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  USAs, Amerikanske kernevåben

US, American nuclear weapons
USA er siden 1945 medlem af atomvåbenklubben.
The United States has since 1945 been a member of the nuclear weapons club.
Alle oplysninger om amerikanske atomvåben har været eller er klassificerede og eller maskerede. Her er et eksempel på et nyt dokument som antyder, at nogle oplysninger har været klassificeret. Dokumentet savner kildeoplysninger og er endda uden afsender. Stockpile Numbers End of Fiscal Years 1962-2015.
CRS : The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites.
/ : Amy F. Woolf ; James D. Werner, 2018.
Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2018) United States nuclear forces.
2018, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:2, 120-131, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2018.1438219
'The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Defense Department maintaining an estimated stockpile of some 4,000 warheads to be delivered via ballistic missiles and aircraft. Most of these warheads are not deployed but stored, and many are destined to be retired. Of the approximately 1,800 warheads that are deployed, roughly 1,650 are on ballistic missiles or at bomber bases in the United States, with another 150 tactical bombs deployed at European bases.'
Militærforskning og -udvikling
/ Military Research and Development
/ Recherche et développement militaire
/ Investigación y Desarrollo Militar
/ Militärische Forschung und Entwicklung:
CRS: Defense Science and Technology Funding. / : John F. Sargent Jr., 2018.
In FY2017, Defense S&T was $13.4 billion, nearly six times the FY1978 level of $2.3 billion. Most growth occurred from FY1978 to FY2006, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.4%. From FY2006 to FY2017, growth was slower (0.1% CAGR). Most of the growth and volatility was in advanced technology development. In FY2017 constant dollars, Defense S&T funding peaked at $16.2 billion in FY2005 and declined by $2.8 billion through FY2017.
In FY2016, basic research accounted for $2.2 billion of the Defense S&T total. The Navy accounted for the largest share of DOD basic research (29.2%), followed by the Defense-Wide agencies (27.6%), Air Force (23.0%), and Army (20.3%). Universities and colleges performed nearly half ($1.1 billion, 48.8%) of DOD basic research in FY2016; DOD and other intramural federal laboratories performed 22.9%; industry, 18.2%; other non-profits, 7.5%; federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), 0.7%; and others, 2.0%.
Økonomi / Economy:
GAO: Columbia class submarine: Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases, 2019.
The Navy's $115 billion procurement cost estimate is not reliable partly because it is based on overly optimistic assumptions about the labor hours needed to construct the submarines. While the Navy analyzed cost risks, it did not include margin in its estimate for likely cost overruns. The Navy told us it will continue to update its lead submarine cost estimate, but an independent assessment of the estimate may not be complete in time to inform the Navy’s 2021 budget request to Congress to purchase the lead submarine. Without these reviews, the cost estimate—and, consequently, the budget—may be unrealistic. A reliable cost estimate is especially important for a program of this size and complexity to help ensure that its budget is sufficient to execute the program as planned.
CRS: Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities. / : Amy F. Woolf, 2018.
The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill funds civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies.
The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts research and development (R&D) into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program; Naval Reactors, which “is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work”; and Weapons Activities.
The last is the subject of this report. The Weapons Activities account supports programs that maintain U.S. nuclear missile warheads and gravity bombs and the infrastructure programs that support that mission. Specifically, according to DOE’s budget documentation, these programs “support the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to continue sustained confidence in their safety, reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable certification of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; and manufacture of nuclear weapons components.” NNSA’s budget request for FY2019 seeks $11.02 billion for Weapons Activities within a total of budget of $15.09 billion for NNSA. This represents a 7.6% increase of NNSA’s budget request of $10.239 billion for Weapons Activities in FY2018 and a 19% increase over the $9.314 billion enacted for Weapons Activities in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2017 (P.L. 115-31). The requested increase of 19% in funding for Weapons over the FY2017-enacted amount is within an increase of 16.7% over the FY2017 amount enacted for NNSA’s total budget.
CRS: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. / : Amy F. Woolf, 2018.
The Trump Administration in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile.
Trump administration's planned nuclear upgrade is being undermined by cost overruns
Millions of dollars in promised savings at Texas, Tennessee nuclear weapons plants have disappeared, and the government is letting a powerful contractor off the hook
By Patrick Malone
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2018/02/05/21507/trump-administration-s-planned-nuclear-upgrade-being-undermined-cost-overruns
Consolidating the management of two critical sites where nuclear weapons are assembled would yield huge taxpayer savings, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) promised in 2013 — as much as $3.27 billion over a decade.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in savings were to be spent on the modernization of the nuclear weapons production complex, and billions of dollars were to revert to the public treasury. The government was so pleased with the promised benefits that in 2015, it gave one of the department’s highest awards to the 14 sharp-eyed officials who processed the single-contract paperwork.
