by undertaking joint DDR activities.

Economic Community of West African States

With the technical support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the financial contribution of the Government of Austria, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission developed and adopted the Guide for the Harmonization of National SALW Legislations in West Africa at a meeting of governmental experts held in Lomé from 21 to 23 June.

²⁴ Available from <http://unrec.org/docs/Strategy%20Final.pdf> (accessed 14 June 2012).

Furthermore, in order to increase awareness-raising and public education on the negative impact of the proliferation of SALW, a series of capacity-building workshops for the media were organized in Guinea from 23 to 30 July, in Liberia from 28 August to 2 September and in Côte d'Ivoire from 22 to 25 November.

Within the framework of implementing the provisions of articles 18 and 19 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials,²⁵ governmental experts adopted, during their meeting from 6 to 8 December in Bamako, Mali, standards and unique codes to be used by each ECOWAS member State for the marking of SALW.

For the acquisition of any new SALW, it was agreed that classical and security markings were to be applied in accordance with the provisions of article 18. Classical markings included, in particular, the following:

- ECOWAS logo;
- Serial number;
- Identification of the manufacturer;
- Identification of the country of manufacture;
- Year of manufacture;
- Identification code ISO 3166-1 (or Alpha-2) of the importing State;
- Year of import; and
- Identification of the institution that is supposed to use the weapons.

For weapons already in current stocks, markings should show at a minimum and in the proposed order, the following elements:

- ECOWAS logo;
- ISO 3166-1 (or Alpha-2) country identifying code;
- Identification of the institution that is supposed to use the weapon; and
- Serial number.

For locally manufactured weapons, marking is to be done in strict compliance with the provisions of article 18 of the ECOWAS Convention when they are industrially produced. For artisanal weapons, markings must at least comprise ISO 3166-1 (or Alpha-2) country identification code, and the identification of the manufacturer and the serial number.

The ECOWAS Commission also participated in the discussions held during the two sessions of the United Nations Preparatory Committee on the

²⁵ Available from http://www.ecosap.ecowas.int/index.php?option=com_jotloader§ion=files&task=download&cid=3_17714a46188cf52f23f2b926a6a857da&Itemid=84&lang=en (accessed 13 June 2012).

ATT held in 2011. In addition, the Commission advocated for the adoption of an AU common position leading to the approval by the governmental experts from AU member States of a draft African Common Position on the ATT during their meeting in Lomé from 26 to 30 September (see also pp. 131 and 132).

Economic Community of Central African States

In 2011, positive developments took place in Central Africa concerning disarmament in general and SALW issues in particular.

In the context of the preparations for the negotiation of the upcoming ATT, the members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa adopted the Sao Tome Declaration on a Central African Common Position on the Arms Trade Treaty during their thirty-second ministerial meeting in Sao Tome from 12 to 16 March.

A subregional seminar for governmental experts, members of parliament and civil society organizations in Central Africa was held in Brazzaville, Congo, on the topic of the Kinshasa Convention, from 14 to 16 November. The seminar aimed to raise awareness about the Convention among participants, in order to contribute to its timely ratification, entry into force and implementation in their respective countries.

Throughout 2011, the question of private security companies was under scrutiny with the goal of publishing a “white book on private security companies in Central Africa”. Following a workshop on research methodology held in Libreville, Gabon, from 7 to 9 December, national experts were hired and dispatched on fact-finding missions.

As part of his duties under paragraphs 3 (a) and (b) of article 29 of the Kinshasa Convention, the Secretary-General of the Economic Community of Central African States supported the work of the Central African Action Network on Small Arms during its first General Assembly held in Bangui, Central African Republic, from 30 November to 3 December.

Regional Centre on Small Arms

In 2011, the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) continued to provide logistical and technical support to its member States in arms marking. Various States were at different stages of marking their State-owned arms. For example, Seychelles completed marking arms held by police and the military while Burundi marked only 47 per cent of police firearms and only 6 out of its 17 provinces completed the exercise. In Uganda, the police marked 90 per cent of its arms while the military marked 40 per cent. The United Republic of Tanzania started marking arms held legally by civilians.

RECSA trained law enforcement officers and the military in arms marking in the Central African Republic, the Congo, South Sudan and

Zambia. RECSA also provided support to the West African region to purchase electronic marking machines for four pilot countries,²⁶ which will receive training in arms marking. Support to West Africa was provided under a project on Africa funded by the European Union and coordinated by RECSA.

In an effort to enhance stockpile management, RECSA made available its customized software for electronic record keeping of data and information on SALW.

RECSA supported Ethiopia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania to undertake arms destruction under a project funded by Japan. Support was also provided to Eritrea in the destruction of unexploded ordnance with funding from the European Union's Dar-es-Salaam Office.

RECSA continued to disseminate its Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament among its member States. The guidelines were developed with funding from the Government of Japan to harmonize disarmament practices in RECSA member States in order to facilitate cooperation in disarmament exercises among these countries. Governments in the region and the RECSA Council of Ministers endorsed the guidelines.

RECSA supported the following activities: the disarmament meetings of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to discuss strategies for disarming pastoralist communities and negative forces; the official launch of national action plans in Rwanda and Burundi; the finalization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Action Plan, which was awaiting presidential endorsement; and the review of the legislation of the United Republic of Tanzania on SALW.

Two additional countries²⁷ were admitted to RECSA during the year, bringing the total number of its member States to 15.

Americas

Security and disarmament continued to occupy a dominant position in the domestic and regional agendas of Latin American and Caribbean States. Member States renewed their support in favour of various disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and took collective action to promote disarmament and reduce armed violence.

At the International Conference in Support of the Central American Security Strategy held in Guatemala, Heads of State of Mexico and Colombia identified the security strategy for the subregion, and expressed strong support for regional disarmament activities. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) control and armed violence reduction were at the centre of this security strategy.

²⁶ Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Togo and Ghana.

²⁷ Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan.

At the 32nd Caribbean Summit held in St. Kitts and Nevis, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries addressed, among other topics, the impact of illicit firearms trafficking and transnational crime on the socio-economic development and economic viability of CARICOM States. At the Summit, the CARICOM Declaration on SALW²⁸ was adopted as the regional framework for the collective effort to combat illicit trafficking in SALW.

The South American Defence Council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) inaugurated the new Centre for Strategic Defence Studies in Argentina. The Centre is the academic body responsible for research on defence and security matters affecting the 12 members of UNASUR. It will address a wide range of issues, including confidence- and security-building measures, transparency and comparative data on military spending and defence expenditures. UNASUR agreed to a 2012 Plan of Action with the objective of advancing the creation of a South American Register of Military Expenditure.

In other developments, Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions,²⁹ and Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador ratified the instrument. As a contribution to transparency in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, Mexico initiated its domestic process in order to join the Wassenaar Arrangement with the goal of completing the process in early 2012.

Central American Integration System

In 2011, major advances for Central America took place in the area of democratic security. During the International Conference in Support of the Central American Security Strategy, held in Guatemala City on 22 and 23 June, the Central American Integration System (SICA) member States presented the Central American Security Strategy, based on the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America,³⁰ along with its action plan, costs, 14 priorities and 22 project profiles.

With regard to the arms control strategy, which is driven by the Central American Programme on Small Arms Control, SICA continued work on highlighting the issue of SALW control at both the national and regional level.

²⁸ CARICOM, "CARICOM Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons, issued by the thirty-second meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 30 June-4 July 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis". Available from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/declaration_small_arms_light_weapons_2011.jsp (accessed 13 June 2012).

²⁹ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

³⁰ Available from http://www.sica.int/busqueda/busqueda_archivo.aspx?Archivo=trat_33842_2_19032009.htm (accessed 14 June 2012).

Other important achievements were the implementation of the SICA project to promote the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other transnational threats, and the Central American Border Security Programme, which sought to strengthen internal and peripheral border security by using institutional and technical support and by promoting greater connectivity, integrated management and information sharing in border areas.

Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security

Efforts were made under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) through the activation of four technical committees and the convening of the second meeting of the CBSI Commission. The technical committees were in the following areas:

- Law enforcement information sharing;
- Law enforcement cooperation and capacity-building, which focused broadly on building the capacity of the justice sector to fight violent and organized crime, as well as illicit trafficking of guns and drugs, money-laundering, cybercrime and corruption;
- Crime prevention by focusing on vulnerable youth and at-risk populations; and
- Maritime and aerial domain security cooperation.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member States benefited from the stockpile management and disposal project of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), which provided significant assistance to CARICOM States. The UNLIREC efforts were synchronized with the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) programme of work targeting SALW projects, such as the Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network (RIBIN) and Strengthening CARICOM Cooperation to Reduce Gun Crime.

CARICOM continued to pursue the development of a RIBIN to track licensed firearms and ammunition and those that had been stolen, lost or recovered.

CARICOM member States received new laser-marking machines for firearms from the Organization of American States (OAS) as part of capacity-building efforts on marking and tracing within the context of the United Nations Programme of Action. OAS and CARICOM IMPACS also endeavoured to improve collaboration through the establishment of Public

Security Observatories and through enhanced support for a multilateral evaluation mechanism and security sector assessments.

Strengthening CARICOM Cooperation to Reduce Gun Crime, a three-year project, was launched in February through a partnership involving Project Ploughshares, CARICOM IMPACS and the Institute of International Relations at the University of West Indies. The project, which was undertaken with the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, sought to improve national capacity to report on the implementation of existing agreements and build capacities in the fight against the proliferation of SALW.

CARICOM also supported negotiation efforts, including the holding of preparatory committee workshops aimed at securing an arms trade treaty.

Organization of American States

As part of efforts to strengthen cooperation with other organizations, the Technical Secretariat of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)³¹ participated in various regional, subregional, and international seminars including: the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on the illicit trade in SALW and the International Tracing Instrument; the seminar Combating Firearms Trafficking in the Caribbean: Stockpile Management and Destruction, which was organized jointly by the United States Department of State, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the United States Southern Command; and the working meeting of the Advisory Group of the Stolen and Lost Firearms System of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

The CIFTA Technical Secretariat, with the cooperation of experts provided by the Government of Mexico, worked during this period on preparing the three pending model legislation proposals that complement the Convention: (a) Draft Model Legislation and Comments on Controlled Delivery; (b) Draft Model Legislation and Comments on Recordkeeping, Confidentiality, and Exchange of Information; and (c) Draft Model Legislation and Comments on Security Measures to Eliminate Loss or Diversion.

Under the United States-funded project Stockpile Management and Destruction in Central America, the Technical Secretariat, together with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, conducted a number of legislative studies

³¹ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

that summarized the degree of compliance with the provisions of the CIFTA in Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.

Between October 2009 and December 2011, the CIFTA Technical Secretariat implemented four projects, financed by the United States, Spain and Italy, to strengthen national capacities in Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama in terms of proper arsenal management, modernization of armories, and the destruction of obsolete and unused weapons and ammunition.

The Organization of American States (OAS) organized a seminar in Guatemala to provide a framework for discussing experiences and identifying effective means of ensuring appropriate management of national arsenals and the effective destruction of obsolete or unused weapons and ammunition. Additionally, a subregional technical seminar to improve the capacity of authorities responsible for the management of explosive materials from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Belize was held in Madrid, with support from the Governments of Spain and the United States. All the participants received a level-three explosive ordnance destruction certificate, which qualifies them to conduct or supervise destruction of explosive ordnance.

OAS assisted Guatemalan authorities in destroying almost 635 tons of white phosphorus grenades, white phosphorus projectiles of up to 120 mm, aircraft bombs of up to 250 kg and artillery of various types of obsolete ammunition.

Since September 2009, the CIFTA Technical Secretariat has been implementing a project to strengthen national capacity in the marking of imported, exported and confiscated firearms, in accordance with the legal requirements of article VI of CIFTA. With the financial backing of the United States, 31 beneficiary countries will receive through this activity electric dot-peen or micropercussion marking equipment, the necessary training for its effective use and computers to facilitate the storage of marking data. Twenty countries that had signed cooperation agreements with the OAS General Secretariat joined the initiative. Of those countries, 16 already received the equipment and over 120 people were trained to use the machinery and became part of the Hemisphere's network of marking practitioners.

Asia and the Pacific

The unprecedented Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster of 11 March added a new and pressing sense of urgency to the discussions about nuclear safety and security. Many States around the globe were fundamentally reconsidering the future use of nuclear energy technology.

Indonesia ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty³² on 6 December, which constituted a significant step towards its entry into force. Indonesia is one of the so-called Annex 2 States whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to take effect.

Regarding the Korean Peninsula, efforts to advance denuclearization, including through a resumption of the Six-Party Talks,³³ remained stalled, despite two rounds of bilateral talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States during the course of the year.

Regional organizations in Asia and the Pacific continued to enhance their efforts to address challenges in the field of peace and disarmament. On 11 November, the member States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation adopted the Addu Declaration,³⁴ which, *inter alia*, emphasized the importance of making concerted efforts to combat terrorism, including its linkages to illicit weapons.

The member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations reconciled their differences on the procedure by which the nuclear-weapon States could accede to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty.³⁵ The Executive Committee of the SEANWFZ Commission began direct consultations with China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to persuade them to sign the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty .

The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat continued to support efforts of its member States on weapons control. On 7 September, on the occasion of its 42nd Meeting, the Forum issued a joint statement³⁶ with the United Nations Secretary-General, stressing that cooperation between the United Nations and the Pacific States would support the efforts of, *inter alia*, non-proliferation and disarmament, including controlling illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the negotiation of an arms trade treaty.

Marking its tenth anniversary, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted the Astana Declaration³⁷ on 15 June, which underscored the

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Six-Party Talks participants: China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and United States.

³⁴ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, "Latest Update: Addu Declaration", 14 November 2011. Available from <http://www.sarc-sec.org/2011/11/14/news/ADDU-DECLARATION/79/> (accessed 14 June 2012).

³⁵ The Treaty is also known as the Bangkok Treaty. The text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

³⁶ Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, joint statement with Pacific Islands Forum leaders, Auckland, New Zealand, 7 September 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5490> (accessed 14 June 2012).

³⁷ Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "Astana Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", 15 June 2011. Available from <http://www.sectso.org/EN/show.asp?id=294> (accessed 13 June 2012).

importance of the observance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of outer space.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1997. Since then, steady progress has been made in implementing the Treaty and its Plan of Action, including accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements and related instruments by States parties to the SEANWFZ Treaty. New developments in 2011 included Indonesia's ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management³⁸ in April; the admission of the Lao People's Democratic Republic into the IAEA in September; and Indonesia's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in December.

At the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety on 21 June in Vienna, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Malaysia delivered a statement³⁹ on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He recognized the need to promote universal adherence to the international framework on nuclear safety and emergency preparedness and response in the development of civilian nuclear energy. He also emphasized that ASEAN member States were committed to creating an appropriate nuclear safety infrastructure based on IAEA safety standards and guidance.

Significant progress took place in 2011 in renewing consultations between the 10 SEANWFZ Treaty States parties, which are now also member States of ASEAN, and the 5 nuclear-weapon States (NWS) towards enabling the NWS to sign the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty as soon as possible. Building upon the progress made during informal direct consultations in Geneva and New York in August and October, respectively, the representatives of the SEANWFZ Executive Committee and of the NWS, who met on 15 November in Bali, were able to conclude negotiations on the outstanding issues related to the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Protocol. This development will be followed up by efforts towards the signing of the SEANWFZ Protocol by the NWS in July 2012.

The third ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, held in Las Vegas from 23 to 25 February, addressed international cooperation in the disarmament of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. Further

³⁸ IAEA, document INFCIRC/546. Available from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc546.pdf> (accessed 14 June 2012).

³⁹ Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/plenary/p_d2_malaysia.pdf (accessed 14 June 2012).

advancement of this cooperation, which is outlined in the draft ARF Work Plan on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, will be submitted for the Ministers' endorsement in July 2012.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

In 2011, the Pacific Islands Forum continued to be active in advocating and providing technical assistance and support to Forum members to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the trafficking and illegal use of SALW in the region.

With regard to weapons of mass destruction, members continued to advocate for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, in their 2011 Communiqué, encouraged all States to become party to the Treaty, given its importance as a practical and effective means to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. They also extended their support to a number of United Nations activities, including implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and liaised with representatives of the 1540 Committee Expert Group at the 2011 meeting of the Working Group on Counter Terrorism of the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC). In addition, Forum members continued to support the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga,⁴⁰ as a regional commitment to international peace and security.

Regarding SALW, the FRSC, in order to advance a call by Forum leaders for the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW, endorsed the Regional Implementation Guidelines and directed the Secretariat to provide technical assistance and implementation support to its members. As part of this support, the Secretariat reported to the FRSC in 2011 on constraints being faced by Forum Island Countries in implementing the Programme of Action. In response, members agreed to a number of activities to be undertaken at the national and regional level to enhance implementation. At the regional level, in addition to the ongoing availability of legislative drafting support to members seeking to adapt the regional Model Weapons Control Bill, the Secretariat was directed to prioritize the provision of technical assistance to members in undertaking national reporting and needs analysis assessments. A key proposal considered by the FRSC was the formation of a regional SALW technical experts group to allow organizations and Forum members with the necessary technical capacity to provide direct assistance to Forum Island Countries seeking such assistance and support.

In their 2011 Communiqué, Forum leaders welcomed the progress made by the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, believing that such a treaty would help to deter and prevent

⁴⁰ The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

illicit trafficking and proliferation of arms including SALW. Forum leaders also expressed support for the development of a common Forum position on an arms trade treaty to ensure a strong and proactive voice at the treaty negotiations.

Europe

European Union

In 2011, the European Union (EU) continued to be guided by the EU Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Strategy,⁴¹ adopted in 2003, and by the EU Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Strategy,⁴² adopted in 2005. These were based on the principle of support for effective multilateralism, in particular for the universalization and full implementation of relevant international treaties and instruments.

The EU continued to incorporate non-proliferation of WMD into its contractual relations with third States and made similar efforts to provide a legal basis for enhanced cooperation in SALW controls.

Following increased concerns raised by the IAEA on the possible military dimension of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme, the EU prepared a new set of sanctions as mandated by the European Council in December. With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the EU updated in December its WMD-related sanctions against that country.

As part of its commitment to the implementation of the action plan⁴³ agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the EU organized a seminar, held in Brussels on 6 to 7 July, on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. It also continued to actively promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement at the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, including verification provisions. The EU also continued to provide support to the IAEA, being the top donor to the Agency, contributing to its Nuclear Security Fund and to the modernization of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory located in Seibersdorf, Austria.

In 2011, the EU prepared a new Council Decision, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which is aimed at

⁴¹ EU, "EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", document 15708/03, annex. Available from <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2012).

⁴² EU, "EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition", document 5319/06, annex. Available from <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05319.en06.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2012).

⁴³ NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 19-31.

supporting resolution 1540 (2004) and the work of the 1540 Committee, with a particular focus on country visits.

The EU continued to pursue the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention⁴⁴ and to promote new activities in support of specific projects of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A new EU Council Decision in support of Organisation activities was also negotiated.

The EU actively engaged in the process leading to the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),⁴⁵ held in Geneva from 5 to 22 December, on the basis of a formal Common Position, which the Council had adopted on 18 July. The EU continued its support to BWC and World Health Organization activities in the area of biosafety and biosecurity through the implementation of two distinct Joint Actions.

With regard to its regulatory framework of dual-use items, the EU continued to regularly update its control list to correctly reflect updates made by the relevant international non-proliferation regimes. The EU regulatory framework of dual-use items was also amended in 2011 with the introduction of new EU General Export Authorizations aimed at simplifying the current system.⁴⁶

The EU continued to promote its initiative for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, conducting consultations with major space-faring nations and presenting its initiative in various United Nations forums.

The EU was very active in supporting the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles, also known as The Hague Code of Conduct, through a specific Council Decision⁴⁷ and worked in 2011 on a new Council Decision that would support not only the Code of Conduct but also tackle missile non-proliferation in general.

⁴⁴ The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The treaty text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

⁴⁵ The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

⁴⁶ See amendment to Regulation No. 428/2009 (Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No. 1232/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 326 (8 December 2011), pp. 26-44. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:326:0026:0044:EN:PDF> (accessed 13 June 2012)).

⁴⁷ Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/974/CFSP of 18 December 2008, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 345 (23 December 2008), pp. 91-95. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0091:0095:EN:PDF> (accessed 13 June 2012).

In July, the EU adopted a Council Decision⁴⁸ in support of United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) activities to promote the regional implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW, the International Tracing Instrument and the United Nations International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. Several other ongoing EU projects were implemented.

The EU published its annual report on arms exports licensed in 2010 by its member States.⁴⁹ Several regional outreach seminars aimed at promoting controls on arms exports were organized during the year for countries neighbouring the EU.

Throughout the year, the EU continued to closely support and participate in the ongoing arms trade treaty (ATT) negotiation process. The EU actively participated in the two sessions of the ATT Preparatory Committee held in 2011, advocating the negotiation of a strong and robust treaty, with high parameters and the widest possible scope. Within the framework of EU Council Decision 2010/336/CFSP, the EU jointly organized several outreach seminars with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The main task of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the politico-military sphere remained the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. However, OSCE also addressed new threats to stability and security. It paid particular attention to the security-related concerns posed by the illicit trafficking, uncontrolled proliferation and surpluses of SALW; and unsafe storage of stockpiles of conventional ammunition, including rocket fuel melange.

In October 2011, OSCE and UNODA signed a memorandum of understanding on joint project activities to promote regional implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

OSCE also worked closely with 10 interested participating States, in coordination with the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts and UNODA, on the development of national action plans and improving national legislation. OSCE and UNODA organized a workshop, held in Astana, Kazakhstan, on

⁴⁸ Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2011/428/CFSP of 18 July 2011, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 188 (19 July 2011), pp. 37-41. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:188:0037:0041:EN:PDF> (accessed 13 June 2012).

⁴⁹ For an overview, see Council of the European Union, “Notices from European Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies: Council—Thirteenth annual report according to article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment”, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 382 (30 December 2011). Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:382:0001:0470:EN:PDF> (accessed 13 June 2012).

these matters, with a regional focus on Central Asia. The workshop focused primarily on the main elements of border and export controls and was tailored for border, customs and policymaking officials from the participating States of the region.

During the year, OSCE States decided to treat destruction as the preferred method of disposal of surplus, expired and obsolete ammunition. In order to alleviate the reporting burden on States, the Conflict Prevention Centre of OSCE and UNODA aligned the reporting templates with regard to their respective small arms instruments.⁵⁰ The participating States conducted an information exchange on national controls over brokering activities in SALW, which was then summarized in a report. The Centre, together with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, also developed an electronic template for an end-user certificate relating to SALW.

OSCE continued providing assistance on destruction and stockpile management, security of SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition. Projects in Albania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine were completed. OSCE continued the implementation of two joint assistance programmes with the United Nations Development Programme in Montenegro and Belarus, and launched another joint project in Georgia. OSCE received four new requests for assistance on SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, the Republic of Moldova and Serbia.

In October, OSCE organized in Zagreb a regional Workshop on Customs Procedures and Licensing Issuance, which focused on integrating the national processing of dual-use and military goods, including SALW, through information sharing.

In line with the Astana Commemorative Declaration,⁵¹ OSCE engaged in discussions to update, revitalize and modernize confidence- and security-building measures. Following the establishment of a procedure for regular updating of the Vienna Document every five years, OSCE adopted nine decisions called Vienna Document Plus, which were integrated into the Vienna Document 2011.⁵²

Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation

The Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)–Centre for Security Cooperation continued its efforts to improve and maintain the standards indispensable for the full implementation

⁵⁰ The instruments are the OSCE Document on SALW and the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW.

⁵¹ OSCE, “Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community”. Available from <http://summit2010.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/444.pdf> (accessed 14 June 2012).

⁵² Available from <http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597> (accessed 13 June 2012).

of arms control agreements, conventions and treaties concluded by the States of South-Eastern Europe.

Arms control was once a keystone of the programme policy of RACVIAC—Centre for Security Cooperation, but over the years it has fallen out of favour with many regional policymakers. Politicians, however, have started to recognize arms control as a crucial factor in international security, acknowledging its indispensable role in security policy and realizing that it is needed now more than ever, although in a different form.

In that regard, the Centre conducted training courses and seminars that contributed to a common understanding of the existing agreements to which the countries of the region are signatories.

In 2011, the Centre conducted the following eight activities (attended by a total of 248 participants) on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and confidence- and security-building measures:

- Oslo Convention—Workshop on Cluster Munitions, which was aimed at sharing the latest developments related to the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions;⁵³
- Chemical Weapons Convention Seminar, which provided an overview of the Chemical Weapons Convention implementation procedures and of specific conditions in the region;
- Dayton Article IV Course, which aimed to inform and educate the participants on the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement)⁵⁴ and to train the participants in their roles as inspectors and escorts within the framework of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control;
- Vienna Document 1999⁵⁵ Formation/Unit Commanders' Course, which provided Formation/Unit Commanders with an overview of the Vienna Document 1999 and gave guidance for practical implementation;
- Customs Procedures and Licensing Issuance: Integrating the National Processing of Dual Use Goods and Conventional Weapons through Information Sharing, which provided participants with extensive knowledge on the best practices in the field of processing dual-use goods and conventional weapons;
- Physical Security and Stockpile Management Course, which trained executive managers to assess national stockpiles, operational procedures and infrastructure;

⁵³ Treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

⁵⁴ Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina". Available from http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 (accessed 8 June 2012).

⁵⁵ Available from <http://www.osce.org/fsc/41276> (accessed 13 June 2012).

- Arms Control Symposium (the Centre's first arms control-related activity of this kind and at this level), which reflected on political ambitions to implement the existing arms control treaties, presented the latest developments in the field, and opened new perspectives on confidence-building measures for peace and stability in South-Eastern Europe; and
- Conference entitled "Towards a Sustainable Solution for Excess Weapons and Ammunition: Policy, Logistical and Financial Aspects of Excess Weapons and Ammunition Disposal", which served as a forum for raising the awareness on these topics and facilitating the process for finding a sustainable solution.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

In 2011, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) focused on upgrading SALW and ammunition storage facilities; conventional weapons and ammunition stockpile management training; destruction of SALW; weapons collection and awareness-raising campaigns; marking, tracing and registration of weapons; and arms exports control.

The improvement of physical security and increased stockpile management capabilities through training and reconstruction of storage facilities represented a crucial contribution to SALW control in the region. Supported by European Union Council Decision 2010/179/CFSP 44, SEESAC activities resulted in the successful upgrade of the storage facilities named "Taras" in Montenegro and "Murat" in Croatia. Furthermore, preparatory work for the upgrade of four storage locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place.

In terms of capacity development, SEESAC developed and implemented an extensive Regional Course on Stockpile Management with three modules and lasting 15 days. It was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was attended by representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It resulted in a significantly increased capacity to plan, develop and manage stockpiles of conventional weapons and ammunition.

SEESAC work was focused on directly assisting local authorities towards diminishing the risk of arms proliferation by significantly reducing the number of illegal, unwanted or surplus weapons in storage. Some of its activities included the destruction of 16,329 SALW in Croatia and several awareness-raising campaigns in Croatia and Serbia, supporting the Governments to properly disseminate information regarding the legalization and voluntary surrender of illegal firearms.

Through its efforts to enhance controls on SALW, including the implementation of international and national instruments on marking and tracing, and the improvement of the weapons registration process, SEESAC successfully assisted the Governments of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in implementing an efficient weapons registration system, in connection with SEESAC activities on marking, tracing and registration of firearms.

The SEESAC focus on improving the administrative capacity and support for transparency of arms transfers to and from the Western Balkans resulted in: (a) the publication of annual national reports on arms exports and imports by Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia; (b) the publication of the third *Regional Report on Arms Exports*; (c) the development of a regional database of registered brokers; and (d) the support for the Parliamentary Forum on small arms and light weapons.

Throughout the year, SEESAC continued to act as the Secretariat for the Regional Information Exchange Process on Arms Export Controls and organized three regional meetings among Government officials from the countries of the Western Balkans.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has consistently supported arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, in line with the commitments of the Allies under existing arms control treaties and agreements and within the framework of the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit, held in 2010. The Alliance has also been implementing the Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats.⁵⁶ At the same time, NATO continued to be concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and called upon specific countries to comply fully and without delay with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and international obligations.

In 2011, following its active policy of cooperation and outreach to partners and international organizations, NATO organized its seventh annual Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, which took place in Bergen, Norway, from 15 to 16 June. Senior officials participated in a free and informal discussion on a wide range of proliferation issues, representing Allies and Partners, as well as countries from Asia and the Pacific, international organizations, and select academic institutions and think tanks. Together with Azerbaijani authorities, NATO

⁵⁶ Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_57218.htm (accessed 13 June 2012).

organized a workshop in Baku from 12 to 13 April on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

For the first time, NATO officials participated as observers in the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),⁵⁷ held in Geneva from 5 to 22 December. On 6 December, the NATO-Russia Council adopted a joint statement on the Seventh Review Conference, which confirmed the high value of the BWC and the work of the Review Conference, as well as the intention of the 29 States of the NATO-Russia Council to work to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and its universalization.

In accordance with its tradition, NATO also attended the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention held in The Hague from 28 November to 2 December.

At Lisbon, the Alliance also reaffirmed its commitment to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)⁵⁸ with all its elements. Allies actively engaged in talks with other CFE States parties in order to preserve, strengthen and modernize the CFE regime. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mine Action met on five occasions during the year, and its capstone event was a Structured Information Exchange to enhance opportunities for States to consult and coordinate on bilateral and multilateral SALW-related efforts.

The Alliance also continued to train national experts on arms control issues at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. In 2011, the school conducted nine courses (with a total of 217 participants) on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and confidence- and security-building measures.

Middle East

League of Arab States

During the year, the League of Arab States (LAS) held the twenty-ninth and thirtieth meetings of the Follow-up Committee on Israeli Nuclear Activities. The Committee coordinates Arab positions on different disarmament issues, especially those related to the IAEA and the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

⁵⁷ The full title is Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

⁵⁸ Treaty text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties>.

The LAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council adopted Resolution 7362 (Extraordinary Session—15/5/2011), entitled “United Arab position on practical steps to free the Middle East from nuclear weapons”, regarding the convening of the conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The resolution expressed concerns regarding the delays in appointing the facilitator and the host Government for the 2012 Conference. It also established a high-level official committee from the Arab Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the LAS to coordinate Arab positions and to follow-up on the preparations of the conference in 2012 on the Middle East.

The LAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council also adopted Resolution 7392 (Ordinary Session—13/9/2011), entitled “Threats of Israeli nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on international peace and Arab national security”. The resolution looked into Arab coordination at the fifty-fifth session of the IAEA General Conference and preparations for the conference in 2012 on the Middle East.

United Nations Development Programme

In 2011, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sought to ensure the linkage of small arms control to broader armed violence reduction programmes, including establishing rule of law and building better and stronger governance institutions. Its support included the strengthening of institutional capacities to respond to crime and violence and tackling the challenge of small arms proliferation.

In South Sudan, with technical support from UNDP, the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control became an active participant in the programme of the Regional Centre on Small Arms, with which it worked closely to define South Sudan’s State-level disarmament strategy. The Bureau is the principal national Government body on small arms and light weapons (SALW) control and is embedded in the Ministry of Interior. In Burundi, UNDP assisted in the development and adoption of the National Action Plan for 2011 to 2015 for the control and management of SALW and civilian disarmament. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the establishment of offices of the National Commission for Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons and for Armed Violence Reduction in four provinces was initiated with UNDP support. In addition, a five-year National Action Plan on the control of SALW was officially adopted on 9 July.

In Liberia, UNDP and the United Nations Mission in Liberia supported the efforts of the local government to collect and destroy 12 rifles, 3,708 rounds of ammunition and 156 unexploded ordnance after funding awareness campaigns on crime and armed violence reduction. In Kenya, UNDP strengthened the capacity of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms to coordinate weapons destruction in different regions. Additionally, 80,000

State-owned SALW were marked. In Côte d'Ivoire, following the electoral violence of late 2010 and 2011, UNDP engaged in boosting the capacity of the State agency dealing with small arms control.⁵⁹

In Nicaragua, with UNDP support, the police seized an increased number of illegal SALW (5,031 in the year). A national communications campaign was designed to prevent violence generated by the use of arms and to promote the control system. In Honduras, UNDP helped the Secretary of Security to develop a national plan on citizen security for 2011 to 2022, with a special focus on arms control. In El Salvador, with UNDP assistance, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, in coordination with local authorities and the National Police, started "gun-free zones" in April, banning the carrying of arms in the 20 most violent municipalities in the country.

In Papua New Guinea, UNDP strengthened coordination of gun control through the interministerial Gun Control Committee. The Government committed itself to the implementation of the National Gun Control Strategy as one of the line items in its 2012-2013 national budget.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNDP supported the destruction of 3,000 pieces of SALW, as well as the systematic disposal of thousands of pieces of ammunition. In Georgia, UNDP initiated the Georgia Ammunition Demilitarization and Community Security Programme in March in collaboration with relevant Government authorities. In Kosovo, the Government approved in August the National Community Safety Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2016, developed with UNDP as a key partner.

⁵⁹ The agency is called the National Commission to Combat Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms (ComNat).



Related
issues,
including
information
and outreach

CHAPTER V

Related issues, including information and outreach

In our increasingly interdependent world, weapons-related technologies and materials flow more readily and easily across borders. And, in such a world, the use of such weapons anywhere jeopardizes security everywhere.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL¹

Developments and trends, 2011

THE STALEMATE afflicting the United Nations disarmament machinery for more than a decade showed no sign of abatement in 2011. Both the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the negotiating and deliberative bodies of the United Nations, respectively, failed to make any headway, raising difficult questions about the way ahead.

The absence of a programme of work continued to paralyse the work of the CD on a range of issues, most notably a fissile missile cut-off treaty, while the UNDC ended its three-year cycle without reaching agreement at any of its three working groups, which were mandated to deal with: recommendations related to achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade; and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.

The impasse led not only to expressions of heightened frustration but also to a more intense debate about the problems besetting the disarmament machinery and what needs to be done to safeguard its future. While some delegations wanted urgent procedural changes to expedite the work of these bodies, others maintained that procedural reform would not necessarily lead to substantive progress because they believed that the crux of the problem was essentially of a political nature. Nevertheless, others felt that the time had come to seriously consider alternatives to relying wholly on the United Nations machinery to advance the global disarmament agenda.

The paralysis plaguing the CD and UNDC also received the focused attention of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.

¹ The Secretary-General's "Remarks to the Conference on Promoting the Global Instruments of Non-proliferation and Disarmament: The United Nations and the Nuclear Challenge", New York, 31 May 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13608.doc.htm> (accessed 19 June 2012).

Indeed, in 2011, the two annual sessions of the Board were preoccupied with the issue of revitalization of the United Nations disarmament machinery, particularly the CD. In its wide-ranging discussions on the subject, the idea of establishing a high-level panel of eminent persons was also broached.

An important development with regard to gender and disarmament was the ceremonial launching in February of UN-Women by the Secretary-General as part of a larger international drive to promote gender equality, empower women and seek an end to sexual violence. Later, in his annual report to the Security Council on women and peace and security,² the Secretary-General noted that while there was growing recognition of women's roles in peace and security, the levels of their participation in peace negotiations, preventative efforts and other key decision-making processes related to peace and security remained unacceptably low.

The relationship between disarmament and development continued to receive attention especially in the context of deliberations in the United Nations on an arms trade treaty and the implementation of the Programme of Action to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Concerns were expressed about the destabilizing effects of the easy availability of such weapons and their widespread misuse affecting both the stability and development potential of societies and regions.

For more information on the resolutions and decisions related to this chapter, refer to appendix VIII.

Disarmament machinery

The Conference on Disarmament is the undisputed home of international arms control efforts. However, the Conference's record of achievement has been overshadowed by inertia that has now lasted for more than a decade. The very credibility of this body is at risk. Continued inaction will only endanger its future as a multilateral negotiating forum.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL³

Conference on Disarmament, 2011

The year was once again marked by the failure to agree on a programme of work that would allow for the commencement of negotiations on any of the substantive items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). At the beginning of the session, many members were inclined to see this year's session as a "make or break" year for the Conference in view of the persisting

² S/2011/598.

³ Secretary-General's remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 26 January 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13367.doc.htm> (accessed 17 May 2012).

predicament over this issue. Among the most frustrated delegations, there seemed to be a readiness to take radical action should the year end without starting substantive work.

Following his address⁴ at the formal plenary meeting of the CD on 26 January, the United Nations Secretary-General held an informal meeting with all members and observer States. The Secretary-General's appeal to the Conference to start negotiations and his initiative in convening the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament held in September 2010 were widely supported. There were also positive reactions to the Secretary-General's idea of starting an informal process before initiating formal negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. In addition, many delegations welcomed the Secretary-General's suggestions at the High-level Meeting and his follow-up efforts, and looked forward to the work and recommendations of his Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, including the possible establishment of a high-level panel of eminent persons with a special focus on the functioning of the CD.

On 28 February, the President of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Joseph Deiss (Switzerland) delivered a statement⁵ in which he acknowledged the merit of having broad-based support for substantive work while also emphasizing that the rule of consensus should not be used to block such work. Referring to the High-level Meeting of September 2010, which was one of the recommendations of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he noted the Secretary-General's intention to breathe fresh life into the CD and stated that the General Assembly, as the founding body of the Conference, would be ready to contribute to the revitalization process.

In the absence of any prospects for an agreement on a programme of work, the first two Presidencies of the CD in 2011⁶—Canada and Chile—organized substantive discussions in plenary meetings, focusing on the four core issues (nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances). These efforts resulted in a high degree of engagement by members in thematic debates, creating a congenial atmosphere in the Conference. Many delegations acknowledged the usefulness of such discussions, even though they stressed that exchanges of views could not be a substitute for substantive work, i.e.,

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Available from [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/08C33AFF117B41A1C1257845004933EB?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/08C33AFF117B41A1C1257845004933EB?OpenDocument) (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁶ Successive Presidents of 2011 were as follows: Marius Grinius from Canada (24 January to 20 February), Pedro Oyarce from Chile (21 February to 20 March), Wang Qun from China (21 March to 1 April and 16 to 29 May), Alicia Victoria Arango Olmos from Colombia (30 May to 26 June), So Se Pyong from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (27 June to 1 July and 2 to 21 August) and Rodolfo Reyes Rodrigues from Cuba (22 August to 16 September).

negotiations. In addition, the Chilean presidency made an effort to commence negotiations through the exploration of innovative approaches.

The high-level segment of the 2011 session, held under the presidency of Pedro Oyarce (Chile), attracted a record number of 19 dignitaries, including the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, which helped to enhance the Conference's political profile.

On 19 April, the CD held an unprecedented formal plenary meeting during the intersessional period to bid farewell to the outgoing Secretary-General of the Conference, Sergei Ordzhonikidze. The new Secretary-General of the CD and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, assumed his functions on 19 May.

After lengthy procedural discussions,⁷ the substantive deliberations on the agenda items continued under the Chinese presidency, albeit in an informal setting.

As it became clear during the second part of the 2011 session that there were no prospects for the internal reform of the Conference, a large group of members began to focus attention on the follow-up to the High-level Meeting of September 2010.

Subsequently, at the request of 49 Member States, the General Assembly convened a plenary meeting on 27 July under agenda item 162, entitled "Follow-up to the high-level meeting held on 24 September 2010: revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations".

The Colombian presidency organized informal meetings to discuss the strengthening of the Conference and its future. To facilitate the discussions, Arango Olmos (Colombia) invited the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to make introductory presentations based on two questionnaires, prepared by the Colombian presidency with the help of UNIDIR, which were circulated in advance of each informal meeting.

In order to prepare for an exchange of views, which was held on 30 June, between the informal plenary of the CD and members of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the Colombian presidency also conducted a debate on the causes of the lack of productivity and the scope for internal reform.

Subsequent presidencies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Cuba⁸ also did not see any progress in bridging the existing political

⁷ From 21 March to 1 April and 16 to 29 May 2011.

⁸ An agreement was reached at the 1227th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament that Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would switch the order in which they served as President.

divergences. Furthermore, under the Cuban presidency, the CD finalized its 2011 report to the General Assembly.

Nuclear disarmament

In accordance with the schedules set by the three initial Presidents of 2011, debates on nuclear disarmament were held on 1 February under the presidency of Marius Grinius (Canada),⁹ on 24 February under the presidency of Pedro Oyarce (Chile)¹⁰ and on 29 March under the guidance of Kshenuka Senewiratne (Sri Lanka), the coordinator¹¹ of the item.

During these discussions, many States acknowledged that there was new momentum for nuclear disarmament, but the discussions again highlighted divergent views on this issue.

Members of the Group of 21 (G-21 States)¹² reiterated their call for the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD, as a matter of priority, to negotiate a phased programme of the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a fixed time frame or a nuclear weapons convention. In this context, several members recalled the United Nations Secretary-General's five-point plan on nuclear disarmament of October 2008.¹³

While committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, many other countries stressed the importance of taking gradual, pragmatic steps to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament, underscoring the need to implement the action plan contained in the Final Document¹⁴ of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In particular, these States focused on the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), as well as on transparency- and confidence-building measures, in order to make progress on nuclear disarmament.

Several nuclear-weapon States reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament and highlighted their achievements in this regard. However, a number of States criticized the nuclear-weapon States for their adherence to nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrines, and their refusal to engage in multilateral negotiations on disarmament, including in the CD. Numerous members stressed the importance of abolishing nuclear weapons, reiterating

⁹ CD/PV.1201.

¹⁰ CD/PV.1208.

¹¹ CD/1918.

¹² Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

¹³ Available from the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/sg5point.shtml> (accessed 16 May 2012).

¹⁴ NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vols. I-III). Available from <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/index.shtml> (accessed 16 May 2012).

that the complete elimination of all such weapons was the only guarantee against their use and proliferation.

Fissile materials

According to the schedules set by the three initial Presidents of 2011, debates on fissile materials were held on 3 February under the presidency of Marius Grinius,¹⁵ on 3 March under President Pedro Oyarce¹⁶ and on 17 and 18 May, under the guidance of Giovanni Manfredi (Italy) who was appointed coordinator¹⁷ of the item.

During the deliberations, delegations discussed issues such as definitions, verification and stockpiles, and many speakers made concrete proposals on how to move forward on these topics.

Numerous references were made during these sessions to the Shannon Report (CD/1299 of 24 March 1995) and to the Shannon Mandate contained therein, whose continued validity was not questioned.

The principles on which an FMCT should be based, in particular, that it should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively and internationally verifiable were reaffirmed.

The question of stockpiles was addressed in depth on various occasions during the informal meetings, confirming the opinion that, should negotiations begin, it would constitute one of the most contentious issues.

As in the past, some delegations insisted that the FMCT should limit itself to banning future production of fissile materials, while others reiterated the need to add at least a minimum of provisions regarding present stocks. In spite of this difference, however, it was generally understood that the question would inevitably surface during negotiations, and that the Shannon Mandate—as it stood—allowed this.

Considerable attention was also devoted to the topic of definition and verification. In general, the usefulness of basing definitions on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criteria and designing verification on its comprehensive safeguards system was recognized. Concerns were, however, expressed on the extra burden to the Agency's budget that this would entail. Hence, an FMCT would require financial assessment clauses in order to conclude a feasible and credible treaty, able to contribute both to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

During the first and second parts of the 2011 session of the Conference, Australia and Japan hosted three “experts side events”¹⁸ on various aspects of the proposed FMCT. In hosting these events, both States were motivated by the Secretary-General's call to the CD on 26 January for “a basic process to

¹⁵ CD/PV.1202.

¹⁶ CD/PV.1213.

¹⁷ CD/1907 and CD/1918.

¹⁸ CD/1906, CD/1909 and CD/1917.

educate each other and build trust which will inform and facilitate the formal process once the CD adopts its work programme". The Chairs considered that the side events met this call and achieved modest but useful results.

The side events offered the opportunity for CD delegations and experts from capitals to exchange views on a number of FMCT-related topics, notably definitions and verification concepts. The discussions benefited from the active participation of Bruno Pellaud (Switzerland) and representatives of the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Representatives of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR were also present at the side events.

The Chairman's reports of these side events were contained in documents CD/1906, CD/1909 and CD/1917.

Negative security assurances

According to the schedules set by the first three Presidents of 2011, debates on negative security assurances were held on 10 February under the presidency of Marius Grinius,¹⁹ on 10 March under the presidency of Pedro Oyarce²⁰ and on 19 May under the guidance of Fodé Seck (Senegal), the appointed coordinator²¹ of the item.

The discussions were similar to those held previously and basically reflected two groups with divergent positions—those who wanted a legally binding framework to be negotiated in the CD and others who wanted such assurances to be provided by all the nuclear-weapon States through established nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Members noted that statements made by the nuclear-weapon States on numerous occasions that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States were insufficient, given that the statements were unilateral, conditional and revocable.

Some delegations maintained that the assurances given in relation to nuclear-weapon-free zones were inadequate, conditional and geographically limited. Nevertheless, the creation of such zones in Africa, South-East Asia, Central Asia and South America, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, were recognized as important forward-looking steps.

It was also mentioned that granting negative security assurances would constitute a quid pro quo for States that renounced nuclear weapons and hence such assurances would help to combat proliferation. In that sense, granting legally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would

¹⁹ CD/PV.1204.

²⁰ CD/PV.1215.

²¹ CD/1907 and CD/1918.

be a confidence-building measure and a step towards the implementation by nuclear-weapon States of article VI of the NPT, relating to nuclear disarmament.

It was recalled that the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. It also reaffirmed the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States so as to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Reference was also made to the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), notably on the nuclear-weapon States' unilateral statements in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. They also gave such assurances to States parties to the relevant protocols established pursuant to nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognizing that treaty-based security assurances were available to such zones.

Agenda items 5 to 7

According to the schedules set by the three initial CD Presidents, debates on agenda item 5 on "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", item 6 on a "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" and item 7 on "Transparency in armaments" were held respectively on 17 February under the presidency of Marius Grinius,²² on 17 March under the presidency of Pedro Oyarce²³ and on 25 May under the guidance of Mikhail Khvostov (Belarus), who was appointed coordinator²⁴ of the items.

While there was limited interest in these clustered issues, as witnessed in previous years, members nevertheless noted the importance of keeping the opportunity open for future discussions in the Conference. During the discussion on the three agenda items, the delegations made use of the opportunity to update and revalidate their positions.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

In accordance with the schedules set by the three initial Presidents, debates on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) were held on 8 February under the presidency of Marius Grinius,²⁵ on 8 March under the

²² CD/PV.1206.

²³ CD/PV.1216.

²⁴ CD/1907 and CD/1918.

²⁵ CD/PV.1203.

presidency of Pedro Oyarce²⁶ and on 31 March under the guidance of Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares (Brazil), the coordinator²⁷ of the item.

Many delegations highlighted the growing global dependence on space technologies and the importance of keeping outer space safe for peaceful activities. They discussed the increase of space debris, the growing possibility of satellite collisions and the development of space-related weapon technology that threatens outer space security.

Delegations believed that outer space should be used solely for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all States and should not become an arena for competitive strategic policies. Some referred to outer space as a common heritage of humankind. Most member States expressed fear that the placement of weapons in outer space could deepen global insecurity, affecting all countries.

There was a general recognition that current international instruments were not sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. Many delegations maintained that a specific international legal instrument was needed to strengthen or complement existing regimes.

Since different organizations were regulating the use of outer space, member States stressed the importance of compatibility among instruments and coordination between the CD and other bodies, such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the International Telecommunications Union and the United Nations General Assembly. Cooperation and exchange of information among these bodies was emphasized.

Many member States of the CD believed PAROS to be an issue falling within the Conference's thematic competence and hence was a topic that it could legitimately consider. In this regard, most delegations reiterated their support for a programme of work of the CD that would initiate negotiations or substantive discussions on PAROS.

United Nations Disarmament Commission, 2011

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) met at United Nations Headquarters from 4 to 21 April, under the chairmanship of Hamid Al-Bayati (Iraq). During the course of its annual session, it held eight plenary meetings.²⁸ In accordance with the past practice of the Commission, interested non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings.

On 4 and 5 April, the UNDC held a general exchange of views on all agenda items,²⁹ which included the following subjects: "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of

²⁶ CD/PV.1214.

²⁷ CD/1907 and CD/1918.

²⁸ A/CN.10/PV.310-317.

²⁹ A/CN.10/PV.310-313.

nuclear weapons”; “Elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade”; and “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”.

At the first plenary meeting on 4 April, the Commission heard the statement³⁰ of the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs who expressed hope that the UNDC, which was now approaching the end of its current three-year cycle, would be able to achieve consensus on each agenda item, despite past frustrations. At the same time, he said, “the ultimate responsibility for the fate of disarmament initiatives lies at the doorsteps of our Member States, whose policies, priorities, and sheer persistence will shape the contours of our world to come, for better or worse”.

In his opening statement,³¹ the Chairman of the UNDC stated that “obstacles and difficulties are inherent in trying to reach agreement through consensus”, yet he believed that “finding solutions to overcome such difficulties should be possible, considering the widespread agreement that exists on the importance of the issues before the Commission”. He underscored the urgency of demonstrating “the political will needed to restore the credibility of the disarmament machinery”.

During the general exchange of views,³² the delegations underlined the need to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, to reduce nuclear warheads and to allow non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT³³ to exercise their legitimate right to participate in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination.

Many delegations hoped that the work previously done in the current three-year cycle would enable the UNDC to reach a positive conclusion. They also reaffirmed the primacy of the United Nations disarmament machinery while some others expressed concern at the slow pace of progress and suggested its revitalization.

Hungary, on behalf of the European Union (EU), stressed that the danger posed by non-State actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery was one of the greatest threats to the international

³⁰ See A/CN.10/PV.310.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² The representatives of the following countries made statements during the general exchange of views: Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile (on behalf of the Rio Group), China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Hungary (on behalf of the European Union), India, Indonesia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Nepal, Nigeria, Nigeria (on behalf of the Group of African States), Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam. See A/CN.10/PV.310-313.

³³ The text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

community. It reiterated that the NPT remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. The EU also remained committed to the full implementation of the understandings reached at the 1995 NPT Review Conference concerning the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means in the Middle East.

The EU underlined the need to devote adequate attention to conventional weapons, including the full implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action³⁴ against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as it had done during the current three-year cycle in the UNDC. It also stressed that transparency in military matters was a major confidence-building measure and that it remained committed to the Mine Ban Convention.³⁵ In addition, the EU supported the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, as well as strong international responses to the humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions.

Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed concern over the slow progress in nuclear disarmament and urged particularly the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their disarmament and non-proliferation pledges and obligations simultaneously in all their aspects.³⁶ The NAM maintained that the CD was the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and reiterated its position for a balanced and comprehensive programme of work and early negotiations in the CD on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the NAM also called for vigorous efforts for the early conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, it reaffirmed the “inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”.

The NAM referred to its draft proposal to Working Group I of the UNDC on achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)³⁷ and it also expressed deep concern that a fourth

³⁴ The full title is Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. A/CONF.192/15. Available from <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx> (accessed 16 May 2012).

³⁵ The treaty's full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

³⁶ A/CN.10/PV.310. See also the summarized version of statements by delegations in the press release of the Department for Public Information, New York, 4 April 2011, available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/dc3288.doc.htm> (accessed 17 May 2012).

³⁷ The text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had yet to be convened. At the same time, the Movement reaffirmed the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms for their self-defence and security needs.

The United States underscored continued progress towards the challenging tasks of strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, reducing nuclear warheads, preventing access to nuclear materials by terrorists and expanding peaceful nuclear cooperation. It highlighted the urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT and commencement of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The United States favoured a flexible approach in the UNDC in order to resolve procedural matters and facilitate substantive outcomes. It advocated extracting from previous efforts only those broadly agreed elements that had the best chance of commanding consensus.

China stressed that global interdependence called for States to embrace a new security concept featuring “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination”. It advocated political and diplomatic means to resolve hot-spot issues confronting the international community in the “complicated and volatile” area of nuclear non-proliferation. It also advocated enhancing the universality, authority and effectiveness of the NPT, and the functioning of IAEA, while also acknowledging the legitimate rights of each State to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and ensuring impartiality and non-discrimination in international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation.

Japan advocated a concise and well-balanced approach to a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, stressing the importance of early entry into force of the CTBT and believing that negotiations on an FMCT was the next logical and critical step. On conventional weapons issues, it highlighted the confidence-building role of the arms transparency instruments of the United Nations, the importance of further strengthening the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and accelerating efforts towards an arms trade treaty.

Chile, on behalf of the Rio Group, advocated the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame and the full implementation of the NPT on a non-selective basis as well as the right to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It also supported nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, and the early entry into force of the CTBT. In addition, it wanted a road map to nuclear disarmament to be a key element in the proposed declaration of the fourth disarmament decade.

Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, aligned itself with the statement of the NAM. It called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner and advocated unconditional negative security assurances in a legally binding instrument. Nigeria also called for the early entry into force of the CTBT, the ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty protocols³⁸ by all the nuclear Powers and more effective implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

Brazil maintained that the nuclear deterrence concept, created during the cold war, had lost its strategic significance and was no longer crucial for military purposes and that the time was ripe to begin negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Until such time, it advocated negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It also supported negotiations for a verifiable FMCT. Brazil wanted the proposed declaration of the fourth disarmament decade to include the holding of a fourth special session on disarmament and also relevant issues in the field of conventional weapons, including practical confidence-building measures.

Pakistan, aligning itself with the NAM, expressed concern over the widening gap between the major Powers and smaller States resulting from the development of anti-ballistic missile systems, militarization of outer space, build-up of conventional forces by the major Powers, and the erosion of nuclear security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It also maintained that no State could be expected to engage in disarmament, arms control or non-proliferation negotiations if those negotiations undermined its core security interests.

Report of the Commission (A/66/42)

At its organizational session held on 28 March, the UNDC adopted the agenda³⁹ for its 2011 substantive session, and in accordance with that decision, it established three working groups to carry out its substantive work.

Working Group I was given the mandate to deal with agenda item 4 entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”. It was chaired by Knut Langeland (Norway) and held seven meetings from 7 to 14 April.

The Commission entrusted Working Group II with the task of dealing with agenda item 5 entitled “Elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade”. It was chaired by Kayode Laro (Nigeria) and seven meetings were held, on 6 April and from 8 to 14 April.

Working Group III was allocated agenda item 6 entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”. It was

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ A/CN.10/L.65.

chaired by Liseth Ancidey (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and held seven meetings from 15 to 20 April.

Working Group I had before it a working paper⁴⁰ submitted by the Chair of that Group at its 2008 session as well as a working paper⁴¹ presented by the NAM at the 2010 session. The Group held discussions on the topics suggested by the Chair in his personal capacity, during which members made various proposals. The Chair also circulated a non-paper, under his own responsibility, to facilitate discussions. In addition, delegations made various proposals to find agreed language to bridge their respective positions but were unable to achieve a consensus. On 14 April, Working Group I agreed on a procedural report, which it adopted by consensus.

Working Group II had before it a non-paper⁴² circulated by the Chair, pursuant to a decision at its 2010 session. The non-paper included proposals made by delegations during the 2010 session. After a preliminary reading of the non-paper, the Chair circulated a revised non-paper that incorporated proposals put forward by the delegations. At the same time, the Chair introduced his own non-paper without prejudice to the position of any delegation. Following an exchange of views, the Group was, however, unable to reach agreement. On 14 April, Working Group II adopted a procedural report by consensus.

Working Group III had before it A/CN.10/2008/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2 and a non-paper prepared and circulated by the Chair, under her own responsibility, to facilitate discussion, without prejudice to the position of any delegation. After discussion and deliberation, the non-paper was further revised in the light of additional proposals by delegations, but failed to bridge the respective positions of delegations. On 20 April, Working Group III adopted its procedural report by consensus.

In the concluding session of the UNDC, a number of delegations stressed the importance of revitalizing the disarmament machinery in order to achieve better results in future deliberations while some delegations emphasized the primacy of the disarmament machinery and the need to work within its existing framework for seeking progress in the disarmament field.

In presenting the draft report, the Rapporteur of the Commission, Dadjedji Hervé Djokpe (Benin), remarked that the inability of the working groups to adopt outcome documents by consensus was a reflection “of the complexity of the issues at hand, and not of insufficient efforts made by delegations”.⁴³

⁴⁰ A/CN.10/2008/WG.I/WP.1/Rev.1.

⁴¹ A/CN.10/2010/WG.I/WP.1.

⁴² A/CN.10/2009/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2.

⁴³ A/CN.10/PV.317.

In his concluding remarks, the Chair of the UNDC expressed his belief that the non-papers presented in the working groups had provided “a good basis for reaching consensus in future deliberations”. He also observed that the Commission’s method of work had been raised as an issue on a number of occasions by many delegations and he believed that “future sessions of the Commission should devote a certain amount of time to discuss it”.⁴⁴

On 21 April, the UNDC adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies, the conclusions contained therein and its report, as a whole, to be presented to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session.

Terrorism and disarmament

Concerted international cooperation and action remains vital to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery to terrorists and other non-State actors.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL⁴⁵

Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism

In 2011, several preparatory meetings were convened in advance of the second Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in Seoul from 26 to 27 March 2012. These meetings took place in Vienna (March), Seoul (June) and Helsinki (October) to deal, inter alia, with the preparation of a concluding document⁴⁶ for the 2012 Summit. In the Final Communiqué⁴⁷ adopted at the first Summit in Washington, D.C., in April 2010, the participating leaders of 47 States and 3 international organizations had stated that “nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials”. The 2012 Summit will focus on cooperative measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, protection of nuclear materials and related facilities, and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

On 22 September, the United Nations Secretary-General convened and chaired a High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security. The meeting

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Secretary-General’s statement, “Secretary-General Welcomes Mandate Extension for Security Council’s 1540 Committee”, New York, 26 April 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13527.doc.htm> (accessed 17 May 2012).

⁴⁶ Available from http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/userfiles/Seoul%20Communique_FINAL.pdf (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁷ United States, Office of the Press Secretary, “Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit”, 13 April 2010. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/communiqu-washington-nuclear-security-summit> (accessed 16 May 2012).

focused on strengthening nuclear safety and security, especially in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and on building high-level political support and momentum for further strengthening international efforts in this connection.

In his statement,⁴⁸ the Secretary-General stressed the need to focus on the nexus between safety and security, in order to ensure that any deliberate attack against nuclear facilities or nuclear materials would not have catastrophic consequences. As the depositary of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Secretary-General reiterated his invitation to States that were not yet parties to the Convention to join the treaty and further called upon the States parties to consider ways to promote the ratification and implementation of the Convention in 2012, which would mark the fifth year of its entry into force. Participants to the High-level Meeting expressed heightened interest in addressing the nexus between nuclear safety and security, as well as in taking account of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident regarding the potential vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants.

In August, the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks, which operates under the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and supports the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,⁴⁹ published a report entitled “Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials”.⁵⁰

This report complemented that of the Working Group of 2010 on inter-agency coordination in the event of a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological materials. The 2011 report included key findings and recommendations addressing the prevention and preparedness, as well as the actions of the United Nations and other international entities, in response to terrorist attacks using chemical or biological weapons or materials. It concluded that “while no one agency is responsible for preparing or responding to a terrorist attack using chemical or biological weapons, there are a number of United Nations entities and international organizations that address specific aspects of the threat”.

In resolution 66/50 of 2 December 2011 (see also appendix VIII), the General Assembly expressed deep concern over “the growing risk of linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and in particular by the

⁴⁸ Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, remarks to the opening session of the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, New York, 22 September 2011. Available from http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1312 (accessed 18 May 2012).

⁴⁹ General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006.

⁵⁰ Available from http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_wmd_working_group_report_interagency_2011.pdf (accessed 20 January 2012).

fact that terrorists may seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction”. The Assembly acknowledged “the urgent need for addressing, within the United Nations framework and through international cooperation, this threat to humanity” and it also encouraged “cooperation between and among Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in this regard”.

Contribution to global anti-terrorism (OPCW)

The Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to support anti-terrorism efforts within the framework of its mandate, including through institutional cooperation with the United Nations and by promoting the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁵¹ The Technical Secretariat also encouraged States parties to exchange experiences and discuss issues relevant to anti-terrorism efforts in this context.

The Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism of the OPCW Executive Council continued to serve as a forum for sharing information and best practices among member States, as well as for promoting the Organisation’s contribution to the global efforts against terrorism. The Working Group is supported by the Technical Secretariat of OPCW.

Chemical safety and security

From 11 to 12 April, OPCW organized a seminar on the subject of “OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-proliferation”, which was held in The Hague. The seminar provided an opportunity for an exchange of information on best practices on safety and security at chemical plants and in transportation, including their relationship to an effective anti-terrorism framework.

From 12 to 13 September, the OPCW Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security served as the Organisation’s contribution to mark 2011 as the International Year of Chemistry. The Conference underscored the critical importance of the use of chemistry for exclusively peaceful purposes and further strengthened support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Over 400 participants from 29 countries participated in the Conference, which provided further evidence of the strong commitment of the OPCW States parties to the goals of the Convention.

⁵¹ The full title of the treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The text and adherence status are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

Cooperation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

OPCW actively supported the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including by co-chairing the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. The Organisation hosted a meeting of the Working Group from 16 to 17 May to share experiences and information on existing inter-agency mechanisms and mandates. (For more information, see p. 170.)

Cooperation in promoting the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

The OPCW Secretariat maintained regular contact with the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Experts of the 1540 Committee participated in a series of new programme activities of OPCW aimed at building national and regional capacities in the area of prevention of, preparedness for and response to incidents involving the misuse or release of toxic chemicals, as well as incidents involving chemical safety and security.

Terrorism and disarmament (IAEA)

In resolution 10 of 23 September entitled “Nuclear security”,⁵² the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took note of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), United Nations General Assembly resolution 65/62 of 8 December 2010, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and international efforts aimed at preventing access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related materials. In this connection, it recalled General Assembly resolution 65/62 (para. 2), which stated that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism, and acknowledged the need to make further progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament. All IAEA member States were encouraged to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism if they had not yet done so.⁵³

The General Conference noted the Agency’s leading role in the field of nuclear security, as well as its central role in developing comprehensive nuclear security guidance documents and, upon request, in providing assistance to member States in their implementation. The Conference also

⁵² IAEA, document GC(55)/RES/10. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/GC55Resolutions/English/gc55res-10_en.pdf (accessed 17 May 2012).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

called upon all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encouraged them to act in accordance with the objectives and purposes of the amendment until it enters into force. It encouraged all member States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and to adopt its amendment as soon as possible.

The Conference recognized the Secretariat's continued coordination with its member States and its constructive and coordinated role in nuclear security-related initiatives, inter alia, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It encouraged the Secretariat to continue working jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations.⁵⁴ The Secretariat was further invited to provide assistance to its member States, upon request, in fulfilling their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and to the 1540 Committee, provided that the requests were within the scope of the Agency's statutory responsibilities.⁵⁵

Relationship between disarmament and development

In 2011, progress continued to be made towards strengthening the central role of the United Nations system in highlighting the relationship between disarmament and development, as stressed by the General Assembly in paragraph 1 of resolution 65/52 of 8 December 2010.

The Organization, through its existing coordination mechanisms—such as the United Nations Mine Action Team, the Coordinating Action on Small Arms and the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration—was able to ensure that the relationship between disarmament and development was adequately and effectively addressed through the involvement of relevant actors from within the United Nations system.

In paragraphs 6 and 7 of its resolution 65/52, the General Assembly reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

The replies received from the Governments of Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Lebanon, Mexico, Portugal, Qatar, Ukraine and Zambia are contained in the Secretary-General's report⁵⁶ on the subject.

⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 9.

⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 11.

⁵⁶ A/66/168.

On 11 February, the Security Council held an open debate on the interdependence of security and development and in a presidential statement issued after that debate, the Council noted “that successful implementation of the many tasks that peacekeeping operations could be mandated to undertake in the areas of security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; rule of law; and human rights requires an understanding of ... the close interlinkage between security and development”.⁵⁷ On 19 April 2011, the Council considered the Secretary-General’s report on small arms,⁵⁸ which drew attention to the interconnection between armed violence and development.

In May, the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in New York. In that meeting, the relationship between disarmament and development was discussed particularly during the debate on the subject of international assistance and capacity-building. Notably, special emphasis was placed on the need to improve the implementation capacity of States to enable them to effectively trace illegal arms back to their point of diversion, thus contributing to safer and more secure communities.

The United Nations also improved its ability to deliver effective policy, programming and advice—to its own agencies, to funds and programmes working in the field, and to Member States—on curbing the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Efforts to develop a set of International Small Arms Control Standards and international ammunition technical guidelines were under way (the latter in response to paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 63/61 of 2 December 2008). Both will complement the existing Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards and the International Mine Action Standards.

Within the framework of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development,⁵⁹ the United Nations also organized two events in 2011 as part of an ongoing series of regional seminars: in Nairobi from 23 to 25 February and in Kathmandu from 16 to 18 March. These seminars fostered discussions and experience-sharing at the regional level, assessed the progress of implementation of armed violence reduction programmes, and identified promising and innovative practices. They were part of the preparations for the second Ministerial Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration that was held in Geneva from 31 October to 1 November. The Review Conference, which was hosted by the Government of Switzerland and the United

⁵⁷ S/PRST/2011/4.

⁵⁸ S/2011/255.

⁵⁹ Available from <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-Declaration-091020-EN.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2012).

Nations Development Programme, reaffirmed in its Outcome Document⁶⁰ the commitment of the 112 signatory States⁶¹ to promote the reduction and prevention of armed violence as a necessary part of their development programmes.⁶²

At the second and third sessions⁶³ of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to be held in 2012, the negative impact of unregulated arms transfers on security, development and human rights was a recurring point of discussion in these preparatory sessions.

The Group of Governmental Experts established in 2010 to review the operation and further development of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures completed its work and submitted its report⁶⁴ in 2011. The standardized reporting instrument seeks and receives information from Member States on their national military expenditures on a voluntary basis and one of its underlying objectives is to encourage restraint in military spending.

Gender and disarmament

Women hold up more than half the sky and represent much of the world's unrealized potential. ... We need their full engagement—in government, business and civil society. And this year, for the first time, we have UN Women—our own unique and powerful engine for dynamic change.

BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL⁶⁵

The protection of women and girls from violence and their involvement in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and the peacebuilding process underscore the importance of gender equality and women's empowerment. The United Nations Security Council's landmark resolution 1325 (2000) encouraged "all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants" (para. 13). This was

⁶⁰ Available from <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/gdrevcon2011/gdrevcon2011/outcome-document.html> (accessed 17 May 2012).

⁶¹ Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, "Who has signed it?" Available from <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration/who-has-signed-it.html> (accessed 17 May 2012).

⁶² Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, "GD Review Conference 2011: Reduce armed violence, enable development". Available from <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/gdrevcon2011/gdrevcon2011.html> (accessed 17 May 2012).

⁶³ The sessions were held in New York in 2011.

⁶⁴ A/66/89 and Corr.1-3.

⁶⁵ See Secretary-General's remarks to the General Assembly, New York, 21 September 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13823.doc.htm> (accessed 17 May 2012).

followed 10 years later by United Nations General Assembly resolution 65/69 of 8 December 2010 entitled “Women, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation”, which formally addressed the vital links between women and disarmament and encouraged Member States and other organizations “to ensure equitable representation of women at all decision-making levels, in particular in the security sector, which may make or influence policy with regard to matters related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation”.

In 2011, UN-Women focused on increasing women’s participation in governance bodies, including in arms control mechanisms, promoting the use of gender perspectives in policy development, strengthening the protection of women affected by armed, sexual and gender-based violence, and amplifying calls for accountability and advanced gender equality. During the year, there were several initiatives that merit highlighting.

As a part of the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, UN-Women continued to support the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.

At the country level, UN-Women supported and highlighted the importance of women’s leadership in peacebuilding, including in arms control mechanisms and processes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and for security sector reform.

At the global level, UN-Women pursued their advocacy for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions (1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010)) in all aspects of its work, including through knowledge-building activities related to the forthcoming negotiations of an arms trade treaty in 2012.

As requested by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 26 October 2010,⁶⁶ made on the tenth anniversary of its landmark resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, the Secretary-General continued to submit his annual report on the implementation of that resolution.

In his report of 29 September,⁶⁷ the Secretary-General listed a number of priorities, that included: (a) the need for accountability for results and improved coordination of implementation; (b) the need to strengthen women’s participation and leadership in conflict prevention, resolution and long-term peacebuilding; (c) the need for a more effective justice and security environment for women and girls during and after conflict; and (d) the need to increase resources for all aspects of the women and peace and security agenda.

The report also mentioned the creation of UN-Women as one of the most significant institutional developments with regard to women and peace and

⁶⁶ S/PRST/2010/22.

⁶⁷ S/2011/598.

security. An important part of its role is to leverage the entire United Nations system to ensure accelerated implementation of all resolutions on women and peace and security. The report also referred to other gender-related developments in 2011.

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations continued to encourage measures to ensure women's participation in peace processes, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, as well as in post-conflict public institutions, by including the provision of gender expertise.

The report indicated a significant increase from the previous year in the number of Governments that had adopted national action plans to implement their commitments relating to women and peace and security. A number of additional countries were in advanced stages of finalizing their national action plans.

In February, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs signed a memorandum of understanding with the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) that included mainstreaming gender and diversity in the fields of arms control, disarmament, peace and security as one of the areas of cooperation. In addition, renewed attention was given to the participation of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control decision-making at the intergovernmental level with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/69.

In April, women ambassadors from Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland and Kenya, who were accredited to the African Union, undertook a mission to the Sudan to encourage the continued engagement of women in efforts to secure and sustain peace.

In 2011, in connection with United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) assisted the Togolese Government with the elaboration and adoption of three documents: (a) training curricula for the armed forces including gender issues; (b) a gender policy for national defence and security forces; and (c) the National Action Plan on the role of Togolese women in promoting security and peaceful conflict resolution. UNREC also assisted the Togolese national authorities in the implementation of the National Action Plan through media awareness activities and embarked on a draft United Nations country team joint programme to prevent gender-based violence in Togo.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) collaborated with IANSA and the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation for the second consecutive year in organizing specialized training for women on small arms control issues. Its regional training participants ranged from security sector personnel in the Andean region to civil society organizations in South

America. Participants enhanced their understanding of the impact of SALW on women's lives and identified how their work on gender and sexual violence could be linked to international firearms instruments and the world campaign against armed violence.

UNLIREC also collaborated with the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force of the United Nations by providing input to the United Nations Interim Guidance Note module on gender-responsive security sector reform. UNLIREC recommended that legal norms and regulations on small arms include a "do no harm approach" in order to facilitate the inclusion of gender perspectives and responses to the different needs of men, women, boys, and girls, and in particular, to provide effective protection from and responses to gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific contributed to the discussions of the Peace Support Working Group on United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), which took place in Nepal. In February, the Government of Nepal endorsed a National Action Plan on the implementation of those resolutions, making Nepal the second country in Asia, and the twenty-fourth worldwide, to adopt such a plan.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its fifty-fifth session in New York from 23 to 25 February and its fifty-sixth session in Geneva from 29 June to 1 July. During both its sessions, the Secretary-General requested the Board to focus its deliberations on issues raised at the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations, which had been held at United Nations Headquarters on 24 September 2010. Consequently, the Board had an in-depth exchange of views on those issues, including the possible establishment of a high-level panel of eminent persons with a special focus on the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

In July, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly summarizing the Advisory Board's deliberations and recommendations (for a list of members of the Board, see annex I to this chapter).⁶⁸

The Board recommended that the Secretary-General continue to encourage the CD to engage in all efforts to achieve a breakthrough in the continuing impasse. In this regard, the Board suggested that the Secretary-General may consider encouraging progress on a programme of work that

⁶⁸ A/66/125.

would facilitate work on the four core issues based on the consensus reached in document CD/1864.

The Board also recommended that should a high-level panel of eminent persons be established, the Secretary-General should ask the panel as an urgent task to make recommendations on the way to revitalize the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole, especially the CD. In this connection, the Board suggested that the Secretary-General may wish to consider establishing an institutional link between the Advisory Board and the proposed high-level panel by inviting one or more current or former Board members to be part of the proposed panel.

Another recommendation by the Board was that the Secretary-General should continue to raise public awareness and encourage civil society groups and non-governmental organizations to contribute their ideas on ways to overcome the stalemate at the CD and facilitate progress towards the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

During the discussion among its members, the Board considered the prolonged deadlock in the Conference. Most members expressed growing frustration over that body's inability to move forward. The Board considered that the root cause of the stagnation in the CD could be attributed to both political and procedural problems. However, different views were expressed on the nature of the problem and its possible solution.

It was generally agreed that a lack of political will was a more fundamental matter than the technical issues being faced by the CD. It was also posited that changing the method of work of the CD may not necessarily make that body more efficient. Nevertheless, some of the procedural issues and the CD method of work received attention. Views also differed on how the Conference could be made more efficient, including the idea of changing the dynamic between that body and the General Assembly. It was generally agreed that the CD remained a valuable forum where States could articulate their positions.

Different views were also expressed on the issue of a fissile missile cut-off treaty (FMCT), including the idea of parallel negotiation under the General Assembly's oversight. At the same time, it was recognized that an FMCT was an international security-related issue that was quite different from some of the procedural problems being faced by the CD. The Board also considered an FMCT to be a priority issue, while recognizing the importance of other core issues such the peaceful uses of outer space and negative security assurances.

Similarly, views differed on various issues related to establishing a high-level panel of experts, including its size, composition and effectiveness in fulfilling its proposed purpose. Nevertheless, the desirability of an

institutional link between the Board and a possible high-level panel was widely recognized by the Board members.

The continuing deadlock in the CD also heightened interest in the role of civil society and non-governmental organizations in the disarmament process, particularly with a view to pressing the CD to move forward on nuclear disarmament issues.

As the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Board formally adopted the Institute's 2011 programme of work and budget⁶⁹ and approved the submission of the Institute's report to the General Assembly. It also recommended the continuing subvention from the United Nations regular budget for the biennium 2012-2013. In addition, the Board continued to urge the Secretary-General to use all the influence at his disposal to secure the Institute's increased subvention in the regular budget of the United Nations.

Disarmament information and outreach

Disarmament studies by experts groups

By its resolution 65/64 of 8 December 2010, the General Assembly decided to convene an open-ended meeting of governmental experts on the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects⁷⁰ at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 9 to 13 May.

The Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts addressed key implementation challenges and opportunities relating to particular issues and themes, including international cooperation and assistance, and adopted its report⁷¹ by consensus on 13 May. (See also pp. 74-76.)

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 62/13 of 5 December 2007, the Secretary-General established a group of governmental experts in 2010 to review the operation and further development of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. The Group, which held three sessions,⁷² completed its work in May and transmitted its report⁷³ to the General Assembly on 14 June. In the report, the Group concluded that transparency in military expenditures remained an essential

⁶⁹ See A/65/177.

⁷⁰ See also the website of the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts, <http://www.poa-iss.org/MGE/> (accessed 11 May 2012).

⁷¹ A/CONF.192/MGE/2011/1.

⁷² The first session was held in Geneva, from 8 to 12 November 2010, and the following two in New York, from 7 to 11 February and from 9 to 13 May 2011, respectively.

⁷³ A/66/89 and Corr.1-3.

element for building trust and confidence among States and helped to relieve international tensions. (See also pp. 83-84.)

Disarmament and non-proliferation education

In its resolution 65/77 of 8 December 2010 entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”, the General Assembly welcomed the report of the Secretary-General⁷⁴ on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.⁷⁵ The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations and possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to submit the report to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

In accordance with relevant provisions of the General Assembly resolution 65/311 of 19 July 2011 on multilingualism, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) relaunched the disarmament education website (www.un.org/disarmament/education) in September in all six official languages of the United Nations. Since 2007, UNODA has been updating the website, featuring disarmament education materials from the United Nations, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations, including a section for use in the classroom by teachers and students.

UNODA also launched “Disarmament Today”,⁷⁶ a series of podcasts in which experts are interviewed about present-day disarmament issues. In 2011, these discussions included topics such as the status of disarmament and non-proliferation education, disarmament and non-proliferation in the context of space security, and the story of an atomic bomb survivor who became a peace activist. In December, UNODA created a dedicated web page focusing on atomic bomb survivors or hibakusha.⁷⁷

A number of new interactive presentations were added to the disarmament education website,⁷⁸ including, inter alia, the Disarmament Treaties Timeline from 1946-2011; the International Day against Nuclear Tests, 29 August; the Convention on Cluster Munitions;⁷⁹ Transparency in the Global Arms Trade; Focus on Armed Violence; and the Biological Weapons Convention.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ A/65/160.

⁷⁵ A/57/124.

⁷⁶ Available from the UNODA disarmament education website, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/podcasts/>.

⁷⁷ Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/hibakusha/>.

⁷⁸ Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/presentations/>.

⁷⁹ The text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

Print and e-publications

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* is the flagship publication of the UNODA. It is distributed worldwide to United Nations libraries, its depository library system, United Nations Information Centres, permanent missions to the United Nations, regional commissions and parliamentary libraries. It is also disseminated widely, mainly in the developing world, to research institutes, organizations and individuals. The searchable electronic version of the Yearbook is easily accessible at the UNODA website.⁸¹

UNODA publications are part of the information and outreach activities of UNODA (for a list of 2011 UNODA publications, see also annex II to this chapter).⁸² In addition to the *Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 35 (Parts I and II): 2010, an Occasional Paper was released in 2011: *Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End-Use and End-User Control Systems* (No. 21, December 2011).⁸³ The study assessed existing practices regarding end-user certification in a wide range of countries and endeavoured to identify political and practical obstacles to the development of an international framework for authentication, reconciliation and standardization of end-user certificates. It also proposed practical guidelines to assist States in the development of a reliable system of end-user certification. It was commissioned by the UNODA and funded by the Government of Sweden.

In January, UNODA also published a booklet entitled *Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons*⁸⁴ as part of the Critical Disarmament Issues series that has been produced in cooperation with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. This publication was based on a panel discussion held on 6 December 2010 and contains extensive material generated by meetings related to the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme. An electronic version of the booklet is also available online.

In December, UNODA also released Disarmament Study Series No. 33⁸⁵ on the subject of developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. The series highlights General Assembly studies undertaken by groups of governmental experts, which are packaged in an attractive form for wider dissemination and future reference.

⁸¹ Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/Yearbook/>.

⁸² Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/index.shtml>.

⁸³ Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP21.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/DELEGITIMIZING_NUCLEAR_WEAPONS.pdf.

⁸⁵ Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS_33.pdf.

In December, the Office published a booklet entitled *Disarmament: A Basic Guide*⁸⁶ in collaboration with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security pursuant to the purposes of the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme. It was an update of an earlier version from September 2009. The guide aims to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action, and support for it, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. While intended for the general reader, it is also useful for the disarmament educator or trainer. It is available in English and an electronic version is available online. The Office has been seeking partners to translate the guide into as many languages as possible.

UNODA also embarked on making all of its publications eventually available in electronic and downloadable formats. A new development was the availability of some of its publications as “e-books”,⁸⁷ which can be purchased from a number of commercial retailers and downloaded to an “e-reader” portable device.

The Office continued to publish, through e-mail and its website, the *UNODA Update*.⁸⁸ This quarterly e-publication highlights events and activities of UNODA and other disarmament forums, and provides links to fuller material and documents.

In addition to the *UNODA Update*, the Office also continued to regularly send out other e-mail announcements to a list of recipients which included: permanent and observer missions to the United Nations; United Nations funds, programmes and specialized agencies; international and regional organizations; research institutes; non-governmental organizations; experts; and individuals. In 2011, such e-mail announcements were sent out to over 3,000 recipients.

Website

The UNODA website (www.un.org/disarmament) remains one of the principal tools for information and outreach to many different stakeholders in the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control community. In 2011, the website received 244,346 visits from 116,039 unique visitors. The top users of the website, measured by time spent, were Government agencies (mainly ministries of foreign affairs), educational institutions and non-governmental organizations.

⁸⁶ Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/Basic_Guide-2011-web-Rev1.pdf.

⁸⁷ The *Disarmament: A Basic Guide* and the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 34 (Parts I and II): 2009, are available in e-book format for Amazon Kindle and Barnes and Noble Nook and from iBookstore for Apple devices. The 2009 *Disarmament Yearbook* is also available from the Sony Reader Store.

⁸⁸ Available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/ODAUpdate/>.

Following the revamping of its website in 2010 to include a new archive of disarmament-related videos as part of the disarmament education site, in April 2011, UNODA announced an updated home page with a new layout, new features and a new interactive slideshow.

The layout includes a new UNODA banner, an easy to navigate horizontal “dropdown” menu for weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms and regional disarmament, as well as a new and improved calendar for the latest disarmament-related meetings and events. Among the new features of the website is the Spotlight feature, providing the latest United Nations disarmament news with immediate updates, and a Twitter and RSS service reflecting the latest content of the Spotlight section of the home page.

Exhibitions

The inauguration of the “Cities are not targets (CANT)” exhibit at the Permanent Disarmament Exhibit at the United Nations Headquarters in New York took place on 24 March. The new exhibit is an art piece of two columns by artist Eli Elysee containing 1,024,820 signatures for the non-targeting of cities and the abolition of nuclear weapons. Mayors for Peace collected the signatures between 12 February 2007 and 26 April 2010. It is the first exhibit that emphasized the importance of the partnership of the United Nations with a global non-governmental organization.

A new disarmament exhibition entitled “Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” was opened on 11 November at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. This collaborative project had the following partners: the Government of Japan, UNODA, the United Nations Office at Geneva and the atomic bomb museums of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The exhibition consisted of text and photographs that explained the history of nuclear weapons and what was being done to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Conferences, panel discussions and other information activities

The 23rd United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues took place in Matsumoto City, Japan, from 27 to 29 July. The Conference was organized by UNODA in cooperation with the Government of Japan and the City of Matsumoto. The participants discussed critical and relevant issues related to disarmament and security, and called for implementing the action plan in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.⁸⁹ Against the backdrop of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the discussions, particularly those on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, assumed a new and pressing sense of urgency.

⁸⁹ NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vols. I-III). Available from <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/index.shtml> (accessed 16 May 2012).

The 10th United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues took place in Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, from 7 to 8 November. The participants examined both setbacks and progress in the past decade, as well as future challenges and the expected outcome of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Some 80 representatives from Governments, academic institutions, industry and civil society attended and the United Nations Secretary-General sent a video message emphasizing his commitment for a world free of nuclear weapons.

The United Nations regional workshop for East and South-East Asia entitled “Strengthening the Capacity of the Media in Advocating and Promoting Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific” was held in Beijing from 20 to 21 January. It was organized by UNODA and supported by the Government of China and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. Over 50 participants including senior media staff from 11 East and South-East Asian Member States as well as disarmament experts from think-tanks and representatives of international organizations took part in the workshop, which provided a unique occasion for interactive discussions on disarmament topics, and for empowering the role of regional media in promoting disarmament.

In 2011, a month-long social media Poetry for Peace contest⁹⁰ took place. The public was invited to hear the living testimonies of atomic bomb survivors, called hibakusha, and to respond to their stories in verse. People were also encouraged to “like” the poems that most touched them. Some of the poems echoed the pain of the victims, while others called for nuclear disarmament and almost all pleaded for peace. The finalists were narrowed down to three winners, who were announced on 25 October at a ceremony in New York.

The Permanent Representative of Japan, the Under Secretary-General for Public Information, and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs spoke at the ceremony. In addition, Monique Coleman, singer-actress and United Nations Youth Champion, also addressed the event. A number of New York City schoolchildren listened to and engaged with two hibakusha, who were also appointed by the Government of Japan as Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons.

The Poetry for Peace contest website⁹¹ had more than 150,000 page views from visitors in 169 countries. A total of 741 poems were accepted for submission.

The three UNODA regional centres for peace and disarmament held numerous conferences, panel discussions and other information and outreach activities in their respective regions (see chap. IV for details).

⁹⁰ More information is available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/poetryforpeace/>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

For a list of events held at the margins of the sixty-sixth session of the First Committee, see annex IV to this chapter.

Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace

Michael Douglas has served as a United Nations Messenger of Peace since 1998. He spoke at the inauguration of the “Cities are not targets (CANT)” exhibit in the General Assembly Hall on 24 March.

He also joined the Secretary-General and a number of other United Nations Messengers of Peace and Goodwill Ambassadors in recording video messages of solidarity with the people of Japan in the wake of the 11 March earthquake and tsunami. The messages were played to affected populations via national Japanese broadcast partners, online partners, United Nations Information Centres and the United Nations social media channels. In addition, in November, Michael Douglas recorded a public service announcement for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, urging the entry into force of the Treaty.

International Day against Nuclear Tests

The Second International Day against Nuclear Tests was observed in conjunction with the twentieth anniversary of the closure of the nuclear weapons test site at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on 29 August.

The Secretary-General, in his statement⁹² to mark the two occasions, stressed the urgent need for new progress in achieving a world free of both nuclear tests and nuclear weapons, which he described as “dangerous relics of the Cold War, long overdue for permanent retirement”. Current voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests, though valuable, were no substitute for a global ban, he said. The Secretary-General also urged all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so “as a matter of priority”.

An informal plenary session of the General Assembly was held at United Nations Headquarters on 2 September to mark the two occasions. In that session, the President of the General Assembly lamented the fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), though approved as far back as 1996, was still not in force.⁹³ He urged the international community to

⁹² Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, message on the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 12 August 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13745.doc.htm> (accessed 17 May 2012).

⁹³ Joseph Deiss, President of the sixty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, statement to the informal plenary meeting on the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Tests and the twentieth anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site, New York, 2 September 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/statements/nucleartests02092011.html> (accessed 17 May 2012).

undertake all necessary efforts to achieve the universal adoption of the Treaty and to pursue all necessary ratifications for it to be fully operative.

The United Nations Deputy Secretary-General also addressed the special event.⁹⁴ Speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General, she said that voluntary moratoriums on nuclear tests were no substitute for a legal prohibition and it was time for the CTBT to be brought into force, taking advantage of the current momentum.

A high-level workshop entitled “From here to 2015: Meeting the targets of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan” was also organized at United Nations Headquarters on 1 September. It was co-hosted by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EastWest Institute.

In addition, various activities, such as symposia, conferences, exhibits, competitions, publications, instruction in academic institutions and media broadcasts, were undertaken. UNODA and its regional centres, together with the United Nations Department of Public Information, served as the focal points within the United Nations system to commemorate the Day, in close collaboration with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The United Nations Information Centres and Services were also involved in supporting observance-related activities and relaying messages in the countries and regions they serve.

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/79 of 8 December 2010 entitled “United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services”, the Geneva Branch of UNODA continued to offer training to young diplomats in the field of disarmament and international security to enable them to participate effectively in international negotiating forums. This programme, which is carried out by UNODA within existing resources, was launched in 1978 by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament.⁹⁵ The selection process, carried out by UNODA on the basis of the nominations by Member States, takes into consideration the greater needs of developing countries as well as geographical balance.

The Fellows of the 2011 programme came from the following countries: Belarus, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia,

⁹⁴ Asha-Rose Migiro, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, remarks at the General Assembly event marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 2 September 2011. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/dsgsm570.doc.htm>.

⁹⁵ S-10/2, para. 108.

Mexico, Russian Federation, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Togo, Switzerland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States and Uzbekistan.

As in previous years, the 2011 programme was structured in three parts. The first part of the programme was conducted in Geneva, where the Fellows attended the Conference on Disarmament and heard lectures by senior representatives of UNODA, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Upon invitation by the Swiss authorities, visits to the cities of Geneva and Bern were included in the programme.

The second part of the programme comprised study visits to intergovernmental organizations of relevance in the field of disarmament, as well as to Member States, at their invitation. In 2011, the Governments of Germany, Japan and China invited the programme participants. These country visits acquainted the Fellows with the national foreign policies of each country in the areas of international security, through lectures, meetings with Government officials and scholars, as well as by visits to relevant facilities.

The third part of the programme was carried out at the United Nations Headquarters and consisted of a second cycle of lectures by members of delegations to the First Committee and by United Nations officials on items on the agenda of the Committee. The Fellows also regularly attended the meetings of the First Committee.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), an autonomous extrabudgetary body within the United Nations system, develops practical ideas for building peace and security through forward-looking analysis of disarmament and security issues. Through its research projects, publications, conferences and expert networks, UNIDIR serves as a bridge between decision makers, researchers, practitioners, Member States and United Nations agencies to promote creative thinking and dialogue on both current and emerging security challenges.

In 2011, the Institute completed the restructuring of its work into five programmes: Weapons of Mass Destruction; Weapons of Societal Disruption; Emerging Threats; Process and Practice; and Security and Society.⁹⁶ This was done to better address the needs and concerns of all stakeholders of UNIDIR, as well to ensure that all elements of its mandate continue to be fulfilled.

⁹⁶ Visit www.unidir.org for full access to books and reports, project descriptions and materials, as well as the quarterly journal *Disarmament Forum*, audio files of UNIDIR events and other resources. See also annex III to this chapter for a list of UNIDIR publications in 2011.

Brief descriptions of the programmes as well as key activities of the Institute during 2011 are provided here. A full account of the activities of UNIDIR in 2011 and its proposed programme of work for 2012 are contained in the Director's annual report to the General Assembly.⁹⁷

The Weapons of Mass Destruction programme sought to support and facilitate progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to assist the international community in efforts to keep the world free of biological and chemical weapons. In 2011, the Institute addressed issues related to nuclear security and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle; tactical nuclear weapons; nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the Biological Weapons Convention.⁹⁸

The Weapons of Societal Disruption programme focused on limits and controls on the weapons that cause harm to societies on a daily basis, such as small arms, cluster munitions, landmines and explosive remnants of war. In 2011, the Institute addressed explosive weapons and building dialogue to promote norms governing their use; regional challenges to combating illicit trade in weapons and materials; and the tracing of ammunition used in conflict.

The Emerging Threats programme worked to anticipate the security challenges of tomorrow so that action to address them can be taken today. In 2011, UNIDIR addressed cybersecurity; legal and political perspectives on conflict in cyberspace; multilateral approaches to space and cybersecurity; and trust- and confidence-building mechanisms in outer space activities. The Institute held its annual Space Security Conference in April.

