The Danish Peace Academy

Documentation


Strategic

Attack

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2

20 May 1998





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BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–1.2

20 May 1998



OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Raymond Laffoon, USAF)

Certified by: AFDC/DR (Col Roger W. Philipsek, USAF)

Pages: 59

Distribution: F

Approved by: Ronald E. Keys, Maj Gen, USAF

Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center



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FOREWORD

Aerospace forces possess the unique capability to strike at the heart of the enemy;

disrupt critical command, control, and communications and war-sustaining capabilities;

and avoid a sequential fight through layers of surface forces to reach the objective. …






RONALD E. KEYS

Major General, USAF

Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center



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INTRODUCTION



PURPOSE


This document establishes operational doctrine for United States Air

Force strategic attack operations. It articulates fundamental Air Force principles

for the application of combat force and provides commanders operational-

level guidance on the employment and integration of Air Force

resources to achieve desired objectives. It addresses two interrelated subjects:

1) experience provides the best lessons in how to apply aerospace

forces in the attainment of strategic effects, and 2) such lessons have been,

and must continue to be, modified in light of advances in technology.







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DESERT STORM:

Impact of Strategic Attack on Electrical System

The electrical attacks proved extremely effective. By 0310L (H+10)

CNN (Cable News Network) reported that Baghdad had completely lost

commercial power. Few, if any, electrons flowed through Iraq for the remainder

of the six-week war. The loss of electricity shut down the capital’s water

treatment plants and led to a public health crisis from raw sewage dumped in

the Tigris River. It further disrupted the commercially dependent Kari system,

forcing its defenders to resort to backup generators. Fluctuating output,

the air planners knew, would play hob [cause mischief] with sensitive electronic

equipment and computers. The loss of electricity further hampered

daily government functions and literally put Iraq’s leaders “in the dark.” In

the following week, Tomahawk land attack missiles and coalition aircraft reduced

every major city in Iraq to the same unhappy situation.



Richard G. Davis

Decisive Force: Strategic

Bombing in the Gulf War



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http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afdd2-1.2/afdd2-1.2.pdf





Griffith, Jr., Thomas E.: Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems.


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