But four years after the consolidated contract was won by Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS) LLC, a group of corporations led by Bechtel National Inc., there’s not much to celebrate, government documents and reports show.
In particular, much of the promised quick savings haven't shown up, while the annual federal costs of running and overseeing the two sites — the Pantex Plant in Texas and the Y-12 site in Tennessee where nuclear weapons are disassembled and modernized — have risen more than 30 percent from nearly $1.85 billion to $2.48 billion.
Despite these numbers, the government still awarded the contractor extra profits for cost savings.
As a result, the funds needed to keep these two vital sites operating over the next decade threaten to eat up a sizable chunk of the new money the Trump administration wants to spend upgrading the safety, security and quality of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and enlarging its size. The cost increase, combined with rising fees for nuclear weapons work and physical modernization needs at other facilities, casts doubt on whether Trump's ambitious nuclear agenda can be completed.
USA opgraderer sine atomvåben. I: Arbejderen, 28. november 2017.
CBO: Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046, 2017.
To continue to field a nuclear force roughly the same size as it is today, the United States plans to modernize virtually every element of that force over the coming decades. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the most recent detailed plans for nuclear forces, which were incorporated in the Obama Administration's 2017 budget request, would cost $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017–2046 period: more than $800 billion to operate and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about $400 billion to modernize them.
GAO: Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: A Complete Scope of Work Is Needed to Develop Timely Cost and Schedule Information for the Uranium Program, 2017 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made progress in developing a revised scope of work, cost estimate, and schedule for its project to construct a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), according to NNSA documents and program officials. As of May 2017, NNSA had developed and approved a revised formal scope of work, cost, and schedule baseline estimates for four of the seven subprojects into which the project is divided. NNSA expects to approve such baseline estimates for the other three—including the two largest subprojects—by the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. NNSA also plans to validate the estimates by then through an independent cost estimate.
GAO: Nuclear Weapons Sustainment: Budget Estimates Report Contains More Information than in Prior Fiscal Years, but Transparency Can Be Improved, 2017.
- http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-557
The fiscal year 2017 joint report submitted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in August 2016 includes 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons (see figure below), and these estimates are generally consistent with the two departments' internal funding and modernization plans—with some exceptions. GAO could not verify that DOD's nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) estimates were fully consistent with its internal funding plans.
GAO: National Nuclear Security Administration: Action Needed to Address Affordability of Nuclear Modernization Programs, 2017.
- http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-341
To ensure that the nation's existing nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable, the National Nuclear Security Administration is working to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile and its related infrastructure. Budget estimates for these efforts total about $301 billion from fiscal years 2017 to 2041.
We reviewed NNSA's fiscal year 2017 plan for nuclear modernization over the next 25 years. We found that NNSA's estimated budget needs may exceed those projected by the President's fiscal year 2017 budget for fiscal years 2022 through 2026. We recommended that NNSA assess the affordability of its modernization plans.
GAO: Department of Energy: Continued Actions Needed to Address Management Challenges, 2017.
- http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684918.pdf
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) faces challenges related to the affordability of its nuclear modernization programs. GAO found in April 2017 that these challenges were caused by a misalignment between NNSA’s modernization plans and the estimated budgetary resources needed to carry out those plans. First, GAO found that NNSA’s estimates of funding needed for its modernization plans sometimes exceeded the budgetary projections included in the President’s planned near-term and long-term modernization budgets. Second, GAO found that the costs of some major modernization programs—such as for nuclear weapon refurbishments—may also increase and further strain future modernization budgets that currently do not anticipate these potential increases...
DOE also faces challenges with addressing its environmental liabilities—the total cost of its cleanup responsibilities. In February 2017, GAO found that DOE was responsible for over 80 percent ($372 billion) of the U.S. government’s estimated $450 billion environmental liability. However, this estimate does not reflect all of DOE’s cleanup responsibilities. For example, in January 2017, GAO found that the cost estimate for DOE’s proposal for separate defense and commercial nuclear waste repositories excluded the costs and time frames for key activities, and therefore full costs are likely to be billions of dollars more than DOE’s reported environmental liabilities. To effectively address cleanup, GAO and other organizations have reported that DOE needs to take a nation-wide, risk-informed approach, which could reduce long-term costs as well as environmental risks more quickly.
According to documents related to DOE’s fiscal year 2016 financial statements, 50 percent of DOE’s environmental liability resides at two cleanup sites: the Hanford Site in Washington State and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
DOE has not yet developed a cleanup plan or cost estimate for the Nevada National Security Site and, as a result, the cost of future cleanup of this site was not included in DOE’s fiscal year 2015 reported environmental liability. The nearly 1,400-square-mile site has been used for hundreds of nuclear weapons tests since 1951. These activities have resulted in more than 45 million cubic feet of radioactive waste at the site.