The Process and Practice programme sought to translate ideas for disarmament and security into practical action. During the year, the Institute addressed issues facing the Conference on Disarmament, and possible ways of breaking the deadlock in that body; the development of a tool to make reintegration programmes more effective; preparations and support for negotiation of an arms trade treaty; and improving the effectiveness of implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms.

The Security and Society programme was based on the belief that human security hinges on economic and social development. The programme encompasses work to integrate the ideas and actions of a wide range of security stakeholders in order to promote better understanding and facilitate practical solutions for the greater security not just of all States, but also of all peoples. In 2011, the Institute focused on project development, briefings and

⁹⁷ A/66/123.

⁹⁸ The treaty's full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The text and status of adherence are available from <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> (accessed 7 May 2012).

dialogue to strengthen the human security linkages with other thematic areas of its activity.

Other issues

Compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament agreements

By its resolution 66/49 of 2 December 2011 entitled “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments”, the General Assembly urged all States to implement and comply fully with their respective obligations and called upon all Member States in a position to do so to encourage and appropriately assist other States at their request to increase their capacity to implement fully their obligations.

The General Assembly also called upon concerned States to take concerted action, consistent with relevant international law, to encourage the compliance by all States with their respective non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and with other agreed obligations, and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter.

In addition, the resolution urged those States not currently in compliance with their respective obligations and commitments to make the strategic decision to come back into compliance, and encouraged action by all States, the United Nations and other international organizations, pursuant to their respective mandates and consistent with the Charter, to safeguard international security and stability from any serious damage arising from non-compliance by States with their existing non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament obligations.

For more information on the subject, refer to appendix VIII.

Developments in the field of information technology and security

In continuation of its annual requests since 1998, the General Assembly by its resolution 65/41 of 8 December 2010 invited all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions: (a) general appreciation of the issues of information security; (b) efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in this field; (c) the content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the resolution; and (d) possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level. The Assembly had also requested that a group of governmental experts be established in 2012 to continue studying existing and

potential threats in the sphere of information security and to submit a report on the results of their study at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Replies received from seven Governments (Australia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Netherlands and United States) are contained in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.⁹⁹

At its sixty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/24 on 2 December 2011. For more information, refer to appendix VIII.

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted resolution 65/53 on 8 December 2010, which called upon States "to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development" (para. 2). The resolution also invited "all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution" (para. 4). The replies received from seven Governments (Cuba, Ecuador, Lebanon, Panama, Portugal, Qatar and Ukraine) are contained in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.¹⁰⁰

At its sixty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/31 on 2 December 2011. For more information, refer to appendix VIII.

National legislation on arms transfers and dual-use goods

In its resolution 66/41 of 2 December 2011 entitled "National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology", the General Assembly invited Member States that were in a position to do so to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures in order to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, without prejudice to the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) as well as other relevant Council resolutions adopted subsequently. The resolution also stated that such legislation, regulations and procedures should be consistent with the obligations of States parties under international treaties.

In addition, the General Assembly encouraged Member States to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to the Secretary-General on their national

⁹⁹ A/66/152.

¹⁰⁰ A/66/97 and Add.1.

legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, as well as any changes therein, and requested the Secretary-General to make that information accessible to Member States.

For more information on the subject, refer to appendix VIII.

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

In its resolution 65/54 of 8 December 2010, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session.

Replies received from 10 Governments (Australia, Cuba, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Qatar, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkmenistan) are contained in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.¹⁰¹

At its sixty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/32 on 2 December 2011. For more information, refer to appendix VIII.

Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

By its decision 66/514 of 2 December 2011, the General Assembly decided to include the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session. For more information, refer to appendix VIII.

Role of science and technology

By its decision 66/515 of 2 December 2011, the General Assembly decided to include the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament" in the provisional agenda of its sixty-seventh session. For more information on the subject, refer to appendix VIII.

¹⁰¹ A/66/111 and Add.1-2.

Annex I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in 2011

- Olga Pellicer (Chair), Department of International Studies, Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, Mexico City
- Nobuyasu Abe, Director, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
- Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Director for Programme Research, Habibie Centre, Research Professor and Deputy Chairperson for Social Sciences and Humanities, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta
- Desmond Bowen, Former Director of Policy, Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, London
- Jingye Cheng, Permanent Representative and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of China to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna
- Kate Dewes, Co-Coordinator of the Disarmament and Security Centre of the New Zealand Peace Foundation, Christchurch
- Monica Herz, President, Brazilian Association of International Relations, Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
- Togzhan Kassenova, Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
- Sergey M. Koshelev, Chief, Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow
- H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, Former Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka, Colombo
- Marcie Berman Ries, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Department of State of the United States, Washington, D.C.
- François Rivasseau, Deputy Chief, Embassy of France to the United States, Washington, D.C.
- Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Special Envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw
- Cheikh Sylla, Ambassador-at-large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Dakar
- Carlo Trezza, Special Envoy of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, General Directorate for Multilateral Political Affairs and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
- Theresa Hitchens (ex-officio member), Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva

Annex II

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publications and other materials in 2011^a

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 35 (Parts I and II): 2010. New York: United Nations, 2010 (Sales No. E.11.IX.1).

Study on the Development of a Framework for Improving End-Use and End-User Control Systems. UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 21. New York: 2011 (Sales No. E.12.IX.5).

Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons, Critical Disarmament Issues series. New York: 2011.

Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Disarmament Study Series, No. 33. New York: 2011 (Sales No. E.12.IX.3).

Disarmament: A Basic Guide. Third edition. New York: 2011 (ISBN 978-92-1-142282-5). Available in e-book format for Amazon Kindle and Barnes and Noble Nook and from iBookstore for Apple devices.

UNODA Update (quarterly e-newsletter): No. 1 (First Quarter, 2011), No. 2 (Second Quarter, 2011), No. 3 (Third Quarter, 2011), No. 4 (Fourth Quarter, 2011).

Forthcoming

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 36 (Part I): 2011. New York: United Nations, 2012 (Sales No. E.12.IX.1).

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 36 (Part II): 2011. New York: United Nations, 2012 (Sales No. E.12.IX.2).

Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

“Activity Report UNREC 2010”. Togo: UNREC, 2011.

“Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly”. Togo: UNREC, 2011.

“Fight Against Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: UNREC’s Contribution”. Togo: UNREC, 2011.

“Guide on the maintenance of law and order during elections” (2011 revision). Togo: UNREC, 2011.

^a New York publications are available from www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/.

“Project report: Regulating Small Arms Brokering in Eastern Africa”. Togo: UNREC, 2011.

UNREC Focus: No. 12 (March 2011), No. 13 (April 2011), No. 14 (July 2011), No. 15 (November 2011). Available in English and French from www.unrec.org (accessed 7 May 2012).

“Video Simulation of a Law Enforcement Operation During Electoral Period” (2011 revision). Togo: UNREC, 2011.

Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

“United Nations Regional Best and Promising Practices Seminar on Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention for South and Southeast Asia: Informal Summary Report”. Nepal: UNRCPD, March 2011. Available from <http://www.unrcpd.org/uploads/conferences/file/11%2004%2005%20KTM%20March%20Seminar%20Report%20final.pdf> (accessed 7 May 2012).

UNRCPD Newsletter: No. 1 (January 2011), No. 2 (April 2011), No. 3 (July 2011), No. 4 (October 2011). Available from www.unrcpd.org.np (accessed 7 May 2012).

Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

“Andean sub-regional Comparative Legislative Study on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives Norms and Legal Instruments”. Peru: UNLIREC, 2011.

“Control and Regulation of Private Security Companies in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Comparative Analysis”. Peru: UNLIREC, 2011.

UNLIREC Newsletter: No 3 (March 2011), No 4 (May 2011), No 5 (December 2011). Available from www.unlirec.org (accessed 7 May 2012).

Annex III

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications in 2011^b

Caughley, T. *Breaking the Ice in the Conference on Disarmament: A Wrap-up*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare: Preliminary Assessment of National Doctrine and Organization*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.

^b Available from <http://www.unidir.org/html/en/publications.php> (accessed 17 May 2012).

- Fihn, B. *The Conference on Disarmament and Negative Security Assurances*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Johnson, R. *Civil Society and the Conference on Disarmament*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- King, J. *Transforming the Conference on Disarmament: Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament for a Pluralistic World*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Melzer, N. *Cyberwarfare and International Law*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Meyer, P. *The Conference on Disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Millett, P., ed. *Improving Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention: The 2007–2010 Intersessional Process*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Parker, S. *Improving the Effectiveness of the Programme of Action on Small Arms: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Podvig, P. *Global Nuclear Security: Building Greater Accountability and Cooperation*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- UNIDIR, *The Conference on Disarmament and Engagement with Civil Society*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- UNIDIR, *Fissile Material Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (Version 2, updated February 2011)*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- UNIDIR, *Space Security 2011: Building on the Past, Stepping towards the Future—Conference Report 4–5 April 2011*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Yudin, Y., ed. *Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The First Practical Steps*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Yudin, Y. *Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Long Road Ahead*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- Zaleski, J. *Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament: Consideration of the Item by the CD*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- _____. *New Types and Systems of WMD: Consideration by the CD*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- _____. *Transparency in Armaments: Consideration of the Item in the CD*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.
- _____. *Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011.

Disarmament Forum (a quarterly publication): “Beyond the BTWC RevCon” (No. 1), “Nuclear-weapon-free zones” (No. 2) and “Children and conflict” (No. 3)

Annex IV

Events held at the margins of the First Committee 2011 session

- 13 October Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Meeting the Global Challenges (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
- 17 October Supporting the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations (organized by the European Union and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
- 18 October Transparency in the Global Arms Trade (organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 19 October Trust- and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities: Looking Back and Moving Forward (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
- 20 October International Law and War in Cyberspace: Many Questions, Few Answers (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)
- 21 October Enhancing Small Arms Control in Central Africa—the Kinshasa Convention (organized by the Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 24 October Nuclear Disarmament: A Compass Point for Progress and Accountability (organized by the EastWest Institute, the Global Security Institute and the Center for Non-proliferation Studies)
- 25 October Press Event: Hibakusha Respond to “Poetry for Peace” Contest (organized by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)
- 26 October Testimony of Hibakusha (Atomic Bomb Survivors) (organized by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)

appendix I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The most up-to-date information on disarmament treaties and their status of adherence is available from the UNODA website at:

<http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>

The data contained in this appendix has been provided by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements, as follows (inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the United Nations Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported):

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention)

African Union

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

Canada and Hungary

Treaty on Open Skies

France

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

Kyrgyzstan

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty)

Mexico

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Netherlands

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Organization of American States

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Pacific Islands Forum

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

Thailand

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

United States

Antarctic Treaty

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2011

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2011 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.^a The order in which the agreements are listed below are according to the date of signature or opening for signature. The total number of parties for each treaty or agreement has been calculated based on information received from the depositaries.

A new State party in the following list includes the date of deposit, to the respective depositary, of the State's instruments of ratification, and are further noted as follows, if applicable: (a) = accession, (A) = acceptance, (AA) = approval, (P) = consent to be bound, and (s) = succession.^b

In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The following notation indicates where the reported action was completed: (M) = Moscow, (L) = London and (W) = Washington.

Certain treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (Bangkok Treaty, CANWFZ Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Rarotonga Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco) have associated protocols concerning security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States and some also have protocols for States outside the zone of application, but which have some territory within the zone. They are at different stages with regard to signature, ratification and entry into force. Full details can be found at <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 8 February 1928

DEPOSITARY: France

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 137

Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY: United States

NEW PARTIES: Malaysia —31 October (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 49

^a The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), in *Status*, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), and thereafter in the relevant volumes of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. The texts and status data are also available from the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/>.

^b Accession is a one-step process for becoming bound by a treaty after it has entered into force. A glossary of other terms relating to treaty actions is available from http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml.

**Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)**

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES^c in MOSCOW: 5 August 1963
OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963
ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963
DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
NEW PARTIES: None
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 126

**Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967
ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967
DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
NEW PARTIES: None
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 100

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967
ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually
DEPOSITARY: Mexico
NEW PARTIES: None
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 33

Amendment to article 7^d

NEW PARTIES: None

Amendment to article 25^e

NEW PARTIES: None

Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20^f

NEW PARTIES: None

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968
ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970
DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
NEW PARTIES: None
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 189

^c The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

^d Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.

^e Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.

^f Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 94

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

NEW PARTIES: Burundi —18 October (L)

Mozambique —29 March (a) (L)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 163

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Cameroon —18 April (a)

Estonia —14 April (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 76

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:^g None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13

^g Article 19, paragraph 4, states:

“For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument.”

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:^h None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 114

Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 75

Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)

NEW PARTIES: Montenegro —30 December (P)

Serbia —14 February (P)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 98

Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 100

Protocol V (entered into force on 12 November 2006)

NEW PARTIES: Argentina —7 October (P)

Poland —26 September (P)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 76

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

DEPOSITARY: Netherlands

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30

^h Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:

“2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Agreement on Adaptation

ADOPTED AND SIGNED AT ISTANBUL: 19 November 1999

NOT YET IN FORCEⁱ

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 30

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 3

Treaty on Open Skies

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 January 2002

DEPOSITARY: Canada and Hungary

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 34

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)

SIGNED AT PARIS: 13 January 1993

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 29 April 1997

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 188

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

SIGNED AT BANGKOK: 15 December 1995

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 27 March 1997

DEPOSITARY: Thailand

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 10

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

SIGNED AT CAIRO: 11 April 1996

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 15 July 2009

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the African Union

NEW PARTIES: Ghana —27 June

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 32

“3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention.”

ⁱ Article 31, paragraph 3, states:

“This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form.”

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GUATEMALA CITY: 7 June 1999

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 November 2002

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW PARTIES:	Costa Rica	—12 May
	Mexico	—7 March

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 15

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT SEMIPALATINSK: 8 September 2006

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 March 2009

DEPOSITARY: Kyrgyzstan

NEW PARTIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 5

Convention on Cluster Munitions

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OSLO: 3 December 2008

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 August 2010

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:	Afghanistan	8 September
	Botswana	27 June
	Bulgaria	6 April
	Cook Islands	23 August
	Costa Rica	28 April
	Czech Republic	22 September
	Dominican Republic	20 December
	El Salvador	10 January
	Ghana	3 February
	Grenada	29 June (a)
	Italy	21 September
	Lithuania	24 March
	Mozambique	14 March
	Netherlands	23 February (A)
	Portugal	9 March
	Senegal	3 August
	Swaziland	13 September (a)
	Trinidad and Tobago	21 September (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 67

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT BRAZZAVILLE: 19 November 2010

NOT YET IN FORCE^m

DEPOSITARY: Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES:	Burundi	—22 September
	Equatorial Guinea	—29 April
	Rwanda	—1 August

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 11

^m Article 36, paragraph 1, states:

“This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

appendix II

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Final Declaration

APPENDIX II

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(CTBT-Art.XIV/2011/6, annex)

New York, 23 September 2011

1. We, the ratifying States, together with other States Signatories, met in New York on 23 September 2011 to discuss concrete measures to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest possible date, thus ridding the world once and for all of nuclear test explosions. The entry into force of the CTBT is of vital importance as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We reiterate that a universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and that, fifteen years after opening of the Treaty for signature, its entry into force is more urgent than ever before. We urge all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level.

2. We further reiterate that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The ending of nuclear weapon testing is, thus, a meaningful step in the realization of the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons globally, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The overwhelming support for the Treaty and its early entry into force has been expressed by the United Nations General Assembly, which has called for signature and ratification of the Treaty as soon as possible, and has urged all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level. The Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in New York on 24 September 2009, which adopted resolution 1887, and the adoption by consensus of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), among other events, demonstrate continued strong international will to see this Treaty brought into force.

3. We welcome that 182 States have signed and 155 States have ratified the CTBT, including 35 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force (Annex 2 States). In this respect, we welcome progress made towards universalization of the Treaty, and recognize the significance of the ratifications of the Treaty since the 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We urge all remaining States, especially those whose signatures and ratifications are necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, to take individual

initiatives to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay in order to achieve its earliest entry into force. A list of those States is provided in the Appendix. We welcome the recent expressions by a number of States, including some Annex 2 States, of their intention to pursue and complete their ratification processes soon.

4. We affirm the importance and urgency of achieving early entry into force of the Treaty as one of the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which were agreed to by the participating States at international forums dealing with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, we reaffirm our commitment, as expressed in the conclusions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and call on all States, to refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapon technologies and any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, and to maintain all existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions, while stressing that these measures do not have the same permanent and legally binding effect as the entry into force of the Treaty.

5. With respect to the nuclear tests announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009, bearing in mind the United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/RES/61/104, A/RES/63/87 and A/RES/65/91 and other relevant United Nations resolutions, including S/RES/1874 (2009), we continue to underline the need for a peaceful solution of the nuclear issues through successful implementation of the Joint Statement agreed upon in the framework of the Six-Party Talks. We also believe that the aforementioned events, internationally condemned, highlighted the urgent need for the early entry into force of the Treaty.

6. We reaffirm our strong belief that it is essential to maintain momentum in building all elements of the verification regime, which will be capable of verifying compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force. The verification regime will be unprecedented in its global reach after entry into force of the Treaty and will thereby ensure confidence that States are maintaining their Treaty commitments. We will continue to provide political and tangible support required to enable the Preparatory Commission to complete all its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way, including the building up of the on-site inspection pillar of the verification regime and the progressive development of the coverage of the International Monitoring System, so that it will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at its entry into force. In this regard we note the progress achieved in the establishment of the International Monitoring System, which currently has 270 certified facilities, and the satisfactory functioning of the International Data Centre, and in developing the on-site inspection regime.

7. We agree that in addition to its essential function, the CTBT verification system is capable of bringing scientific and civil benefits, including for tsunami warning systems and possibly other disaster alert systems. In this context we welcome the rapid response of the Preparatory Commission to the tsunami and the ensuing nuclear power plant accident on 11 March 2011 in Fukushima, Japan, and wish to underline the importance of cooperation between the Preparatory Commission and relevant international organizations in this regard. We will continue to consider ways to ensure that these benefits can be broadly shared by the international community in conformity with the Treaty.

8. We reaffirm our determination to take concrete steps towards early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty and to this end adopt the following measures:

(a) Spare no efforts and use all avenues open to us, in conformity with international law, to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty, and urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference and to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;

(b) Support and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives by interested countries, the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat to promote the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty;

(c) Agree that ratifying States will continue the practice of selecting coordinators to promote cooperation, through informal consultations with all interested countries, aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications;

(d) Maintain a contact list of countries among ratifying States which volunteer to assist the coordinators in various regions in promoting activities to achieve entry into force of the Treaty;

(e) Encourage the organization of regional seminars in conjunction with other regional meetings in order to increase the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays;

(f) Call upon the Preparatory Commission to continue its international cooperation activities and the organizing of workshops, seminars and training programmes in the legal and technical fields;

(g) Call upon the Preparatory Commission to continue promoting understanding of the Treaty, including through education and training initiatives, and demonstrating, on a provisional basis, and bearing in mind the purpose and specific mandates as foreseen in the Treaty, the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, inter alia, in such areas as the environment, earth science and technology, tsunami warning systems, detection of the accidental release of radioactive particulates and gases, and possibly other disaster alert systems;

(h) Request that the Provisional Technical Secretariat continue to provide States with legal assistance with respect to the ratification process and implementation measures and, in order to enhance these activities and their visibility, maintain a contact point for the exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation;

(i) Request the Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue to act as a “focal point” for collecting information on outreach activities undertaken by ratifying States and States Signatories, and to maintain an updated overview of the information based on inputs provided by ratifying States and States Signatories for this purpose on its public web site, thereby assisting in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty;

(j) Encourage cooperation with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty and its objectives, as well as the need for its early entry into force.

Appendix to the Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

List of States

A. States that have ratified the Treaty

Afghanistan	El Salvador
Albania	Eritrea
Algeria	Estonia
Andorra	Ethiopia
Antigua and Barbuda	Fiji
Argentina	Finland
Armenia	France
Australia	Gabon
Austria	Georgia
Azerbaijan	Germany
Bahamas	Ghana
Bahrain	Greece
Bangladesh	Grenada
Barbados	Grenadines
Belarus	Guinea
Belgium	Guyana
Belize	Haiti
Benin	Holy See
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Honduras
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hungary
Botswana	Iceland
Brazil	Ireland
Bulgaria	Italy
Burkina Faso	Jamaica
Burundi	Japan
Cambodia	Jordan
Cameroon	Kazakhstan
Canada	Kenya
Cape Verde	Kiribati
Central African Republic	Kuwait
Chile	Kyrgyzstan
Colombia	Lao People's Democratic Republic
Cook Islands	Latvia
Costa Rica	Lebanon
Côte d'Ivoire	Lesotho
Croatia	Liberia
Cyprus	Libya
Czech Republic	Liechtenstein
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Lithuania
Denmark	Luxembourg
Djibouti	Madagascar
Dominican Republic	Malawi
Ecuador	Malaysia

Maldives	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Mali	Samoa
Malta	San Marino
Marshall Islands	Senegal
Mauritania	Serbia
Mexico	Seychelles
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Sierra Leone
Monaco	Singapore
Mongolia	Slovakia
Montenegro	Slovenia
Morocco	South Africa
Mozambique	Spain
Namibia	Sudan
Nauru	Suriname
Netherlands	Sweden
New Zealand	Switzerland
Nicaragua	Tajikistan
Niger	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Nigeria	Togo
Norway	Trinidad and Tobago
Oman	Tunisia
Palau	Turkey
Panama	Turkmenistan
Paraguay	Uganda
Peru	Ukraine
Philippines	United Arab Emirates
Poland	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Portugal	United Republic of Tanzania
Qatar	Uruguay
Republic of Korea	Uzbekistan
Republic of Moldova	Vanuatu
Romania	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Russian Federation	Viet Nam
Rwanda	Zambia
Saint Kitts and Nevis	
Saint Lucia	

B. The following 44 States, whose ratification is required for the entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with Article XIV, are listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty

Algeria	Canada
Argentina	Chile
Australia	China
Austria	Colombia
Bangladesh	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Belgium	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Brazil	Egypt
Bulgaria	Finland

France	Republic of Korea
Germany	Romania
Hungary	Russian Federation
India	Slovakia
Indonesia	South Africa
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Spain
Israel	Sweden
Italy	Switzerland
Japan	Turkey
Mexico	Ukraine
Netherlands	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Norway	United States of America
Pakistan	Viet Nam
Peru	
Poland	

1. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have signed and ratified the Treaty

Algeria	Mexico
Argentina	Netherlands
Australia	Norway
Austria	Peru
Bangladesh	Poland
Belgium	Republic of Korea
Brazil	Romania
Bulgaria	Russian Federation
Canada	Slovakia
Chile	South Africa
Colombia	Spain
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Sweden
Finland	Switzerland
France	Turkey
Germany	Ukraine
Hungary	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Italy	Viet Nam
Japan	

2. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty

China	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Egypt	Israel
Indonesia	United States of America

3. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty that have not yet signed the Treaty

Democratic People's Republic of Korea
India
Pakistan

appendix III

**Seventh Review Conference of the
States Parties to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction: Final Declaration**

APPENDIX III

Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Final Declaration

(BWC/CONF.VII/7, sect. II)

The States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which met in Geneva from 5 December to 22 December 2011 to review the operation of the Convention, solemnly declare:

(i) Their conviction that the Convention is essential for international peace and security;

(ii) Their determination also to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control including the prohibition and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and their conviction that the prohibitions of the Convention will facilitate the achievement of this goal;

(iii) Their reaffirmation of their understanding that the Convention forms a composite whole, as well as of their firm commitment to the purposes of the Preamble and all the provisions of the Convention;

(iv) Their determination to comply with all their obligations undertaken pursuant to the Convention and their recognition that States Parties not in compliance with their Convention obligations pose fundamental challenges to the Convention's viability, as would the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons by anyone at any time;

(v) Their continued determination, for the sake of humankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and their conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind;

(vi) Their reaffirmation that under any circumstances the use, development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited under Article I of the Convention;

(vii) Their conviction that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and whatever its motivation, is abhorrent and unacceptable to the international community, and that terrorists must be prevented from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining, and using under any circumstances, biological agents

and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of agents or toxins, for non-peaceful purposes, and their recognition of the contribution of the full and effective implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, and other relevant United Nations resolutions;

(viii) Their reiteration that the effective contribution of the Convention to international peace and security will be enhanced through universal adherence to the Convention, and their call on signatories to ratify and other States, not party, to accede to the Convention without further delay;

(ix) Their recognition that achieving the objectives of the Convention will be more effectively realized through greater public awareness of its contribution, and through collaboration with relevant regional and international organizations, in keeping within their respective mandates, and their commitment to promote this;

(x) Their recognition of their consideration of the issues identified in reviewing the operation of the Convention as provided for in Article XII, as well as their consensus on the follow-up actions contained herein.

Article I

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article I, as it defines the scope of the Convention. The Conference declares that the Convention is comprehensive in its scope and that all naturally or artificially created or altered microbial and other biological agents and toxins, as well as their components, regardless of their origin and method of production and whether they affect humans, animals or plants, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, are unequivocally covered by Article I.

2. The Conference reaffirms that Article I applies to all scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention and notes that the Conference has decided to include in the 2012-2015 intersessional programme a standing agenda item on review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention.

3. The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use. The Conference affirms the determination of States Parties to condemn any use of biological agents or toxins other than for peaceful purposes, by anyone at any time.

4. The Conference notes that experimentation involving open air release of pathogens or toxins harmful to humans, animals and plants that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the undertakings contained in Article I.

Article II

5. The Conference reaffirms for any state ratifying or acceding to the Convention, the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes specified in Article II would be completed upon accession to, or upon ratification of, the Convention.

6. The Conference emphasises that states must take all necessary safety and security measures to protect human populations and the environment, including animals and plants, when carrying out such destruction and/or diversion. The Conference also stresses that these States Parties should provide appropriate information to all States Parties via the exchange of information (confidence-building measures form F).

7. The Conference welcomes statements made by States Parties, and newly acceding and ratifying States Parties, that they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery as prohibited by Article I of the Convention.

Article III

8. The Conference reaffirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at the international, national or sub-national levels.

9. The Conference calls for appropriate measures, including effective national export controls, by all States Parties to implement this Article, in order to ensure that direct and indirect transfers relevant to the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever, are authorized only when the intended use is for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

10. The Conference reiterates that States Parties should not use the provisions of this Article to impose restrictions and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials under Article X.

Article IV

11. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this Article. The Conference also reaffirms that the enactment and implementation of necessary national measures under this Article, in accordance with their constitutional processes, would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. In this context, the Conference calls upon States Parties to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes, legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures, including penal legislation, designed to:

(a) enhance domestic implementation of the Convention and ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery as specified in Article I of the Convention;

(b) apply within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere and apply, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, to actions taken anywhere by natural or legal persons possessing their nationality;

(c) ensure the safety and security of microbial or other biological agents or toxins in laboratories, facilities, and during transportation, to prevent unauthorized access to and removal of such agents or toxins.

12. The Conference welcomes those measures taken by States Parties in this regard, and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures, to do so without delay. The Conference encourages States Parties to provide appropriate information on any such measures they have taken, as well as any other useful information on their implementation to the Implementation Support Unit within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

13. The Conference notes the value of national implementation measures, as appropriate, in accordance with the constitutional process of each State Party, to:

- (a) implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity;
- (b) encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to promote awareness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors and throughout relevant scientific and administrative activities and;
- (c) promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness of the obligations of States Parties under the Convention, as well as relevant national legislation and guidelines;
- (d) promote the development of training and education programmes for those granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and toxins;
- (e) encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct;
- (f) strengthen methods and capacities for surveillance and detection of outbreaks of disease at the national, regional and international levels, noting that the International Health Regulations (2005) are important for building capacity to prevent, protect against, control and respond to the international spread of disease;
- (g) prevent anyone from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining, transporting or transferring and using under any circumstances, biological agents and toxins, equipment, or their means of delivery for non-peaceful purposes.

14. In this regard, the Conference welcomes assistance related to Article IV already provided and encourages those States Parties, in a position to do so, to provide assistance, upon request, to other States Parties.

15. The Conference further encourages States Parties, that have not yet done so, in accordance with the recommendation of the Sixth Review Conference, to designate a national focal point for coordinating national implementation of the Convention and communicating with other States Parties and relevant international organizations.

16. The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention.

17. The Conference recalls United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) that places obligations on all states and is consistent with the provisions of the Convention. The Conference notes that Resolution 1540 affirms support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States Parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability. The

Conference also notes that information provided to the United Nations by states in accordance with Resolution 1540 may provide a useful resource for States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under this Article.

Article V

18. The Conference reaffirms that:

(a) this article provides an appropriate framework for States Parties to consult and cooperate with one another to resolve any problem and to make any request for clarification, which may have arisen in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, the provisions of the Convention;

(b) any State Party which identifies such a problem should, as a rule, use this framework to address and resolve it;

(c) States Parties should provide a specific, timely response to any compliance concern alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention.

19. The Conference reaffirms that the consultation procedures agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences remain valid to be used by States Parties for consultation and cooperation pursuant to this Article. The Conference reaffirms that such consultation and cooperation may also be undertaken bilaterally and multilaterally, or through other appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

20. The Conference takes note of initiatives from States Parties to promote confidence-building under the Convention.

21. The Conference stresses the need for all States Parties to deal effectively with compliance issues. In this connection, the States Parties agreed to provide a specific, timely response to any compliance concern alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention. Such responses should be submitted in accordance with the procedures agreed upon by the Second Review Conference and further developed by the Third Review Conference. The Conference reiterates its request that information on such efforts be provided to the Review Conferences.

22. The Conference emphasises the importance of the exchange of information among States Parties through the confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences. The Conference welcomes the exchange of information carried out under these measures and notes that this has contributed to enhancing transparency and building confidence.

23. The Conference recognises the urgent need to increase the number of States Parties participating in CBMs and calls upon all States Parties to participate annually. The Conference notes that since the Sixth Review Conference, there has only been a slight increase in the percentage of State Parties submitting their CBMs. The Conference emphasises the importance of increasing and continuing participation in the CBMs.

