The Danish Peace Academy
Documentation
Strategic
Attack
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2
20 May 1998
[side 1 af 62]
BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–1.2
20 May 1998
OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Raymond Laffoon, USAF)
Certified by: AFDC/DR (Col Roger W. Philipsek, USAF)
Pages: 59
Distribution: F
Approved by: Ronald E. Keys, Maj Gen, USAF
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center
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FOREWORD
… Aerospace forces possess the unique capability to strike at the heart of the enemy;
disrupt critical command, control, and communications and war-sustaining capabilities;
and avoid a sequential fight through layers of surface forces to reach the objective. …
…
RONALD E. KEYS
Major General, USAF
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center
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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
This document establishes operational doctrine for United States Air
Force strategic attack operations. It articulates fundamental Air Force principles
for the application of combat force and provides commanders operational-
level guidance on the employment and integration of Air Force
resources to achieve desired objectives. It addresses two interrelated subjects:
1) experience provides the best lessons in how to apply aerospace
forces in the attainment of strategic effects, and 2) such lessons have been,
and must continue to be, modified in light of advances in technology.
…
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…
DESERT STORM:
Impact of Strategic Attack on Electrical System
The electrical attacks proved extremely effective. By 0310L (H+10)
CNN (Cable News Network) reported that Baghdad had completely lost
commercial power. Few, if any, electrons flowed through Iraq for the remainder
of the six-week war. The loss of electricity shut down the capital’s water
treatment plants and led to a public health crisis from raw sewage dumped in
the Tigris River. It further disrupted the commercially dependent Kari system,
forcing its defenders to resort to backup generators. Fluctuating output,
the air planners knew, would play hob [cause mischief] with sensitive electronic
equipment and computers. The loss of electricity further hampered
daily government functions and literally put Iraq’s leaders “in the dark.” In
the following week, Tomahawk land attack missiles and coalition aircraft reduced
every major city in Iraq to the same unhappy situation.
Richard G. Davis
Decisive Force: Strategic
Bombing in the Gulf War
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http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afdd2-1.2/afdd2-1.2.pdf
Griffith, Jr., Thomas E.: Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems.
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