GAO: Missile Defense: Some Progress Delivering Capabilities, but Challenges with Testing Transparency and Requirements Development Need to Be Addressed, 2017.
- http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-381?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
The Missile Defense Agency has spent $123 billion on a system to track and destroy enemy missiles—and plans to spend another $37 billion through 2021.
While we found that MDA has made progress developing some parts of this system, the agency has also faced challenges completing its testing goals, maintaining its test schedule, and integrating its various components. Moreover, the agency is developing new programs with limited input from DOD and the military services responsible for operating and maintaining them.
We recommended that MDA increase transparency into testing and costs, and improve its knowledge before funding future efforts.
CRS: Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations for Nuclear Weapons Activities. / : Amy F. Woolf, 2017.
The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill funds civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies.
The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts research and development (R&D) into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program; Naval Reactors, which “is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work”; and Weapons Activities. The last is the subject of this report. The Weapons Activities account supports programs that maintain U.S. nuclear missile warheads and gravity bombs and the infrastructure programs that support that mission. Specifically, according to DOE’s budget documentation, these programs “support the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to continue sustained confidence in their safety, reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable certification of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; and manufacture of nuclear weapons components.” NNSA’s budget request for FY2017 sought $9,243.1 million for Weapons Activities...
CRS: Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Countries. / : Jonathan Medalia et al., 2013.
'United States, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and United Kingdom.'
Manhattan Engineer District, Manhattan District eller
Manhattanprojektet
Den amerikanske atomenergikommission.
DOE, Department of Energy / Det amerikanske energiministerium.
Atomvåbenlovgivning:
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (as amended).
Atomvåbenforsøg ; Atomvåbenuheld.
Under og efter den kolde krig har der været udstationeret amerikanske kernevåben og atomvåbenrelateret udstyr på baser i:
Afghanistan?, Australien?, Antigua?, Bahamas?, Belgien, Bermuda?, Canada, Danmark, Filippinerne, Grækenland, Grønland (Thule), Holland, Island?, Italien, Japan, Norge, Okinawa, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Spanien, Storbritannien, Sydkorea, Taiwan, Tyrkiet, Tyskland og Vesttyskland.
During and after the Cold War, there have been deployed US nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related equipment on bases in:
Afghanistan?, Australia?, Antigua?, Bahamas?, Belgium, Bermuda?, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Iceland?, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Okinawa, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom and West Germany
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. --
An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile was launched during an operational test at 12:03 a.m., PDT, here April 26. 2017.
- http://www.vandenberg.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1162963/minuteman-iii-launches-from-vandenberg/
Se også: Aktuelle stater med atomvåben, kernevåben: Frankrig, Indien, Israel, Kina, Nordkorea, Pakistan, Rusland, og Storbritannien.
See also: Current states with nuclear weapons: France, India, Israel, China, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and UK.
Se tillige: US Air Force ; US Navy.

Litteratur

GAO: Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise:
NNSA's Budget Estimates Increased but May Not Align with All Anticipated Costs
GAO-16-290: Published: Mar 4, 2016.
In the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal year 2016 budget materials, the estimates for efforts related to modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile total $297.6 billion for the next 25 years— an increase of $4.2 billion (1.4 percent) in nominal dollar values (as opposed to constant dollar values) compared with the prior year's budget materials. However, for certain program areas and individual programs, budget estimates changed more significantly than the overall estimates. NNSA's modernization efforts occur in four areas under the Weapons Activities appropriation account: stockpile; infrastructure; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other weapons activities. For the stockpile area, budget estimates over 25 years increased by 13.2 percent over the nominal values in the Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan . Within the stockpile area, the estimates for life extension programs (LEP), which refurbish nuclear weapons, increased by 19.6 percent compared with the prior year's estimate, in part because of changes in the scope and schedule for some programs. In contrast, estimates for the other weapon activities area decreased by 18.1 percent, mainly because NNSA shifted two counterterrorism programs out of the Weapons Activities budget and into NNSA's separate Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget.