24. The Conference recognises the technical difficulties experienced by some States Parties in completing full and timely submissions. The Conference urges those States Parties, in a position to do so, to provide technical assistance and support, through training for instance, to those States Parties requesting it to assist them to complete

their annual CBM submissions. The Conference notes the decision to update the CBM forms.

25. The Conference notes the desirability of making the CBMs more user-friendly and stresses the need to ensure that they provide relevant and appropriate information to States Parties.

26. The Conference recalls that the Third Review Conference agreed, “that the exchange of information and data, using the revised forms, be sent to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs no later than 15 April on an annual basis”. The Conference reaffirms that the data submitted in the framework of the annual exchange of information should be provided to the Implementation Support Unit within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and promptly made available electronically by it to all States Parties according to the updated modalities and forms in Annex I. The Conference recalls that information supplied by a State Party must not be further circulated or made available without the express permission of that State Party. The Conference notes the fact that certain States Parties made the information they provide publicly available.

Article VI

27. The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

28. The Conference emphasizes the provision of Article VI that such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity. It stresses that, as in the case of the implementation of all the provisions and procedures set forth in the Convention, the procedures foreseen in Article VI should be implemented in good faith within the scope of the Convention.

29. The Conference invites the Security Council:

(a) to consider immediately any complaint lodged under this Article and to initiate any measures it considers necessary for the investigation of the complaint in accordance with the Charter;

(b) to request, if it deems necessary and in accordance with its Resolution 620 of 1988, the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate the allegation of use, using the technical guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I of United Nations Document A/44/561;

(c) to inform each State Party of the results of any investigation initiated under this Article and to consider promptly any appropriate further action which may be necessary.

30. The Conference reaffirms the agreement of States Parties to consult, at the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of biological or toxin weapons. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of each State Party to cooperate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council initiates.

31. The Conference notes that the procedure outlined in this Article is without prejudice to the prerogative of the States Parties to consider jointly cases of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention and to make appropriate decisions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable rules of international law.

Article VII

32. The Conference notes with satisfaction that these provisions have not been invoked.

33. The Conference takes note of desires expressed that, should a request for assistance be made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided. In this context, in view of the humanitarian imperative, pending consideration of a decision by the Security Council, timely emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties, if requested.

34. The Conference recognises that States Parties bear the responsibility for providing assistance and coordinating with relevant organizations in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking made by each State Party to provide or support assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention.

35. The Conference takes note of the willingness of States Parties, where appropriate, to provide or support assistance to any State Party, which so requests, when that State Party has been exposed to danger or damage as a result of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons by anyone.

36. The Conference considers that in the event that this Article might be invoked, the United Nations could play a coordinating role in providing assistance, with the help of States Parties, as well as the appropriate intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with their respective mandates, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). The Conference recognises the value of further dialogue regarding appropriate means of coordination between States Parties and relevant international organizations.

37. The Conference recognizes that there are challenges to developing effective measures for the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant international organizations to respond to the use of a biological or toxin weapon. The Conference underlines the importance of the coordination of the provision of appropriate assistance, including expertise, information, protection, detection, decontamination, prophylactic and medical and other equipment that could be required to assist the States Parties in the event that a State Party is exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention. The Conference also takes note of the proposal that States Parties may need to discuss the detailed procedure for assistance in order to ensure that timely emergency assistance would be provided by States Parties, if requested, in the event of use of biological or toxin weapons.

38. The Conference notes that State Parties' national preparedness contributes to international capabilities for response, investigation and mitigation of outbreaks of disease, including those due to alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. The Conference notes that there are differences among States Parties in terms of their level of development, national capabilities and resources, and that these differences affect national and international capacity to respond effectively to an alleged use of a

biological or toxin weapon. The Conference encourages States Parties, in a position to do so, to assist other States Parties, upon request, to build relevant capacity.

39. The Conference notes the need for States Parties to work nationally, and jointly, as appropriate, to improve, in accordance with their respective circumstances, national laws and regulations, their own disease surveillance and detection capacities for identifying and confirming the cause of outbreaks and cooperating, upon request, to build the capacity of other States Parties. The Conference notes that the International Health Regulations (2005) are important for building capacity to prevent, protect against, control and respond to the international spread of disease; such aims are compatible with the objectives of the Convention.

40. On the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, States Parties recognize that in this regard health and security issues are interrelated at both the national and international levels. The Conference highlights the importance of pursuing initiatives in this area through effective cooperation and sustainable partnerships. The Conference notes the importance of ensuring that efforts undertaken are effective irrespective of whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or deliberately caused, and cover diseases and toxins that could harm humans, animals, plants or the environment. The Conference also recognises that capabilities to detect, quickly and effectively respond to, and recover from, the alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon need to be in place before they are required.

Article VIII

41. The Conference appeals to all States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to fulfil their obligations assumed under that Protocol and urges all states not yet party to the Protocol to ratify or accede to it without further delay.

42. The Conference acknowledges that the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, and the Convention complement each other. The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any state under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

43. The Conference stresses the importance of the withdrawal of all reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the Convention.

44. The Conference recalls the actions which States Parties have taken to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the Convention, and calls upon those States Parties that continue to maintain pertinent reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw those reservations, and to notify the Depositary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol accordingly, without delay.

45. The Conference notes that reservations concerning retaliation, through the use of any of the objects prohibited by the Convention, even conditional, are totally incompatible with the absolute and universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, with the aim to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.

46. The Conference notes that the Secretary-General's investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. The Conference notes national initiatives to provide relevant training to experts that could support the Secretary-General's investigative mechanism.

Article IX

47. The Conference reaffirms that this Article identifies the recognized objective of the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

48. The Conference welcomes the fact that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction entered into force on 29 April 1997 and that 188 instruments of ratification or accession have now been deposited with the United Nations. The Conference calls upon all states that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to that Convention without delay.

49. The Conference notes the increasing convergence of biology and chemistry and its possible challenges and opportunities for the implementation of the Conventions.

Article X

50. The Conference stresses the importance of implementation of this Article and recalls that States Parties have a legal obligation to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and not to hamper the economic and technological development of States Parties.

51. The Conference reaffirms the commitment to the full and comprehensive implementation of this Article by all States Parties. The Conference recognises that, while recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology would increase the potential for cooperation among States Parties and thereby strengthen the Convention, they could also increase the potential for the misuse of both science and technology. Therefore, the Conference urges all States Parties possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, particularly with countries less advanced in this field, while promoting the basic objectives of the Convention, as well as ensuring that the promulgation of science and technology is fully consistent with the peaceful object and purpose of the Convention.

52. The Conference recognises the important role of the private sector in the transfer of technology and information and the wide range of organizations within the United Nations system that are already engaged in international cooperation relevant to this Convention.

53. Recognizing the fundamental importance of enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, the Conference agrees on the value of working together to promote capacity building in the fields of vaccine and drug production, disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases as well as biological risk management. The

Conference affirms that building such capacity would directly support the achievement of the objectives of the Convention.

54. The Conference:

(a) encourages the States Parties to continue strengthening existing international organizations and networks working on infectious diseases, in particular those of the WHO, FAO, OIE and IPPC, within their respective mandates;

(b) notes that the role of these organizations is limited to the epidemiological and public/animal/plant health aspects of any disease outbreak, but recognises the added value of information exchange with them;

(c) encourages States Parties to improve communication on disease surveillance at all levels, including between States Parties and with the WHO, FAO, OIE and IPPC;

(d) calls upon States Parties to continue establishing and/or improving national and regional capabilities to survey, detect, diagnose and combat infectious diseases as well as other possible biological threats and integrate these efforts into national and/or regional emergency and disaster management plans;

(e) urges States Parties in a position to do so to continue supporting, directly as well as through international organizations, capacity-building in States Parties in need of assistance in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases and related research;

(f) calls upon States Parties to promote the development and production of vaccines and drugs to treat infectious disease through international cooperation and, as appropriate, public-private partnerships.

55. The Conference recognizes the importance of developing effective national infrastructure for human, animal and plant disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment, as well as national biological risk management through international cooperation and assistance.

56. The Conference, while noting existing bilateral, regional and multilateral assistance, cooperation and partnerships, recognizes, however, that there still remain challenges to be overcome in developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes and that addressing such problems, challenges, needs and restrictions will help States Parties to build sufficient capacity for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment. Keeping in mind Article X, the Conference agrees on the value of targeting and mobilizing resources, including financial resources, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information to help overcome challenges to disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment. Recognizing that all States Parties have a role to play, the Conference stresses that those States Parties seeking to build their capacity should identify their specific needs and requirements and seek partnerships with others, and that those States Parties, in a position to do so, should provide assistance and support.

57. The Conference reaffirms that existing institutional ways and means of ensuring multilateral cooperation among all States Parties need to be developed further in order to promote international cooperation for peaceful uses in areas relevant to the

Convention, including areas, such as medicine, public health, agriculture and the environment.

58. The Conference calls for the use of the existing institutional means within the United Nations system and other international organizations, in accordance with their respective mandates, to promote the objectives of this Article. In this regard the Conference urges States Parties, the United Nations and its specialized agencies to take further specific measures within their competence for the promotion of the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and of international cooperation in this field.

59. The Conference also recognises that there should be efficient coordination mechanisms between the specialized agencies of the United Nations system and international and regional organizations in order to facilitate scientific cooperation and technology transfer.

60. The Conference recognises the need to effectively implement national measures in order to further implementation of Article X. In this regard, the Conference urges States Parties to undertake to review their national regulations governing international exchanges and transfers in order to ensure their consistency with the objectives and provisions of all the articles of the Convention.

61. The Conference encourages States Parties to provide at least biannually appropriate information on how they implement this Article to the Implementation Support Unit within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and requests the Implementation Support Unit to collate such information for the information of States Parties. The Conference welcomes the information provided by a number of States Parties on the cooperative measures they have undertaken towards fulfilling their Article X obligations.

Article XI

62. The Conference recalls that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented at the Sixth Review Conference a proposal to amend Article I and the title of the Convention to include explicitly the prohibition of the use of biological weapons.

63. The Conference recalls the statement at the Sixth Review Conference by the Government of the Russian Federation as a Depositary that it has notified all States Parties of the proposal by the Islamic Republic of Iran to amend the Convention.

64. The Conference reaffirms that the provisions of this Article should in principle be implemented in such a way as not to affect the universality of the Convention.

Article XII

65. The Conference reaffirms that Review Conferences constitute an effective method of reviewing the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Convention are being realized. The Conference therefore decides that Review Conferences be held at least every five years.

66. The Conference decides that the Eighth Review Conference shall be held in Geneva not later than 2016 and should review the operation of the Convention, taking into account, *inter alia*:

(a) new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, taking into account the relevant decision of this Conference regarding the review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention;

(b) the progress made by States Parties on the implementation of the Convention;

(c) progress of the implementation of decisions and recommendations agreed upon at the Seventh Review Conference, taking into account, as appropriate, decisions and recommendations reached at previous review conferences.

Article XIII

67. The Conference reaffirms that the Convention is of unlimited duration and applies at all times, and expresses its satisfaction that no State Party has exercised its right to withdraw from the Convention.

Article XIV

68. The Conference notes with satisfaction that ten states have acceded to or ratified the Convention since the Sixth Review Conference.

69. The Conference underlines that the objectives of the Convention will not be fully realized as long as there remains even a single state not party that could possess or acquire biological weapons.

70. The Conference reiterates the high importance of universalization, in particular by affirming the particular importance of the ratification of the Convention by signatory states and accession to the Convention by those which have not signed the Convention, without delay. States Parties agree to continue to promote universalization.

71. The Conference notes that the primary responsibility for promoting the universality of the Convention rests with the States Parties. The Conference urges States Parties to take action to persuade non-parties to accede to the Convention without delay, and particularly welcomes action by States Parties and regional initiatives to provide assistance and support that would lead to wider accession to the Convention.

72. The Conference welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to wider accession and adherence to the Convention.

73. The Conference urges those States Parties, in a position to do so, to offer assistance and support to States in their preparations for ratification or accession to the Convention.

Article XV

74. The Conference welcomes the decision of the Sixth Review Conference that as well as the five languages listed in this Article, Arabic shall be considered an official language for the purposes of any meetings of the States Parties and other formal communications concerning the operation of the Convention.

appendix IV

Fourth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: Final Declaration

APPENDIX IV

Fourth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Final Declaration

(CCW/CONF.IV/4/Add.1)

The High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which met in Geneva from 14 to 25 November 2011, to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments of the Convention or of the existing Protocols, as well as proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols,

I

Recalling the Declarations adopted by the First Review Conference in 1996, the Second Review Conference in 2001, and the Third Review Conference in 2006,

Reaffirming their conviction that the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is a major instrument of international humanitarian law, which contributes to both preventing and reducing the suffering of civilians and combatants,

Recognising that most major armed conflicts are non-international in character, and that such conflicts have been brought within the scope of the Convention and its annexed Protocols by the amendment of Article 1 of the Convention,

Emphasizing their determination to promote the universality of the Convention and its annexed Protocols with the goal of achieving global adherence and the importance of all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention and its Protocols without delay,

Emphasizing also the importance of the comprehensive implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols including through the dissemination of information to armed forces and the civilian population, the adoption of appropriate technical measures and legislative provisions concerning both the type and use

of weapons, and measures, including legal measures where appropriate for the prevention, enforcement, investigation and suppression of breaches of the regime,

Recognizing the important role international cooperation and assistance can play in the implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols,

Recalling the obligation of all parties to a conflict to take all feasible precautions in the use of mines other than anti-personnel mines with a view to avoiding incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects,

Reaffirming their strong determination to protect civilians from the deleterious humanitarian impact of cluster munitions,

Deeply concerned at the humanitarian and development problems caused by the presence of explosive remnants of war, which constitute a danger to the civilian population as well as an obstacle to reconstruction, restoration of normal social conditions and economic development and in this context reaffirming the need to further develop international cooperation and assistance with this respect,

Acknowledging the foreseeable effects of explosive remnants of war and explosive weapons on civilian populations as a factor to be considered in applying the international humanitarian law rules of precautions, distinction and proportionality,

Recognising also the crucial role of the International Committee of the Red Cross and encouraging it to continue to work to facilitate further ratifications and accessions to the Convention and its annexed Protocols, to disseminate their contents and to lend its expertise to future Conferences and other meetings related to the Convention and its annexed Protocols,

Acknowledging the invaluable humanitarian efforts of international, regional and non-governmental organisations in mitigating the humanitarian impact of armed conflicts,

SOLEMNLY DECLARE:

1. Their commitment to respect and comply fully, in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, with the objectives and provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party as authoritative international instruments governing the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

2. Their acknowledgement that all parties to a conflict have a responsibility to respect international humanitarian law during an armed conflict and to apply, *inter alia*, the prohibitions and restrictions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols,

3. Their desire that all States respect and ensure respect for the revised scope of application of the Convention to the fullest extent possible, and their determination to encourage all States which have not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede to, as appropriate, the amendment to Article 1 without delay,

4. Their determination to encourage all States to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of

War (Protocol V), and that all States respect and ensure respect for the substantive provisions of these Protocols,

5. Their satisfaction at the adoption of “An Accelerated Plan of Action on Universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols” and urge all High Contracting Parties, CCW Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs and other United Nations structures and agencies, International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations to work towards the implementation of that Plan,

6. Their commitment to implement fully the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party, and to keep the provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols under review in order to ensure their provisions remain relevant to modern conflicts,

7. Their determination to consult and cooperate with each other in order to facilitate the full implementation of the obligations contained in the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party, thereby promoting compliance,

8. Their commitment to the full implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention and its annexed Protocols, and in this respect, to fulfil their legal, technical and reporting obligations,

9. Their commitment to continue to contribute to the further development of international humanitarian law and in this context to keep under review both the development of new weapons and uses of weapons, which may have indiscriminate effect or cause unnecessary suffering,

10. Their acknowledgement of the invaluable contribution of the Sponsorship Programme to promote the universalization and implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, the essential administrative support provided by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to the Programme, and to encourage States to contribute financially to the Programme,

11. Their satisfaction at the establishment of the CCW Implementation Support Unit within the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, while noting that the CCW and its Protocols could benefit from a strengthened UNODA, Geneva Branch, in general.

12. That they call on the Implementation Support Unit to work efficiently and effectively to promote the Convention and its annexed Protocols, provide substantive and secretariat support for meetings, facilitate the exchange of information among States and organisations, and assist High Contracting Parties with implementation.

13. Their acknowledgement that there remain ongoing concerns at the humanitarian suffering caused by mines other than anti-personnel mines,

14. Their commitment to consider further the implementation of international humanitarian law with regard to mines other than anti-personnel mines, acknowledging the call of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to this Conference,

15. Their continuing commitment to assist, to the extent feasible, humanitarian demining missions, operating with the consent of the host State and/or the relevant High Contracting Parties to the conflict, in particular by providing all necessary information in their possession covering the location of all known minefields, mined

areas, mines, explosive remnants of war, booby-traps and other devices in the area in which the mission is performing its functions,

16. Their determination to urge States which do not already do so to conduct reviews to determine whether any new weapon, means or methods of warfare would be prohibited under international humanitarian law or other rules of international law applicable to them.

II

Recognising that the important principles and provisions contained in this Final Declaration can also serve as a basis for further strengthening the Convention and its annexed Protocols and express their determination to implement them,

AND TAKE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

Decision 1

Decide to convene an open-ended meeting of experts, under the overall responsibility of the Chairperson-designate of the 2012 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, of three days in 2012 to discuss further the implementation of international humanitarian law with regard to mines other than anti-personnel mines, and to submit a report to the 2012 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.

Decision 2

Decide to commit to “An Accelerated Plan of Action on Universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols” as contained in Annex I of the Final Declaration.

Decision 3

Decide to continue the Sponsorship Programme and urge it to explore all options to promote the universalization and implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols in accordance with the recommendations contained in Annex II of the Final Declaration.

Decision 4

Decide to enhance the implementation of the Compliance Mechanism for the Convention and its annexed Protocols, which was agreed to at the Third Review Conference and the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in 2007 in accordance with the recommendations as contained in Annex III.

Decision 5

1. In accordance with the relevant decisions taken by the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Fifth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V decide to organize in 2012 the following CCW related activities:

(i) Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II on 23 and 24 April 2012;

(ii) Meeting of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V from 25 to 27 April 2012;

(iii) Sixth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on 12 and 13 November 2012;

(iv) Fourteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II on 14 November 2012;

(v) An open-ended meeting of experts of three days in 2012 to discuss further the implementation of international humanitarian law with regard to mines other than anti-personnel mines from 2 to 4 April 2012; and

(vi) Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on 15 and 16 November 2012.

2. The High Contracting Parties agree that all meetings, formal or informal, and Conferences should work in a focussed and efficient manner to achieve their intended objectives, bearing in mind the common goal of optimal use of resources.

3. The Conference decides that a review of the CCW Implementation Support Unit's performance, staff employed and functioning should be undertaken by the High Contracting Parties to the Convention at their annual meeting in 2012, and in this regard requests the Implementation Support Unit to provide a comprehensive report in time for consideration by the High Contracting Parties.

III

REVIEW:

The Conference:

1. Reaffirms that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and recalls the obligation to determine, in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means and method of warfare, whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited under any rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Parties.

2. Reaffirms the need to continue, as appropriate, the codification and progressive development of the rules of international law applicable to certain conventional weapons which may be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and recalls the basic principle that reservations to the Convention or its Protocols must be in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention or its Protocols, respectively.

3. Underlines the need to achieve universal adherence to the Convention and its annexed Protocols. The Conference welcomes recent ratifications and accessions to the Convention and its annexed Protocols and urges the High Contracting Parties to accord high priority to their diplomatic efforts to encourage further adherence with a view to achieving universal adherence as soon as possible.

Article 1

1. The Conference notes the provisions of Article 1, as amended on 21 December 2001.

2. The Conference calls upon States which have not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede to, as appropriate, the amendment to Article 1.

Article 2

The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be interpreted as detracting from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by international humanitarian law.

Article 3

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 3.

Article 4

1. The Conference acknowledges that 114 States have ratified, accepted, acceded or succeeded to the Convention.

2. The Conference calls upon States which are not parties to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to, as appropriate, the Convention, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.

3. The Conference urges High Contracting Parties to actively promote universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

4. The Conference, in this context, welcomes the adoption of “An Accelerated Plan of Action on Universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols”.

Article 5

1. The Conference notes the provisions of Article 5.

2. The Conference recalls in particular the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, which stipulates that each of the Protocols annexed to the Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it.

Article 6

1. The Conference encourages international cooperation in the field of dissemination of the Convention and its annexed Protocols and recognizes the importance of multilateral collaboration relating to instruction, the exchange of experience at all levels, the exchange of instructors and the organization of joint seminars. The Conference underlines the importance of the High Contracting Parties’ obligation to disseminate this Convention and its annexed Protocols and, in particular, to include the content in their programmes of military instruction at all levels.

2. The Conference welcomes the work of the Sponsorship Programme to promote awareness and understanding of the Convention and its annexed Protocols and in particular the production of the DVD ‘Before the Blast’.

3. The Conference also welcomes the CCW website and urges the Implementation Support Unit within the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office

for Disarmament Affairs to continue this work with a view to ensuring the website is up to date and user friendly.

Article 7

1. The Conference notes the provisions of Article 7.
2. On compliance, the Conference welcomes the decision taken to enhance the implementation of the compliance mechanism of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

Article 8

1. The Conference notes the provisions of Article 8.
2. The High Contracting Parties agree to convene an open-ended meeting of experts, under the overall responsibility of the Chairperson-designate of the 2012 Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention, of three days in 2012 to discuss further the implementation of international humanitarian law with regard to mines other than anti-personnel mines.
3. The High Contracting Parties recall their agreement reached at the First and Second Review Conferences and also recalled at the Third Review Conference that Review Conferences should continue to be held on a regular basis.

Article 9

The Conference notes with satisfaction that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

Article 10

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 10.

Article 11

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 11.

Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I)

The Conference notes the provisions of this Protocol.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

The Conference notes the provisions of this Protocol.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

1. The Conference notes the provisions of this Protocol.

2. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of the High Contracting Parties to take the necessary measures under this Protocol and to ensure the full and effective national implementation of the obligations under this Protocol.

3. The Conference welcomes the efforts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to reduce the indiscriminate effects of the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices and to ensure that any such weapons designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering is never used.

4. The Conference welcomes the decision by the Tenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II in 2008, in the framework of revitalizing the work under Amended Protocol II and to further enhance its implementation, to establish an informal open-ended Group of Experts.

5. The Conference notes with satisfaction that annual meetings of the Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II have been held since 2009 to review the operation and status of the Protocol, consider matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to Article 13, paragraph 4 of Amended Protocol II and the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines, as well as the issue of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

6. The Conference takes note of the reporting obligations of the High Contracting Parties under Amended Protocol II, and calls on the High Contracting Parties to fulfil these obligations in a timely, consistent and complete manner.

7. The Conference notes with satisfaction the continued substantive discussions on IEDs which provided the Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II the opportunity to engage actively in a topic relevant to the provisions of Amended Protocol II and their implementation. Experts engaged on various technical aspects including ways to prevent IEDs from being made or emplaced and exchanged views on the humanitarian and other aspects of the IED phenomenon.

8. The Conference notes with satisfaction the decision by the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to analyze the different reporting forms each year to improve the quality of reporting and of the information contained in the forms submitted.

9. The Conference also takes note of the decision by the Twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II in 2010 to synchronize the submission of the national annual reports with the submission of national reports under Protocol V to the Convention. The submission date for both reports was set at 31st March of every year to allow for their consideration by the Group of Experts.

10. The Conference notes with satisfaction that, in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, thirteen Annual Conferences of the High Contracting Parties have been held for the purpose of consultations and cooperation on all issues related to Amended Protocol II.

11. The Conference recalls that the deferral period provided for in paragraphs 2 (c) and 3 (c) of the Technical Annex, which allows High Contracting Parties to defer compliance with the requirements of Article 4 on detectability of anti-personnel mines

and of Article 5 on self-destruction and self-deactivation of anti-personnel mines, has expired on 3 December 2007.

12. The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and bodies of the United Nations; the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist war victims; the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining; as well as of non-governmental organizations in a number of fields relevant to Amended Protocol II, in particular the care and rehabilitation of mine victims, the implementation of mine-awareness programmes and mine clearance.

13. The Conference recommends that future Annual Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II be held back-to-back with Meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention and the Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)

1. The Conference notes the provisions of this Protocol.

2. The Conference notes the concerns raised during the discussions on Protocol III by some High Contracting Parties about the offensive use of white phosphorous against civilians, including suggestions for further discussion on this matter. The Conference further notes that there was no agreement on various aspects of this matter.

Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV)

The Conference notes the provisions of this Protocol and welcomes that there has been no confirmed use of blinding laser weapons.

Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

1. The Conference notes the provisions of this Protocol.

2. The Conference welcomes the efforts of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V to address the deleterious humanitarian effects of explosive remnants of war.

3. The Conference appreciates the fact that since the Third Review Conference 49 new High Contracting Parties joined the Protocol which brings the total number to 76 and reiterates the need for further vigorous efforts from High Contracting Parties, United Nations, international and regional organizations, International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations to promote universalization of the Protocol.

4. The Conference notes with appreciation achievements within Protocol V, especially the Article 4 generic electronic template, Plan of Action on Victim Assistance, Guide to National Reporting, Guide on Generic Preventive Measures and Web-based Information System for Protocol V (WISP.V).

5. The Conference encourages the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V to continue their much needed work on implementation in the areas of the clearance of explosive remnants of war, including existing explosive remnants of war as referred

to in Article 7, recording and transferring information on explosive ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance under Article 4, generic preventive measures, victim assistance, cooperation and assistance, national reporting, as well as the maintenance of the Web-based Information System for Protocol V (WISP.V).

6. The Conference acknowledges the cooperative approach of High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and that this has been facilitated through the decision of the First Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V in 2007 to establish a mechanism for consultation and cooperation consisting of informal meetings of experts chaired by coordinators of which there have been four meetings.

7. The Conference further acknowledges that, in accordance with Article 10 of Protocol V, five Conferences of the High Contracting Parties have been held for the purpose of consultations and cooperation on all issues related to the operation of Protocol V.

8. The Conference acknowledges the valuable contributions and work of relevant agencies and bodies of the United Nations; International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, as well as of non-governmental organizations in a number of fields relevant to Protocol V, in particular the care and rehabilitation of victims of explosive remnants of war, risk education, and clearance, removal or destruction of unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance.

9. The Conference recommends that future Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V be held back-to-back with meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention and the Annual Conferences of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II.

Annex I

An Accelerated Plan of Action on Universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols

The High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects agree to the following actions to accelerate universalization of the Convention and its Protocols:

1. Recognizing that universalization is critical to the success of the Convention and its Protocols as major international humanitarian law treaties and positive progress has been achieved since the Third Review Conference. With the total number of High Contracting Parties to the Convention standing at 114, universalization must continue to be a priority issue;
2. Reaffirming their commitment to the Plan of Action agreed to at the Third Review Conference;
3. Prioritizing universalization efforts on Signatory States, States not party from conflict zones, mine and explosive remnants of war affected States not party and regions with low levels of adherence to the Convention;

4. For all High Contracting Parties to seize all relevant opportunities to promote the Convention and its Protocols, especially through their bilateral contacts;
5. For all High Contracting Parties and the CCW Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, and other United Nations structures and agencies to work with international organizations, regional organizations, International Committee of the Red Cross, parliamentarians, civil society and other stakeholders to promote universality;
6. Urging the CCW Sponsorship Programme to explore all avenues and opportunities to advance universalization of the Convention and its Protocols;
7. Calling on the United Nations Secretary-General to use all available channels to promote the universalization of the Convention and its Protocols, including through the UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Lima, Lomé and Kathmandu;
8. Requesting the CCW Implementation Support Unit to assist High Contracting Parties efforts to promote universalization, gather information on States not party and work towards the objective of universal adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;
9. Further requesting the CCW Implementation Support Unit to continue to report annually to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties on the efforts undertaken towards and progress made on universalization; and
10. Establishing ‘Universalization of the Convention and its Protocols’ as a standing agenda item of the annual Meetings of the High Contracting Parties under which the Chairperson-designate, High Contracting Parties, United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, regional organizations and other organizations would exchange information and report on their respective efforts to promote universalization.

Annex II

CCW Sponsorship Programme

1. The High Contracting Parties welcome the efforts of the Steering Committee of the Sponsorship Programme in implementing the Programme’s basic operational modalities, sponsoring the attendance of 145 beneficiaries from 50 countries and educational tools, thus contributing to the universalization, implementation and respect of the Convention and its Protocols.
2. The High Contracting Parties express appreciation that the Sponsorship Programme has ensured widespread representation and increased technical expertise at CCW meetings and made an important contribution to raising awareness of the Convention and its Protocols.
3. The High Contracting Parties recognize that the ongoing work of the Sponsorship Programme depends on voluntary contributions. Therefore, all High Contracting Parties are invited to support the Programme financially.
4. The High Contracting Parties thank the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining for administering the Sponsorship Programme.

5. It is recommended that the Fourth Review Conference takes the following decisions:

(a) To call on the Sponsorship Programme to continue to adhere to the general principles, basic goals, basic operational purposes and basic operational modalities established in Decision 5 of the Third Review Conference;

(b) To urge the Sponsorship Programme to explore all opportunities to advance awareness raising, universalization and implementation of the Convention and its Protocols;

(c) To encourage the Steering Committee of the Sponsorship Programme to be efficient and pro-active in its work;

(d) To ask the GICHD to continue to administer the Sponsorship Programme, based on an agreement between the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the GICHD, specifying the modalities of co-operation; and

(e) To task UNODA to assess alternative ways of administering the Sponsorship Programme, including by the CCW Implementation Support Unit (ISU), and to submit a report to the CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties in 2012, with recommendations for the administration of the Sponsorship Programme.