The estimates in NNSA's 2016 nuclear security budget materials may not align with all elements of modernization plans for several reasons. First, the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes estimates for 2021 through 2025 that are $4.4 billion higher than the same time period in a set of out-year projections for funding levels that were included in a joint report by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. NNSA noted this issue in the 2016 plan and stated that it will need to be addressed as part of fiscal year 2017 programming. In addition, in some years, NNSA's budget estimates for certain weapons refurbishment efforts are below the low point of the programs' internally developed cost ranges. For example, the W88 Alteration 370 budget estimate of $218 million for 2020 was below the low end of the internal program cost range of $247 million. NNSA officials stated that the total estimates for this program are above the total of the midpoint cost estimates for 2016 through 2020 and that funding for 2016 to 2019 is fungible and could be carried over to cover any potential shortfall in 2020. GAO also identified instances where certain modernization costs were not included in the estimates or may be underestimated, or where budget estimates for some efforts could increase due to their dependency on successful execution of other NNSA programs. For example, an NNSA official said that budget estimates for the IW-1 LEP— which is NNSA's first interoperable ballistic missile warhead LEP—are predicated on NNSA successfully modernizing its plutonium pit production capacity. This official stated that if there are delays in modernizing this capacity, the IW-1 LEP could bear greater costs than currently estimated. In August 2015, GAO recommended that NNSA provide more transparency with regard to shortfalls in its budget materials. NNSA agreed and said that it plans to implement this recommendation starting in its 2017 budget supporting documents.
Complete List of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons. / : Nuclear Weapon Archive. 2006.
- http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
How Many and Where Were the Nukes? What the U.S. Government No Longer Wants You to Know about Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 197, 2006.
- http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/index.htm
Nuclear Command and Control Systems.
CRS: Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues, May 3, 2006 - 40 s.
CRS: Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress. / : Ronald O'Rourke, 2016.
'The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget requests $773.1 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $1,091.1 million in research and development funding for the Ohio replacement program (ORP), a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Ohio replacement program, also known as the SSBN(X) program, as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Ohio replacement boat in FY2021, and the $773.1 million in AP funding requested for FY2017 represents the initial procurement funding for that boat.
A March 2015 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs states that the estimated total acquisition cost of the Ohio replacement program is about $95.8 billion in constant FY2015 dollars, including about $11.8 billion in research and development costs and about $84.0 billion in procurement costs.'
Navy to Christen Submarine Washington
News Releases for U.S. Department of Defense, March 3, 2016
The Navy will christen its newest Virginia-class attack submarine USS Washington (SSN 787), Saturday, March 5, during an 11 a.m. EST ceremony at Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia.
CRS: U.S. Nuclear Weapon “Pit” Production: Options for Congress.
/ : Jonathan E. Medalia, 2014.
Aftrækkeren "pit" er plutoniumkernen i et atomvåben.
U.S. Presidents and the Nuclear Taboo
Cold War U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Repeatedly Expressed Aversion to Going Nuclear; Even Eisenhower Changed Thinking
JFK: “Once One Resorts to Nuclear Weapons One Moves into a Whole New World”
During Vietnam, CIA Analysts Worried Nuke Use Would Expose U.S To “Widespread and Fundamental Revulsion That [It] Had Broken the …Taboo”
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 611
Washington, D.C., November 30, 2017 – U.S. presidents sometimes made nuclear threats in the course of Cold War crises and confrontations, but powerful social norms – not just military considerations – inhibited them from initiating the combat use of nuclear weapons, according to declassified documents posted today by the nongovernmental National Security Archive.
From President Harry S.Truman forward, the record shows, U.S. commanders-in-chief have been sensitive to what is sometimes referred to as the nuclear taboo – the recognition that atomic weapons belong to an entirely different category from conventional armaments and that their use would open up “a whole new world,” in the words of President John F. Kennedy.
Many other leading figures held similar views, conditioned by an aversion to the horrific effects of nuclear weaponry as well as by the impact of ethical concerns and global public opinion. However, past experience also indicates that the taboo has not constrained everyone, including military officials who developed plans for the possible first-use (preemptive strikes) of nuclear weapons.
With growing international concern today over the possible resort to nuclear means in connection with tensions over North Korea’s growing capabilities, it is instructive to look at the record of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period to see how U.S. presidents and senior government officials thought about the problem. Today’s posting of CIA, State Department, and other materials covers the era from the 1940s to the 1990s including events from the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War.
Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960 / : Elliott V. Converse III.
- Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2012. - 784 s.
; History of acquisition in the Department of Defense ; v. 1).
- http://history.defense.gov/resources/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf
CRS: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments. / : Jonathan Medalia, 2009 - 49 s.
Terp, Holger: Atomvåbenproduktion i USA / Nuclear Weapons Production in the US., 2011.
United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992.
U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office, DOE/NV--209-REV 15, December 2000.
Work Finishes Trip Focusing on U.S. Nuclear Deterrent. / : Jim Garamone.
DoD News, Defense Media Activity
WASHINGTON, Feb. 26, 2016 — Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work observed the test of an unarmed Minuteman 3 missile at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, last night, at the culmination of a trip to examine the progress of reforms in DoD’s nuclear deterrent. The warhead splashed down at the military’s test range near Kwajalein Atoll more than 4,000 miles away.

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