Annex III

Enhancing the implementation of the compliance mechanism for the Convention and its annexed Protocols

In recognition of the fundamental importance of compliance, the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects agree to the following actions to enhance implementation of the compliance mechanism for the Convention and its annexed Protocols:

1. Reaffirm their commitment to the compliance mechanism for the Convention and its annexed Protocols as agreed at the Third Review Conference and the Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention in 2007;
2. All High Contracting Parties are called on to submit compliance reports;
3. The deadline for the submission of compliance reports is set at 31 March of each year; and
4. The Chairperson of the annual Meetings of High Contracting Parties to the Convention is tasked with encouraging higher rates of compliance reporting.

appendix V

**High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety
and Security: Chair's summary**

APPENDIX V

High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security 22 September 2011, New York

Chair's summary

(A/C.4/66/8, annex)

The high-level meeting was held on 22 September 2011, from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. A total of 69 delegates spoke, including 8 Heads of State or Government, 30 ministers, and representatives of intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, specialized agencies and related organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Secretary-General opened the meeting and invited the President of the General Assembly and the Director General of IAEA, as well as the Heads of State or Government of Brazil, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine, to address the meeting. At the end of the meeting, the Secretary-General, as convener and Chair of the high-level meeting, circulated the following summary of the discussion which reflected his understanding of the views expressed.

1. The high-level meeting focused on strengthening nuclear safety and security, especially in the light of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, with a view to building political support and momentum at the highest level for the ongoing and planned efforts of the international community. In this connection, the initiative of the Secretary-General in convening the high-level meeting and the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and its outcome were welcomed. Participants expressed appreciation for the United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Participants expressed gratitude for the contribution of the United Nations entities, specialized agencies and related organizations that took part in the study.

2. The high-level parallel interactive sessions addressed the topic of “Strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear disaster risk preparedness”. The sessions were co-chaired at the ministerial level by Brazil, France, Japan and the Republic of Korea. During the high-level segment of the interactive sessions, the Heads of State or Government of Hungary and Lithuania addressed the meeting. Ministers and deputy ministers from Germany, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America participated as discussants at the interactive sessions.

Implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station

3. Participants expressed solidarity with the people and Government of Japan following the earthquake and tsunami on 11 March, which gave rise to the accident

at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. It was noted that the Fukushima accident has given rise to concerns regarding the adequacy of international safety standards and conventions, the global emergency preparedness and response system, and the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies. These concerns have highlighted the need to further improve the nuclear safety regime and the role of IAEA.

4. Participants affirmed the right of States to choose their own energy mix. It was recognized that some States consider nuclear power to be a viable option in meeting their energy needs, while other States have decided not to use, to phase out or to reconsider the development of nuclear power. Some participants emphasized the importance of renewable energy and conservation as alternative energy policies.

5. Participants noted that public confidence in nuclear power has been affected by the Fukushima accident. In particular, participants noted public concerns regarding the impact of radiation on human health. Towards ensuring public trust, participants acknowledged the need to meet the high level of public expectation for maximum efforts to improve nuclear safety and for full transparency and openness in all aspects of nuclear energy and the impact of radiation on human health.

6. Participants recognized that major nuclear accidents may have consequences that transcend national boundaries, including radiological effects on people, agriculture and the environment, as well as economic and development impacts, and that such consequences require an international approach.

Strengthening nuclear safety

Promoting the highest levels of nuclear safety

7. Participants affirmed that the responsibility for ensuring the application of the highest standards of nuclear safety and for providing a timely, transparent and adequate response to nuclear emergencies, including addressing vulnerabilities revealed by accidents, lies with each State and operating organization. Participants further affirmed that safety is a key element for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Participants emphasized the commitment of all States to apply the highest standards of safety to all existing and planned nuclear installations. Participants underscored the importance of independent regulatory frameworks for ensuring nuclear safety.

8. Participants noted with appreciation the convening by the IAEA Director General of the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and welcomed its outcome: the ministerial declaration and the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors and endorsed by the General Conference. Participants hoped that the Action Plan would contribute to strengthening international nuclear safety and looked forward to its full implementation. Participants affirmed the key, statutory role of IAEA in the development of nuclear safety standards and welcomed the intention of the Agency to review and revise the relevant IAEA safety standards as necessary, as provided for by the Action Plan. All States were urged to join and

effectively implement all relevant conventions^a and to apply all relevant international standards and guidelines.

9. Participants welcomed the steps taken so far by the international community to discuss the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and to strengthen nuclear safety and emergency response and preparedness, including the outcomes of the third session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Deauville, the ministerial seminar on nuclear safety and the related forum on the Fukushima accident held in Paris.

10. In this connection, Japan reiterated its decision to host a follow-up high-level meeting on nuclear safety in the second half of 2012, in cooperation with IAEA. Participants expressed support for further expert meetings to be organized by IAEA, to analyse and learn the lessons from the Fukushima accident.

11. Participants also acknowledged the steps taken by Governments, including reviews of their nuclear safety standards and the adequacy of nuclear regulatory frameworks, as well as assessments of the safety of their planned and existing nuclear installations. States that have not done so were urged to promptly undertake a national assessment of the design of nuclear power plants against site specific extreme natural hazards, including the possible impact of multiple events, and to implement the necessary corrective action in a timely manner.

12. Participants expressed support for enhancing the transparency and effectiveness of communication among operators, regulators and relevant international organizations and for strengthening the role of IAEA in this regard. Participants emphasized the importance of transparency and openness and the dissemination of timely, clear and easily understandable information to the public, utilizing available expertise and monitoring techniques of the relevant international organizations. Participants recognized that public concerns about the effects of radiation could be best addressed through objective, scientifically based assessments, transparency, and accurate and thorough public reporting. Participants underscored the importance of increased cooperation between the relevant international organizations.

Strengthening the international framework for nuclear safety

13. Participants expressed support for the strengthening and review of the international nuclear safety framework, including enhancing implementation of existing instruments and consideration of proposals made to amend specific conventions. They welcomed the decision of the Contracting parties of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to convene an extraordinary meeting in 2012 on the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Participants affirmed the central role of IAEA in promoting international cooperation and in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global nuclear safety, in providing expertise and advice in this field, and in promoting nuclear safety culture worldwide.

^a These include: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; Convention on Nuclear Safety; Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

14. Participants welcomed the efforts by IAEA to develop a standard methodology for the above-mentioned hazard assessments and noted the benefit of impartial international peer review of such assessments. Participants expressed support for strengthening existing IAEA peer reviews of nuclear regulatory effectiveness, the operational safety, design safety and emergency preparedness and response. Some participants wished to see these peer reviews have a more mandatory nature.

15. Some participants emphasized the necessity of a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing appropriate compensation for nuclear damage.

Nuclear safety and security

16. Participants recognized that the Fukushima accident also has implications for nuclear security. Many participants recognized the increased synergy between nuclear safety and nuclear security, and acknowledged the importance of a coordinated approach to nuclear safety and security, pursued within the framework of IAEA, and as addressed in the IAEA safety standards and security guidance. Some participants stressed that nuclear security and nuclear safety may have different causes, which may require different responses. It was also emphasized that nuclear safety cannot be dealt with in isolation of nuclear security, non-proliferation and disarmament, and that nuclear disarmament strengthens nuclear safety and security.

17. Participants recognized that there are several common characteristics in incidents arising from the unauthorized acquisition, use, transport or storage of nuclear materials or attacks on nuclear installations and nuclear accidents, and that both types of incidents may have similar consequences in terms of radioactive releases. Participants expressed heightened interest in addressing the nexus between nuclear safety and security, and to take account of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident relating to the potential vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants.

18. In this regard, participants took note of their recent accessions to the international conventions dealing with nuclear safety and security.

19. Some participants noted that matters pertaining to nuclear security had been addressed in a number of forums, including the Nuclear Security Summit, the G-8 Global Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The key role of IAEA in promoting international cooperation to strengthen nuclear security was emphasized, as was the importance of ensuring that IAEA has the resources needed to perform this role.

20. In this connection, some participants expressed the hope that the Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in Seoul in March 2012, would reinforce global efforts to enhance nuclear security. Furthermore, participants expressed support for the efforts of the Republic of Korea to address the synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

Enhancing emergency preparedness and response

21. All States were urged to conduct prompt national reviews of their emergency preparedness and response arrangements and capabilities, with the IAEA secretariat providing support and assistance as requested. A number of participants emphasized the importance of universal implementation of the relevant IAEA standards and

response at the national level as a key to improving preparedness and response. In this regard, IAEA should review and revise, as necessary, the IAEA safety standards and continuously upgrade standards, guidance and practical tools in the area of emergency preparedness and response. Participants underlined that capacity-building programmes should include education and training and exercises at the national, regional and international levels, and that such programmes should cover all the nuclear safety-related areas, including emergency preparedness and response. An initiative was proposed to create an international response force attached to IAEA, in addition to the creation of a training centre to respond to nuclear accidents.

22. Participants underlined the need to review and strengthen the international emergency preparedness and response framework, and to strengthen the assistance mechanisms to ensure that necessary assistance is made available promptly and to consider enhancing and fully utilizing the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET), including expanding its rapid response capabilities.

23. It was stressed that effective local, national, regional and international preparedness and response capabilities and arrangements are essential to minimize the impacts of nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies. In this regard, participants highlighted the importance of integrated planning for preparedness and response and that such capabilities should be improved.

24. Some participants underscored the need to strengthen, within existing mechanisms, the link between the international system of response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies and the international humanitarian coordination system and contingency planning and preparedness.

25. Some participants, including specialized agencies and international organizations, highlighted the need to enhance the information exchange of environmental radioactivity monitoring data in nuclear and radiological incidents.

26. Participants expressed support for a number of additional measures, including promoting emergency preparedness at all levels; ensuring greater cohesion between national and international emergency response efforts, including through the development of training at the regional and international levels, strengthening regional capabilities; and enhancing the role of IAEA, including through analysis of emergency situations and prognosis of possible scenarios based on evidence, scientific knowledge and the capabilities of States, and by conducting, in case of a nuclear emergency and with the prior consent of the State concerned, timely fact-finding missions and making the results publicly available.

27. Taking into consideration the points raised during the high-level meeting, the Secretary-General suggested the following actions:

(a) The Secretary-General will forward the present summary to the General Assembly for consideration, as appropriate, by the Fourth Committee and the plenary, as well as to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

(b) In order to facilitate a full assessment of the levels of exposure and radiation risks attributable to the Fukushima accident by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the General Assembly

should ensure that the Committee has all the necessary capacity and resources to better undertake its work;

(c) Given that the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference recognized the need for continuing international efforts to address the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy, the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference should consider allocating specific time to discuss nuclear safety and security;

(d) In view of the efforts by the Secretary-General and the IAEA Director General in promoting greater participation in the international instruments on nuclear safety and nuclear security, the Secretary-General urges all States to become party to and effectively implement relevant international instruments. In particular, the Secretary-General reiterates his invitation to States that are not yet parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to become party to this important treaty. The Secretary-General also calls upon the States parties to the Convention to consider ways to promote ratification and implementation of the Convention in 2012, marking the fifth year of its entry into force. This matter can be further discussed at the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in 2012;

(e) In the light of the intersection between nuclear energy, climate change and sustainable development, the Secretary-General recommends that the preparatory process for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 consider addressing these issues, as appropriate, in its outcome document. It should also consider ways of giving these issues attention in the preparatory activities of the Conference;

(f) Given the need for establishing a closer link between the nuclear response system and the humanitarian coordination system in case of nuclear accidents, the Secretary-General will ask the Emergency Relief Coordinator and Chair of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to study ways to enhance the capacity of the organizations of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in this regard. The result of the study will be announced at the appropriate forums;

(g) Recalling the work of the G-8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG), including the launch of the International Initiative on 3S-Based Nuclear Energy Infrastructure, at the 2008 G-8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, to raise awareness and improve safeguards, safety and security in the context of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and also recalling the G-8 summit in Deauville and the ministerial seminar on nuclear safety, the Secretary-General encourages the G-8 to further develop this initiative taking into account the issues raised by the Fukushima accident.

appendix VI

Second Ministerial Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development: Outcome Document

APPENDIX VI

Second Ministerial Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development

Outcome Document

1. We, the Ministers and representatives of 96 countries, met in Geneva to assess the progress made in implementing the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development adopted on 7 June 2006, and to reaffirm our support and commitment to its goals.
2. We are encouraged that 112 countries have adopted the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and call upon additional countries to do so.
3. We commend the progress made at the international, regional, national and local levels in better understanding the linkages between armed violence and development and in fostering actions to reduce the risks of armed violence. Notable in this regard are, among others, the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence as well as the United Nations Secretary-General's report *Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence* and the 2011 World Bank *World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development*.
4. We believe that measurable reductions in armed violence can be achieved and are inspired by the growth in innovative measures designed to improve safety, security and access to justice alongside efforts to enhance socio-economic development. These endeavours are pursued by national governments, but also by local authorities, civil society organizations and the private sector, increasingly in a coherent, coordinated and complementary manner. Past experience highlights the critical importance of adopting comprehensive and evidence-based approaches that build on principles of local ownership and capacity and respect for cultural diversity.
5. We accept that poverty reduction, equitable socio-economic development, social inclusion, democratic values, good governance and the respect for the rule of law and human rights have important roles to play in continuing efforts to reduce and prevent armed violence.
6. We believe that activities to address the specific impact of armed violence on women, boys and girls, should be incorporated into development efforts at the international, regional, national and local level in accordance with existing international commitments, including United Nations Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security.
7. We recognize that much more work needs to be done if citizens are to experience greater safety and security. Since our 2008 Ministerial Review Conference, more than two million men, women and children have died as a result of armed violence around

the world.^a During this period millions more lives have been devastated through injury, trauma, the loss of economic and social opportunities and the destruction of physical infrastructure. The majority of these deaths and injuries occurred in non-conflict settings. Although the perpetrators and direct victims of armed violence are predominantly men, many others are also victims, including women and girls who may suffer sexual and gender-based violence.

8. We believe that, whether in situations of armed conflict or crime, armed violence has a devastating impact on development and hinders the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. It reduces national income and productivity, diverts investment and rolls back hard-won development gains.

9. We acknowledge that armed violence is a shared security concern for all countries, regardless of their level of development, because its impact often extends beyond national borders.

10. We believe that a concerted and accelerated effort, based on increased international cooperation, is required to reduce and prevent armed violence. Reaffirming our support to the goals and commitments of the Geneva Declaration and the Oslo Commitments, in particular to achieving, by 2015, measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and tangible improvements in development, we agree to:

a) Integrate armed violence reduction and prevention objectives and actions into regional, national and sub-national development and security plans and programmes. These should be measurable, developed on the basis of consultative processes that include groups particularly affected by armed violence, and their implementation supported by relevant sub-national, national, regional and international actors, including civil society organizations;

b) Advance comprehensive and conflict/violence-sensitive development strategies and institutional capacities that purposefully target the key risk factors that give rise to armed violence. These strategies should aim to generate employment, livelihoods and economic opportunities; strengthen people's security and access to justice; foster effective and accountable public security institutions; encourage inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; and promote social inclusion, gender equality, child protection efforts and the effective delivery of basic services, including health and education;

c) Strengthen and further develop sub-national, national and regional capacities to monitor, measure and analyse the scope, scale and distribution of armed violence, and establish national armed violence monitoring and reporting mechanisms. These monitoring systems should be designed so that they can be accessible to states, local authorities and civil society to track progress in achieving measurable reductions in armed violence;

d) Implement existing national, regional and international agreements to deal effectively with the supply of, demand for, and illicit trafficking of small arms, light weapons and ammunition. This includes, in particular, implementing fully the *UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small*

^a The Global Burden of Armed Violence estimates that more than 740,000 people die directly or indirectly from armed violence every year.

Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons*, and the *UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition*, and supporting the development of other legally-binding international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty;

e) Recognize and ensure the rights of victims of armed violence in a non-discriminatory manner, including, inter alia, provision for their adequate care and rehabilitation, as well as their social and economic inclusion, in accordance with national laws and development plans, and applicable international commitments and obligations;

f) Increase the effectiveness of the financial, technical and human resources and assistance available from international organizations, national governments and local authorities, and establish effective and efficient multi-year armed violence reduction and prevention programmes in line with regional, national and sub-national development plans and programmes;

g) Implement integrated approaches to reduce and prevent armed violence by working in partnership across sectors (such as development, humanitarian, public health, peace-building, human rights, urban development, security and justice), at regional, national and sub-national levels, and with relevant actors, including government, civil society, international organizations and the private sector;

h) Support and further develop collaborative mechanisms, partnerships and initiatives, in particular, South-South and triangular cooperation and initiatives;

i) Nominate a national point of contact to act as an information and coordination resource on national activities carried out in the framework of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development; and

j) Strengthen our efforts to share knowledge, experiences and good practices on armed violence reduction and prevention. Towards these ends, we encourage the development of the capacities of the Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration to assist signatory States in accessing available expertise, knowledge and financial resources to implement innovative armed violence reduction and prevention programmes.

11. We commit ourselves to promote these undertakings, and the overall goals of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, in the United Nations General Assembly and in all other appropriate fora;

12. We agree to meet again prior to the review of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015 to review our progress and assess what further steps are required to reduce armed violence and to achieve development outcomes.

Adopted in Geneva on 31 October 2011

appendix VII

Security Council resolution 1977 (2011)

APPENDIX VII

Security Council resolution 1977 (2011)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6518th meeting, on 20 April 2011

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006 and 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008,

Reaffirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the need for all Member States to comply fully with their obligations and fulfil their commitments in relation to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be misused for proliferation purposes,

Remaining gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-state actors may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that international cooperation between States, in accordance with international law, is required to counter the illicit trafficking by non-State actors in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts at national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, in order to strengthen a global response to the serious challenge and threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Emphasizing the need for States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to strengthen export controls, to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, and to secure sensitive materials,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, in accordance with its programmes of work, including the establishment of the working groups for facilitating implementation of the Programme of Work,

Recognizing States' progress in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), *while noting* that States have taken fewer measures in some of its areas,

Endorsing also the valuable activities of the 1540 Committee with relevant international regional and subregional organizations,

Taking note of international efforts towards full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on preventing the financing of proliferation-related activities, and *taking into consideration* the guidance of the framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),

Noting that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their national reports on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

Further noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Recognizing, in that regard, the importance of dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States and stressing that direct contact is an effective means of such dialogue,

Recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), *emphasizing* the importance of providing States, in response to their requests, with effective assistance that meets their needs, and *welcoming* the coordinating and facilitating role of the 1540 Committee in this regard,

Stressing, in that regard, the need of enhanced assistance and collaboration among States, between the 1540 Committee and States, and between the 1540 Committee and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations in assisting States to implement resolution 1540 (2004),

Recognizing the importance of progress towards achieving the goals and objectives of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit as a contribution to the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004),

Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress acts of nuclear terrorism including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions, and through appropriate measures to reinforce the existing legal framework with a view to ensure that those committing offences of nuclear terrorism are effectively held accountable,

Endorsing the 2009 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and *taking note* of the findings and recommendations contained in its final document,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), and *re-emphasizes* the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;

2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of 10 years until 25 April 2021;

3. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will conduct a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate, including, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments to the mandate, and will submit to the Security Council a report on the conclusions of those reviews, and *decides* that, accordingly, the first review should be held before December 2016;

4. *Again decides* that the 1540 Committee should submit an annual Programme of Work to the Security Council before the end of each May, and *decides* that next Programme of Work will be prepared before 31 May 2011;

5. *Decides* to continue to provide the 1540 Committee with the assistance of experts, and to this end:

(a) *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish, in consultation with the 1540 Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“group of experts”), acting under the direction and purview of the Committee, composed of individuals with the appropriate experience and knowledge to provide the Committee with expertise, to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate under resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and this resolution, including through facilitation of assistance to improve implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

(b) *Requests*, in that regard, the 1540 Committee to consider recommendations for the Committee and the group of experts on expertise requirements, broad geographic representation, working methods, modalities, and structure, including consideration of the feasibility of a coordination and leadership position of the group of experts, and to present these recommendations to the Security Council no later than 31 August 2011;

Implementation

6. *Again calls upon* all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the Committee without delay;

7. *Again encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, when appropriate or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, voluntarily, on States’ effective practices;

8. *Encourages* all States to prepare on a voluntary basis national implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as appropriate,

mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit those plans to the 1540 Committee;

9. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work, which includes the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) as well as States' efforts at outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation; and which addresses in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of that resolution, which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such exports and trans-shipments; and includes, as necessary, specific priorities for its work, taking into account its annual review on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), prepared with the assistance of the group of experts before the end of each December;

10. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to engage actively with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned and effective practices, in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), drawing in particular on information provided by States as well as examples of successful assistance, and to liaise on the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), while bearing in mind that customized assistance is useful for the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at national levels;

11. *Encourages*, in that regard, the 1540 Committee, with the support of necessary relevant expertise, to actively engage in dialogue with States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits to States at their invitation;

12. *Requests* the 1540 Committee, with the support of the group of experts, to identify effective practices, templates and guidance, with a view to develop a compilation, as well as to consider preparing a technical reference guide about resolution 1540 (2004), to be used by States on a voluntary basis in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), and in that regard, *encourages* the 1540 Committee, at its discretion, to draw also on relevant expertise, including, civil society and the private sector, with, as appropriate, their State's consent;

Assistance

13. *Encourages* States that have requests for assistance to convey them to the 1540 Committee, and *encourages* them to make use of the Committee's assistance template to that effect;

14. *Urges* States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to inform the Committee as appropriate of areas in which they are able to provide assistance; and *calls upon* States and such organizations, if they have not done so previously, to provide the 1540 Committee with a point of contact for assistance by 31 August 2011;

15. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue strengthening the Committee's role in facilitating technical assistance for implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in particular by engaging actively, with the support of the group of experts, in

matching offers and requests for assistance, through such means as visits to States, at the invitation of the State concerned, assistance templates, action plans or other information submitted to the 1540 Committee;

16. *Supports* the continued efforts of the 1540 Committee to secure a coordinated and transparent assistance process that provides timely and ready availability of information for States seeking assistance and for States prepared to provide assistance;

17. *Encourages* meetings on assistance issues with the participation of the 1540 Committee, between States prepared to offer assistance, States requesting assistance, other interested States, and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations;

Cooperation with International, Regional, and Subregional Organizations

18. *Calls upon* relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to designate and provide the 1540 Committee by 31 August 2011 with a point of contact or coordinator for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); and *encourages* them to enhance cooperation and information sharing with the 1540 Committee on technical assistance and all other issues of relevance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

19. *Reiterates* the need to continue to enhance ongoing cooperation among the 1540 Committee, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information sharing, coordination on visits to States, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to all three committees; and expressing its intention to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order to better coordinate their efforts;

Transparency and Outreach

20. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to institute transparency measures and activities, inter alia by making fullest possible use of the Committee's website, and *urges* the Committee to conduct, with the participation of the group of experts, regular meetings open to all Member States on the Committee's and group's activities related to the aforementioned objectives;

21. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to organize and participate in outreach events on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the international, regional, subregional, and, as appropriate, national level, and promote the refinement of these outreach efforts to focus on specific thematic and regional issues related to implementation;

Administration and Resources

22. *Recognizes* that implementation of the mandate of the 1540 Committee requires sustained support and adequate resources; and to that end:

(a) *Endorses* the existing administrative and logistics support to the 1540 Committee from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and decides that the Committee should report to the Council by January 2012 on the possibility of strengthening this support, including through strengthening of ODA's regional capacity to support the implementation of the resolution at regional, subregional and national levels;

(b) *Calls upon* the Secretariat to provide and maintain sufficient expertise to support activities of the 1540 Committee as outlined in the present resolution;

(c) *Encourages* States that are able to do so to provide resources to the Office of Disarmament Affairs to assist States in implementing their 1540 obligations, and to make available "in kind" contributions or cost-free training and expertise to the 1540 Committee to help the group of experts meet requests for assistance in a timely and effective manner;

(d) *Invites* the 1540 Committee to consider developing, in close cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and other United Nations bodies, ways to utilize and maintain expertise, including, in particular, of former experts of the group, that could be made available for specific missions and assistance needs regarding the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

(e) *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to encourage and take full advantage of voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and *requests* the 1540 Committee at its discretion, to promote the efficient and effective use of the existing funding mechanisms within the United Nations system;

23. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

appendix VIII

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

APPENDIX VIII

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

66/26. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), be further explored. It also recommended that the CD actively continue intensive negotiations to reach agreement and conclude effective international agreements on security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

Introduced by: Pakistan (28 Oct.)

GA vote: 120-0-57 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 119-0-56 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 22-26.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it intended to support the draft resolution, reaffirming that security guarantees received to date had not been effective and that a single international, legally binding judicial instrument, through which nuclear-weapon States could provide non-nuclear-weapon States with security guarantees against the use or threat of use of such weapons, should be created. Cuba reiterated its call for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and supported the call for a high-level international conference to reach an agreement on that matter. Furthermore, it believed that the concept of nuclear deterrence as a basis for unsustainable and unacceptable military doctrines should be abandoned once and for all, since, far from contributing to nuclear disarmament, it encouraged the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons.

After voting in favour, **Japan** expressed its belief that deepening substantive discussions on ways to increase the effectiveness of negative security assurances was an important issue. However, it stressed that the draft resolution should not prejudice the discussions in the CD. Japan strongly hoped that each member State of the CD would demonstrate its flexibility and that the Conference would break the long-standing stalemate and advance its substantive work on the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and discussions on other important issues.

66/28. Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly, which last adopted this resolution in 2009, recalled that the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reaffirmed the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Assembly also noted that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Introduced by: Islamic Republic of Iran (17 Oct.)

GA vote: 118-52-6; 113-9-48, p.p. 6; 118-7-43, p.p. 9 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 105-52-10; 110-7-47, p.p. 6; 111-7-44, p.p. 9 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 32-37.

First Committee. Having voted against the draft resolution, the following countries made statements:

- **Poland**, which spoke on behalf of the European Union (EU), explained that their negative vote was due to the non-compliance of the resolution's sponsor with non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. The EU particularly welcomed the convening of a 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to be attended by all States of the region, which the EU urged to fully and constructively engage in the process leading to the 2012 conference and at the conference itself. The EU considered that the 2012 conference should contribute to the resolution of all challenges related to weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
- The **United States** stated that, notwithstanding its negative vote on the draft resolution, it continued to support the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference and, of course, the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which covered all three pillars of the NPT. However, the draft resolution as a whole reflected a lack of balance and integrity. It also mentioned the non-compliance of the primary sponsor with its NPT obligations.

After having abstained in the vote, **Pakistan** conveyed that, as a non-party to the NPT, it neither subscribed to nor was bound by the conclusions and decisions of the Treaty, including those relating to universality.

66/33. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee

By this resolution, the General Assembly took note of the decision by States parties to hold the first session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2012 and requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide

Introduced by: Philippines (17 Oct.)

GA vote: 175-0-3; 174-0-3, p.p. 7 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 169-0-3; 169-0-3, p.p. 7 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 52-55.

such services as may be required for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

First Committee. **Pakistan**, which abstained in the vote, clarified that, as a non-party to the NPT, it neither subscribed to, nor was bound by the conclusions, decisions and follow-on actions of the NPT Review Conferences.

66/40. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly reiterated that each article of the NPT was binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that all States parties should be held fully accountable with respect to strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and called upon all States to comply fully with all decisions, resolutions and other commitments made at Review Conferences.

The General Assembly called upon all NPT States parties to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and recognized the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the region, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The Assembly welcomed the recent appointment of a facilitator and designation of a host Government.

The Assembly also stressed the importance of the fulfilment of the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2010 Review Conference to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, and recalled those commitments as envisaged in action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan, which included, inter alia: to rapidly move towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; to address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; and to discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.

The General Assembly called upon all NPT States parties to implement all elements of the 2010 Review Conference action plan in a faithful and timely manner so that progress across all of the pillars of the Treaty could be realized.

First Committee. The following two States made general statements before the vote:

- **New Zealand**, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and New Zealand), expressed the commitment of the members of the Coalition to the NPT. It stated that with the success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the draft resolution, like the previous year's, reflected the New Agenda Coalition's focus on ensuring that the

Introduced by: New Zealand, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (28 Oct.)

GA vote: 169-6-6; 170-1-7, o.p. 1; 168-4-3, o.p. 9 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 160-6-4; 163-1-8, o.p. 1; 160-5-3, o.p. 9 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 82-90.

nuclear disarmament commitments contained in the Conference's action plan were fully implemented.

- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** pointed out that paragraph 10, which mentioned the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Six-Party Talks, conveyed contradictory messages: "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", not the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was a correct expression of the reality. It also disagreed with the singling out of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the draft resolution.

Two of the States that voted against the draft resolution explained their positions:

- **India** reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, India could not accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, emphasizing that, as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State's acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty should be based on the principle of free consent. India stressed that nuclear weapons were an integral part of its national security and would remain so pending global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.
- The **United States**, speaking also on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, noted that the draft resolution did not accurately reflect the commitments contained in the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, did not show an equitable balance among the three pillars of the NPT, did not adequately address compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations and, in particular, neglected to mention the challenge to the NPT regime posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran's failure to comply with its international obligations. They were also concerned that it omitted any reference to the negotiation of an FMCT in the CD.

Two abstaining States took the floor:

- **Pakistan** agreed that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing, however, it was disappointed at the selective and discriminatory language of paragraph 9 that called upon Pakistan to accede unconditionally to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and, in accordance with its clear position on the NPT, it could neither accept nor endorse the decisions, recommendations and resolutions emanating from the NPT Review Conferences.
- **China** supported the purposes and objectives contained in the draft resolution, however, it noted with regret that certain elements were inconsistent with the contents of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. China's view was that, as the Final Document had been adopted by consensus that was difficult to attain, it should not be changed or interpreted in an arbitrary or more generalized manner, and the consensus attained should not be misinterpreted.

66/44. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly resolved to consider options for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices at its sixty-seventh session should the CD fail to agree on and implement a comprehensive programme of work by the end of its 2012 session. It encouraged interested Member States to continue efforts, including within and on the margins of the CD, in support of the commencement of negotiations, including through meetings involving scientific experts on various technical aspects of the treaty, drawing on available expertise from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant bodies, as appropriate.

Introduced by: Canada (18 Oct.)

GA vote: 158-2-21; 157-2-17, o.p. 2; 160-2-16, o.p. 3 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 151-2-23; 149-3-16, o.p. 2; 148-2-19, o.p. 3 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 99-103.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Tuvalu** said that it had intended to become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

Explaining their positions before the vote, two States took the floor:

- **Pakistan**, which intended to vote against the draft, pointed out the draft resolution's flaws: retaining the reference to consider options for FMCT negotiations, ostensibly outside the CD; and keeping its non-proliferation-centric focus. It disagreed on a ban on future production of fissile materials without reduction of existing stocks. Pakistan asserted that the stalemate in the CD was not due to the FMCT alone, and noted that it would be appropriate to acknowledge the reasons for the decades of CD deadlock on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
- **Argentina** stated that it would vote in favour of the draft. It agreed with the spirit of the draft resolution that attempted to contribute to revitalizing the work of the CD through the adoption and implementation of a programme of work leading to the start of substantive negotiations. Argentina stressed the role of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. However, it disagreed with the establishment of a priori options for future courses of action to be considered by the General Assembly should the CD fail to agree on and implement its programme of work by the end of its 2012 session.

After voting in favour, the following five States, explained their positions:

- **South Africa** noted that, although it supported the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, such a treaty was not the only item that was ripe for negotiations in the CD. It viewed the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as an important and viable option where disarmament issues could be discussed in a comprehensive manner. South Africa emphasized that its support for the draft resolution was without prejudice to the priority it attached to nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and other priority issues such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

- **Slovenia**, which had long supported the FMCT, believed that the treaty would not only lead to a world free of nuclear weapons, but also complemented the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Pointing out the urgency of commencing negotiations, Slovenia expressed regret that the original draft's paragraph 2, which would have requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to identify options for an FMCT, was removed in the final draft. In its view, that text would have provided new impetus to start those long-awaited negotiations.
- **Liechtenstein**, expressing disappointment at the general lack of progress made thus far by the CD, would have preferred to see an earlier version of the draft resolution, which had called for a governmental expert group in the absence of an agreed programme of work for the CD in due time. It hoped that, in the next session of the General Assembly, different initiatives could be merged in order to create one strong resolution that would carry multilateral disarmament negotiations forward.
- **China** voted in favour of the draft resolution based on its consistent support for the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. It also stressed that the CD was the only appropriate forum for the negotiation and adoption of an FMCT. Given that paragraphs 2 and 3 were inconsistent with that view, China abstained in the voting on those paragraphs.
- **Brazil** stressed that negotiations on an FMCT should not be launched at the risk of the CD's future as the single legitimate multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, efforts should be made to hold negotiations or deliberations on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It also did not encourage the future establishment of parallel mechanisms to the CD. It was convinced that the best solution was the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in order to have a true revision of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

Five States, which abstained in the vote, delivered statements:

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** pointed out that the General Assembly should not be misused as leverage to prioritize the items on the Conference's agenda. It believed that starting negotiations in the CD on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline should receive the highest priority on the agenda of the Conference. That programme should include the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believed that an FMCT should not be developed as a mere non-proliferation instrument and must cover past and future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and provide for their total destruction.
- **Indonesia** was not convinced that some new elements in this year's draft resolution would contribute positively to common efforts to urge the Conference to meet its obligations as the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, and disagreed that any issue before the Conference should be taken outside the Conference before 2012. Such a deadline for discussing FMCT issues outside the CD would also tip the already delicate balance between the progress made on non-proliferation and on nuclear disarmament issues. It was

opposed to taking only the FMCT outside the Conference, maintaining that the Conference lacked political will not only on an FMCT, but also on the issues of nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

- Recalling the high-level meeting in September 2010 that underscored the importance of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted with the consideration of disarmament issues, **Libya** stressed that seeking other options for negotiations outside the CD would weaken the Conference. Secondly, it believed that States should implement the resolution on the follow-up to the high-level meeting on revitalizing the CD (A/RES/65/93), which was adopted by consensus, before other mechanisms were sought outside the CD. Thirdly, it saw a contradiction between paragraphs 1 and 2, since paragraph 1 requested the CD to immediately implement a comprehensive programme of work on an FMCT, while paragraph 2 resolved to consider various options. That would create a duplication of the decisions of the Conference and other proposed mechanisms.
- **Israel** drew attention to the unproven utility of an FMCT in addressing the current and growing proliferation challenges, including non-compliance by States with their international obligations in the nuclear domain. It believed that that was especially true for the Middle East, where several States had a poor track record of compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Israel reiterated that its long-standing position was that the idea of a cut-off treaty was subsumed in the concept of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East—the central prerequisites for which were far from being fulfilled.
- **Egypt** believed that the CD was the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and therefore opposed any potential encroachment on the Conference or any risk of possible duplication of its work. Egypt stressed that the lack of political will prevented the Conference from adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would address its four core issues equally. Having always considered an FMCT as a crucial step towards nuclear disarmament, which it considered a top priority, Egypt had engaged constructively with the main sponsor of the draft resolution to include language that would address the issue of stockpiles of past fissile materials production for military uses in any potential fissile materials treaty. However, those suggestions were not adequately taken on board.

66/45. United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly emphasized the importance of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in a way that promoted international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security, and the call upon the nuclear-weapon States to report

Introduced by: Japan (14 Oct.)

GA vote: 169-1-11; 175-1-4, p.p. 9; 174-3-2, o.p. 2; 177-1-3, o.p. 8; 169-3-6, o.p. 9; 172-1-5, o.p. 15 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 156-1-15; 165-1-3, p.p. 9; 166-3-2, o.p. 2; 167-1-3, o.p. 8; 161-3-7, o.p. 9; 164-1-5, o.p. 15 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 104-114.

their undertakings in 2014 to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The Assembly reiterated its call for the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT and its early conclusion and regretted that negotiations had not yet started. It recognized the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States, which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also recognized that, by signing and ratifying relevant protocols (to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones) that contain negative security assurances, nuclear-weapon States would undertake individual legally binding commitments with respect to the status of such zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to such treaties.

First Committee. Speaking in explanation of its position before the vote, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**, which intended to vote against the draft resolution, reacted to the text's reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its nuclear weapons programme, uranium enrichment and light water reactor construction. It stated that it was committed to a peaceful settlement through the early and speedy opening of the Six-Party Talks and was in favour of moving towards a settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula on an equal basis, in a comprehensive and full-fledged manner and through a simultaneous action-for-action process.

Although it voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, the **Russian Federation** explained that it abstained in the voting on paragraph 9 because it dealt with the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Its position was that such negotiations must be conducted at the CD. It believed matters related to negotiations on that treaty should be decided within the context of the draft resolutions presented by the representative of Canada on an FMCT and on the CD.

The following five countries that took the floor abstained in the vote:

- **Brazil** stated that it had the following concerns in paragraph 9 of the draft resolution: language that would allow for negotiations on an FMCT to take place outside the CD; exclusion of language to support the immediate commencement of discussions within the CD of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and the absence of a reference to the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol and that additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons had been achieved. It further disagreed to the reintroduction of some ambiguous formulations derived from article VI of the NPT, which was supposed to be clarified by the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals, agreed on at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
- **India** stressed that the draft resolution fell short of the objective to address the need for a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework for achieving global and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. India voted against paragraph 2, as it could not accept the call to accede to NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Nuclear weapons were an integral part of India's national security and would remain so pending

non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament. Consistent with its position on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, India abstained in the voting on paragraph 8. As India supported the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the CD, the question of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons did not arise and it therefore abstained in the voting on paragraph 9. India had also abstained in the voting on paragraph 15, believing that the concept of a comprehensive safeguards agreement was applicable only to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. India had concluded an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and a protocol additional to that agreement.

- **Pakistan** maintained that it could not accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State without conditions. While it supported the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it was opposed to the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, which were selective, discriminatory and unrealistic.
- **Cuba** believed that the draft resolution lacked the substantive elements to effectively achieve the objective of general nuclear disarmament, which it considered to be achievable through specific measures adopted on a verifiable and non-discriminatory basis. With regard to the fifteenth preambular paragraph, it was concerned that the Security Council was limited in composition and tended to be selective in the treatment of the nuclear non-proliferation issue. It also reiterated its deep concern about the slow movement towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by nuclear-weapon States on the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
- Although it had consistently advocated the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons, **China** could not, however, support paragraph 9, relating to moratoriums on production, because it was not conducive to the promotion of the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT.

66/46. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

The General Assembly adopted this annual resolution. It shared the deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and in this context reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. It called upon all nuclear-weapon States to undertake concrete disarmament efforts and stressed that all States needed to make special efforts to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

Introduced by: Malaysia (14 Oct.)

GA vote: 130-26-23 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 127-25-22 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 115-119.

The Assembly again called upon all States to fulfil immediately the obligation under the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

First Committee. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, **Sweden** took the floor, commenting with regard to the fifteenth preambular paragraph, in which the General Assembly took note of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. Sweden believed that that was done without prejudice to any future negotiating process on a nuclear weapons convention or on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments.

Having abstained in the vote, **Japan** stressed that nuclear weapons should never again be used, and supported the unanimous opinion of the judges of the International Court of Justice on the existing obligations under international law to pursue nuclear disarmament and to conclude negotiations on the matter in good faith. For that, States must take concrete measures to achieve steady, step-by-step progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan believed that such progress should be made prior to embarking upon the negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

66/48. Reducing nuclear danger

The General Assembly, by this annual resolution, continued to call for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, for immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It also requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,^b and to continue encouraging Member States to consider the convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration.

Submitted by: sponsors (26 Oct.)^a

GA vote: 117-49-13 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 110-48-12 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 126-128.

First Committee. In a general statement before the vote, **Cuba** said that it intended to support the draft resolution, reaffirming that security guarantees received to date had not been effective and that a single international, legally binding judicial instrument, through which nuclear-weapon States could provide non-nuclear-weapon States with security guarantees against the use or threat of use of such weapons, should be created. Cuba had repeatedly called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and supported the call for a high-level international conference to reach an agreement on that matter. Furthermore, it believed that the concept of nuclear deterrence as a basis for unsustainable and unacceptable military doctrines should be abandoned once and for all, since, far from contributing to nuclear disarmament, it encouraged the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons.

After voting favour of the draft resolution, **Brazil** stressed that nuclear doctrines must be reviewed, as called for in paragraph 1, in order to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. Measures such as de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons could not substitute for multilateral agreements

^a Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Viet Nam and Zambia.

^b See A/56/400, para. 3.

conducive to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Brazil cited paragraphs in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, noting the proposals to consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments with a strong system of verification, as well as pursuing the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process within an agreed legal framework, which should include specified timelines.

66/49. Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments

By this resolution, which was last introduced in 2008, the General Assembly welcomed efforts by all States to pursue additional areas of cooperation to increase confidence in compliance with existing non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding. The Assembly also called upon Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and with international law, and welcomed the role that the United Nations had played and continued to play in restoring the integrity of, and fostering negotiations on, certain arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and in the removal of threats to peace.

Introduced by: United States (27 Oct.)

GA vote: 161-0-18 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 157-0-18 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 129-132.

First Committee. In a general statement before the vote, the **United States** recalled that it had been sponsoring the draft resolution for more than 25 years and thanked the current sponsors. It drew attention to the two new paragraphs, 5 and 6, drawn from the compliance resolution adopted by consensus in 2002 and it hoped for the broadest possible support for the draft resolution.

After the vote, **India** stated that it was in favour of the draft resolution since it believed in the responsibility of States to fully comply with their obligations in the various agreements to which they were party. It believed that States, in encouraging the compliance of other States, should do so in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and international law. It emphasized the importance of multilateralism in issues pertaining to disarmament, arms limitation and non-proliferation agreements.

Six States that abstained in the vote took the floor:

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** believed that all States should comply, on a non-discriminatory basis, with their obligations under all provisions of the treaties to which they were party. However, it stressed that unilateral assessments of non-compliance and attempts to use such assessments as foreign policy leverage would undermine international disarmament efforts. It joined the sponsors of the draft resolution in urging those States that were not in compliance to make a strategic decision and to fully and immediately meet their obligations. It added that continued failure of States to comply with their NPT obligations would undermine the effectiveness of the Treaty.
- **Egypt** said that unfortunately, and despite a few improvements in the text, the draft resolution retained the language that extended the scope of the draft resolution beyond disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements.

Egypt did not acknowledge the right of one or more States to enforce compliance by another State that was party to a treaty or an agreement. Operative paragraph 7 referred to “concerted action”, however, it was not clear which means were foreseen within the interpretation of “concerted action”. The draft resolution missed the aspect of underscoring the urgency of achieving the universality of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.

- The **Syrian Arab Republic** stressed that it was not possible to vote on a draft text that called for adherence to the NPT when Israel, which was one of the main sponsors of the draft resolution, possessed nuclear weapons and did not accede to the NPT. It asserted that compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament commitments required that the sponsors of the draft resolution themselves comply with the international agreements, particularly the NPT. The draft resolution lacked balance as it failed to mention the role of the IAEA and the CD.
- **Ecuador** believed that the draft resolution did not go far enough in urging the adoption of agreed bilateral or multilateral measures, which could result in broad interpretations for actions, including unilateral action.
- **Belarus** expressed its support for non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements. It abstained from voting on the draft resolution because it doubted the readiness of the initiators of the document to set out clear provisions in the draft text.
- **Pakistan** stated that it subscribed to the core objectives of the draft resolution. However, the concepts and practices of compliance, verification and enforcement must be anchored strictly in legality. Some of the major disarmament initiatives have suffered setbacks precisely because of lack of compliance and enforcement mechanisms. It wished for a more consultative approach on producing the draft text.

66/51. Nuclear disarmament

In adopting this annual resolution, the General Assembly welcomed the ongoing efforts between the States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States. It also encouraged the nuclear-weapon States in their early signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It also called for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate and unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Introduced by: Myanmar (27 Oct.)

GA vote: 117-45-18; 162-0-14, o.p. 14; 172-1-7, o.p. 16 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 113-44-18; 157-0-14, o.p. 14; 164-1-6, o.p. 16 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 136-145.

First Committee. **Pakistan**, which intended to abstain in the vote, explained its position before the vote, saying that it had consistently supported the goals of nuclear disarmament as well as the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It noted, however, that the draft resolution contained unnecessary references to the full implementation of the action plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In line with its well-known position on the NPT, it would abstain on paragraph 14. It

also intended to abstain in the vote on paragraph 16, which called for the immediate commencement of negotiations for an FMCT, in line with its clear position on the FMCT.

After the vote, four States that had voted against the draft took the floor:

- The **United Kingdom**, also speaking on behalf of France, clarified that they had abstained in the vote on paragraph 16, which called for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD for an FMCT, but reiterated that they supported the objective of that paragraph. As was their standard practice, they abstained on the paragraph because they voted against the draft resolution as a whole. They also commended the language in paragraph 4, which referred to efforts between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States to agree on signing the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The United Kingdom, France and the United States were encouraged in making early progress on that.
- **Netherlands** said that it was fully committed to the full implementation of the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which contained actions on the three NPT pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For the Netherlands, non-proliferation and disarmament were equally important and mutually reinforcing. It was therefore important to work towards the full implementation of all elements of the 2010 NPT action plan.
- **Ukraine** stressed that it was in favour of a nuclear-free world, but had voted against the draft resolution as a whole because some of its provisions were not entirely balanced.
- **Germany** pointed out that it voted in favour of retaining paragraph 14, with a view to achieving a balanced implementation of all three pillars of the NPT.

Two States that had abstained in the vote as a whole took the floor:

- **Japan** stated that it shared the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, it attached the highest priority to concerted actions by the international community, including nuclear-weapon States, in order to steadily implement concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. It stated that there remained a great difference between Japan's standpoint and the approach of the draft resolution.
- **India** said that it attached the highest priority to nuclear disarmament and shared the main objective of the draft resolution, which was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified period of time. However, it had been constrained to abstain on the draft resolution because of certain references to the NPT, on which India's position was well known. Nevertheless, its vote should not be seen as opposition to other provisions of the draft resolution.

66/52. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

In this biennial resolution, the General Assembly took note of the Declaration of the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, convened by the Secretary-General.

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (27 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 146-148.

66/57. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly again reiterated its request to the CD to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

Submitted by: sponsors (26 Oct.)^c

GA vote: 117-48-12 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 113-48-10 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 161-163.

First Committee. **Brazil** explained that it voted in favour of the draft resolution in spite of its well-known position on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, not merely to prohibit their use. Brazil understood that a gradual, phased programme working towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons could be a realistic approach to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Having voted against the draft resolution, **Australia** pointed out that it placed the greatest importance on implementation of the consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including actions 7, 8 and 9 relating to security assurances. Australia, however, did not support the draft resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, which did not refer to relevant non-proliferation norms.

66/61. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly once again called upon Israel to accede to the NPT, and not to develop, produce, test or acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Introduced by: Egypt (24 Oct.)

GA vote: 167-6-5; 170-2-2, p.p. 5; 171-2-2, p.p. 6; 173-1-2, p.p. 7 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 157-5-6; 155-2-4, p.p. 5; 160-2-2, p.p. 6; 163-1-2, p.p. 7 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 172-178.

First Committee. In a general statement before voting in favour and speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, **Qatar** noted that, although no tangible progress had been

^c Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Viet Nam and Zambia.

made, the Arab Group continued to believe that the NPT was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and disarmament. The Arab States supported a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and attached great importance to the balanced activation of the three NPT pillars. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was a prerequisite to establish peace and stability in the region for future generations.

The Arab Group demanded that the international community reiterate its commitment to implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The parties to the Treaty should fully assume their responsibilities for implementing that resolution in full. They also stressed the importance of pressuring Israel to accede unconditionally to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to submit all its nuclear facilities to IAEA monitoring. They called on all Member States to participate positively in the 2012 conference and to work to make the conference a milestone on the path to freeing the Middle East of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

In explanation of vote before the vote, **Poland**, which also spoke on behalf of the European Union (EU), said that they intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution. The EU had always been fully committed to the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and supported in particular the convening of a conference in 2012 for that purpose. It regretted that the draft resolution was not sufficiently comprehensive, in that it did not address all the nuclear proliferation challenges in the region.

The draft resolution also did not mention the serious proliferation risks related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear and ballistic programme. It noted with grave concern the recent developments of the Iranian nuclear programme, as reflected in the latest IAEA report, and shared the Agency's increasing concerns about the possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Regarding the Syrian Arab Republic, the EU was seriously concerned about the conclusion of the IAEA Director General, in his May report to the Board of Governors, that the destroyed building at the Dair Alzour site was very likely a nuclear reactor. The EU urged the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy that non-compliance.

The following two States, which intended to vote against the draft resolution, took the floor before the vote:

- The **United States** believed that the draft resolution failed to meet the fundamental tests of fairness and balance, and confined itself to expressions of concern about the activities of a single country. A glaring omission was the lack of reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran's violation of IAEA safeguards, obligations under the NPT and the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as its failure to cooperate fully and transparently with the Agency. It reiterated the United States' support of universal adherence to the NPT and to a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It highlighted its readiness to work with others to build the confidence necessary to ensure the success of a regional conference in 2012 on the zone's establishment, pointing out that the conference must be conducted in a constructive and unbiased way.

- **Canada** maintained that the draft resolution unfairly singled out Israel, while failing to address serious non-compliance issues by other States in the region already party to the NPT. Canada had taken that position in other forums and had consistently called for universal adherence to the NPT. Canada found the draft resolution to be deficient because it ignored other realities, such as the non-cooperation with the IAEA by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic.

After voting in favour, five States delivered statements:

- **Switzerland** noted that the draft resolution promoted the universalization of the NPT in the region of the Middle East, to which it fully subscribed. It welcomed the concrete measures with respect to the creation of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in particular the decision to hold a conference on this subject in 2012. It attached importance to the full and complete implementation of the obligations of all States under the NPT. In order to implement the draft resolution and to achieve the goal of preventing the risk of nuclear proliferation in the broadest possible scale, it was imperative that States be fully cognizant of the present context and of all developments that affected the countries of the region taken as a whole.
- **New Zealand** said that it believed in the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, and was a strong and long-standing supporter of universalization of the NPT. It was committed to the realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and strongly supported the convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of such a zone. Noting that the IAEA would have a crucial role to play in verifying such a zone, it urged all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol to allow the Agency to undertake its important work. It was concerned, however, regarding the absence in the draft resolution of any reference to other States in the Middle East that presented significant nuclear proliferation concerns and hoped that this lack of balance would be addressed in future years.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** found it ironic that countries such as Canada, members of the EU or the United States had ignored the unsafeguarded nuclear installations of Israel, while making baseless allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran's exclusively peaceful and safeguarded nuclear programme.
- **Pakistan** supported the primary focus of the draft resolution, but was disappointed at the continued call on Pakistan to join the NPT. It therefore went along with the draft text as a whole while abstaining in the voting on its fifth, sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** stressed that the nuclear policy of Israel was a major obstacle to progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and had been a major source of proliferation in the region.

Two States that had abstained in the vote spoke:

- **Australia** stated that it supported the practical steps endorsed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference towards the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It was Australia's long-held view that all States in the

region should adhere to the NPT and subject their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. However, the draft resolution referred only to Israel and was in their view unbalanced.

- **India** believed that the focus of the draft resolution should be limited to the region that it intended to address. India's position on the NPT was well known, citing the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provision that States were bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent.

66/64. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Adopting this resolution annually, the General Assembly this year urged all States that had not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. It welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by Ghana and Guinea as a significant step towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Introduced by: Mexico (14 Oct.)

GA vote: 175-1-3; 174-1-3, p.p. 6 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 170-1-3; 168-1-3, p.p. 6 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 187-191.

First Committee. The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**, which intended to vote against the draft resolution, delivered a general statement before the vote. It stressed that it rejected the two Security Council resolutions against it that were mentioned in the draft.

After having voted in favour of the draft resolution, four States took the floor:

- **Cuba** expressed its support for the draft resolution, but wished to indicate that paragraph 5 lacked the needed technical character. It hoped that in the future the sponsors of the draft resolution would avoid including controversial elements that could be easily manipulated and focus on issues relevant to the CTBT.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** clarified that it dissociated itself from paragraph 5 due to the language of the text. In its view, there was no need to refer to the work of other organs of the United Nations in a resolution of the General Assembly, which had been done in a completely different context.
- **Pakistan** said that it had consistently supported the objectives of the CTBT and the call in the draft resolution for promoting signatures and ratifications leading to the entry into force of the CTBT, which would be facilitated when major erstwhile proponents of the CTBT decided to ratify it. Reiterating that it did not consider itself bound by the NPT, it was constrained to abstain in the voting on the sixth preambular paragraph.
- **Israel** attached importance to the objectives of the CTBT, however, it could not support the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1. It believed that the CTBT and the NPT were not linked, and forcing such a linkage would jeopardize the CTBT, the global non-proliferation regime and the prospects for better regional security in the Middle East. Israel's signing of the CTBT reflected its policy to bring itself closer to international norms on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. It appreciated the significant progress made in the development of the CTBT verification regime, however, the completion of the verification regime still required additional efforts. For Israel, the regional

security situation in the Middle East, including adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by States in the region, was a major consideration for ratification, as well as the completion of the verification regime.

The **Syrian Arab Republic** abstained from the voting on the draft resolution on the CTBT, maintaining that such an important treaty must not ignore the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, which had not been offered sufficient guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, nor had access to peaceful nuclear technology. The Treaty text did not entail a commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a reasonable period of time, and was confined to banning nuclear explosions without addressing new types of weapons. The Syrian Arab Republic also stressed that inspection measures could lead to abuses in national data monitoring or control, possibly for political purposes. It considered it strange that the Treaty authorized signatory States to take measures against non-signatory States, which was tantamount to a violation of State sovereignty. Citing Israel's possession and development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and its refusal to accede to the NPT or to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA verification, it believed that efforts at creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were hampered. It expressed reservations with regard to all paragraphs of all draft resolutions on the CTBT that had been adopted to date, and those to be adopted.

66/516. Missiles (decision)

The General Assembly, recalling its past resolutions and decisions on the subject, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-seventh session the item entitled "Missiles".

Introduced by: Islamic Republic of Iran (17 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 200.

Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons

66/21. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament

This resolution was last introduced in 2008. The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under review with a view to making recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons, when necessary. It also called upon all States to give favourable consideration to those recommendations, requested the Conference to report the results of any consideration of the matter in its annual reports to the General Assembly, and decided to include this item in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session.

Introduced by: Belarus (17 Oct.)

GA vote: 168-1-1 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 173-1-1 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 6-8.

First Committee. Belarus delivered a general statement, pointing out the four decades that the Committee had been considering the subject of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). From both the humanitarian and financial points of view, it was important to prohibit WMD at the development stage rather than to try to prevent their proliferation once they already existed. It added that proof of the development or creation of new WMD had not been found. Belarus hoped that the draft resolution would once again be adopted by consensus, adding that it was important for the matter to remain on the agendas of the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.

After voting against the draft resolution, the **United States** expressed its belief that the international community should focus its efforts on the proliferation of known types of WMD, both by States violating existing treaties and also by non-State actors. Since the 1948 definition of WMD had been set forth, no new types of WMD had appeared on the horizon. It also stressed that the attention and efforts of the international community should not be directed away from existing threats.

66/35. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly emphasized that the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention was fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose, acknowledged progress made in the implementation of the action plan for the universality of the Convention, and called upon all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay.

Introduced by: Poland (17 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 60-62.

First Committee. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** joined the consensus, having been a victim of the use of chemical weapons. It said that the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities remained the key objective of the Convention. It stressed full compliance by major possessor State parties with the April 2012 extended deadline. Otherwise, the *raison d'être* of the Convention would be seriously challenged and its credibility significantly tarnished. Regrettably, the draft resolution lacked an accurate reflection of that important aspect of the implementation of the Convention.

66/65. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

In adopting this annual resolution, the General Assembly noted with appreciation that two additional States had acceded to the Convention. It welcomed the information and data provided to date, as well as the several measures to update the mechanism for the transmission of information in the framework of confidence-building measures

Introduced by: Hungary (26 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 192-194.

agreed upon at the Convention's Sixth Review Conference, and reiterated its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed upon at the Third Review Conference.

The Assembly welcomed the successful holding of meetings as part of the 2007-2010 intersessional process and welcomed the convening of the Seventh Review Conference in Geneva from 5 to 22 December 2011 pursuant to the decision of the Preparatory Committee.

The General Assembly recalled that the Seventh Review Conference was mandated to consider issues identified in the review of the operation of the Convention and any possible consensus follow-up action. It urged all States parties to continue working together to achieve a consensus outcome of the Seventh Review Conference which strengthened the Convention. It noted with appreciation the events organized by some States parties for exchanges of views on the work of the Seventh Review Conference.

Chapter III. Conventional weapons issues

66/20. Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

Through this biennial resolution, the General Assembly endorsed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Operation and Further Development of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, the recommendations contained therein and the new title of the instrument, namely, the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. It called upon Member States to provide the Secretary-General, by 30 April annually, with reports on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data were available.

Introduced by: Germany (18 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 1-5.

The General Assembly recommended that, for the purpose of reporting by Member States of their national military expenditures in the framework of the Report on Military Expenditures, "military expenditures" be commonly understood to refer to all financial resources that a State spends on the uses and functions of its military forces and information on military expenditures represents an actual outlay in current prices and domestic currency.

The Assembly invited Member States in a position to do so to supplement their reports with explanatory remarks regarding submitted data to explain or clarify the figures provided in the reporting forms, such as the total military expenditures as a share of gross domestic product, major changes from previous reports and any additional information reflecting their defence policy, military strategies and doctrines.

The Assembly also recommended the establishment of a process for periodic reviews, in order to ensure the continued relevance and operation of the Report on Military Expenditures and that another review of the continuing relevance and operation of the Report be conducted in five years.

First Committee. After joining consensus on the draft resolution, two States delivered statements:

- **Cuba** explained that it supported the draft resolution, with the understanding that information in the reporting mechanism was provided on a voluntary basis and that any recommendation by the Group of Experts on the standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures should in no way modify the voluntary nature of that instrument.
- The **Syrian Arab Republic** joined the consensus, based on its convictions and its support for a world that abided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. However, it pointed out that the reports that the draft resolution invited from Member States should be submitted on a voluntary basis.

66/29. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The annual resolution reiterated the General Assembly's invitation and encouragement to all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention, to be held in Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December 2011, and to participate in the future meeting programme of the Convention.

Introduced by: Albania (19 Oct.)

GA vote: 162-0-18 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 155-0-17 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 38-41.

It also requested the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention and, on behalf of the States parties, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations, to attend the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties and future meetings as observers.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Albania** called upon all States, especially those not party to the Mine Ban Convention, to vote in favour of the draft resolution, thus showing their support for the humanitarian principles of the Convention.

In explanation of its intention to abstain in the vote, **Cuba** said that it shared and would continue to support the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines, and was an abiding State party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), including its Amended Protocol II. Having been subject to continuing hostility and aggression, Cuba therefore could not renounce the use of mines to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with the right to legitimate defence.

After having voted in favour of the draft resolution, **Singapore** reiterated its support for all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially to protect innocent and defenceless civilians. A moratorium on

anti-personnel landmines had been in force in Singapore since 1998. At the same time, however, Singapore supported a State's right to self-defence, adding that a blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might be counterproductive. Singapore would continue to work with the international community to seek a durable and truly global solution.

Seven States that abstained in the vote explained their positions:

- **India** said that it endorsed the vision of a world free of anti-personnel land mines, having discontinued the production of non-detectable anti-personnel mines since 1997 and having observed the moratorium on their transfer. It was a party to Amended Protocol II of the CCW. Alternative military technologies would facilitate complete elimination of anti-personnel mines. India remained committed to international efforts in mine clearance and rehabilitation of mine victims. It intended to continue its participation in the meetings of the Mine Ban Convention as an observer.
- **Egypt** mentioned that it had imposed a moratorium on its capacity to produce and export landmines in 1980. Nonetheless, Egypt viewed the Convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian concerns and landmines' legitimate military use in border protection. It further commented on the Convention's weaknesses regarding lack of firmness on the removal of anti-personnel mines by the States responsible for placing them and the weak system of international cooperation. It stated that the Convention's lack of universality was due to its having been concluded outside the United Nations.
- **Pakistan** stressed its commitment to a universal and non-discriminatory ban on anti-personnel mines that took into account the legitimate defence requirements of States. Given that landmines formed an important part of its self-defence strategy, it was not possible for Pakistan to agree to demands for their complete prohibition until viable alternatives were available. As a party to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Pakistan continued to implement the Protocol.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that it shared the humanitarian concerns of the draft resolution's sponsors. However, it believed that the Mine Ban Convention was focused mainly on humanitarian concerns, and did not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries. More national and international efforts should be made to explore new alternatives to landmines. Likewise, international cooperation should be promoted to speed up mine clearance activities for reducing civilian casualties and to establish sustainable indigenous demining programmes.
- **Libya** clarified that it shared the concerns of many States, being a victim of landmines as well. It pointed out that the Mine Ban Convention was concluded outside the United Nations and that it lacked balance between human protection and the use of such mines for security reasons. Imposing a total ban on landmines in weak countries deprived them of a simple means of defence. It also believed that the Mine Ban Convention should establish a mechanism to assist affected States in removing landmines and remnants of war left in their territories by the major colonial Powers, ban the planting of landmines in the territories of other States, provide for compensation to and rehabilitation of affected States, and provide for environmental reparations in areas polluted by landmines and other explosive devices.

- **Lebanon** stated that it supported the humane principles of the Mine Ban Convention and the alleviation of human suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. Lebanon was not yet a party to the Mine Ban Convention for legitimate reasons related to its national security. Innocent civilians in southern Lebanon continued to be victims of the random and arbitrary use of anti-personnel mines.
- The **Republic of Korea** reiterated its support for the spirit and objectives of the Mine Ban Convention and of the draft resolution. However, owing to the security concerns on the Korean peninsula, it had to give priority to its own security and was unable to accede to the Convention. Nevertheless, it was committed to mitigating the suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines through exercising tighter control and enforcing an indefinite extension of the moratorium on their export, joining the CCW and its Amended Protocol II and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, and making financial contributions to mine clearance and victim assistance through the relevant United Nations mine action programmes.

66/34. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly again encouraged the international community to support the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, and also encouraged the States in the Sahelo-Saharan region to facilitate the functioning of national commissions to combat illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and to collaborate with civil society organizations in these efforts.

Introduced by: Mali, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are Members of the Economic Community of West African States (19 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 56-59.

66/39. Transparency in armaments

This resolution was last introduced in 2009. This year, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2012, within available resources, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, relevant deliberations within the United Nations, the views expressed by Member States and the reports of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to taking a decision at its sixty-eighth session. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to continue

Introduced by: Netherlands (18 Oct.)

GA vote: 156-0-23; 154-0-22, o.p. 2; 154-0-20, o.p. 3; 156-0-19, o.p. 4; 157-0-21, o.p. 5 (b); 154-0-24, o.p. 5; 156-0-22, o.p. 7 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 149-0-25; 150-0-24, o.p. 2; 150-0-23, o.p. 3; 151-0-23, o.p. 4; 150-0-23, o.p. 5 (b); 149-0-25, o.p. 5; 150-0-23, o.p. 7 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 72-81.

to assist Member States to build capacity to submit meaningful reports, including capacity to report on small arms and light weapons.

First Committee. Three States that had abstained explained their positions after the vote:

- **Qatar** spoke on behalf of the League of Arab States, expressing support for transparency in armaments, particularly the Register of Conventional Arms, as a means to enhance international peace and security. The League of Arab States wished to expand the scope of the Register to better fulfil States' security needs. To include reporting on advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as advanced technology with military applications, would make the Register more comprehensive, balanced and less discriminatory, and would lead to increased participation in the Register by Member States. It drew attention to the situation in the Middle East, with Israel continuing to ignore repeated calls to adhere to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, thereby undermining the credibility of international oversight and transparency mechanisms.
- The **Syrian Arab Republic** explained that the draft resolution did not take into account the special situation in the Middle East. It noted that Israel continued to be armed with weapons of mass destruction and lethal conventional weapons, and possessed the ability to manufacture advanced weapons such as nuclear weapons.
- The **United Republic of Tanzania** clarified that, in principle, it was not against the draft resolution. However, it wished that small arms and light weapons in all their aspects were included in the Register. It was time to recognize and take decisive action against the menace of small arms and light weapons.

66/41. National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology

Last presented two years ago, the resolution reiterated all the main elements of the previous resolution. The General Assembly invited Member States that were in a position to do so, without prejudice to the provisions in Security Council resolution 1540 and subsequent relevant Council resolutions, to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military

equipment and dual-use goods and technology, and encouraged Member States to provide information on a voluntary basis to the Secretary-General on the above matters, as well as the changes therein. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to continue making that information accessible to all Member States.

Introduced by: Netherlands
(21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook,
Part I, pp. 91-92.

66/42. Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

By this resolution, which was last introduced in 2009, the General Assembly welcomed the completion of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the establishment of the “SaferGuard” knowledge resource management programme for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition. The Assembly encouraged States wishing to improve their national stockpile management capacity, prevent the growth of conventional ammunition surpluses and address wider risk mitigation to contact the “SaferGuard” programme, as well as potential national donors and regional organizations, as appropriate, with a view to developing cooperation, including, where relevant, technical expertise.

Introduced by: Germany (18 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 93-95.

66/47. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

With the adoption of this annual resolution, the General Assembly endorsed the report adopted at the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and took note with appreciation of the Chair’s summary of discussions reflecting his interpretation of the main points under discussion. The Assembly decided that the second conference to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action would be held in New York, from 27 August to 7 September 2012, and that the preparatory committee for the review conference would be convened in New York from 19 to 23 March 2012.

Introduced by: Japan (18 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 120-125.

The General Assembly invited States, at the second review conference, to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, and encouraged them to explore ways to strengthen its implementation, to provide financial assistance to States otherwise unable to participate in meetings on the Programme of Action, and to consider ways to enhance cooperation and assistance and to assess their effectiveness in order to ensure the implementation of the Programme of Action.

First Committee. Morocco delivered a general statement before the action on the draft resolution, saying it believed that the absence of regulation in the small arms and light weapons trade contributed to their uncurbed proliferation, particularly in Africa, and caused human suffering and instability. The capacity to address the issue tested not only the efficacy of disarmament mechanisms, but also the entire United Nations system. Morocco firmly supported the Programme of Action on small arms, the International Tracing Instrument and the conclusion of an arms trade treaty. Regional and subregional cooperation was an essential tool for combating such weapons. The illegal arms trade and the relationships between arms trafficking networks and terrorist groups required strengthening of regional cooperation.

66/62. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly, through this annual resolution, acknowledged the work of the Implementation Support Unit within the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, welcomed the preparatory work for the Fourth Review Conference conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, and noted that the issue of urgently addressing the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations, would be further addressed at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2011. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the Fourth Review Conference and other annual conferences and expert meetings of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II and Protocol V.

Introduced by: Sweden (18 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 179-182.

First Committee. Explaining its position before the action on the draft resolution, **Libya** said that it would join the consensus, however, it was a non-State party to the CCW. It noted that the draft resolution did not take into account the right to self-defence of some States. It believed that addressing the question of certain conventional weapons required sincere cooperation that took into account the concerns of all nations. It added that weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, represented the greatest danger to human life.

66/518. The arms trade treaty (decision)

The General Assembly, recalling its resolution 64/48 of 2 December 2009, decided to hold, within existing resources, the final session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty from 13 to 17 February 2012 in New York, to conclude the Preparatory Committee's substantive work and to decide on all relevant procedural matters, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 64/48.

Introduced by: United Kingdom (19 Oct.)

GA vote: 166-0-13 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 155-0-13 (28 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 202-203.

First Committee. After the vote, three States that had voted in favour took the floor:

- **India** expressed its understanding that the discussions in or papers circulated at the Preparatory Committee would continue to be without prejudice to the negotiations at the 2012 Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. India believed that prospects for a viable and effective arms trade treaty of universal acceptance would be enhanced only if the interests of all stakeholders were addressed in a consensus-based process.
- The **United Kingdom** stated that it regretted that a vote had to be held on the draft decision, but thanked all delegations that showed their support.

- **Uruguay** said that it was convinced that the work of the Preparatory Committee had resulted in significant progress and that the new Preparatory Committee session was essential to continue that progress. It deeply regretted that the draft decision was not adopted by consensus, since its wording in no way prejudged the outcome of the negotiations, their time frame or the documents submitted by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee.

Three abstaining States also delivered statements:

- **Egypt** explained that its abstention was due to the lack of respect for decisions taken by the General Assembly with regard to the scope and duration of the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee. Those decisions were necessary elements for the success of negotiations on that important issue.
- **Pakistan** said that it shared the concerns that arose from the illegal trade in conventional weapons, but restricting the scope of the proposed treaty to trading in arms was partial and lopsided. The exclusion of the important issues of restraints on production, reduction in armaments and conventional arms control remained controversial. Reference in the draft decision to the conclusion of substantive work of the next Preparatory Committee session in February 2012, in Pakistan's view, did not accurately capture the factual work. It was Pakistan's understanding that the next session of the Preparatory Committee would discuss and decide on organizational and procedural issues, not substantive ones.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** asserted that it abstained in the vote as it did not share the aims of the proposed arms trade treaty, which it believed was not a real solution to the problems of developing countries. It was affected by the illicit trade in arms associated with the activities of terrorist groups and drug traffickers and it had therefore supported efforts in the United Nations to address the issue. However, it stressed that negotiations on an international instrument must be conducted in accordance with established practices under international law. The major problem of developing countries was the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, not the illicit trade in the seven categories of the Register, as implied by other countries. The best approach would be to focus on the main issues and to work constructively within the framework of the Programme of Action on small arms, taking into account the concerns of all parties.

Chapter IV. Regional disarmament

66/22. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

In this resolution, which was last introduced in 2009, the General Assembly requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his informal consultations with Committee members and to report through the Committee to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (21 Oct.)

GA vote: 124-4-46 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 124-4-45 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 9-11.

66/23. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly recalled with satisfaction the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) in 2009 and called upon African States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.

First Committee. After joining the consensus on the draft resolution, **India** stated that it respected the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. India conveyed its unambiguous assurance that it would respect the status of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Spain, which had also joined the consensus, said that the entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba was an important contribution to strengthening international peace and security. Spain expressed its support for the Treaty's aims, adding that it was prepared to help the States parties acquire sufficient capacities for its effective implementation in their respective territories. After studying the invitation to become party to Protocol III of the Treaty, Spain decided not to sign the Treaty. The Treaty of Pelindaba did not contain disarmament and non-proliferation provisions that Spain had not already adopted with respect to Spanish territory. Spain had been militarily nuclear-free since 1976 and had therefore taken all the steps required to enable the Treaty to be fully implemented throughout its national territory.

Although Spain had joined the consensus on the draft resolution, it did not support that consensus on paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. It called on the sponsors to hold transparent consultations in good faith to arrive at more balanced language, especially with respect to that particular paragraph.

66/25. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly once again called upon all countries of the region that had not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States and to seek their views on the measures outlined in the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990 or other relevant measures.

First Committee. **Israel** stated that it joined the consensus on the draft resolution, notwithstanding its ongoing substantive reservations. It remained committed to a Middle East free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. Such a vision could be addressed only within the regional context, based on the free will of States of the region. The essential preconditions for

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (14 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 12-13.

Introduced by: Egypt (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 18-21.

a zone free of weapons of mass destruction was a comprehensive and durable regional peace and compliance by regional States with their arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. Israel pointed to the threats against its very existence that were exacerbated by the irresponsible behaviour of certain States in the region and beyond, and hoped that the positive implications of the democratization processes in the region may create an atmosphere conducive to building trust among regional parties.

The **Islamic Republic of Iran** had also joined the consensus, but found it ironic that countries such as Canada, members of the EU or the United States had ignored the unsafeguarded nuclear installations of Israel, while making baseless allegations against its exclusively peaceful and safeguarded nuclear programme.

The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**, which joined the consensus, stressed that the nuclear policy of Israel was a major obstacle to progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and had been a major source of proliferation in the region.

66/36. Regional disarmament

The General Assembly, by this annual resolution, once again called upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels, and welcomed the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken at those levels. It also supported and encouraged efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures, easing regional tensions and furthering disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels.

Introduced by: Pakistan (18 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 63-64.

66/37. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly again requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles to serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looked forward to the subsequent report on the subject. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States for submission to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

Introduced by: Pakistan (18 Oct.)

GA vote: 175-1-2; 141-1-31, o.p. 2 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 165-1-3; 133-1-31, o.p. 2 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 65-68.

First Committee. **Mexico**, which voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, said that it abstained in the voting on paragraph 2 because developing conventional arms control principles was outside the purview of the Conference on Disarmament and should be considered by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Mexico believed that the ongoing paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament made it impossible to include an additional item for consideration in its agenda, such as the issue referred to in paragraph 2.

India explained that it voted against the draft resolution because it requested the Conference on Disarmament to work on regional agreements on conventional arms control, whereas the Conference was responsible for negotiating disarmament instruments of global application. In 1993, the United Nations Disarmament Commission had adopted guidelines for regional disarmament, so there was no need for the Conference on Disarmament to engage in the same subject at a time when it had other priority issues on its agenda.

The **Russian Federation**, which had abstained in the voting on the draft resolution, said it was in favour of the main objectives of the draft resolution, as they would enhance regional peace and security. It believed that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, mentioned in the sixth preambular paragraph, was obsolete, as the world had changed significantly since that time. It therefore proposed conducting negotiations to reach a new, legally binding treaty that could help to enhance security in the region.

66/38. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly once again called upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to pursue confidence- and security-building measures through sustained consultations and dialogue. It also urged States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they were party, and encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures.

Introduced by: Pakistan (18 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 69-71.

66/43. Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

Adopting this resolution on a biennial basis, the General Assembly welcomed the resumption of direct consultations between the States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the five nuclear-weapon States, and encouraged States parties to the Treaty to continue direct consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States to resolve comprehensively, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty, existing outstanding issues on a number of provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto. The Assembly underlined the value of enhancing and implementing further ways and means of cooperation among the States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and the protocols thereto.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the States parties to the Bangkok Treaty (28 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 96-98.

First Committee. India stated that it went along with the adoption of the text without a vote as it respected the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to

establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. As a nuclear-weapon State, it had conveyed its assurance that it would respect the status of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

66/53. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament

As in previous years, by this annual resolution, the General Assembly appealed to Member States in each region and those that were able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives. It also requested the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (25 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 149-150.

66/54. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly invited all States of the region to continue to take part in the activities of the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, proposing items for inclusion in its programme and making greater and better use of the Centre's potential to meet the current challenges facing the international community to fulfil the aims of the United Nations Charter in the areas of peace, disarmament and development. The Assembly also recognized that the Regional Centre had an important role to play in the promotion and development of regional and subregional initiatives agreed upon by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the field of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as in the relationship between disarmament and development.

Introduced by: Peru, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 151-153.

66/55. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

The General Assembly, through this annual resolution, renewed its encouragement to the States members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and other interested States to provide financial support for the implementation

Introduced by: Congo (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 154-158.

of the Kinshasa Convention, adopted on 30 April 2010, at the thirtieth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee, held in Kinshasa in April 2010.

The Assembly welcomed the adoption by the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Sao Tome Declaration on a Central African Common Position on the Arms Trade Treaty, and the signing of the Kinshasa Convention by all eleven States members of the Standing Advisory Committee, and appealed to them to ratify the Convention in a timely manner in order to facilitate its early entry into force and implementation. It requested the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, to facilitate the efforts undertaken by the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee, in particular for their execution of the Implementation Plan for the Kinshasa Convention. The Assembly urged the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee to strengthen the gender component of the various meetings of the Committee relating to disarmament and international security.

66/56. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly once again expressed its satisfaction for the activities carried out in the past year by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and invited all States of the region to continue to support the activities of the Centre, including by continuing to take part in them, where possible, and by proposing items for inclusion in the programme of activities of the Centre, in order to contribute to the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament.

Introduced by: Nepal (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 159-160.

66/58. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

By this resolution, which was last introduced in 2009, the General Assembly welcomed the continental dimension of the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in response to the evolving needs of African Member States in the areas of disarmament, peace and security. It also welcomed the undertaking by the Regional Centre to provide capacity-building, technical assistance programmes and advisory services to the African Union Commission and subregional organizations on the control of small arms and light weapons, as well as the arms trade treaty and weapons of mass destruction-related issues. The Assembly further welcomed the contribution of the Regional Centre to continental disarmament, peace and security, in particular its assistance to the African Union Commission and to the African Commission on Nuclear Energy.

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 164-166.

The General Assembly noted with appreciation the tangible achievements and impact of the Regional Centre at the regional level, including its assistance to Central African States in their elaboration of the Kinshasa Convention, to Central and West African States in the elaboration of their respective common positions on the proposed arms trade treaty, to West Africa on security sector reform initiatives, and to East Africa on programmes to control brokering of small arms and light weapons. It also noted with appreciation the contribution of the Regional Centre to the “One United Nations” approach and to United Nations inter-agency mechanisms.

66/63. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

In this year’s resolution, the General Assembly again reaffirmed that security in the Mediterranean was closely linked to that of Europe, as well as to international peace and security. It called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. It encouraged all States of the region to strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Introduced by: Algeria (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 183-186.

First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** explained that it would again not participate in the Committee’s action on the draft resolution, saying that given the continuing crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel’s imposition of a severe blockade in Gaza, including in the Mediterranean area, the draft resolution did not reflect the reality in the region.

Chapter V. Related issues, including information and outreach

66/24. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be established in 2012 to continue to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States and confidence-building measures with regard to information space, and to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session a report on the results of this study.

Introduced by: Russian Federation (20 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 14-17.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it had co-sponsored the draft resolution, which it believed rightly emphasized the prevention of the use of information and telecommunications for criminal or terrorist purposes. Information and telecommunications could, however, become weapons and could undermine the principles enshrined by the United Nations. Cuba hoped that the draft resolution would receive the broad support of Member States.

Also in a general statement, **Sweden** spoke on behalf of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and itself. They intended to join the consensus, but owing to recent developments in this field, they stressed some aspects regarding Internet governance and related issues. The Internet should remain open and free, and the same universal rights that individuals enjoyed offline must also be upheld and protected online. Human rights should permeate all issues relating to Internet governance, however, the current draft text included no direct references to a human-rights-based approach. Internet governance should be based on a multi-stakeholder approach, including private-sector and civil-society actors. That was particularly important in guaranteeing human rights aspects in discussions on standards and rules of behaviour for the Internet.

66/27. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly invited the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to establish a working group under its agenda item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” as early as possible during its 2012 session.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it sponsored the draft resolution because an arms race in outer space would pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It believed that it was necessary to continue developing international measures that promoted transparency and confidence in outer space matters. The CD should play the central role in negotiating a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Introduced by: Sri Lanka (17 Oct.)

GA vote: 176-0-2 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 171-0-2 (26 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 27-31.

66/30. Relationship between disarmament and development

By this annual resolution, the General Assembly once again reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (27 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 42-44.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** mentioned that it aligned itself with the Non-Aligned Movement, which introduced the draft resolution. It believed that disarmament and development were two of the main challenges that humankind

must face. Cuba reiterated its proposal to establish a United Nations fund that would receive at least half of the amount of military expenditure and spend it for economic, social and development needs of the countries that required it.

Before the action on the draft resolution, the **United States** announced that it would not participate in the Committee's action. It believed that disarmament and development were two distinct issues and it did not consider itself bound by the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, adopted in 1987.

After the adoption of the draft resolution, **France** spoke, also on behalf of the United Kingdom. Both States, which joined the consensus on this draft resolution, clarified that the notion of a symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development was questionable, insofar as the conditions favourable to disarmament did not necessarily depend solely on development. There was no automatic link between the two. The idea that military expenditures deter the needs of development and its financial requirements ought to be refined. Investments in defence capabilities were also necessary for peacekeeping and to improve rapid response in case of natural disasters. It stated that the report of the Group of Governmental Experts did not give sufficient importance to unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions in the field of disarmament.

66/31. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly once again called upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. It also invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly's sixty-seventh session.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (20 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 45-46.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** stated that it aligned itself with the Non-Aligned Movement, which introduced the draft resolution. It believed that international disarmament forums should take into account environmental norms when negotiating treaties and arrangements in the areas of disarmament and arms control, as reflected in the draft resolution.

Before the draft resolution was adopted, the **United States** explained that it would not participate in the Committee's action on the draft resolution. It noted that the United States operated under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. However, it did not see a direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control, as stated in the draft resolution.

After the action on the draft resolution, **France** provided an explanation of its position also on behalf of the United Kingdom, whereby they did not see any direct link between the general rules that were enforced regarding environmental protection and arms control agreements.

66/32. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Beginning in 2002, this resolution has been introduced on an annual basis. This year, the General Assembly again adopted the resolution and reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations and once again called upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (20 Oct.)

GA vote: 125-5-48 (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 120-4-49 (27 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 47-51.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it aligned itself with the Non-Aligned Movement, which introduced the draft resolution. It noted that the complex international situation required tackling in unison the various problems that affected humankind. It believed that the draft resolution made an important contribution to the quest for effective lasting multilateral solutions in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

After abstaining in the vote, **Canada** took the floor on behalf of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. They could not agree that multilateralism was the sole principle in negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation, as is implied in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution. A combination of multilateral, plurilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral measures were needed to achieve concrete results. The matters at stake were simply too vital and the world could not afford not to make use of all the measures available to improve the international security environment.

66/50. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and in this regard urged them to strengthen national measures. It also appealed to all Member States to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass

Introduced by: India (17 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 133-135.

destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

First Committee. Although it joined the consensus on the draft resolution and supported measures to confront terrorism in all its forms, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** dissociated itself from the paragraph in the draft resolution with a reference to the Nuclear Security Summit because a thorough reading of the documents from that gathering had no mention of nuclear disarmament or the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan supported the objectives of the draft resolution, although it believed that its language could have conveyed a more objective reflection of reality. The acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction materials by terrorists and non-State actors needed to be evaluated and viewed in perspective. With regard to the denial of means to terrorists to acquire, possess and use weapons of mass destruction, States had enforced export control measures. Interim measures, such as the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), which were designed to fill the gap in international law, should be taken up by a more inclusive and representative United Nations forum. The full implementation of existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could help. Controlling biological weapons should be of more concern, therefore the Biological Weapons Convention should be strengthened including the conclusion of a verification protocol. Pakistan was convinced that a comprehensive strategy must be developed to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction using a number of measures, including augmenting State capacities to implement global treaty obligations and addressing the root causes of terrorism.

66/59. Report of the Conference on Disarmament

In this annual resolution, the General Assembly called upon the CD to further intensify consultations and explore possibilities with a view to adopting a balanced and comprehensive programme of work at the earliest possible date during its 2012 session, bearing in mind the decision on the programme of work adopted by the Conference on 29 May 2009. It recognized the importance of continuing consultations on the question of the expansion of the membership of the CD.

Introduced by: Cuba (27 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 167-169.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** reaffirmed the importance of the CD as the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, and that the Conference needed to adopt as soon as possible a programme of work that was broad, well balanced and duly took into account the real priorities in the field of disarmament. The language of the draft resolution was a clear message in support of the resumption of the substantive work of the CD.

Also in a general statement, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** underscored the essential point contained in paragraph 1, that is, the reaffirmation of the CD as a unique multilateral forum in the international community. As one of the CD's six Presidents during the 2011 session, the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea had worked closely with the other five Presidents to make progress on the four core issues. There was a strong need for political will to make progress in the CD.

Before the action on the draft resolution, **Pakistan** expressed appreciation to the delegations of Cuba and China for their work on the draft resolution. However, it was disappointed that its proposal in paragraph 2 had not been incorporated. Selective reference to any particular programme of work or a document of the CD neither added any value nor facilitated consensus. In line with its commitment to the CD, Pakistan said that it would join the consensus in favour of the draft resolution's adoption. However, it was not in a position to associate itself with the phrase that read "the decision on the programme of work adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 29 May 2009" in paragraph 2.

After the action on the draft resolution, the following three States, which joined the consensus, took the floor.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** expressed its support for the reactivation of the CD based on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work and on full observance of its rules of procedure. However, it did not share the view that the decision in 2009 produced a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. It stressed that the CD should consider negotiations on nuclear disarmament to be its highest priority.
- **Australia** expressed regret that paragraph 3 of the draft resolution did not fully reflect the range of views expressed by ministers for foreign affairs in the CD in 2011. As the CD's 2011 annual report noted, ministers, including Australia's, expressed support for the CD as well as concern about its current situation.
- **Japan** conveyed its disappointment that the reference to the document on the programme of work (CD/1864) in the draft resolution was changed to an indirect one, and that the text that recognized the programme of work (CD/1864) to be balanced and comprehensive was deleted.

66/60. Report of the Disarmament Commission

With the adoption of this annual resolution, the General Assembly recommended that the Disarmament Commission intensify consultations with a view to reaching agreement on the items on its agenda, in accordance with decision 52/492, before the start of its substantive session of 2012.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** underscored the importance of the Commission as the only specialized deliberative organ of the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery. With regard to the language in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, Cuba hoped that consensus could be reached. It also hoped that all Member States would demonstrate flexibility in order to reach agreements regarding specific arrangements to be submitted to the General Assembly.

Introduced by: Iraq, on behalf of members of the extended Bureau of the Disarmament Commission (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 170-171.

66/66. Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations

Building upon resolution 65/93, the General Assembly called upon States to intensify efforts aimed at creating an environment conducive to multilateral disarmament negotiations, invited States to explore, consider and consolidate options, proposals and elements for revitalization of the United Nations disarmament machinery as

a whole, including the CD, urged the CD to adopt and implement a programme of work to enable it to resume substantive work on its agenda early in its 2012 session, and recognized the need to take stock, during the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, of all relevant efforts to take forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

First Committee. After the action on the draft resolution, the following States that joined the consensus took the floor.

Pakistan said it was in full accord with the need to revitalize the work of the CD, but that the lack of political will was not unique to the CD and was equally manifest in the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee. Some States had claimed that they supported nuclear disarmament but they continued to vote against the resolutions on the subject. Therefore, parallel and complementary efforts were required to reinvigorate the entire disarmament machinery. Pakistan suggested that the problems may not necessarily be with the machinery and that States must work towards reconciling the differences in the priorities and subjects that could form the basis of an agreed disarmament agenda. For those reasons, Pakistan had been calling for a balanced disarmament agenda that not only took into account the security interests of all States, but also advocated a reinvigorated machinery to promote that agenda. It also supported the proposal to convene the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in an effort to try to break the current deadlock.

The **Syrian Arab Republic** affirmed that the most appropriate body to consider the revitalization of disarmament mechanisms and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations was the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The **Islamic Republic of Iran** expressed its belief that the major problem facing multilateral disarmament negotiations was the lack of genuine political will on the part of certain Western countries, not the structure or working methods of such bodies. The Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that the CD should remain the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and its role in the field of nuclear disarmament should be strengthened. It supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In its view, the international community should avoid exclusive and discriminatory approaches and must take into consideration the security interests of all States.

Brazil expressed its apprehension concerning the wording of paragraph 8, which it believed created, if not encouraged, the possibility of direct action by the First Committee on the reform of the CD. As discussed during the high-level meeting and the follow-up plenary meeting, States had addressed all issues regarding

Introduced by: South Africa (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (28 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 195-197.

disarmament and the machinery devoted to it, not just the functioning of the CD. The fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be the most appropriate venue for the overall undertaking to review the United Nations disarmament machinery.

China said that the CD, as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should quickly adopt its programme of work and engage in a substantive, comprehensive and balanced manner to advance the multilateral disarmament negotiation process. China believed that any option for promoting multilateral disarmament negotiations should include safeguarding the authority of the CD and ensure that all parties participate.

66/514. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session the item entitled “Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security”.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (20 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 198.

66/515. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-seventh session the item entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”.

Introduced by: India (20 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (27 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 199.

66/517. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (decision)

The General Assembly, recalling its resolution 65/68 of 8 December 2010 and previous resolutions on this matter, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session the item entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”.

Introduced by: Russian Federation (17 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 201.

appendix IX

Abbreviations and acronyms

APPENDIX IX

Abbreviations and acronyms

AP	additional protocol
APLN	Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATT	arms trade treaty
AU	African Union
BMD	ballistic missile defence
BWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; Biological Weapons Convention
CANWFZ	Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASA	United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CBM	confidence-building measure
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CIFTA	Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
ComNat	National Commission to Combat Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Small Arms
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization


CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; Chemical Weapons Convention
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERW	explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
FMCT	fissile material cut-off treaty
FRSC	Forum Regional Security Committee
GGE	group of governmental experts
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures
HCOC	The Hague Code of Conduct
HEU	highly enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSAN	International Action Network on Small Arms
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive devices
IMPACS	Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
LAS	League of Arab States
LEU	low-enriched uranium
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START	Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
NFA	Nuclear Fuel Assurance
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPDI	Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group

NSS	Nuclear Security Series
NSSC	Nuclear Security Support Centres
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWS	nuclear-weapon State
OAS	Organization of American States
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAROS	prevention of an arms race in outer space
RACVIAC	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms
RIBIN	Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SICA	Central American Integration System
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
SM-3	Standard Missile-3
SQP	small quantities protocol
SSBN	nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TEPCO	Tokyo Electric Power Company
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNLIREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNOCA	United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNRCPD	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific
UNREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNSAC	United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Poetry for Peace contest

In 2011, a social media Poetry for Peace contest invited the world to hear the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors, called HIBAKUSHA, and to respond to their stories in verse. A total of 741 poems were submitted, some echoing the pain of the victims, others calling for nuclear disarmament and almost all crying out for peace. The contest brought poets from all over the world together for the sake of peace.

Below is the winning piece. The second and third place winners, as well as other entries, are available from <http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/poetryforpeace/>.



Explosion Affected Reflection

Blasted into a wasteland,
behind an old torn photo
Father silently weeps
for what were once his people
their voices and love forsaken
while Mother has grown old
torn in recollection with grief
her children's young kisses
still innocent upon her cheek;
memorizing, unborn babies
hear exploding bombs
as yet she stares, despondent,
out the broken window,
in remembrance for peace.

—Helle van Aardeberg